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PREFACE

It is important in the field of political science to
bridge the gap between broad-scale scale political theory
and more specific empirical policy analysis. To fail at this
endeavor is to produce work that is imbalanced; either being
too shallow and empirically unconvincing or failing to tie
into those larger questions of political inquiry which really matter.
This work represents an attempt to bridge that gap and
explore the juncture where normative theory and empirical
analysis intersect. The broader theoretical question at hand
regards the performance and appropriateness of pluralism as
a form of democratic organization. Does pluralism function
as the optimal form of democratic decisionmaking and governance or is it, as critics claim, deeply flawed, especially
in its treatment of certain supposedly more vulnerable types
of policy initiatives?
This study concentrates upon ecological issues as the
specific policymaking context within which such theoretical
questions will be addressed. By analyzing in a given case
the way in which ecological values, initiatives, and policies are treated within a pluralist system, this study examines both how pluralist structures influence this specific
area and what this case tells us about the claims of pluralism as democratic theory.
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CHAPTER 1
PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY
Among conservationists, there is an unspoken conviction that something in the American political
process is inherently inhospitable to environmental protection; that "politics" undermines sound
environmental policies established in the public
interest while nature's private exploiters profit.
Walter Rosenbaum
If in fact environmentalism is costing an elite
group billions of dollars--which it is--perhaps
discarded theories of pluralism should be reviewed and rethought.
Joseph Petulla

Pluralist Theory And Its Critics

The Development of Pluralist Theory
Although its intensity and fashionability have waxed
and waned over the years, the debate between pluralism and
its critics still remains the central issue in American
democratic theory. As articulated in the 1950s and 60s by
political scientists such as David Truman, Robert Dahl, and
Earl Latham, pluralism and its closely related predecessor,
group theory, propose that American politics can be understood as a system of competition and bargaining between and
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among political elites and organized interests.1 This interplay between and ever-shifting equilibrium among competing
interests is, to the pluralists, the essential dynamic of
American politics.
While featuring some elements of centralized authority, the pluralist process is also seen to be marked by a
considerable fragmentation and decentralization of power and
~heoretically

provides, therefore, numerous opportunities

for political inputs to enter the system. It is, according
to William Kelso, a "mixed form" of governance that is
"neither highly centralized nor highly decentralized."2 In
terms of public participation, pluralist theorists claim
that the optimal avenue for an individual to affect policy
is by engaging in or supporting group activity relevant to
that individual's concerns.3 As such, participation in a
pluralist system is open, but not in a direct or strictly
majoritarian manner.
While group theories of politics were to become the
centerpiece of the discipline in the post-World War Two era,
they were by no means new theories, but instead refinements
and reworkings of much older ones. "The language of the
1David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf
1951);
Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961); Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory" American Political Science Review
52:2 (June, 1952), 376-397.
2William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1978), 216.
3 Ibid. 4.

3

group approach," G. David Garson points out, "is rooted
deeply in American political thought,"4 and at least in the
American context, those roots can be traced all the way back
to the eighteenth century.
James Madison, for one, clearly recognized the pivotal and unavoidable role of groups, or factions as he called
them, in American politics. In fact, the bulk of Madison's
political philosophy focused upon how a republic could best
avoid their potentially ill effects. In addition to recommending that government structures be divided both by location (federal and state) and branch, Madison felt that factions could be controlled by constituting a republic large
enough to embrace a great diversity of factions.s This, it
was thought, would create enough competition and rivalry
amongst the numerous factions to retard the formation of
majority faction mischief . 6
A half-century later, John Calhoun in his own conservative way, reiterated this notion of the centrality of
groups in American politics. As part of his defense of
slaveholding interests, Calhoun argued that only his "concurrent majority" which recognized and respected established
interests was truly constitutional. Calhoun rejected simple
4 G.

David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 25-26.
5 James Madison, "Federalist #10" in Roy P. Fairfield
(editor), The Federalist Papers 2nd ed. (Garden City, NY:
Anchor, 1966), 16-23.
6 H.R. Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 4.
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numerical majorities as being akin to Madison's feared tyrannical majority factions.?
Finally, to this pair of proto-group theorists one
certainly must add Alexis de Tocqueville whose keen eye long
ago recognized the prominence of organized groups in American politics as he observed that, "In no country in the
world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects,
than in America."8 Echoing Madison and Calhoun, Tocqueville
found groups or "associations," as he called them, to be the
only reliable obstacle to tyranny. Associations provided, to
Tocqueville, an antidote to America's severe individualism
which, by atomizing society and leaving each individual weak
and helpless, left the public vulnerable to hysterical mass
appeal and the tyranny of the majority. 9
Another early group theorist, turn of the century
political scientist Arthur Bentley, is often singled out as
an especially seminal figure in the development of modern
pluralist thought. Though largely ignored in his day, Bentley was resurrected a half-century later and hailed by pluralists as a genius.10 In an attack upon the legalism and
formalism so prevalent in the political science of his day,
7 John

Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government" in Kenneth
Dolbeare (editor), American Political Thought (Chatham, NJ:
Chatham House, 1984), 269-285.
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Richard
Heffner (editor) (New York: Mentor, 1956), 95.
9
Ibid. 198-202.
10 Garson, 25-26.
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Bentley developed a stark group determinism which rejected
the significance of formal institutions in and of themselves. Instead, Bentley found the origins of all political
activity in the interplay of groups. "The balance of group
pressures," he stressed, "is the state of society" and society, as he saw it was "nothing other than the complex of
groups that compose it." 11 Not merely satisfied to elevate
the status of groups in the field of political science,
Bentley sought to define all of the field in those terms.
"When the groups are adequately stated," Bentley observed of
political inquiry, "everything is stated, when I say everything, I mean everything.

"12

By the 1950s, the various group theories which had
been around in one form or another for a century and a half
began to be organized into a singular body of thought which
soon thereafter gained dominance in political science. The
earliest modern group theorists Truman and Latham, each
presented far more subtle and sophisticated versions of
Bentley's hypothesis which, while still maintaining the primacy of groups in politics, offered a much more solid analytical framework. Truman stresses that:
The behaviors that constitute the process of government cannot be adequately understood apart from
groups, especially organized interest groups which
are operative at any given point in time. Whether we
look at an individual citizen, the executive secre11

Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1908), 222, 259.
12
Bentley quoted in Mahood, 5.
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tary of a trade association, at a political functionary, at a legislator, administrator, governor, or
judge, we cannot describe his participation in the
government institution, let alone account for it,
except in terms of interests with which he affiliates
and with which he is confronted.13
Not long after Truman's groundbreaking The Governmental Process, Robert Dahl's Who Governs? continued to add
subtlety, complexity, and multi-dimensionality to group
theory. Dahl's work went beyond a crude reliance on groups
as the only explanatory factor to include the role of government as its own entity as well as the structural characteristics of government regarding, for example, the degree
of centralization, bureaucratic behavior, and the political
rules of the game. The result of Dahl's effort, which came
to be known as pluralism, represented the most sophisticated
manifestation of group theory and dominated American political science throughout much of the 1960s.

The Nature of Pluralist Theory
From the start, pluralist theory has had both a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension. 14 Not only do plural13 Truman, 502.
14 While many who write on this subject use the terms
group theory, interest group theory, interest group liberalism, and pluralism interchangeably, Garson distinguishes
group theory as the broader umbrella term under which pluralism is merely one particular reformulation. While technically that may be so, this study, like most of the literature, will employ the term pluralism (as it has thusfar) in
a slightly less restrictive manner than does Garson. It
shall encompass the work of Garson's "true pluralists" such
as Dahl and his successors as well as those immediate group
theory relatives of pluralism (such as the work of Truman or
Latham) which speak to the same issues and capture many of

7

ists attempt to show how and why American politics can be so
successfully characterized by pluralism, but also why this
system is preferable to any other form of democratic organization. Broadly stated, the main points of pluralist theory
are as follows:
1. Groups and group interaction with government are at

the center of American politics. Empirically and normative-

+y, pluralists adhere to the idea that the most effective
and appropriate route for public participation in the political process is through the joining or supporting of the
organization or organizations which best represent one's political interests. According to the pluralists, a system of
civic participation channelled through groups is the optimal
form for the representation of one's interests as it avoids
the limitations of strictly electoral representation as well
as the undemocratic excesses of more direct majoritarian
styles of representation (such as, for example, referenda) . is
2. The American public is fragmented by a extreme di-

versity of political, social, and economic interests. Consequently, identifying a single monolithic public interest is
problematic at best, impossible at worst. Instead of thinking in terms of the public and the public's interest, plurthe same themes. Thus, for the purposes of clarity and consistency the term pluralism will be used exclusively in this
stud1,. Garson, 91.
.
1
William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 60-70; Kelso, chaps. 3-4.
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alists tend to conceive of specific interests and specific
issue publics. Issue publics are that sector of society
which finds a given issue relevant enough to their own particular concerns and interests to actually or potentially
participate. 16
3. Due to its relatively decentralized nature, the

American political system has an abundance of entry points
through which groups can gain the access to policymakers
necessary for effective participation. As a result, a fairly
diverse collection of groups and public officials tend to be
involved in any given policy decision. This decentralization
extends access points both vertically and horizontally; that
is, between federal, state, and local levels of government,
as well as between various branches and/or agencies within
any of those levels. Normatively, this situation is generally seen by pluralists as a quite beneficial expansion of opportunities for group (and thus ultimately citizen) involvement in policymaking and the redress of grievances. 17
4. Politics is, above all, a process of bargaining,

negotiation and compromise forced upon competing interests.
Because of the decentralized nature of pluralist politics,
practically any concerned or affected group in a given pol16

For a discussion of issue publics see Gerald Pomper,
Elections in America (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1974),
94-95.
17 While a number of pluralists make this point, it is,
perhaps, most thoroughly laid out in Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York: Politics in the Metropolis
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

9

icy decision has, according to the pluralists, at least some
say. This abundance of potential veto points forces all the
political actors involved to partake in a process of giveand-take invariably involving some degree of dealing, bargaining, and compromise. Dahl notes this characteristic of
pluralist politics:
When one looks at American political institutions in
their entirety .... what stands out as a salient feature
is the extraordinary variety of opportunities these
institutions provide for an organized minority to
block, modify, or delay a policy which the minority
opposes. Consequently, it is a rarity for any coalition to carry out its policies without having to bargain, negotiate, and compromise with its opponents.18
One benefit of what Kelso calls the "open, fluid" nature of pluralism,19 is that it allegedly encourages a free
and constant flow of information as each rival group wanting
to influence policy will naturally communicate a great deal
of information to bolster their case. As a result, the process of give-and-take bargaining works against the suppression of information by any policymaking elite or single interest .20 The process, therefore, guarantees a broadening of
policymaking debates.
In addition, the involvement of rival groups and the
necessity of bargaining, according to the pluralists, will
in most cases assure that the final policy outcome does not
completely ignore or violate the interests of a particular
18 Robert Dahl, Pluralistic Democracy in the United States
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1956), 326
19 Kelso, 13.
20
Ibid. 16-19.
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group. Thus, even if the outcome was not what that group initially sought, they were likely to have had at least enough
input so that they were not completely swept aside.21 This
compromise product of extensive bargaining is, to the pluralists, the closest that a democracy can come to addressing
the public interest, if such a thing could be said to exist.
5. The political system is self-regulating and thus

corrects pronounced imbalances before any one interest can
gain an excess of power and thereby seriously bias the process. In a pluralist system, prolonged biases in what needs
to be a fair and open arena of political competition are
supposedly avoided through what Dahl terms "political slack"
or what Truman calls the phenomenon of "potential

groups."~

What both concepts convey is the notion that the mere existence of untapped power and influence and group mobilizing
potential is often enough to deter existing interests from
abusing their power. Truman clearly articulates this point:
The power of unorganized interests lies in the possibility that, if these wide, weak interests are too
flagrantly ignored, they may be stimulated to organize
for aggressive counteraction. In a society permitting
a wide freedom of association, access to power is not
confined to the organized groups in the population. 23
Dahl confirms that this excess capacity or "slack" to check
bias or excessive power exists and can be activated if necessary. Thus, the system exists in an equilibrium of sorts

21 Ibid. chap. 5.
22
oahl, Who Governs?, 310; Truman, 114.
23 Truman, 114.
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which, if disrupted, will quickly work to correct the
imbalance. 24
Another major factor inhibiting the abuse of power in
the pluralist system is the sheer diversity of groups and
interests. Much like Madison, pluralists take comfort in the
rivalry of more groups rather than less. When "one center of
power is set against another," contends Dahl, "power itself
will be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to decent
human purposes" while "coercion .... will be reduced to a
minimum."~

The danger of excess power is further decreased,

argue the pluralists, by the similarly divided and decentralized government which is bound to the principles of federalism and checks and balances.
6. In most policy areas, the role of the state is and

ought to be primarily mediative. Pluralist theorists claim

that because of the fragmentation of power in the political
system, as well as the government's own internally divided
nature, the power of all concerned parties, including government, is constrained. Government's chief and most appropriate role, therefore, is seen to be as facilitator of the
give-and-take process, referee of group competition, and reconcilor of disparate interests.26 This is as it should be,
argue the pluralists, for if the government were to unilaterally act in a way that ignored the group dynamic and var24 Ibid. 2 6-33.
25 Dahl, Pluralistic Democracy, 24.
26 For a general discussion of this idea see Kelso, 15-16.
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ious groups' concerns and demands, the entire equilibrium of
interests might come unhinged. In the pluralist vision, the
state's proper role, then, is as one participant, albeit a
crucial and central one, among many in the process of group
interaction. 21
The Critics of Pluralism
While pluralism at one time completely dominated political science, it has never gone unchallenged. From the
start, pluralism has faced counterarguments; some gleaned
from pre-existing theories, others developed as a direct
response and rebuttal. The critiques of pluralism fall
roughly into one of two categories. The first includes the
work of elite and critical theorists, such as C.Wright
Mills, G. William Domhoff, or Ralph Miliband who fundamentally reject pluralism's validity as descriptive model. 28
Elite theory contends that power in the United States is
dominated by a small, identifiable elite, while critical
theorists deny the central role not only of interest groups,
but the entire decisionmaking process itself. Instead, they
see a system of elite symbol manipulation charading behind
an empty democratic facade.

27

Latham, 382.
Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Ralph Miliband,
The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books,
1969).
28

c.
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Other critics of pluralism such as Theodore Lowi,
Grant McConnell, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz or Robert
Wolff, on the other hand, do not offer such a vigorous rejection of pluralism's empirical reality.29 While many of
these critics do have very specific empirical doubts about
aspects of the pluralist model, unlike elite or critical
theorists, they do not reject wholesale the existence of
pluralist structures and processes in American politics.
Instead, these critics either raise doubts about pluralism's
normative desirability as a form of democratic organization
or else empirically question certain descriptive aspects and
assumptions of pluralist theory. These empirical reservations, however, are never raised in a way which denies the
overall pluralistic nature of American politics.
For the purposes of this study, it will be assumed
that, in the broadest conception of the term, the American
political system is pluralistic, at least insofar as power
is fragmented, political authority is divided, there exist
numerous theoretical access points, and interest groups are
involved, in varying degrees, in the policymaking process.
Presuming this broadly defined pluralist nature of American
politics is not to say that political reality perfectly fits

29

Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism 2nd ed. (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1979); Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 1970); Peter
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Robert Wolff, The Poverty of
Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
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the pluralist model. Nor does this study's general acceptance of a pluralist political reality imply anything as to
pluralism's normative desirability. Instead, it simply means
that a broad understanding of pluralism as the American political context will provide the framework for this study and
its attempt to explore pluralism and the claims of its critics. As such, the arguments of the elite and critical
theorists, although certainly noteworthy, shall be considered outside the scope of this study.
The criticisms directed at pluralism have usually been
voiced by detractors who advocate alternative forms of democratic organization such as those distinguished by

Kelso.~

Much of the disagreement between these competing alternative
perspectives and pluralism revolves around the question of
where the locus of power should lie in a democratic system.
On one hand, critics such as Lowi, Joseph Schumpeter,
Samuel Huntington, or Robert Crain call for a centralization
of power into the hands of a more rational, capable, and
less discretionary elite. 31 For these critics, elites who
are insulated from the demands of special interests are best
able to design and implement sound, innovative, and rational

°Kelso,
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Lowi, The End of Liberalism; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950);
Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981);
Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald Rosenthal, The Politics
of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
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policies, resist the mass threats to civil liberties as
Herbert Mcclosky suggests, and, according to Giovanni
Sartori, otherwise act as a corrective to the mediocrity of
the masses.32 To these elite-centralists, or polyarchal
democrats, as Kelso terms them,33 the appropriate avenue for
public participation in politics is through the maintenance
of elite accountability through electoral means.
Meanwhile, other critics of pluralism, such as Wolff,
Bachrach and Baratz, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Richard
Hamilton, and more recently Kirkpatrick Sale, Frank Bryan
and John McClaughtry, and Murray Bookchin have all advocated
quite the opposite--increased decentralization (beyond even
pluralism's level) and dispersal of power to the community
level.34 They seek, in other words, a system of grassroots

32

Herbert Mcclosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American
Politics" American Political Science Review 58:2 (June,
1964), 361-382; Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New
York: Praeger, 1958), 96-124.
33 Kelso, xi. I have chosen the the term elite-centralists
to designate those theorists typified by Lowi who advocate
increased centralized rule guided by a rational elite. The
terms elitists or elitist democrats might become confused
with the elite theory of Mills or Domhoff, while the term
polyarchal is clouded by Dahl's usage which more akin in
certain ways to pluralism.
~Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism; Bachrach and Baratz,
Power and Poverty; Alan Altschuler, Community Control (New
York: Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kolter, Neighborhood Government
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Richard Hamilton, Class
and Politics in the United States (New York: Wiley & Sons,
1972); Kirkpatrick Sale, Human Scale (New York: Coward,
Mccann, and Geoghegan, 1980); Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, The Vermont Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human
Scale (Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co.1 1989);
Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, CA:
Chesire, 1982).
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participatory democracy. At a minimum, such a system must
feature local control, decentralized jurisdictions, and
extensive and meaningful opportunities for individual citizen participation in the decisionmaking process. Besides arguing that grassroots democracy is a logistically superior
form of democratic organization,35 the participatory democrats see political participation, as did their mentor Rousseau, as an end in and of itself. The actual act of participating, these critics argue, builds morality, virtue, and
civic obligation rather than serving merely as a means by
which to scramble for advantage.36
The specific complaints about pluralism voiced by
these diverse critics generally fall into one of two broad
categories or what Kelso terms "perennial" aspects of democratic theory: issues relating to the process of decisionmaking and the administration of those decisions and those
regarding the nature of participation and the mobilization
of the various interests involved.37
It is the former aspect of pluralism, decisionmaking
and administration, which tends to concern elite-centralist
critics the most and leads them to question pluralism's ef35 Sale, Chap.a.
For a discussion on the personal benefits which political participation is alleged to bring see Terrence Cook and
Patrick Morgan, Participatory Democracy (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971); this theme is also echoed in Wolff, The
Poverty of Liberalism and Carole Pateman, Participation and
Democratic Theory (Cambridge, MA: At the University-Press,
36

1970).

37 Kelso, 7.
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ficacy as a policymaking process. Critics such as Lowi see
pluralism as a haphazardly ineffective and inefficient manner by which to make policy, especially in areas that are
complex, multi-dimensional, or involve the long-term national interest.38 Such critics charge that pluralism so
fragments power and leaves government so reluctant or unable
to act decisively, that the entire policymaking process becomes paralyzed. Too often, what all the players can agree
on rather than what is most sound and beneficial to the
public interest becomes the criterion for such fragmented
decisionmaking.
At the root of this paralysis, argues Lowi, is the
pluralist system's profound aversion to the formalized and
authoritative exercise of governmental power. Instead, publie officials are alleged to be far more comfortable as a
mere participant in the give-and-take of group bargaining;
the state is thus reduced to being nothing more just than
another interest. The costs of government's allergy to formal power are high, according to Lowi, and lead to a very
troubling "discontinuity between politics and

government."~

The signs of this discontinuity include the inability of
government to plan or determine independent goals, the
withering of popularly controlled political institutions,
and a stifling inertia which thwarts innovation and pre-

38

39

Lowi, chaps. 4-6.
Ibid.
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serves the status quo and all of the privilege bound up into
it. Rather than taking the bull by the horns, so to speak,
and pursuing sound, rational, long-term policies informed by
notions of principle, morality, and justice, Lowi accuses
pluralism's weakling government of "yielding" to conflict
and merely being content to "redistribute power by the maxim
of each according to his claim ... 40 Says Lowi:
By rendering formalism impotent, [pluralism] impairs
legitimacy by converting government from a moralistic
to a mechanistic institution. It impairs the potential
of positive law to correct itself by allowing the law
to become anything that eventually bargains itself out
as acceptable to the bargainers.~
Lowi and other critics, such as McConnell also warn
that pluralism frequently leads to policymakers becoming
unduly influenced by the private interests they must deal
with and supposedly regulate. Because pluralism's fragrnentation isolates and compartmentalizes policymaking agencies
into disconnected little realms, they become increasingly
vulnerable to interest group penetration and even capture.
As a result, argues McConnell, pluralism allows private
interests to seize large chunks of public authority and use
it to their benefit:
A large number of groups have achieved substantial autonomy for themselves and the isolation of important
segments of government and public policy. The result
has been the establishment of varying degrees of control and exercise of public authority by the private

40
41

Ibid. 297.
Ibid. 63.
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groups within the public areas with which they are
concerned. 42
In addition to indicting pluralism on the grounds that
it is poor at policymaking, critics also focus upon the
question of just how open and fair pluralism's battlefield
of interests really is. Some critics, especially those of a
populist or communitarian bent, charge that pluralism, despite its supposedly self-regulating nature, contains an inherent bias against certain types of interests, namely those
that are underprivileged, marginal, diffuse, or otherwise
less robust. Bachrach and Baratz, Hamilton, Wolff, and
others all point to pluralism's subtle and not-so-subtle
biases which allow some groups to be heard while others are
marginalized, shut out, or never get the chance to organize.
As such, the critics maintain, pluralism in practice, despite its theoretical equality of opportunity, acts to defend
the status quo. "The flaw in the pluralist heaven," as E.E.
Schattschneider states in his famous quote, "is that the
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class

accent."~

Wolff affirms this as well:
Pluralist theory functions ideologically by tending to
deny new groups or interests access to the political
plateau. It does this by ignoring their existence in
practice, not by denying their claim in theory. The
result is that pluralism has a braking effect on social change.44

42

McConnell, 7.
E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960), 35.
44 Wolff, 156.
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Even if pluralism is willing to recognize all comers
on the political battlefield, critics contend that many
interests cannot even make it onto the battlefield in the
first place. Some either lack the resources, education, or
inclination to organize or, as Mancur Olson demonstrates,
have a stake in too diffuse or non-exclusive an interest to
mobilize effectively, if at all.45 According to critics,
then, large segments of the population (the vast majority,
argues Schattschneider) cannot penetrate what Schattschneider calls the "pressure system" and so because they exist in
this group-oriented pluralist system, essentially go unrepresented.~

Is There a Public Interest?
In reviewing the criticisms of pluralism from both a
policymaking and participatory angle, it soon becomes clear
that a fundamental bone of contention between pluralists and
their opponents regards the notion of the public interest.
The pluralists, influenced as they are by Lockean political
philosophy, see society ultimately as a fragmented and diverse collection of self-interested individuals or groups of
the similarly-interested locked in competition for advantage. The notion of a true majority in the pluralist's universe is a myth; all that really exists are issue or atten45 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
~Schattschneider,

35.
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tive publics, those groups and individuals for whom a given

issue is relevant and involves their interests.47 The benefit of issue publics, the pluralists maintain, is that they
assure that a given policy area will be most heavily inf luenced by those citizens who are more knowledgeable and concerned about and impacted by that issue. Thus a pluralist
system has the ability to discern what the pluralists call
intensity.~

Also, pluralists argue that such fragmentation

of interests, as Madison pointed out two centuries ago,
helps to preserve liberty by preventing tyrannical mass
movements.
In such an atomized political environment, the notion
of the public interest is, consequently, quite limited. Because there is no singular public to the pluralists, there
is no real public interest if by that one means an overriding, obviously discernable mass interest. Rather than a
singular interest, there are instead many diverse and equally valid interests locked in competition. If it can be said
at all that there is anything approaching a pluralist public
interest, then it is not based upon an obvious a priori political good, but rather is the end result of the bargaining
and accomodation of the political process. Since nearly
every issue features diverse competing claims, what could
more resemble the public interest, ask the pluralists, than
47 Kelso, 62-63.
~Ibid. 82-83.
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the compromise between all these factions? Thus, the pluralist public interest is, as Garson puts it, "social rationality emerging from group

accornodation."~

In stark contrast to the pluralist conception of the
public interest is that of pluralism's critics. To nearly
all the critics, whether elite-centralists, rnajoritarians,
or participatory democrats, the public interest is singular
~nd

readily identifiable, as Wolff or Lowi would argue,

through the employment of either moral or legal principles
and standards or else merely as a reflection of the public's
collective will (as populists or some participatory democrats would suggest). Just as pluralism betrays its liberal
and Lockean roots on this issue, the critics' conception of
the public interest exposes their theoretical heritage as
well. Whether that heritage sterns from Plato, Aristotle,
Rousseau, or Burke, most of pluralism's critics adhere to a
vision of society that is far more unified and organic than
that of the pluralists. Consequently, if one views the polity as a single and whole community, then common problems and
needs and desires could readily be identified and addressed
by an active government executing policy based upon a combination of public mandate and moral principle.
In such a scenario, the wishes of interest groups (or
special interests as they are called by their detractors)

should account for little since they would not be the pri49

Garson, 94.
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mary vehicle for the articulation of the public's needs and
desires. Thus, critics argue, the public interest stands far
above and apart from the lesser and more narrow conflict of
self-interests which they claim is all the pluralists ever
recognize. "The·genius of American politics," notes Wolff
disapprovingly, "is its ability to treat even matters of
principles as if they were conflicts of

interest."~

To the

pluralists, though, this sort of talk not only raises the
question of whose principles Wolff finds so obviously and
unquestioningly valid, but also the dreaded specter of Madison's tyrannical factions, each claiming the mantle of public interest while riding roughshod over individual and especially minority rights.
The academic struggle that has pitted pluralism
against its critics peaked in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Though certainly not resolved, this debate has
quieted down considerably since then. But it has not been
completely quiet. Without as shrill a tone, the debate has
reemerged in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s as
pluralist scholars have conducted numerous smaller scale,
more specialized studies which have attempted to empirically
test at least certain aspects of the pluralist argument. As
part of what Andrew McFarland calls the "critical pluralism"
of the 1980s, these studies and this revised perspective in
general have been mindful of prior critiques and have,
50

wolff, 137.
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therefore, kept within more modest bounds than earlier, more
theoretical works.5 1 While acceding to their opponents on
certain of pluralism's more indefensible claims (such as
Latham's portrayal of the passive state acting as just
another interest with little autonomy), this revised pluralism has attempted to confirm the role of groups in the
policymaking process, while asserting that equal opportunity
amongst groups has grown as well.52 These groups are found
to be operating as part of a very complex and fairly wellfunctioning relationship with various government agencies.53
Not only is this revised vision of pluralism found to be empirically valid, contends Kelso, but a strong case could
still be made for its normative superiority as well.54

51 Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A
Pluralist Reponse to Olson" from a paper delivered at the
Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991). In general, such a perspective can be
found in: James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New
York: Basic Books, 1980); Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1981); John Kingdon, Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984);
Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment"
in Anthony King (editor), The New American Political System
(Washington o.c.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978}; William Brown, Private Interests, Public Policy, and American
Agriculture (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988).
52 see, for example, Culhane, Public Lands Politics;
Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America; Browne, Private
Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture; Christopher Sosso, Pesticides and Politics, (Pittsburgh: Universit~ of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
See, for example, Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment."
54 Ke 1 so , 2 5- 3 4 •
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Pluralism and Ecological Values55
The Politics of Ecology
As mentioned before, the debate over pluralism,
whether on the level of broad theorizing or more specialized
case studies, has concentrated on the questions of how eff ectively and autonomously policymakers and their agencies
function and whether the pluralist process discriminates
against certain interests and their policy goals. There is a
policy area from which to examine these questions and the
arguments of the pluralists and their critics which, although quite well-suited for this task, has been largely
overlooked. The politics of ecological concern as Dean Mann
complains, "scarcely receives mention" in the debate over
pluralism, being "clearly subsidiary to the dominant issues
of economic policy and social

relations."~

And yet, ecolog-

ical politics provide the scholar with a unique opportunity
to probe pluralist theory for several reasons.
First of all, ecological matters, perhaps more so than
just about any other policy area, feature incredibly complex, interrelated and long-term issues. 57 As any biologist
55 For a far more in-depth discussion of the nature of
ecological values than this section provides, see appendix
A.
56
Dean Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael
Clarke (editors), Controversies in Environmental Politics
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 17.
57
Ecological matters in this study will broadly be defined as issues involving the aesthetic, spiritual, and
biological dimensions of objects in the natural world.
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can attest to, they involve principles whose intricacy humankind is only scarcely beginning to unravel and comprehend
as well as systems which often proceed at a glacial pace and
in quite subtle ways. In this way, then, ecological policy

provides the perfect archetype for the complex and longrange policies which Lowi accuses pluralist policymakers of
so gravely mishandling.
In addition to, and perhaps even more important than
their complex nature is the fact that ecological concerns
can be so intangible. Ecological values, especially those
immediately divorced from human health or safety concerns
tend to be far less tangible, quantifiable, and material
than those of many other interests in pluralist competition.
According to Daniel Henning and William Mangun:
Many values and considerations found in environmental
administration are of an intangible nature and consequently are difficult or impossible to define or quantify. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to
assign economic values to living resources due to the
complexities and ambiguities associated with their
being given proper weight and consideration. 58
In other words, ecological values involve concepts
that go well beyond the standard who gets what, when, and

how? of the give-and-take politics of pluralism. Ecological
concerns depend upon measures of value which are often not
commonly recognized or understood within the political process. Rather than relying upon traditional and widely accep58

Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the
Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1989), 4-5.
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ted economic measures of worth, ecological values are usually measured in terms of fairly intangible emotional, aesthetic, and biological justifications (see appendix A). To an
ecologist, therefore, an immense ancient tree in an old
growth forest is more than the board feet of timber which
the policymaking realm has traditionally measured it by.
The advocates of ecology complain that such subtleties are easily lost in the more quantitatively-oriented
pluralist process. The tendency of the pluralist process to
perceive of political demands in terms of self-interest, especially materially quantifiable self-interest, might attest
to the fact that it is the language of economics it is most
comfortable speaking. If true, then ecological values might
have an especially hard time competing as they risk

oc~upy-

ing something of a pluralist no-man's-land where the language of ecology is not reliably spoken nor understood. The
early Forest Service wilderness advocate Bob Marshall noted
this gap when he characterized the arguments of preservation
as being "subtle and difficult to express" as opposed to the
"concrete and direct" language of

development.~

Naturalist

Wallace Stegner puts this issue in more partisan terms:
Being an intangible and spiritual resource, [the wilderness idea] will seem mystical to the practical-

59

Bob Marshall quoted in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and
the American Mind revised ed.(New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press 1973), 20.
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minded--but then anything that cannot be moved by a
bulldozer is likely to seem mystical to them.~
Because they are often speaking in terms of such disparate measures of value, ecologists and their opponents
very often find themselves politically in zero-sum situations, and with no type of politics is pluralism more uncomfortable. The problem for the pluralist process is that
zero-sum situations tend to preclude, or at least make very
difficult, much of the accomodation and bargaining that define pluralism. The essential question that arises then, is
whether or not that discomfort translates into a bias
against and marginalization of ecological interests and
their initiatives just as critics charge pluralism does to
other disadvantaged interests. Robert Paehlke suggests that
this may be the case:
In this context [that is, pluralism], environmental
groups often seem foreign to the political decisionmaking process. Environmental issues are treated as
inconvenient, time-consuming add-ons.61
Understanding just whose interests are identified with
ecological values can be as complex as appreciating the values themselves. Although they definitely constitute a distinct political interest, ecologists, like other "collective" interests which Olson identifies, are, in many ways, a
special case. This is because their interest is so broad,
~Wallace Stegner quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy (Washington o.c.: CQ Press, 1985),

255.

61 Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989), 210.
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diffuse, and immaterial. Any group which speaks to these
sorts of large-scale, non-exclusive interests invariably
terms themselves a public interest; that is, a supposedly
aloof, selfless defender of what is in the whole public's
best interest.
Such interests also commonly play to the fact that
they themselves have no self-interest vested in the pursuit
of their goals. In the case of ecological interests, aside
from a few wilderness outfitters or kayak guides, this indeed may be true regarding materially quantifiable selfinterest, but in terms of the more intangible dimensions of
self-interest, such individuals may actually have much at
stake. Any group ideologically and emotionally invested in a
cause cannot help but have at least some degree of personal,
psychological self-interest in that cause. Ecologists would
be the first to admit to the spiritual and emotional benefits which the wilderness accrues for them. Still, they
would argue that the protection of the planet's complex ecosystems is hardly on the same level of interest as the mill
owner trying to protect the steady flow of timber into his
mill. Whether ecologists are a special type of public interest or just another self-interested faction fighting it out
on the pluralist battlefield amongst all the other equally
valid factions is a question that strikes at the heart of
the debate between the pluralists and their critics.
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Ecological matters are by no means the only policy
area within pluralist politics which transcend distributive
and/or easily quantifiable concerns or involve selfproclaimed public interests. Political battles that have
raged over school prayer, abortion, flag burning, and federal funding for the arts are just a few examples of issues
which also involve less tangible, non-quantifiable interests
and very emotional, symbolically potent issues. In fact, it
might be said that, to some extent, even the most seemingly
tangible issues have their intangible aspects. Thus, even
fairly standard distributive issues involving, for instance,
taxes or various benefit programs could be said to have a
strong emotional and symbolic dimension which also cannot be
easily quantified. Still, ecological values and issues stand
out. Despite a potential intangible dimension to practically
any interest, ecological interests, along with a few others,
have goals and values which are, for the most part, exclusively non-economic.
Ecological Values and the Case of the Siskiyou National
Forest
Because of this distinctness, ecological policymaking
offers an especially good opportunity to determine how pluralism operates and its theoretical claims hold up when confronted with challenging, often zero-sum, policy dilemmas
and demands. Does the political system's fragmentation and
numerous points of access provide, as pluralists like Dean
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Mann might suggest, the guarantee that marginalized or fragile (in our case ecological) values will gain a forum and a
voice which otherwise, perhaps in another system of democratic organization, might be denied them?62 Or does the
short-term economically-oriented policymaking patchwork of
pluralism leave supposedly vulnerable ecological values
skewered on what Rosenbaum calls the "pikes of the politicians"?~

These are the chief questions that this study

will concern itself with.
In order to address these questions, the broad-scale
theoretical claims of the pluralist model and its critics
must be empirically tested. One way to achieve this is to
explore in-depth a specific case of political conflict involving explicit ecological values and issues as we earlier
defined them.
The case which will be explored in this study involves
the political battle over the Siskiyou National Forest in
southwestern Oregon. Since the early 1980s, local groups
have been trying to prevent the Siskiyou from being logged
and having logging roads built into it. During the mid and
late 1980s this issue heated up and merged with the larger
regional, and later national effort to save the old growth
forests of the Pacific Northwest and the threatened Northern
spotted owl which inhabits the forests.
62
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I have chosen the Siskiyou case for a number of
reasons. First, it involves very basic and explicit ecological values which are, at least in the short-term, not
directly related to human health or safety. In other words,
the readily identifiable and tangible human welfare interests that are evident in the pursuit of some ecologically
informed policy demands such as, say, preventing ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect, or toxic dumping are less
obvious and more indirect in the case of the Siskiyou forest. Therefore, the values which foster a desire for the
forest's protection can be less easily confused or diluted
with matters of quantifiable self-interest or economic rewards. What is at stake here for the Siskiyou's defenders
are the symbolic, spiritual, aesthetic, and ecological aspects of the forest. 64 The Siskiyou case is, in other words,
a very straightforward example of fairly intangible values
competing in a pluralist system against far more tangible,
quantifiable, and (as far as pluralism goes) traditional
interests and values. In the case of the Siskiyou, these
opposing values have been largely, though not exclusively,
64

Concerning that last, ecological, aspect, it must be
said that environmentalists would make a very strong case
that, in the long-run, human welfare is indeed very much
tied up with the forest's fate. This is a central tenet of
the ecologic perspective. In terming the ecological interests at stake as being not directly related to human health
or safety, I do not intend to rule out this perspective.
What I am trying to convey is that human health and safety
interests in the forest's continued existence are usually
long-term, indirect, and often subtle rather than obvious,
direct, and immediate.
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material and utilitarian in nature and involve the economic
interests of those who make a livelihood from the logging of
this national forest.
In addition to the explicitness of its ecological values, the politics of the Siskiyou case closely mirror the
pluralist process in that they provide sets of actors at
various levels of jurisdiction (both horizontally and vertically) and ultimately involve the pluralist system at many
equally important points.
Broadly, this case study attempts to address two
major issues. First is the issue of how ecological values
and initiatives fare in a pluralist political process. Is
this process inherently hostile towards and biased against
ecological concerns or is it the best system that could be
hoped for at least in regards to allowing peripheral values
the chance to be heard? Secondly (though this is really part
of the previous issue), this study attempts to determine how
valid the critics' major complaints against pluralist
theory, both empirical and normative, are, at least in the
context of ecological issues. In addition to examining their
critiques of pluralism, the question of how the critics'
specific prescriptions would affect ecological values and
initiatives is considered as well: would these reforms really improve the success of ecological interests as many critics claim?
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To address these issues, both the participatory and
decisionmaking aspects of the pluralist process in the Siskiyou National Forest must be considered. More specifically,
such an analysis encompasses the following questions:
1.

Were there inherent biases or serious imbalances

in interest group resources, organization, and mobilization
capacity which seriously harmed or limited ecological interests? If there was a discrepancy in raw resources was there
enough "political slack" to offset these inequalities?
2. Were there biases amongst administrative or other
decisionmakers which limited ecological interests' access to
the policymaking process or prevented their demands and initiatives from being seriously considered?
3. Were there structural biases in the political system, especially in regards to levels of decentralization,
which militate against the success of ecological values and
initiatives?
Other research has touched upon this issue of pluralism and environmental values and pondered some questions
similar to those addressed in this study. They regard
whether the structure of American goverment and its policymaking process is well-disposed towards dealing with environmental concerns or whether it is inherently hostile and
biased against them. A number of scholars argue in favor of
the latter scenario. While representing a variety of perspectives, these critics of pluralism would all agree with
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Rosenbaum's description of the perceived disadvantage of
ecological values in a pluralist system:
Many [environmentalists] .... recognize they are operating in a milieu where the opposition has historically
enjoyed the greater advantage and success. Under the
most favorable of conditions, environmentalists expect
a hard, uncertain battle in an unfriendly arena.65
Kraft, writing in 1974, is even more forthright and specific
about this "unfriendly arena":
[T]he dominant political response to the ecological
crisis has been characterized by marginal and superficial attention to, understanding of, and concern for
ecological problems; a weak and uncertain commitment
to new environmental priorities .... ; timidity and moderation at best in public policy developments .... ; the
frequent use by politicians of rhetorical and symbolic
gestures as a substitute for material, real accomplishments; dedication to palliative measures .... In
short, the political response has favored inertia and
old priorities rather than rigorous and imaginative
progress and new priorities.~
Harold and Margaret Sprout offer a similar critique of the
pluralist system's piecemeal approach to ecological
issues,67 while William Ophuls argues that the individual
self-interest basis of pluralism is woefully inadequate for
dealing with ecological

matters.~

There are also those who see pluralism in a much more
favorable light. Far from being inherently hostile, plural65 Rosenbaum, The Politics of Ecological Concern, 93.
~ Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Government: A Review Essay" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Environmental Politics (New York: Prager Publishers, 1974), 148.
67 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Context of Environmental Politics (Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky, 1978).
~William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977).
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ism is seen by some as ecology's best, if not only, chance
to influence policy. While admitting that pluralism may offer some difficulties, these advocates of pluralism, including Mann, Petulla, Paehlke, Howard Mccurdy, and Norman Vig
and Michael Kraft claim there is no better alternative.69
Mccurdy def ends pluralism as being more democratic and beneficial to the environment than more centralized alternatives, while Kraft undergoes at least a partial change of
heart from his earlier works as he and Vig proclaim that:
Pluralism and flexibility in governance, as well as in
economic activities, permit widespread experimentation
and social change when challenges arise. Popular mobilization that results from voluntary cooperation
tends to outlast coerced obedience, as we have
learned. 70
The research into pluralism's treatment of ecological
values is incomplete however. When attempts have been made
to address broad theoretical questions about pluralism and
environmental issues, such studies have often failed to accompany their claims with detailed empirical support. On the
other hand, when such detailed empiricism is indeed applied
to environmental policy issues, it usually takes the form of
69 Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy";
Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Station,
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next
Century" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, Environmental
Policy in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990);
Howard Mccurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamieniecki, et al.; Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, "Conclusion:
Toward a New Environmental Agenda" in Vig and Kraft.
70
Vig and Kraft, 385.
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a narrowly focused examination of some small aspect of the
policymaking process, thereby failing to explore any larger
theoretical implications. Michael Kraft disapprovingly notes
the proliferation of such microanalysis in environmental
policy studies:
One of the major weaknesses of the social science literature on ecological matters, in fact, is a notable
failure to come to grips with such questions (of
whether or not pluralist institutions and structures
are inherently incapable of addressing ecological
problems] .... while deficient in attending to these
tough and subversive questions, we have by comparison
absolutely lavished attention on trivial descriptions
of routine issues in contemporary environmental politics and administration, on microanalysis of largely
inconsequential environmental behavior, and on the development of methodological sophistication in policy
analysis that seems greatly to exceed the marginal
payoffs of the final product.n
Although the more specific research relevant to this
study probably does not deserve so harsh a criticism, Kraft
touches on an important point regarding political science's
treatment of the "big questions" of environmental policy
wherein it sometimes cannot see the theoretical forest for
the empirical trees.
Plan of the Study
In order to comprehensively explore the effect a pluralist political system has upon ecological policymaking and
what this says about pluralism itself, it will be necessary
in this study to approach the issue from several angles.
First, though, an overview of the issues at hand and the

n Kraft, "Ecological Politics," 146.
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relevant political events that have thusfar occurred must be
presented. Chapters two and three provide such an overview
as they lay down the basic facts and history of this case.
The next chapter focuses upon the manner in which the
various interests involved in the Siskiyou case have articulated demands, mobilized supporters and resources, and participated in the process. Such an investigation will shed
light upon those issues in the debate over pluralism which
revolve around the nature of interest group activities and
allegations of marginalization. How effectively, for example, did the ecological interests organize and mobilize? Was
there a great disparity between the resources available to
the ecological interests and their opponents and if so, did
this affect their ability to effectively participate? What
role did the way in which demands were articulated and symbols manipulated play in the competition between interests?
Did this aspect of the interest group competition serve at
all to compensate for any material inequality in group resources or was it simply another function of resource advantage?
Chapter five turns to the issue of bureaucratic administration in the Siskiyou National Forest, concentrating
primarily upon whether pluralist or critical models of administration are most appropriate in this case. For instance, did ecological interests gain sufficient access to
the decisionmaking process? Were their values and policy
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objectives taken seriously by policymakers? Were they
weighed in a manner commensurate with the level and skill of
organization behind them or was there a consistent bias preventing this? If there was a bias, what was the nature of
this bias; was it caused by internal agency norms and values
or outside client pressures or, perhaps, various immutable
principles of bureaucratic behavior?
Still within the realm of the decisionmaking process,
the following chapter will address the critics', especially
Lowi's, allegations that the very structure of pluralism,
most particularly its decentralization, is ill-designed for
and inept at producing sound, rational policy. Both the effects of policy fragmentation in the Siskiyou and the alternative of centralization are considered. Critics put forth
other alternatives to pluralism besides elite centralization, specifically radical decentralization or majoritarianism, and in chapter seven, this study speculates upon the
validity of these other alternatives. Finally, the last
chapter moves on to draw some conclusions about pluralism
and ecology in the Siskiyou battle.

CHAPTER 2
THE BATTLE FOR THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST

Americans .... may be said not to perceive the mighty
forests that surround them till they fall beneath the
hatchet.
Alexis de Tocqueville
.... the Forest Service has announced plans to begin
clearcutting much of the remaining unprotected public
forest in the Siskiyous. In the hamlets around the
Rogue River, clusters of people say that they will die
to prevent that from happening. Few people doubt them.
Timothy Egan
They just created Appalachia in the Northwest.
President, Medford Timber Company
Like a stranger who defies stereotype upon first
acquaintance, the Siskiyous are hard to figure. A
little incongruent, at times spooky.
Timothy Egan

This case study revolves around the political struggle
over one particular national forest, the Siskiyou. Before
any attempt is made to analyze how the politics of this forest relate to larger questions of ecological policymaking
and pluralist democratic theory, though, the forest's story
must be told. This chapter and the next, therefore, lay out
40
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the political history of the Siskiyou National Forest and
the larger old growth controversy that it was a part of for
the period of 1983 to 1992.
The Siskiyou Forest: The Natural Context
In the northwest corner of this continent, from northern California to southern Alaska, ocean currents and buckled jet streams conspire to produce a gush of moisture and
mild air which the region's mountains wring dry. With annual
precipitation in excess of two hundred inches in some areas,
the Pacific Northwest is a place which for millenia has produced immense trees and vast forests. In fact, these trees,
which often reach astonishing height, girth, and age, and
the forests they are a part of, are estimated to comprise
the greatest density and mass of living organic matter on
the entire planet.1 The remnants of such forests are known
today as old growth.
To describe old growth is to use a good deal of superlatives; tallest, heaviest, widest, oldest. The precise definition of old growth, however, is as politically significant and contentious as is the struggle over its future.
Those who favor the continued logging of these forests use
fairly liberal definitions that describe quite a bit more

1 At

four hundred tons per acre, an average old growth
forest in the Pacific Northwest far outweighs its tropical
rainforest counterpart which measures only 185 tons per
acre. Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker
(14 May 1990), 46.
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acreage than the far more stringent interpretations of old
growth adhered to by environmentalists.
Perhaps the closest thing to a standard definition has
been established by Forest Service biologist and old growth
expert Jerry Franklin who identifies specific criteria a
forest must meet to be considered old growth. According to
Franklin, old growth forests must contain trees of mixed age
and species including a number of very large and very old
trees. In addition, old growth forests must have a certain
amount of standing and downed dead trees and organic matter. 2
For decades, the conventional wisdom regarding old
growth forests was that they were, as one Forest Service
silviculturist termed them in 1952, a "biological desert," 3
too dense and dark and static to harbor much flora or fauna.
Moreover, since the biggest trees in these mature forests
are slow-growing, not growing at all, or even dying, they
have traditionally been seen by foresters as a monumental

2 specifically,

Franklin lays out five criteria: (1) there
must occur two or more tree species with a wide range of
ages and sizes amongst individual trees; (2) six to eight
coniferous trees per acre must measure at least thirty inches in diameter and be at least two hundred years old; (3)
the forest must have a non-uniform, multi-layered canopy;
(4) there must exist two to four standing dead trees (snags)
per acre, measuring at least twenty inches in diameter and
fifteen feet tall; and (5) on the ground must lie at least
ten tons per acre of fallen logs, including at least two
sections twenty-four inches in diameter and fifty feet long.
These criteria are summed up in Herbert McLean, "Paying the
Price for Old Growth" American Forests (October 1991), 25.
3 caufield, 48.
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waste. In the parlance of the logger they are ''overripe" or
"decadent"; that is, just sitting there taking up land upon
which rapidly growing young trees could be established instead.
It was not until Franklin's seminal 1981 study of old
growth that myths regarding its biological impoverishment
were dispelled. 4 Rather than being an "overmature desert,"
what Franklin found was that the ecologically mature or climax stage known as old growth is the biologically richest
and most complex in a Northwest forest's life. Franklin describes intricate ecological interrelationships and an ecosystem of almost mind-boggling complexity and diversity.
Like the tropical rainforests, old growth forests play host
to thousands of specialized plant, animal, and microbiotic
species which perform, as former BLM biologist Chris Maser
has termed it, "a ballet of interaction."5
Towards the southern end of the historic range of the
Pacific old growth forests, straddling the Oregon-California
4 USDA

Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Forest and Range
Experiment Station, Ecological Characteristics of Old Growth
Douglas-fir Forests, by Jerry Franklin et al., General Technical Report PNW-118 (1981).
5chris Maser quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient
Forests" E Magazine (October 1989). So precise and efficient
are these interactions and processes that the old growth
forest is a system in near-perfect balance, consuming precisely what it produces and therefore wasting practically no
organic matter. Such a system, barring catacylism, could
theoretically remain stable indefinitely. Yet as stable as
it is, old growth is also extremely fragile; if any part of
the system is removed, from mammals to the lowliest
nitrogen-fixing root fungi, the entire process could unravel. Caufield, 49.
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border, lies a region of exceptional botanical and geological interest. Where the northern edge of the Siskiyou mountains meet and blend into the Coastal Range further to the
west is found the Siskiyou National Forest. Within this national forest are perhaps the largest remaining unlogged and
roadless blocks of old growth forest in the continental United States.6
Unlike more typical old growth regions in northern
Oregon and Washington, the Siskiyou area, which has what is
classified as a Mediterranean climate, features very hot,
dry summers, frequent fires, and less rainfall. 7 As a result, the old growth in the Siskiyou is, for the most part,
not quite as immense or long-lived and the soils are thinner
and more fragile than in the cool, dripping wet forests further up the coast. In relation to most Pacific Northwest
ecosystems, therefore, the Siskiyou is an anomaly; dry
enough to spark fearsome fires and support sparse desertlike habitats in some places and yet rainy enough to produce
towering old growth forests including the northernmost
stands of coast redwoods, the world's tallest tree.a

6 Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New York: Knopf, 1990),
164.
7 The Siskiyou receive only 20-160 inches of rain compared
to 100-200 inches further north. Robert Sterling, "In a
Strikingly Different Ecological Overlap Zone" Medford Mail
Tribune (25 June 1989).
·
8 Egan, 161; Jonathan Nicholas, "The Once and Future Forest" (Portland) Oregonian (20 June 1988).
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Because of its unique geological features, 9 the very
ancient Siskiyou mountains have for millions of years served
as an evolutionary crossroads, nursery, and gene pool for
much of the continent west of the Mississippi.10 Not surprisingly, such evolutionary continuity and centrality has
led to the development of an unusual level of biological
diversity and complexity in the Siskiyou's plant and animal
communities as botanist Robert Whittaker points out:
This [the Siskiyou) is an area of biological interest
as great as that of the Southern Appalachians .... as
dramatic an expression of relationships of natural
communities to geological formation as is to be found
anywhere in the world. 11
In terms of both flora and fauna, this purported
birthplace of the modern coniferous forest is home to the
biologically uncommon and significant. Over 1,400 plant
species, of which more than one hundred have been classified
as either endangered, rare, or sensitive occur here,12 as
does the Rogue River system, described by the Forest Service
as "some of the most valuable salmon and steelhead habitat

9 Unlike

most all other mountain ranges on the continent,
the Siskiyou and its parent Klamath mountains have an eastwest rather than north-south orientation. This unique orientation is thought to have possibly been responsible for
blocking the periodic advances of the glaciers which crushed
the forests of the north-south ranges. As a result, scientists believe that the Siskiyou region has been temperate
and continuously vegetated for 40 million years. Caufield,
72-73; Egan, 161.
10 Ibid.
11 Robert Whittaker, Vegetation of the Siskiyou Mountains,
Oregon and California, Ecological Monographs Series, vol. 30
(1960), 279-338.
12 Egan, 161; Caufield, 73.
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in the United States." 13 In addition, rare or endangered
fishers, wolverines, pileated woodpeckers, and the northern
spotted owl are found in the Siskiyou. Rarest of all might
be Bigfoot, Sasquatch, or the Hermit of the Siskiyous as he
is locally called, whose elusive presence, real or imagined,
has haunted this region for ages.14
The Siskiyou Forest: The Human Context
Covering 1,092,302 acres of land over parts of Curry,
Josephine, and Coos Counties in southwestern Oregon and a
very small portion of Del Norte County in extreme northern
California, the Siskiyou National Forest is one of the 155
national forests administered by the United States Forest
Service 15

(see figure

1) .

The agency manages the fores ts un-

der what is called a multiple use mandate which includes
authorization to harvest timber on the forest.
The Forest Service, which is part of the Department of
Agriculture, oversees from its Washington D.C. headquarters
nine regional offices. 16 One of these, Region Six (Oregon
and Washington), includes the Siskiyou National Forest. Individual national forests are administered by a forest su13

USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. I,
15.

14 Egan, 161.
15 There are nineteen national grasslands under its jurisdiction as well.
16 Several million acres of additional public forestlands
in central and southern Oregon are administered by the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM).
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pervisor who reports to one of the nine regional foresters
who in turn answers to the Chief of the Forest Service in
Washington D.C. The Siskiyou National Forest, which is headquartered in the city of Grants Pass, OR, is further decentralized into five ranger districts. 17 Each of these ranger
districts, with headquarters in nearby towns, is administered by a district ranger.
The area surrounding the Siskiyou National Forest is
a fairly rural region situated several hundred miles in any
direction from a major metropolis. 18 The largest city in the
region is Medford with a population of approximately forty
thousand people. Unlike the increasingly diversified economies of the Portland area and a good deal of Washington
state, the economy of southwestern Oregon is still heavily
dependent upon timber production. Providing a little over
17% of total employment in the four-county area, the lumber
and wood products industry is the single largest employer in

17

These ranger districts are Powers in the far northern
portion of the forest, Gold Beach in the north-central,
Galice in the east-central, Chetco in the southwest, and
Illinois Valley in the southeast.
18 The region around the Siskiyou, defined by the Forest
Service as the "primary area of economic and social inf luence" consists of the three counties in which the forest
lies as well as nearby Jackson County which includes the
city of Medford. Land and Resource Management Plan FEIS,
sec. III, 128.
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the region. 19 Other major employers in the region include
government, tourism, agriculture, and fisheries.20
Communities within this four-county area having what
the Forest Service calls, "close socioeconomic ties" to the
forest include Medford, Grants Pass, Brookings, Gold Beach,
Port Orford, Powers, and Cave Junction21

(see figure 1). Be-

sides the direct and indirect employment which the wood products industry provides, communities in this area also depend upon the portion of timber receipts which the Forest
Service pays to the counties. On most national forest land,
counties earn a quarter of Forest Service receipts from timber sales and in the 17% of the Siskiyou's area that is specially classified as Oregon and California lands, counties
are supplemented with an additional 25% of receipts.22
19 Ibid. sec. III, 129.
20 Amongst the agricultural activities in this region is a
great deal of illicit marijuana production which has become,
in fact, the area's number one cash crop. Egan, 165.
21 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan (Region
10: GPO, 1989), sec. I, 4.
22 Land and Forest Management FEIS, sec. II, 211. Counties
are offered either seventy-five cents per federal acre or
25% of receipts. In the high-yield national forests of the
Northwest, the latter has always been far more lucrative. As
for the so-called Oregon and California (O&C) lands, they
were confiscated by the federal government in 1916 from the
Oregon and California Railroad which had engaged in massive
fraud with land granted to them. The O&C lands operate under
a different charter which mandates a higher rate of payment
to local governments. While most O&C lands are now under BLM
jurisdiction, some acreage does occur in the National Forest
system, including the Siskiyou. Kathie Durbin, "BLM Mandate
Collides With Owl" from special report: "Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 October 1990), 10. For full statistics
regarding county receipts, see Land and Forest Management
Plan FEIS, sec. III, 132.

50

Within this region's communities, a diversity of lifestyles exist. In addition to the socially conservative loggers, farmers, ranchers, and fishermen who have traditionally populated this region, southwestern Oregon has for several decades served as a magnet for individuals who abide by
alternative lifestyles. Drawn to the region's rural character and scenic beauty, a good number of such individuals
have settled in this region, a few living in communes, or
more commonly, small communities such as Takilma.23 These
less traditional residents of the area are most often employed or self-employed in small cottage industries or in
the recreational sector.24
That logging has traditionally been king in southwestern Oregon is written all over the land in the patchwork of
second growth forests and clearcuts and logging roads that
are evident throughout the countryside. When the first loggers arrived in this region a century and a half ago, many
coming from the completely spent timberlands of the upper
Great Lakes, they settled in the best timber growing regions
in the lowlands and coastal areas. 25 When the Siskiyou National Forest was established around the turn of the cen23 Egan, 169.
24 This is not to imply that all individuals in the region
with alternative values or lifestyles are migrants from
elsewhere; there are also many native Oregonians amongst
their ranks. Also, although many are environmental activists, I am in no way implying that such individuals are synon~ous with the environmental community in this region.
5
Caufield, 60.

51
tury, it was relegated to the steepest, most mountainous
forestlands.
While logging commenced soon after settlement, it was
not until the 1920s that large-scale operations began. From
that time until the 1950s, private lands were heavily logged, to the point where today practically no significant
acreage of old growth exists outside of the public domain.26
In southwestern Oregon as well as the entire Pacific Northwest, the cutting reached its peak in 1952 when the annual
cut for the whole region climbed to a record 9.8 billion
board feet (bbf) of timber.27
Such a rapid depletion of forestlands was made possible by the logging practices common to private lands
where, according to Bernard Shanks's estimate, only one in
ten acres of forest is managed properly.28 Not bound by any
legal mandates to maintain the forests' long-term sustainability, much timber on private lands is harvested instead
when the financial needs of the owner or market considerations determine that a liquidation of assets is economically
prudent.
uFrom Section V, "Findings of Fact" in the opinion of
Judge William Dwyer, Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 771 F.
Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District, 1991).
27 Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to
special report: "Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 October
1990), 24. A board foot is a unit of measurement which corresponds to a piece of wood one foot square by one inch
thick.
~Bernard Shanks cited in Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 109.
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All throughout the first half of this century, while
private timberlands were being exhausted all around them,
the Forest Service held onto its trees, assuming a largely
caretaker role. Part of the reason that national forests in
the Pacific Northwest were left unexploited was due to the
pressure which private logging concerns put upon the Forest
Service to keep its timber off the market, thus keeping
prices high.29 Obviously, though, the extremely high rates
of timber production on private lands could not continue for
long and indeed, after the peak 1952 harvest, a steep and
steady decline in the productivity of such lands began. In
Curry County alone, the 1952 harvest of approximately
620,000 board feet (bf) plummeted to the point where in
1988, volume stood at just 48,628 bf .30
As the depletion of private timber stocks began to become apparent by the 1950s and the post-war building boom
increased demand, the timber industry's pressure on the Forest Service reversed itself .3 1 Now what the industry sought
was access to the vast stands of virgin old growth that lie
on national forest lands. Not only did this land represent
an immense untapped timber supply, but a good portion of it
was in enormously profitable old growth. Just one giant old

29 Caufield, 52.
~Paul Koberstein, "Private Forests Face Critical Log
Shortages" Oregonian special report, 4.
31 Julie Norman, "Our Choices to Keep Overcutting" Headwaters (September 1990), 15.
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growth Douglas Fir may contain enough timber to build an
average single family

house.~

In short order, the Forest Service shifted course and
geared itself for timber production. At the centerpiece of
this new orientation was the goal of converting old growth
to younger stands. Unlike private owners, the Forest Service
is legally bound to the principles of sustained yield33
which requires that the annual cut in a given forest not
exceed annual growth, thereby maintaining the timber supply,
at least in theory, indefinitely. Old growth presented a
problem for the Forest Service in that because it was mature, it put on less annual growth than younger stands and
thus, by its mere existence, kept down the harvest levels
allowable under sustained yield.
Not surprisingly, old growth began to disappear on
public land just as it had on private land. Since the 1960s,
the Forest Service is estimated to have liquidated 65% of
all old growth on its lands.3 4 In fact, it has been this
very liquidation of old growth stocks that has been the key
to what little profitability the Forest Service has achieved
in recent decades. Logging from the twelve very productive
old growth forest units in Region Six provides, according to
32 Caufield, 56.
33 The doctrine of sustained yield is laid out in the
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 and the National
Forest Management Act of 1976.
~ "Liquidation of the Public Forests Since 1960 L~ads
Citizens to Court and Now Congress" Headwaters, (Late Summer
1991), 2.
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Catherine Caufield, 90% of the Forest Service's net receipts, while the other 143 units in the system provide the
remaining 10% of receipts. These twelve forests also account for a full one-third of the total volume cut in the
entire system. 35
This conversion of old growth in particular, and the
harvest of timber in general, further accelerated during the
1980s under the influence of the Reagan administration and
especially its Assistant Secretary of Agriculture (and former Vice President of Louisiana Pacific Corp.) John Crowell,
Jr. Crowell, who referred to old growth as "decadent" aggressively sought to boost timber output in the national
forests by, in his words,

"liquidating the existing inven-

tory and getting the forest into a fully managed condition."~

Throughout the 1980s, old growth in the Pacific

Northwest was removed at a rate of 2% or approximately
71,000 acres a year.3 7 At that pace, it is estimated that
the last unprotected old growth would be harvested by the
year 2020. 38
Such estimates naturally bring up the question of
exactly how much old growth is left from the twenty million
acres or so that is believed to have existed in presettle35 Caufield, 69.
~Crowell quoted in Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay
Northwest Timber Management Plans" Oregonian special report,
8; Egan, 1 7 O.
~Durbin and Koberstein, introduction "Forests in Distress," 24.
38
Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests."
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ment Washington and Oregon. As mentioned before, the estimates and even definitions of old growth can depend on one's
political persuasion. The most comprehensive and scientifically reliable old growth inventories (based upon Franklin's
standard definition of old growth) have been conducted in
1990 by Peter Morrison for the Wilderness Society and in
1991 by the Forest Service.

Although both studies employ similar definitions of
old growth and the same satellite computer mapping techniques, they come to somewhat differing conclusions. The
Forest Service, which surveyed thirteen national forests
found 4.3 million acres of old growth of which 966,000 acres
were protected in Wilderness areas. Morrison, on the other
hand, found only 2.3 million acres or 12% of what he considered to be true old growth left in the twelve national
forests he surveyed. In what is termed ancient forests
(which display many, but not all of the characteristics of
true old growth), Morrison found another 1.5 million acres
bringing total ancient/old growth acreage to 3.8 million, of
which 934,600 acres were protected.39

39 For a summary of the findings of both studies, see Gerald Gray and Anita Eng, "How Much Old Growth is Left?" American Forests (October 1991), 46-48. Far less rigorously obtained estimates of remaining old growth acreage includes
the claim of the Northwest Forest Resource Council that 8.2
million acres of old growth still exist, and that of the Evergreen Foundation which puts the figure closer to 6.2 million. Of this, timber interests claim that 4.2 million acres
are already protected in national parks and Wilderness
areas. McLean, 72.
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Of the Siskiyou's million acres, Morrison identified
132,000 acres of true old growth of which sixty thousand
acres were protected, while the Forest Service using the
much broader category of mature and old growth forests lists
443,000 acres of which 99,000 are

Wilderness~

(see figure

2). Regardless of the estimate employed, 1989 Forest Service
plans in the Siskiyou scheduled the eventual harvest of most
of the currently unprotected acreage.
Bald Mountain: The Opening Shot
The decade-long struggle environmentalists have waged
over the Siskiyou has involved, at different levels and at
various times, a complex range of issues. Initially, however, it was the particular goal of preventing road construetion on Bald Mountain in 1983, which furiously ignited the
political and social conflict over the Siskiyou's future.
The stage for the Bald Mountain Road protests was actually
set several years earlier as local residents organized to
protest the Forest Service's use of herbicides in the area.
In order to control the weeds and brush that competed with
tree seedlings on its newly replanted clearcuts, the Forest
Service had long sprayed these areas with the herbicide
2,4-D. In the late 1970s certain residents near the Siskiyou
forest claimed to have become ill from water poisoned by

~Morrison's findings are charted forest by forest in
"Forests in Distress," 7; Land and Forest Management Plan
FEIS, sec. I, 15.
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herbicide runoff . 41

In response, a grassroots campaign began

to pressure the Forest Service to switch to mechanical means
of brush control. Although this effort eventually triumphed
with a Forest Service moratorium on 2,4-D usage, the local
organizational framework which these environmentalists had
built remained and grew.
In 1983, a number of these local anti-herbicide activists hooked up with some out-of-state members of Earth
First, a new, fairly radical environmental group and initiated a campaign to prevent the road on Bald Mountain from
being built. 42 Bald Mountain lies roughly in the middle of
the Siskiyou National Forest and straddles a ridge that
forms the border between the Siskiyou's largest official
Wilderness area, the 179,850 acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness and
the similarly expansive, but unprotected, defacto wilderness
to the

north~

(see figure 3). This latter area, called the

North Kalmiopsis, contained some of the largest blocks of
old growth in the forest and perhaps the entire continental
U.S. While other areas of the Siskiyou, especially in the
periphery, were already heavily roaded and clearcut from

41

Egan, 175.

~Chant Thomas,

"Return to Bald Mountain" Earth First!
(20 March 1987), 1.
43 Currently, 232,495 acres of the Siskiyou are part of
the congressionally designated National Wilderness Preservation System, most of which is under Forest Service jurisdiction but subject to very strict management regulations as
outlined in the Wilderness Act of 1964. These guidelines are
aimed at preserved the wild, roadless character of such
areas.
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many decades of high volume harvests, this interior portion
remained a huge, virtually intact chunk of high-quality wilderness. Saving the North Kalmiopsis would become the central goal and symbol of the environmentalists throughout
this entire struggle.
In 1936, the early Forest Service wilderness advocate
Bob Marshall, recognizing the Siskiyou's unusual biodiversity, proposed an immense one million acre wilderness area encompassing most of the National Forest. Ten years later, the
Forest Service responded with the much smaller 76,000 acre
Kalmiopsis Wild Area. In 1964, this area was granted formal
legal protection with the passing of the Wilderness Act in
Congress. In a subsequent Wilderness bill passed in 1978,
the Kalmiopsis was enlarged to its present size of 179,850
acres, but in a compromise, the prime areas of old growth to
the north of Bald Mountain were left out and released for
development.44
In 1979, the Forest Service began to plan a road along
the ridge of Bald Mountain. While they claimed it was merely
to facilitate future timber harvesting on lands released for
such activities by Congress, environmentalists believed that
the very costly road was being built specifically to destroy
the roadless character of the North Kalmiopsis as quickly as
possible. Severing it from the rest of the Kalmiopsis would

44 "Fires, Controversy Scorch Forest's Past" Eugene
Register-Guard (13 March 1988).
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Sources: ~~Y9\l, National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan, Sec. A, l;
<MW"a- "FEIS, Sec. II, 34
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prevent it from being considered in any future wilderness
bills.
The Forest Service's push to build the Bald Mountain
Road took on new urgency after President Reagan took off ice
in 1981. As part of the Reagan Administration's overall
drive to open public lands in the West to resource development, Crowell and Secretary of Interior James Watt attempted
to shift the focus of the agencies under their charge
towards increased commodity production.45 For the Forest
Service, this meant a requirement to boost the annual cut.
In 1982, actual construction of the Bald Mountain Road
began. The Rogue River Sierra Club promptly brought suit
charging that an adequate accounting of the environmental
consequences of the road had not been

conducted.~

After

gaining an initial injunction on the road, the court eventually ruled against the environmentalists, finding that the
Forest Service's environmental assessment (EA) was in order . 47
By early 1983, the North Kalmiopsis exploded with protests in what marked the symbolic opening shot not only in
45 See C. Brant Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands
(College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press), 1989.
~ Thomas, 1 .
47 Under the guidelines of the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the Forest Service is required to
complete an environmental assessment (EA) for potentially
disruptive activities such as timber sales, roadbuilding, or
mining. If that activity is expected to have an especially
substantial impact, than a more extensive environmental impact statement (EIS) must be completed.
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the battle for the Siskiyou, but for old growth in the entire Pacific Northwest. After the injunction on the road was
lifted, local activists who had formed Earth First Siskiyou
joined Earth Firsters from other states for a civil disobedience campaign centered around a series of road blockades.
In a total of seven blockades featuring over forty-four arrests and some very tense

confrontations,~

the political

fight entered a new stage.
Throughout the Siskiyou that summer, trees were found
with spikes driven into them to discourage logging. When
loggers began to use metal detectors on the trees, some
spikers switched to ceramic spikes. Elsewhere there were
scattered incidents of construction equipment being disabled
at night as posters promising sabotage began to appear.49
Although they never officially condoned such actions and
since 1983 publically denounced tree spiking in the Siskiyou,so Earth First, nevertheless, came to be associated with
such actions; an accusation they could never quite shake.
The direct actions and arrests on Bald Mountain served
to generate publicity and offers of legal aid for the very
much ad hoc and resource-poor Earth First movement. Before
long, a new lawsuit brought by Earth First and the Oregon
~In fact, in the third blockade Earth First co-founder
Dave Foreman was run over and injured by a logging truck.
Thomas, 1.
49 Egan, 16 0-1 71 .
~Robert Brothers, "Sensational Stories Fuel Already
Tense Situation" letter to the editor, Medford Mail Tribune
(20 August 1988)
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Natural Resources Defense Council (ONRC) succeeded in stopping the road after nine miles, or half its length, had
already been built. With new evidence and testimony, the
environmentalists convinced the court that the Forest Service had not sufficiently considered the environmental impact of the road which, because it penetrated wilderness,
was substantial. 51
On the summit of Bald Mountain, meanwhile, Lou Gold, a
former University of Illinois political science professorturned-activist set up a summer camp to keep vigil on the
divided mountain. In what was to become a yearly ritual,
Gold would host scores of reporters, sympathizers and even
congressional aides who would make the arduous trek through
the wilderness to pay homage to the "man on the

mountain."~

Bald Mountain Revisited
In 1984, another Oregon Wilderness bill was passed,
but Oregon's Senator and strong timber ally Mark Hatfield
(R) managed to keep all of the North Kalmiopsis and its
abundant old growth out of the bill. 53

Instead, four much

smaller areas totalling 52,645 acres were added (see figure

51

"Radical Activists Join Battle for Forests" Oregonian
(20 November 1987). A district court ruling in 1989, established that any proposal to enter a roadless area was in and
of itself significant and controversial enough to warrant an
EIS rather than an EA. After 1989, therefore, all Siskiyou
roadless entries required EISs.
52 Kathie Durbin, "Lou Gold" Oregonian special report, 19.
53 oouglas Murphy, "Earth First! and the North
Kalmiopsis!" The Sneak Preview (Ashland, OR: 11 June 1987).

64

3). Thus, the North Kalmiopsis was once again released for
development and, at least according to the Forest Service,
the injunction on the Bald Mountain Road was thereby dissolved.54 Still, since the controversy over the adequacy of
the initial EA was not yet resolved, the Forest Service
promised not to complete the road until the master Forest
Plan which required an extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was finalized sometime in the next several
years. 55
While they did not extend the road, the Forest Service
did begin to resume timber sales and harvesting in the North
Kalmiopsis in 1985 and 1986 with twenty-four planned or active sales. 56 The environments reacted angrily to these
sales claiming that they had an understanding with the Forest Service that the sales, like the road, would be delayed
until the release of the Forest Plan.57
This resumption of timber harvesting in the North Kalmiopsis could be attributed, in part, to the mounting poli54 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Land and Forest Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices Volume 1 (Region 10:
GPo
1989), sec. C, 113.
15 Robert Brothers, "Wildfire Adds New Twist to the Politics of Logging v. Wilderness" Forest Watch (April 1988),
20.

56 The timber sale is the basic unit by which the Forest
Service sells timber to the highest bidder who then does the
actual cutting and removing of logs. In the Siskiyou, as in
most Region Six forests, such contracts usually cover areas
between forty and three hundred acres and most ofte~ stipulate clearcutting methods.
57 Thomas, 1; Murphy.
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tical pressure from certain members of Congress and the administration upon the Region Six forests to keep timber output high. In 1986 and 1987, annual harvest levels in the
Siskiyou neared a record two hundred million board feet
(mmbf), a level which the supervisor of the forest warned
could not be kept up for long without violating sustained
yield

requirements.~

Converting the North Kalmiopsis's old growth to younger plantations would satisfy the administration's and Congress's demands for high output in two ways. Not only would
immense old trees be cut, but also, once replanted, this
would boost the annual growth figures for the entire forest.
The counties were equally eager to open the North Kalmiopsis
since by a quirk of fate this part of the Siskiyou National
Forest has an especially high percentage of O&C lands in its
acreage (it is roughly half O&C as compared to 17% for the
forest as a whole) which by law nets twice as much county
revenue as non-O&C lands (see footnote 22). 59
In the several years since the first Bald Mountain
protests, the bulk of the environmentalists' efforts involved the appealing of individual timber sales. 60 It has
been rare, however, for an administrative appeal to succeed

~Paul Fattig, "Supervisor Says Forest Service Must Slow
Down" Grants Pass Daily Courier (9 June 1987), 1.
59
Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988).
60 The law requires that, in most cases, before a group
can bring suit against the Forest Service, it must first
file an administrative appeal.
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in turning back a sale. In fact, from 1986 to 1988, only
three of the sixty-one sales appealed were withdrawn or
modified.6 1 And if the paperwork was in order and the sale
did not involve any controversial new roads, there was
usually little legal recourse in the courts for these individual sales. It soon became clear to the environmentalists, therefore, that this case-by-case appeals process was
getting them nowhere in terms of halting the stepped-up logging in the North Kalmiopsis.
By 1987, frustration over the continued logging north
of Bald Mountain spurred a new wave of protests and direct
actions. Throughout the summer of 1987 tensions in the already polarized region heightened further as blockades and
civil disobedience led mostly by Earth First Siskiyou flared
up again as logging commenced on the Hobson Horn, South Indigo, and Sapphire timber sales, all in prime old growth. On
the Hobson Horn site, protesters buried themselves up to
their necks on the logging road while at the Sapphire protest, a number of individuals sat high up in trees slated
for cutting as others chained themselves to the loggers'
yarding

61

unit.~

Meanwhile, protests and disruptions at the

USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Appeal
Number Record 1986-1990, internal document.
~ "Earth First Protests Hobson Horn Sale" Grants Pass
Daily Courier (4 April 1987); David Barron, "CD Begins Anew
in Kalmiopsis" Earth First! (1 May 1987), 1, 5; "Eighteen
Arrested in 3 Actions in North Kalmiopsis" Earth First! (21
June 1987), 6; Jericho Clearwater, "Kalmiopsis Shutdown!"
Earth First! (1 August 1987), 1.
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Siskiyou Headquarters in Grants Pass were becoming an almost
commonplace occurrence. In all, twenty-seven protesters were
arrested that spring and summer and the "Sapphire Six," as
they came to be called, were fined $56,800 in damages.63
Before long it became evident to the environmentalists
that if they wanted to save the North Kalmiopsis and other
unprotected roadless areas in the Siskiyou, then they would
need a strategy beyond blocking roads or appealing individual timber sales after they have already been sold. Not
trusting the Forest Service to refrain anytime soon from
cutting and roadbuilding and having all but exhausted their
chances at securing congressional wilderness designation for
the North Kalmiopsis, the environmentalists (specifically
the ONRC) came up with a rather bold proposal; the creation
of a Siskiyou National Park.
Encompassing about 700,000 acres of the national forest, the proposed park would be off limits to logging and
administered by the Department of Interior's more preservation oriented National Park Service. This change of jurisdiction, felt many environmentalists, offered the best hope
for long-term protection for the Siskiyou. Several local
environmental groups immediately endorsed this idea, while
several new groups organized strictly to promote the
~Thomas,

plan.~

1; Kathy Hands, "Protesters Get Jail Terms"

Grants Pass Daily Courier (30 June 1987); Earth First!, In
the Fight to Save the Earth ... Will Our Constitutional
Rights Become Sawdust Too?, pamphlet, (1988).
~Most

notably, the Siskiyou National Park Campaign.
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To the environmentalists, the Siskiyou's fantastic
biodiversity, especially its unusual plant life, made it a
natural for park designation, being on a par with the Everglades or Yellowstone in its natural wonders. It was also
argued that Oregon with only 183,000 acre Crater Lake, had
far less national park acreage than most western states.
Furthermore, advocates claimed that the park would be an
economic boon to the region's tourist industry and help
southwest Oregon make the inevitable transition away from
dependence on a troubled timber industry. The argument here
was that, tourist-wise, a national park geared towards recreation and preservation would far outdraw the national forest, which is the case, for example, with Yellowstone or
Yosemite and their national forest neighbors. 65
With the park proposal's increasing publicity and momentum, those timber interests who did not already see what
was coming finally began to perceive of the environmentalists as more than just a nuisance, but instead as an immediate and growing threat to their interests. With the park
proposal, local timber interests began to mobilize in earnest, offering a furious counterattack. They labelled the
park an economic disaster that would cost at least fifteen
hundred jobs and lock-up resource-rich

65

lands.~

As for the

For a summary of the supposed benefits of the park
plan, see Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests."
~ "Unknowns Make Park a Gamble" (editorial) Grants Pass
Daily Courier (l April 1989).
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tourism jobs the park was to create, the timber interests
scornfully dismissed them as minimum wage service-sector
employment barely fit for teenagers. Some even questioned
whether the park would create any additional tourism at all,
pointing to the already existing abundance of recreational
opportunities in the region. As evidence, they cited the experience of the costly Redwood National Park not far down
the coast where a promised economic boom after its establishment in the late 1970s never materialized.67
Not surprisingly, the Forest Service was just as
forceful in its rejection of the park proposal, warning of
lost jobs, lost county revenue, and less "balanced"
management.~

The Forest Service, as any bureaucracy would,

dreaded the possibility of losing jurisdiction to its historic rival; a scenario not without precedent in the annals
of Forest Service-Park Service history.69 Painfully aware of
this precedent, the Siskiyou National Forest wasted no time
in denouncing the plan. In uncharacteristically forthright
language, the normally diplomatic Forest Service accused the

~Jim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: Lew Krauss" Evergreen (April 1987); "Perspective: Forest Service Opposes
Park" Evergreen (April 1987).
~USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press
Release (24 March 1987).
69 The Sequoia, Olympic, and North Cascades National Parks
are but a few more famous examples of national parks being
carved out of national forest jurisdictions. For a case
study of the Olympic transfer, see Ben Twight, Organizational Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the
Olympic National Park (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1983).
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ONRC and other environmentalists of having ulterior motives
in proposing the park. 70 The National Park Service, meanwhile, officially remained neutral on the park proposal
while most all of the region's newspapers opposed it. Other
than the environmentalists themselves, only the Oregon Coast
Association and the Salem Statesman-Journal came out in support of the park plan.
The Silver Fire
As the national park campaign was getting underway and
the Bald Mountain protests were winding down in the late
summer, a sudden and unforeseen event dramatically altered
the issues and raised the stakes. On the night on August 30,
1987, lightning from a dry electrical storm struck the tinder dry forest in several places, igniting a monsterous
blaze that would burn for ten weeks in what would become the
largest forest fire in Oregon in the last half-century. 71
Although the fires burned in several areas throughout the
forest and in adjacent national forests across the border in
California, the worst blaze was centered around Silver Creek
in the North Kalmiopsis, not far from Bald Mountain. 72 The
Silver Complex Fires, as they came to be called, burned over

70

usoA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press
Release (24 March 1987).
71
Egan, 179 .
72 In fact, Lou Gold barely made it off the mountain, escaping on foot one step ahead of the flames in a two-day ordeal. T.A. Allen, "Lou Gold Escapes Bald Mt." Earth First/
(l November 1987), 11.
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an area covering roughly 110,000 acres. Of this, 53,600
acres burned in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, while another
42,900 affected acres were in the North Kalmiopsis.73

In

other words, the fire could not have picked a more controversial place to burn (see figure 4).
For the newly invigorated local timber interests, the
fire provided a golden opportunity to settle the North Kalmiopsis controversy in their favor once and for all. It also
served as a rhetorical club with which to beat the environmentalists. Not missing a single angle, the timber interests
went on the attack, demanding immediate salvage of the burned timber while blaming the fire itself on the environmentalists' efforts to keep the area roadless. The lack of
roads, they claimed, seriously hampered firefighting efforts
and thereby allowed the destruction of precious resources. 74
While the burned area within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness
was legally off-limits to salvage, the North Kalmiopsis was
not. The Silver Fire, therefore represented a serious threat
to the environmentalists' goals in that area; namely, keeping the North Kalmiposis roadless and unlogged, and achieving park status for it and the larger forest. Any substantial salvage of burned timber would require roadbuilding

~USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, (Region 10: GPO,

1988), 1.

nJim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: The Firefighters" Evergreen (October 1987).
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which, combined with the logging itself, would strike at the
heart of the proposed park area and might very well leave it
too developed for consideration as a national park. Increasing the pressure on the North Kalmiopsis further was the
time element, as fire-damaged timber has a useful life of
only about two years before insects and rot leave it unusable. 75 Thus, any decisions made on the salvage would have to
sped through.
The stakes thus raised, both sides geared up for action and launched all-out efforts. Locally, each stepped up
their organizing and attempted to reach out beyond southwestern Oregon with their message. Painting the environmentalists as irrational radicals beyond reasoning, and the North
Kalmiopsis as a disaster area of "ash and ruin," the timber
interests, led by the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance
(SORA) pushed for a maximum salvage of the area and the
full-scale roadbuilding necessary to carry this out. 76 If
salvage and rehabilitation were not carried out, warned
SORA, not only would valuable resources go to waste, but
"priceless fish and wildlife habitat" would "be left to the
ravages of wind, rain, erosion and time."n The salvage,
therefore, would not only benefit a damaged land, but would
provide an economic silver lining to an otherwise bad situa75

"Forest Officials Expect Major Battles Over Salvage of
Fire-Damaged Timber" Oregonian (2 October 1987).
76 southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in Medford Mail Tribune (18 October 1987), sec A, 12.
n Ibid.
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tion. Drawn to such common-sense logic, the area's two major
newspapers quickly joined the chorus for rapid salvage.78
SORA, meanwhile, launched an all-out advertising campaign
featuring pre-printed mail-in coupons to be sent to the
Forest Service and members of Congress demanding immediate
and extensive salvage.n
The environmentalists found themselves facing an uphill battle as they tried to explain the subtleties of why
leaving the North Kalmiopsis alone to heal itself in its own
time was a good idea. They disputed the timber interests'
campaign on several grounds. First, they rejected SORA's
characterization of the Silver Fire burn area as a wasteland
and the fire as a tragedy. On the contrary, they argued,
fire was a natural and necessary ecological agent for maintaining the long-term health of the forest and a force which
the Siskiyou evolved with over many

millenia.~

In their

view, then, only those seeing the forest strictly as a commodity would see the fire as a tragedy. Moreover, forest
fires, especially in old growth, the environmentalists
claimed, burn in an irregular mosaic pattern, rarely bringing complete destruction. Pointing to maps of burn intensi-

n "Roadless Area is No Excuse to Waste Wood" (editorial)
Grants Pass Daily Courier (12 October 1987).
n "Storm Brews Over Fate of Roadless Area" Grants Pass
DaiiJ. Courier (25 September 1987).
David Atkin, Fire Salvage Issue Not So Simple, Siskiyou
National Park Campaign flier (Portland: 1987); "Kalmiopsis
Fire: The Reality and the Politics" Earth First/ (2 February

1988), 7.

75

ty, the environmentalists claimed that in only 9% of the
Silver Fire area had over 90% of the trees been killed,
while over 50% of the area had only a 10% mortality rate
(see figure 5) and most of that did not include the biggest,
most fire-resistant

trees.~

The environmentalists also challenged the idea of salvage bringing rehabilitation to the seriously burned areas.
They argued that, far from restoring the North Kalmiopsis,
the logging and roadbuilding of the salvage effort would
bring further damage to already stressed areas; a situation
akin, in the environmentalists' favorite analogy, to "mugging a burn victim." Specifically, it was warned that salvage activities would increase soil compaction, erosion, and
landslides in areas denuded from the fire and seriously increase sedimentation in salmon spawning

areas.~

To either side, the other's position was really a
front for more insidious goals. To the timber interests, all
the environmentalists really wanted was to keep the North
Kalmiopsis roadless at all costs in hopes of achieving their
goal of a national park to keep out the loggers and shut
down the industry. To environmentalists, on the other hand,
the timber interests and the Forest Service were less interested in salvaging burnt logs of questionable value as they

~Ibid.; Brothers, 19.
~Paul Fattig, "Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver

Salvage" Grants Pass Daily Courier (9 September 1988); Headwaters Press Release (6 May 1988); Atkin, SNPC Flyer.
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were in opening up the North Kalmiopsis to roads and tree
farms once and for all.
With both sides more polarized than ever, the ball was
now in the Forest Service's court. While the agency was
clearly inclined towards salvage from the start, it still
had to conduct environment impact studies and determine the
extent of the salvage before it could commence operations.
With the burned timber's limited life span, the pressure to
speed this process through was intense. Originally, the Forest Service intended to prepare a full EIS only for the most
controversial parts of the salvage area, such as around Bald
Mountain, while other parts would be covered by the less
comprehensive EA process.83 However, after an initial series
of public meetings and thousands of letters made it clear
just how controversial the entire project was, Supervisor
Ron McCormick relented, and decided to prepare a single EIS
for the entire Silver Fire area; a procedural victory for
the

environmentalists.~

Regarding roads, however, the For-

est Service announced that the fire had invalidated its moratorium on North Kalmiopsis roadbuilding. While the road issue was originally to be settled in the forthcoming Forest
Plan, it would now be decided in the Silver Fire EIS. 85

83 Regional Forester James Torrence to Supervisor Ron
McCormick, Internal Forest Service document, (17 November
1987).
~ "Feds Order Study on All Kalmiopsis" Medford Mail Tribune (22 February 1988); Brothers, 20.
~"Forest Officials Expect Major Battles .... "
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Now committed to the more comprehensive and timeconsuming EIS process, the Siskiyou National Forest found
itself under considerable pressure from timber interests and
Washington headquarters to finish the process by early
spring 1988. 86 After unsuccessfully appealing to the Environmental Protection Agency for permission to shorten the
length of the comment period on the draft EIS (DEIS), the
Forest Service had no choice but to move as fast as it possibly could.87 By early in the new year, the Silver Fire
Project EIS effort sped into full gear. Preparing a DEIS under such massive time constraints necessitated an unprecedented effort on the Forest Service's part, as the Siskiyou
found that it had to put practically all other national forest business on hold and bring in hundreds of personnel from
other national forests. To house such a massive mobilization, the Forest Service had to expand into a rented office
building in Grants Pass, the new Silver Fire Recovery Center
which quickly became one of the city's largest employers
with its own $2.5 million budget and an ad hoc staff of
120.88

86
Brothers, 2 O.
87 originally the Forest Service sought to reduce the DEIS
review period from the usual forty-five days to fifteen, but
under pressure from one of the Siskiyou area's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), it requested but was still
denied a thirty-day review. "Forest Service to Decide on
Silver Fire Study" Medford Mail Tribune Extra (28 January-3
February 1988).
88 Barnes Ellis, "Back From the Dead" Oregonian (24 April

1988).
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Although the Forest Service held a series of public
workshops in an effort to build consensus, environmentalists
and the timber interests were less interested in negotiating
with each other than in mobilizing their followers both locally and nationally, especially through massive mail campaigns. According to the former supervisor, the Siskiyou
elicited over twenty thousand mail responses (the highest
inputs for any unit in the entire system) from all over the
country on the Silver issue; with most of these urging the
adoption in the DEIS of either the environmentalists' national park/no salvage or timber's maximum salvage alternatives. "We were like a lightening rod," recalled the former
supervisor.
By late March 1988, after several months of frantic
work, the Forest Service completed its draft and announced
its tentative decision to harvest 146 mmbf of timber out of
the 270 mmbf estimated to have been killed. Such an effort
would necessitate the building of twenty-one miles of roads
including the nine mile completion of the Bald Mountain
Road, and would account for the bulk of that year's total
harvest on the Siskiyou. Of the roughly twelve thousand acre
harvest area, one-quarter was to be clearcut and accessed by
roads, while the rest would be harvested by helicopter in an
attempt to minimize damage to the land.~
~USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1988).
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Predictably, the draft plan elicited negative reaction
from both sides. As the DEIS underwent its public comment
period, the timber interests complained that the salvage
volume and new road mileage was too low and depended too
heavily on less profitable helicopter logging. The environmentalists, one the other hand, dreaded the many miles of
new roads and clearcutting on the North Kalmiopsis's extremely steep and unstable

slopes.~

At this point, though, the environmentalists shifted
their focus away from the park proposal and the area's fragile ecosystem, and concentrated their strategy instead, upon
the economics of the plan. Led by Headwaters, a wellestablished local forest issues group, the environmentalists
developed fairly sophisticated analyses showing the Silver
Recovery Plan not to be economically feasible. To the environmentalists, the Forest Service was "spending a dollar to
save a

penny."~

The costs of both roadbuilding and helicop-

ter salvage in the exceptionally steep and rugged terrain of
the Silver Fire area would, according to environmentalists,
exceed the retrieved logs' value. In addition, they argued,
the salvaged timber volume by law would have to come out of
the overall sustained yield. Thus, not logging the burned
area would not cost any jobs since the annual sales quantity

~Paul Fattig,

"Silver Fire Plan Awaits Hatchet" Grants
Pass Daily Courier (22 March 1988).
~Paul Fattig, "Group Says Recovery Plan Uneconomical"
Grants Pass Daily Courier (29 April 1988).

81
(ASQ) would be the same regardless of whether fire-killed
timber or living "green" timber from elsewhere in the forest
was cut. Finally, claimed the environmentalists, county government would receive less receipts from the costly and lower quality salvaged timber. 92
As the comment period wound down and the Forest Service went to work on the FEIS, the Silver Fire controversy
began to catch the notice of Congress which, if it so chose,
could render a decision on the matter that would take precedence over the Forest Service. In late May, Rep. Doug Bosco
(D-CA) proposed legislation designed to assure prompt salvage without the expected court delay by barring judicial
review of any of the salvage sales. One of the Siskiyou
area's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), who opposed
such a court ban, began working on alternative legislation
in an attempt to forge a compromise between timber and environmentalists. DeFazio suggested that the salvage go on, but
at reduced level of 136 mmbf with far less roadbuilding and
more helicopter logging. Although the timber interests
promptly rejected DeFazio's plan, the environmentalists,
alarmed by the Forest Service's rapid preparation of the

92

Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988); Cascades
Holistic Economic Consultants to Supervisor Ron McCormick,
CHEC photocopied transcripts, (28 April 1988); Fattig,
"Recovery Plan Uneconomical."
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salvage sales and on the defensive, grudgingly got behind it
as a basis for negotiation.93
On July 8, as local congressmen continued their negotiations, the Forest Service announced its final decision on
the salvage as they released the Silver Fire FEIS. In a modif ication of the draft plan, the Forest Service boosted the
salvage volume from 146 mmbf to 157 mmbf, but reduced the
acres to be harvested to 9,500 in twenty separate timber
sales. 94 To the environmentalists, this modification worsened an already bad deal. The same day the final decision
was announced, Headwaters and the ONRC joined by three prominent national groups, filed a request for a federal court
restraining order to halt the imminent sales on the grounds
that the Forest Service did not adequately consider all of
the EIS-mandated alternatives, especially the park proposal.
They were granted a hearing in Portland scheduled for later
in the month. 95
In Congress, meanwhile, DeFazio, Hatfield, Rep. Les
Aucoin (D-OR), and the Siskiyou area's other representative,
Bob Smith (R-OR) reached a compromise which they attached to
the Interior Appropriations. For the environmentalists,

93 "DeFazio Raps Timber Salvage Plan" Eugene RegisterGuard (20 May 1988); Robert Sterling, "DeFazio Seeks Pact on
Log-ging" Medford Mail Tribune (9 June 1988).
94
Silver Fire Recovery Project FEIS ROD, 23.
~Fattig,"Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver Salvage."
The three national groups were the National Wildlif~ Federation, the National Audubon Society, and the Wilderness Society.
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DeFazio managed to delete the nine mile extension of the
Bald Mountain Road, allowing for only a three-tenths mile
extension to a flat ridgetop where helicopters could land.
The elimination of the Bald Mountain extension would sacrifice about twenty mmbf from the total salvage volume. All
other roads, though, would still be built. The price DeFazio
paid for this, however, was a ban on court appeals of any of
the salvage sales.%
Although relieved by the halting of road they so
hated, environmentalists reacted with outrage to such tampering with their judicial access, deeming such restrictions, in words of a Headwaters activist, "the stuff of petty dictators, of banana republic politics ... 97 The timber interests, meanwhile, though pleased with the ban on appeals,
expressed dismay with the reduced harvest and the delay,
once again, of the road they badly wanted built. One disappointed mill owner characterized the legislation as a compromise of a compromise, while the Southern Oregon Timber

% Alan Hayakawa, "Compromise Would Block Timber Salvage
Appeals" Oregonian (24 June 1988). Rep. Smith, under pressure from timber interests in his district, eventually reversed himself and withdrew his support for the compromise,
pushing instead his own unsuccessful proposal to built the
Bald Mountain extension. Robert Sterling and Bill Manny,
"Bob Smith Proposal Opposed" Medford Mail Tribune (21 September 1988).
97
"Timber Salvage Plan is a Compromise No One Likes"
Grants Pass Daily Courier (24 June 1988).
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Industries Association (SOTIA), angrily argued that there
was clear public mandate to salvage 200 mmbf .98
In late July, a federal judge turned down the environmentalists' request for an immediate injunction on the salvage and several weeks later, an appellate court turned down
an appeal of that ruling. Court relief was to become a moot
point, however, as Congress soon thereafter passed the Hatfield salvage rider. Although their plans were now modified
by Congress, the Forest Service finally had a green light on
the salvage operation. In July the timber sale auctions
closed and the rush to harvest was on. In celebration, timber interests in Grants Pass organized the Silver Fire
Roundup, a massive parade and demonstration featuring over a
thousand logging

trucks.~

Now that all the legal, administrative, and legislative avenues had been exhausted, Earth First stepped back
into the spotlight announcing the start of a direct action
campaign to stop the logging in their beloved North Kalmiopsis. Jittery about the prospect of anything delaying the
salvage, the Forest Service braced itself for the protesters. As Supervisor McCormick issued orders closing the salvage area to the public, the Josephine County sheriff's po-

~Robert Sterling, "Both Sides Unhappy With Silver Salvage" Medford Mail Tribune (24 June 1988); Ellis, "Logging
Com~romise Kindles Anger."
Evergreen (August 1988).
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lice took special riot control courses and promised aggress i ve action. 100
In late July, after infiltrating the salvage zone near
the Bald Mountain Road with climbing equipment, Earth First
members in three different actions ascended onto platforms
high up in the trees with supplies of food and water. In no
mood for such protests, the Forest Service moved quickly to
remove the treesitters who were gaining quite a bit of media
attention. By early August, they were brought down by professional climbers while a police sniper stood by. 101

As the

long summer wound down so did the protests. The salvage,
however, went on.
The Spotted Owl and the Nationalization of the Old Growth
Controversy
As the controversy over the Silver Fire raged in the
Siskiyou, similar issues and policy conflicts began to crop
up all over the Pacific Northwest. The seed of dissent
planted at the Bald Mountain Road protests back in 1983 had
blossomed into a full-blown regional and, in many respects,
national issue; quite possibly the most important environmental policy debate of the decade.
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Paul Fattig, "Closure to Block Protests" Grants Pass
Daily Courier (8 July 1988); Gail Bullen, "Sheriff Maps Out
Strategy to Handle Forest Protests" Grants Pass Daily Courier ~12 July 1988).
10 Paul Fattig, "Protesters Take to the Trees" Grants
Pass Daily Courier (21 July 1988); Robert Sterling, "Sniper
was Prepared to Shoot Sitter" Medford Mail Tribune (5 August
1988).
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Perhaps more than than anything else, what raised the
stakes and catapulted the old growth issue beyond local protests and appeals was Strix occidentalis caurina, the northern spotted owl. Native only to the Pacific Northwest, this
unobtrusive little bird of prey has highly specific habitat
needs. To feed and nest, each mating pair requires a substantial block of undisturbed old growth. Because the spotted owl is so particular in its old growth habitat needs, it
serves to scientists as what is called an indicator species
for the larger old growth ecosystem. In other words, the owl
is seen as a barometer which gives insight into the health
of the larger ecosystem.102
As the harvesting of old growth intensified in the
1960s and 70s, scientists began to see the first signs of
spotted owl decline. As early as 1972, biologists were warning that the owl was in big trouble, but the Forest Service
and the BLM at that point opted to take no action. 1 ~

By

1986 and 1987, as the rate of old growth felled on public
land reached an estimated 170 acres a day, 104

1

it became

~ For example, the spotted owl feeds largely upon forest
rodents who, in turn, feed upon the truffles of the
nitrogen-fixing root fungi so essential to the big trees of
the ancient forest. A decline in owls, therefore, could be
linked to a decline in mychorrhizal fungi due to logging,
erosion, or other major forest disturbances. Caufield, 52.
103 Carrie Casey, "The Bird of Contention" American Forests (October 1991), 30.
104 Steve Young, "Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work"
Washington Post (13 August 1989).
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clear to biologists and environmentalists that the spotted
owl was reaching the point of no return.
In January, 1987, several national environmental
groups filed a petition with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as a
nationally endangered species. Such a listing would, according to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), require the
federal government to design and implement a plan for the
owl's recovery while taking no action in the interim to harm
the owl or its essential habitat. Fish and Wildlife Service
personnel, however, were under strict orders from the Reagan
Administration, specifically Secretary of Interior Donald
Hodel and their own chief Frank Dunkle, to not extend protection to the bird under any circumstances. Rolf Wallenstrom, the FWS director for the Pacific Northwest region,
later admitted to having been absolutely forbidden to list
the ow1. 1os

And so, by December, 1987, after drawing their

inevitable decision out for almost a year's worth of heavy
old growth harvesting, Fish and Wildlife denied the petition.
Almost immediately a coalition of twenty-five environmental groups brought suit against the agency out of concern
for the owl itself, but perhaps more importantly, to broaden
their arsenal in the fight to save the old growth forests.

1

~ As told to Ted Williams, "The Spotted Fish Under the
Spotted Owls" Fly, Rod and Reel (January/February 1990), 20.
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In November, 1988, federal Judge Thomas Zilly of the Seattle
district, a Reagan appointee, ruled with the environmentalists, finding that the Fish and Wildlife Service had acted
in a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
the law" in not listing the owl as threatened despite "expert opinion to the contrary.

001 06

Consequently, Zilly or-

dered FWS to reconsider its decision and base it upon scientific criteria which, as all parties knew, meant nearcertain listing. Still, due to the low capacity of this
chronically underfunded and understaffed agency as well as
administrative pressure to go as slow as possible, formal
protection for the owl was still a long way off. What this
meant for the Forest Service's timber program in owl habitat, aside from the agency's vague and voluntary promises of
restraint, was a continued green light.
One thing which this uproar over the owl served to accomplish was to gain increasing national exposure for the
old growth issue. This previously obscure term, once the
sole domain of foresters and ecologists, began to filter
into the vocabulary of policymaking circles. To the media,
106

Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v.
Donald Hodel 716 F. Supp. 479 (9th U.S. District, 1988).
This was a finding later corroborated by a highly critical
1989 GAO report of the Fish and Wildlife Service which questioned whether its "objectivity was maintained" and blasted
the agency for having "substantially changed the body of
scientific evidence" warning of the owl's demise. This damaging report was one factor in Dunkle's sudden retirement.
Government Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Spotted
Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by Problems, GAO/RCED-89-79
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989).
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meanwhile, another dramatic snail darter-like endangered
species case seemed to be shaping up. With the Region Six
timber harvest at its all-time high of 5.5 bbf,107

both the

timber interests and environmentalists began competing to
define the controversy for the growing national audience.
For the timber interests, the old growth issue boiled
down to the prosperity and stability of timber dependent
communities whose loggers and millworkers required a steady
and reliable supply of timber. At the heart of the issue
was, therefore, jobs. While the estimates of job loss resulting from old growth protection varied wildly depended
upon both the source of the statistics and the degree of
forest preservation foreseen, practically all painted a grim
picture of hardship and dislocation. The Bush Administration
pegged the figure at 28,000 jobs lost if the spotted owl was
protected, while Hatfield predicted 25,000-50,000 unemployed. Lower estimates of 13,000 and 19,000 were cited, respectively, by Congress and Reuters. 108

The highest estimate was

the American Forest Product Alliance's prediction of 102,757
jobs wiped out over a decade in addition to the 44,500 they
claimed were already lost to the environmentalists' "lockup" of federal lands in the

Northwest. 1 ~

1m Philip Shabecoff, "The Battle for the National Forests" New York Times (13 August 1989), sec.4, 24.
108 John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home" Audubon
(March 1991), 89.
1
~ Ibid. 88.
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In addition to lost jobs, less timber also meant reduced local government receipts which in many rural areas
provided the bulk of funding for schools and services. To
replace such funding in communities already smarting from
high unemployment would be next to impossible claimed timber
advocates. The result of such severe layoffs and reduced
timber receipts, they argued, would be a gradual disintegration of once stable and prosperous communities along with
all the accompanying social disruption. 110

In the words of a

joint Forest Service/SLM study, this expected unravelling of
the social fabric of timber dependent communities would be
marked by "increasing rates of domestic disputes, divorce,
acts of violence, vandalism, suicide, alcoholism and other
social problems.

11

111

Thus, to the timber interests, nothing

less than the family and community life so deeply rooted in
these small towns was at stake, as the owner of a small Oregon logging operation makes clear:
My son is twenty-eight. He will not leave this area.
His great-grandfather was born here. Our roots are
here. We don't want to go anywhere else. I was in
Seattle a few weeks ago, and there was an editorial in
the paper saying that the government should buy our
homes from us, reeducate us, relocate us. But that's
what they don't understand. We want to stay here. And
what are they going to retrain us for? What? 11 2
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Michael Satchell, "The Endangered Logger" U.S. News
and World Report (25 June 1990), 27-29.
111 Report quoted in Ted Gup, "Owls vs. Man" Time (25 June
1990~, 57.
11
Quote in Mitchell, 94.
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In addition to its economic necessity, timber interests also argued that the logging of old growth was smart
forestry as well. Allowing conversion of old growth to vigorous stands of second growth would allow for optimal forest
management and provide timber indefinitely, thereby averting
future timber famines in a society whose seemingly insatiable demand for wood products has been constantly growing. In
addition, timber interests claimed that clearcutting vastly
improved wildlife habitat for game species who preferred
open habitat to old, dark forests.113

As for those who saw

old growth as a unique and irreplaceable habitat, they maintained that plenty was already off limits to logging in wilderness areas and national parks.11 4 Finally, the timber interests argued that the spotted owl, even if it was endangered (which they claimed was not yet clear), should never
come before human beings. If the issue boiled down to man
versus owl, then man had to and ought to prevail.
The environmentalists, on the other hand, saw the issue in starkly different terms. Far from being a case of
owls versus people, it was instead a case of the timber
industry's greed and inflexibility. Lost jobs, they main113 A good summary of all these points from a pro-timber
perspective can be found in Leila Kysar, "A Logger's Lament"
Newsweek (22 October 1990), 10.
114 The environmentalists respond to this point by claiming that most protected areas had the best old growth carefully left outside their boundaries when they were drawn especially in wilderness areas which consist of far greater
acreage of high elevation rock, ice, and alpine meadow. For
actual estimates of protected old growth, see pages 55-56.
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tained, were due, for the most part, to the automation of
the timber industry and the export of raw logs which denied
local mills a massive supply of timber. They cited estimates
that approximately 25% of all unfinished whole logs and 60%
of all wholly or partially processed timber (chips, slabs,
pulp, etc.) from the Pacific Northwest are exported annually. 115

While timber from national forests (which accounts

for around 25% of the total harvest) cannot be exported, environmentalists charged that it was used to satisfy domestic
demand in order to free up private timber for profitable
export. 11 6

This arrangement, they argued, has increased

pressure to keep public timber output high. As one of the
world's only major timber producers to allow export, environmentalists charged that the United States had become a
massive resource colony for Japan at the expense of local
mills and workers.
To support these charges that timber industry practices were behind most of the job loss, environmentalists
pointed to statistics showing an industry which produced
roughly the same volume of wood products, consumed more public timber, and enjoyed far greater profits in 1988 as it
did in 1972, but with only two-thirds or twenty thousand

115

These estimates, the former from the Forest Service,
the latter from Rep. Peter DeFazio's office, are cited in
"Log Exports Liquidating our Forests for Insatiable ·International Demand" Forest Voice 2:2 (1990), 4.
116
Ibid.
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fewer workers and three-quarters of the mills. 117

To the

environmentalists then, cutting the last remnants of old
growth would not reverse these long-term economic trends,
but instead would only briefly forestall the inevitable
continuation of job loss and mill closures. Only through
economic diversification and a restructuring of the timber
industry, they claimed, would things turn around. 118
For the environmentalists, therefore, to blame impending hardships on the preservation of the spotted owl was a
cruel hoax based upon the false premise that prosperity and
employment based upon a finite and rapidly dwindling resource (old growth) could continue indefinitely. An editorial in a Siskiyou area newspaper sums up this view:
Comrnunities .... grew accustomed to a higher standard of
public living than would have been possible had the
resource [old growth] been properly stewarded to begin
with .... unconscionable overcutting of a limited old
growth forest made our towns and counties feel richer
than they ever really were. 119
Sacrificing the last scraps of irreplaceable old
growth in exchange for a very short-term postponement of
unemployment that, if nothing else changed, would occur re-
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Shelby Scates, "Running Out of Trees" Seattle PostIntelligencer (19 November 1989); Egan, 173.
118

Such reforms would include banning or taxing exports,
retooling mill machinery for second-growth timber and hardwoods, and stressing production of finished lumber products
(such as furniture prehab housing, etc.). Brock Evans, We
Can Protect our Remaining Ancient Forests and Maintain a
Strong Timber Economy in the Pacific Northwest, memorandum
(3 February 1989).
119 Robert Staal, "Do They Really Care About Diversification?" (editorial) Ashland Daily Tiding (23 May 1990).
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gardless (when the old growth ran out ten or twenty years
down the road) was, to the environmentalists, senseless.
"When you have a war between nations," suggested Lou Gold,
"you don't refuse peace just because it might cause unemployment among soldiers. 120
The Forest Plan
Just as the old growth controversy in the Northwest
was intensifying, the Siskiyou National Forest was working
towards completion of its long-awaited Forest Plan. As mandated in the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NMFA)
and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
Act of 1974 (RPA), each national forest unit was to draw up
a ten to fifteen year master plan. Such plans, which were to
strive for both balanced usage and compliance with all major
environmental laws, would serve as an overall blue-print for
forest management for that period. Previously, most national
forests were managed through a rather haphazard mix of decentralized area plans, regional plans, and the Forest Service manual. Because the preparation of each plan for a
given forest required an elaborate data-gathering and coordination effort between all the ranger districts and the
different areas of specialization, as well as a draft and
final EIS, plans were often a decade or more in the making.

1

~

Lou Gold quoted in Caufield, 83.
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The Siskiyou's Forest Plan, the initial stages of which were
begun in the late 1970s, proved no exception to this rule.
On August 28, 1987, two days before lightning ignited
the Silver blaze, the DEIS for the Forest Plan was released
and a lengthy 150-day public review period commenced. Refleeting Supervisor McCormick's determination to get the cut
down from what he felt were unsustainable levels, the draft
plan featured a modest drop in the ASQ from the previous
range of 168-200 mmbf to 150 mmbf. 121

Still, the plan kept

the forest firmly on a commodity-producing path as it called
for the eventual harvest of three-quarters of currently unprotected mature forest (including old growth) and the penetration of most roadless areas (including the North Kalmiopsis) outside of the congressionally designated wilderness
with several hundred miles of new

roads. 1 ~

As with the Silver Fire DEIS, the immediate reaction
to the draft plan was criticism from both sides. For the
timber interests, the plan did not maintain timber harvests
at sufficient levels or manage the Siskiyou as intensively
as it could have. In response, SOTIA lauched a massive letter and pre-printed coupon campaign pushing its "Evergreen
121

The DEIS preferred alternative is described in Land
and Resource Management Plan FEIS, sec. II, 103-106.
122 Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS, sec. I I, 154.
Specifically regarding mature and old growth forest, the
draft plan increased protected areas by eleven thousand
acres over the Forest's current guidelines. Roughly 85,500
acres of mature forest outside of wilderness areas was to be
pre-served while the remaining 258,500 acres were slated for
eventual harvest. FEIS, sec. II, 104.

96

Alternative" for the final version of the Forest Plan.
SOTIA's plan would set the annual Siskiyou harvest at 188
mmbf, increase roadbuilding, and reduce the normal 100-120
year cutting rotations to eighty years.1n
The environmentalists, meanwhile, were even less
pleased by the draft. Their main critique of the plan, which
Headwaters was especially instrumental in developing, centered around allegations that the Forest Service models used
to calculate the forest's sustained yield, and hence the
ASQ, were seriously flawed. According to Julie Norman, president of Headwaters, the plan relied upon inaccurate computer model predictions of the growth rate of its second
growth tree farms, thereby falsely boosting the whole forest's sustained yield and the current harvest levels set by
that measure. These models' suspect long-term growth rate
projections, claimed Norman, were based upon little more
than sheer optimism and the liberal use of fertilizers and
currently banned herbicides on the young

stands. 1 ~

Accord-

ing to one environmentalist, this amounted to "voodoo forestry":
Shorter rotations, better seeds--they conjure up all
these intangibles that are supposed to enhance future
growth. They don't care if it really works. The point
is that it provides them with an excuse to cut more
big old trees now.1~

1n Roger Morton, "Santa's List Won't Make Some Jolly"
(editorial) Grants Pass Daily Courier (17 December 1987).
1
~ Norman, "Our Choices," 15.
1
~ Quote in Caufield, 68.
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As such, argued environmentalists, these models served less
to realistically predict forest growth and more as a continued justification for the "business as usual" of clearcutting, overcutting, and old growth harvesting.1u
The truth of the matter regarding reforestation in the
Siskiyou, claimed Headwaters, was something quite different.
On certain parts of the forest (especially on the high, dry,
and rocky slopes of the Illinois Valley Ranger District),
where the Forest Service projected vigorous growth rates for
reforested stands, it was charged that that many of the replanted trees were not thriving or even surviving. In fact,
a few Illinois Valley sites had been unsuccessfully reforested six times since 1961. 127 According to one environmentalist, the Forest Service had been growing "stealth

trees."1~

Based upon their studies, Headwaters estimated that the Forest Service would realize only 66% of their expected harvest

1u Headwater's charges would be largely upheld three
years later in a very critical House Interior Committee Report on the adequacy and reliability of Forest Service timber yield models and reforestation practices. Specifically,
the report found that Siskiyou National Forest's growth projections were totally unproven and purposefully blind to a
number of limiting factors. In the national forests of the
Northwest as a whole, the report found a pattern of overoptimistic growth projections and inaccurate inventories of
actual standing timber. The report also found actual growth
rate to be only 64% of the volume cut--a clear violation of
sustained yield. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Management of Federal Timber Resources:
The Loss of Accountability (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992),
1-3.
1V Ibid.
1
~ Kathie Durbin, "Clearcut Logging Ravages Soil in Areas
of Siskiyous" Oregonian special report, 16.
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on replanted

sites, 1 ~

some of which their own district sil-

viculturist deemed in 1973 as "questionable'' or "out of the
question" for clearcutting in the first place. 130

Since NFMA

prohibits cutting in areas not successfully reforested in
five years, these were quite serious charges the environmentalists were

levelling.1~

Until the Silver Fire Project was wrapped up in the
autumn of 1988, progress on the FEIS was slow. It was not
until September that attention refocused on the Forest Plan
as the state of Oregon jumped into the fray. Democratic Governor Neil Goldschmidt's National Forest Planning Team had
for some time been drawing up the state's own preferred
long-term management plan for the Siskiyou and on September
26 presented its "Oregon Alternative." The state plan called
for an annual harvest of 160 mmbf (ten mmbf over the Forest
Service's proposal), but kept the still substantial undis1

~ Robert Sterling, "Headwaters Notes Flaw in Forest
Plan" Medford Mail Tribune (22 January 1988).
1
~ Illinois Valley District Silviculturist Alan Wolfson
quoted in House Interior Committee Report, 10.
1
~ Again, these charges were backed up in the 1992 Interior Committee Report. The report charged that the Siskiyou misleadingly claimed a 99% reforestation success rate
"by using a biased, incomplete sample that ignored highelevation failures .... " In the strongest terms the report
goes on to find that "the parallel with the savings and loan
crisis is clear. Managers substituted junk bonds and poorlysecured loans for reliable long-term home mortgages .... Likewise, the trustees for the public's forest trust, the Forest
Service and BLM, have failed to adequately audit the consequences of their actions and their investments. Thousands of
acres of original forests have been cashed in by clearcutting. The basic productivity of the land has been reinvested
(loaned out) in a speculative system of clearcuts and monoculture tree farms." House Interior Report, 22.
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turbed portion of the North Kalmiopsis either roadless or
off-limits to

logging.1~

Although it recommended a higher ASQ, the state plan
was still quickly rejected by the timber interests who saw
the North Kalmiopsis provision as needless pandering. Environmentalists, especially Headwaters, though, saw the state
plan as an improvement upon the federal plan in that it was
more amenable overall to the goals of ecological protection
and biodiversity.in

The environmentalists' tentative faith

in the state plan soon crumbled, though, after the state,
under heavy pressure from the timber interests, pulled back
from its proposal to keep the North Kalmiopsis roadless.
Although it alone was responsible for the final decision, the Forest Service granted considerable weight to the
state's view on this matter. According to the Supervisor, he
considered it impossible to come up with a plan that the
state did not sign-on to, primarily because Hatfield made
the state's endorsement of the plan a condition for his own
support. Consequently, the Forest Service went out of its
way to coordinate with and accomodate the state, working
closely with the governor's staff. Most local governments,
taking a very hard line and endorsing SOTIA's Evergreen

1

~

Paul Fattig, "State Wants Siskiyou Harvest Increased"

Grants Pass Daily Courier (26 September 1988).
in "Environmental Groups Like State Alternative" Medford
Mail Tribune (2 November 1988).
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Alternative, found themselves largely outside this policy
loop.
The construction of the final plan featured some of
the most pronounced and closely involved political intervention Siskiyou personnel had yet faced as Supervisor McCormick describes:
There was some pretty heavy political influence and
some give and take in the last minutes before that
plan was born that was .... in some ways heavier than
with the Silver Plan.
By April, 1989, under heavy pressure from all sides,
the Forest Service released the FEIS and the long-awaited
final decision for the Forest Plan. The final plan featured
several changes from the draft including a ten mmbf boost in
the ASQ which put it in line with the state's goal of 160
rnmbf and a 13,407 acre increase in mature/old growth
protection. 1 ~

Although the Forest Service promised to

switch a few high-altitude logging sites from clearcutting
to selective

logging,1~

environmentalists felt this did

little to ameliorate their larger concerns about reforestation failure and inaccurate growth projections; how could it
have, they asked, if the ASQ actually went up? The environmentalists promptly appealed the plan and the appeal was
just as promptly rejected.

1

~

116.

Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS sec. II, 14, 104,

~ Unlike clearcutting which removes all the tree~ in a
given area, selective cutting takes only certain individual
trees of varying ages and leaves most of the rest.
1

CHAPTER 3
OLD GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL AGENDA

The preservationists .... will soon have the blood of
thousands of unemployed timber workers on their hands
.... If we compromise, we let them off the hook.
Yellow Ribbon Coalition
We already cut the heck out of our forests and every
damn stick of old growth left is significant. I for
one am sick and tired of being considered unreasonable
and uncompromising because I don't want to split the
last five percent of the ancient forest with the timber industry.
Tim Lillebo, ONRC

The Pressure Builds
As the Forest Plan was being hashed out in the Siskiyou, the larger old growth issue was expanding. In response
to the court order of the previous year, the Fish and Wildlife Service officially proposed to list the spotted owl as
a threatened species in March 1989. A torturous fifteen
month path of bureaucratic delay still lay ahead before the
actual listing would occur, however, as the Bush Administration sought to stall the inevitable for as long as possible.
101

102
As old growth habitat continued to fall, the environmentalists grew increasingly frustrated at the glacial pace
at which the reluctant agencies were being forced by the
courts to move to protect the owl. Subsequently, they
brought separate suits against the Forest Service and BLM in
early 1989 charging that both agencies failed to properly
consider the impact of their old growth timber sales upon
the owl. As a result, in March 1989, Seattle District Court
Judge William Dwyer, another Reagan appointee, enjoined the
Forest Service timber sales in question until the case could
gain a full hearing. In all, approximately one billion board
feet (bbf) of timber, or about one-quarter of Region Six
sales were held up.1
The injunction of a billion board feet of timber not
only heightened already serious tensions, but lent the old
growth issue increasingly high visibility. Both the timber
interests and environmentalists were now involved in fully
national efforts. Timber industry groups, enraged at the
injunction, sponsored advertisements all over the country
and lobbied heavily both regionally and in Washington D.C.
Most all of the large public lands-oriented national environmental groups, meanwhile, had signed onto the old growth/
spotted owl campaign. Even the Siskiyou's Lou Gold took to
1 This preliminary injunction order is described in the
text of Judge Dwyer's 1991 opinion for Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District), section
II.
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the road in 1988, coming down from his Bald Mountain vigil
each winter to travel around the country delivering lectures
and slide shows promoting the Siskiyou National Park idea
and old growth protection in general. Forest Service officials claimed that they could track his movement across the
country each year by following the postmarks of the indignant letters they received.2
Although the Forest Service was bearing much of the
brunt of the environmentalists' ire, the high volume harvests of the late 1980s were as much or more the responsibility of Congress. Year after year, the Northwest's delegation managed to boost the timber sales appropriations even
further than the Forest Service was requesting.3 In 1987,
for example, the Siskiyou was ordered by Congress to sell
46.7% more timber than the forest had originally planned. 4
Especially with so much timber being held up in court, the
1990 appropriations were to prove no exception regarding
congressional intervention. Senator Hatfield managed to
attach a rider to the 1990 Interior Appropriations bill that
freed up most of the billion bf being enjoined, while mandating a 3.85 bbf Region Six harvest in 1990 and barring judi-

2 Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker (14
May 1990), 72.
3 congress increased the Region Six harvest by 700 mmbf in
1986, 1 billion bf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf
in 1989. Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest
Timber Management Plans" from special report: "Forests in
Distress" Oregonian (15 October 1990), 11.
4
caufield, 56.
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cial review of any of 1990 sales.s Interior Appropriations
Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL), long a staunch
friend of environmentalists, tried to keep the rider off the
House version, but was outmanuevered by Aucoin. Previously,
court-stripping amendments had been very case-specific such
as the rider used in the Silver Fire salvage, but this
rider, known as Section 318, was the broadest court ban ever
attempted.6
In order to get such a controversial measure through
Congress, however, Hatfield had to sweeten the deal with
several compromise measures. First, Section 318 issued a
somewhat vague directive for the Forest Service to do its
best not to fragment significant blocks of owl habitat.
Given the extremely high 1990 quota, however, this goal
would be hard not to violate. Second, it mandated the creation of citizen advisory boards for each Region Six "owl
forest" to review timber sales as to their impact on the
spotted owl and advise the Forest Service accordingly. 7
Finally, Section 318 directed the Forest Service to develop

5 Philip

Shabecoff, "Senate Votes to Allow Cutting of
Northwest's Virgin Forests" New York Times (27 July 1989),
sec. A, 17
6 In all there have been nine court-stripping riders added
to appropriation bills.
7 These advisory boards were to be composed of two timber
industry representatives, two environmentalists, and two or
three supposedly neutral members.
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a spotted owl plan by September, 1990,s something the agency
had already promised to do by the spring of 1989.9
As might be expected, Section 318 raised howls of protest from the environmentalists. Not only did it released
163 timber sales in owl habitat before the courts could rule

on their legality, but it also took from them their most effective weapon. The need for a court ban was obvious, fumed
the environmentalists, because Section 318 violated NEPA,
NFMA, the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Act,
and the Clean Water Act, not to mention the rights of citizens for redress. 10
Around the same time Section 318 was passed, an interagency panel of scientists from the Forest Service, BLM,
FWS, National Park Service, and northwest states, headed by
Forest Service biologist Jack Ward Thomas, convened to devise a plan to save the spotted owl. Around six months later, in March 1990, this Interagency Scientific Committee
(ISC) issued its findings and recommendations, commonly
known as the Thomas Report.11 The committee came to the
fairly obvious conclusion that the spotted owl was headed
towards extinction if current logging practices did not

8 Public

Law #101-122, Section 318, 103 Stat. 701 (1989),

745-750.

9 Text

of Dwyer opinion for Seattle Audubon Society v.
Evans, section II.
10 "Fundamental Rights Trampled" Forest Voice 2: 1 (_1990),
4.

11 Interagency Scientific Committee, A Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl (GPO region 10: 1990).
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change. At the very least, according to the Thomas Report, a
25-40% reduction in timber harvests and increased protection

of significant stands of old growth were necessary to keep
owl populations above the critical threshold. As a nonbinding recommendation towards that end, the ISC drew up its
own fairly modest three million acre system of Habitat Conservation Areas (HCA) which attempted to identify areas of
especially critical habitat or high dispersal potential.
Adoption of the HCAs, however, would have to be accompanied
by logging reductions outside the HCAs, including a 50% reduction in corridors linking one HCA to the next.12 Although
they generally applauded it, environmentalists were never
very comfortable with the ISC plan.13 Specifically, they
feared that the committee's very measured, overly cautious
response could not stand up to the owl's opponents. "They
built in all the compromise already," claimed a spokesman

12 It is important to note that the HCA system was designed as the bare minimum needed to protect the owl, not old
growth. In fact, HCAs leave out many significant areas of
prime old growth and encompass some fairly marginal areas.
The ISC plan was drawn up with wide consideration for economic and social factors and as such did not seek the protection of every single spotted owl, but rather attempted to
keep owl populations above the point of no return. Thus, it
did allow for and expect a certain degree of population decline.
13 Nor, for that matter, were some scientists. In his
lengthy 1991 court opinion on the spotted owl controversy,
Judge Dwyer writes of the ISC report, "While it is endorsed
by well-qualified scientists, it is criticized by others,
equally well-qualified as over-optimistic and risky." Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, section V, finding 3lc.

107

for the Wilderness Society, "It's not a plan that could be
further compromised and still protect the owl."14
Following on the heels of the Thomas Report on June 22
came the long awaited decision that Fish and Wildlife could
delay no longer--the northern spotted owl was now officially
listed as a threatened species. Although the Bush Administration knew it was coming, the owl's listing put it in an
extremely difficult position. While it was firmly opposed to
any harvest reductions and warned of lost jobs as loudly as
the timber industry, the government's own scientists were
calling for less logging to save an owl that now had legal
protection. Faced with such a tough decision, the administration balked; only four days after the owl's listing, it
delayed its decision on how to proceed until September. In
the interim, announced the administration, it would ask Congress to modify the ESA to allow for easier exemptions. 15
Angry environmentalists charged that this failure to promptly implement legally mandated protection was a "throw-back
to the Reagan-era. 16
11

The Forest Service and FWS similarly stalled implementation of owl protection measures. Even after the owl's June
listing, Fish and Wildlife did not oppose a single 1990 Forest Service sale in owl habitat. In 1989 and 1990, in fact,
14 Quote in Scott Somer, "Northwest's Old Growth Forests
Shrink" Medford Mail Tribune (22 May 1990).
15 Timothy Egan, "Softening Stand on Spotted Owl, Administration Delays Protection" New York Times (27 June 1990).
16 Quote in "No Peace for Owl," Time (9 July 1990), 63.
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FWS issued 1,062 "no jeopardy" rulings for Region Six timber
sales, 63,425 acres of which were located in Thomas Committee HCAs. 17 The Forest Service, meanwhile, continued their
1990 harvest with little movement towards developing their
own plan as mandated by the Hatfield rider. Moreover, neither agency showed any inclination to accept the Thomas Report's HCA recommendations.
The Thomas Report and the owl's listing led to a surge
of national press in the summer of 1990 with long features
and regular coverage in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune,
Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal, as well as a June

cover story in Time. The longer the issue dragged on, the
more nationalized it was becoming. The Wall Street Journal
began to warn of the dire economic consequences of environmental extremism, 18 while a June Washington Post editorial
countered with strong support for old growth protection:
The country isn't running out of jobs, but it is running out of ancient forest. This is an irreplaceable
resource; these forests are special and majestic
areas. The country doesn't need the lumber, and for
the loggers and communities involved, cutting the forest down would be only a respite. Once it was done,
there would be no forest (or owls) and still no
jobs. 19

17

These figures were taken from letters from Marvin
Plenart, FWS regional director to John Butruille, Region Six
Forester cited in "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Credibility Hits New Low ... At Owl's Expense" Headwaters (September
1990), 9-11.
18 "Owls are People Too" (editorial) Wall Street Journal
(9 '\Pril 1990), sec. A, 1.
·
1 "Forests, Jobs, and Owls" (editorial) Washington Post
(29 June 1990).
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Despite the fact that Section 318 was keeping harvest
levels high and free of court interference, and despite the
administration's unwillingness to act, timber interests
where, nonetheless, quite jittery in the summer of 1990. In
the past twenty-one months, thirty-five mills and 5,500 jobs
in Oregon alone had been lost and the owl's listing only
worsened the scenario.20 Calling for special action to offset or weaken the owl's ESA protection, timber interests
began to ominously warn of complete economic disaster in the
region.
Not surprisingly, the Northwest turned, in the summer
of 1990, into a powder keg of social tension. In this atmosphere, resentment, fear, and intimidation became increasingly prevalent. Multilated spotted owls began showing up hanging from trees or nailed to signs while bumperstickers reading "Save a logger, kill a spotted owl" or "I love spotted
owls .... well done" became commonplace .21 Also growing more
frequent were pro-logging demonstrations including a 3,500
person rally in Kelso, WA and a huge noisy demonstration in
western Oregon involving hundreds of logging trucks flying
the movement's ubiquitous yellow ribbons from their anten-

2°Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to
"Forests in Distress" Oregonian special report, 24.
21 Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New York: Knopf, 1990),
172; Shawn Doherty, "Oregon's Not-So-Sweet Home" Newsweek
(11 December 1989), 54.
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nas. 22 Earth First, meanwhile, began planning for what it
called its version of Freedom Summer, urging people from all
over the country to descend on northern California for "Redwood Summer." The May car-bombing of two Earth First activists organizing this event, both of whom were seriously
injured, was evidence of the new level the desperation in
the region.23
The Battle Widens in Congress
By early September 1990, as its self-imposed deadline
for coming up with an owl strategy had already passed, the
administration found itself deeply divided and still without
a plan.24 On September 21, the administration, announcing
22 Herbert McLean, "Paying the Price for Old Growth" American Forests (October 1991), 73; "Loggers Protest Owl Decision" New York Times (25 June 1990), sec. A, 19.
23 "2 in an 'Earth' Group Hurt as Car Explodes" New York
Times, (25 May 1990), Al9. This incident soon developed into
a bizarre controversy as the police immediately charged the
activists, one of whom had previously been getting death
threats, with transporting the bomb that blew up their car,
but then withdrew their charges, admitting that they had no
evidence. Not long after, an anonymous caller took responsibility for the blast. The case remains unsolved. The old
growth controversy began filtering down to other, very unlikely places. For example, the Forest Service stopped sending its Woodsy Owl mascot to grade schools in the communities around the Siuslaw National Forest in Oregon. Meanwhile
parents in Laytonville, CA sparked a First Amendment battle
when they demanded that their local school ban Dr. Seuss's
tale of the Lorax, a creature endangered by the destruction
of the Truffulla trees where it lived. "Woodsy Owl Still
Gives a Hoot, But in Siuslaw He Gets a Boot" Oregonian (4
April 1990); Ron Arias and Liz McNeil "A Boy Sides With Dr.
Seuss's Lorax and Puts a Town at Loggerheads" People (3 February 1990).
24 Reportedly, Secretary of Interior Lujan, OMB chief
Richard Darman, and Council of Economic Advisors chief
Michael Boskin all favored keeping harvest levels high and
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that "no perfect solution exists," proposed a 3.2 bbf harvest, a modest decrease. Both sides immediately lambasted
the plan as saving neither jobs nor owls and a waste of
three months' time to decide what everyone already knew.
"Congress and the Pacific Northwest carefully awaited the
recommendations of this Delphic-like task force," claimed
one congressional staffer, "only to find out later .... that
these folks really have nothing to

say."~

In addition to

the modest reduction in logging, the administration called
on Congress to insulate Region Six timber sales from NFMA
and NEPA as well as invoke the so-called God Squad--a special cabinet-level committee empowered to make exemptions to
the Endangered Species Act. 26 The environmentalists claimed
that this move only proved that the administration acknowledged the illegality of their timber sales program.27
The Forest Service, meanwhile, had to confront its own
owl plan deadline imposed upon it by Congress in Section
318. Having failed to meet that deadline, the Forest Service

changing the ESA should legal challenges arise. The Forest
Service and EPA chief William Reilly, on the other hand,
pushed for acceptance of the ISC plan. Timothy Egan, "Split
on How to Save Spotted Owl is Reported in Bush's Study
Grou?," New York Times (8 September 1990), sec. I, 8.
2 Timothy Egan, "Administration Offers Plan to Limit
Northwest Logging" New York Times (22 September 1990), sec.
I, 7; quote in Alyson Pytte, "Bush's Modest Proposal" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September 1990),
3105.

26 Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8; Alyson
Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl Interests Find Middle Ground
Elusive" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September
1990)' 3104.

27 Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8.
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announced on September 28 its decision, made without hearings or an EIS, that it would conduct its timber sales in a
manner "not inconsistent with" the Thomas

Report.~

The rush of events in late 1990 continued to unfold as
the court-stripping provision of Section 318, two weeks before it was to expire, was ruled unconstitutional by a federal appellate court in San Francisco for violating the separation of powers doctrine.29 As a result, the environmentalists' previously banned lawsuits were reinstated and
twelve Oregon timber sales not yet executed were halted by
Judge Dwyer. 30
In Congress, meanwhile, the 1991 Interior Appropriations and with it the annual timber quota was being hashed
out. Hatfield, as he did every year, pushed hard for high
timber quotas; seeking for 1991 a 3.45 bbf Region Six harvest; substantially higher than the Forest Service's 2.6 bbf
request. More significantly, Hatfield sought language in the
appropriations bill which would require the final congressionally designated ASQ to be a legal mandate rather than
28 An overview of spotted owl management is provided in
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Draft
Environmental Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1991), sec. B, 2.
29 Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl .... ", 3104. This ruling,
however was itself overturned by the Supreme Court in March
of 1992 as it ruled that Congress did indeed have the authority to block judicial review in that instance, By this
point, though, the ruling was largely academic. Linda Campbell, "Endangered Owl Loses in High Court" Chicago Tribune
( 2 6 March 1 9 9 2 ) , sec . l , 5 .
30 The 18 December 1990 motion halting these sales is described by Dwyer in Seattle Audubon v. Evans, section II.
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the target which NFMA defines it to be.31 What concerned
Hatfield was that the various national forests, hemmed in by
their own Forest Plans, sustained yield, and now, perhaps,
the ISC guidelines, were finding it impossible in some cases
to satisfy their full congressionally mandated ASQ without
violating these other requirements.32
While the demands of Hatfield and others in the Northwest delegation regarding timber quotas had traditionally
held sway, now for the first time, intense environmental
lobbying was beginning to pay off. Eastern congressmen were
becoming increasingly involved in timber matters and more
willing to take an oppositional stance. As a result, the
1991 appropriations package was rider-free for the first

time in five years and cut levels, although still held by
environmentalists as unsustainable and above ISC recommendations, were slowly beginning to come down.33 Hatfield's ASQmandating language and Senator Robert Packwood's (R-OR) at31 Headwaters Press Release (22 October 1990).
32 Not fully meeting all the Section 318 quotas, in fact,
was the same reason a coalition of timber industry groups
brought an unsuccessful lawsuit against Region Six of the
Forest Service. Interestingly, this suit saw Headwaters intervening on the Forest Service's behalf. Although certainly
not unknown, timberinitiated lawsuits against the Forest
Service were far less common than environmentalist suits.
~Industry Sues USFS; Headwaters Intervenes" Headwaters (Late
Winter 1991), 9.
33 For entire Pacific Northwest harvest (Region Six and
BLM) was sent at 3.2 mmbf, the same as the administration
requested. Alyson Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September 1990), 31063107. For all 155 national forest units, the ASQ was· reduced
to 9.3 bbf, down from 11.2 bbf in 1990. "Interior Appropriations Hits and Misses" Wilderness (Winter 1990), 6.
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tempt to add language to weaken the ESA were both turned
back. Environmentalists, sensing that they had ridden out
the worst of the spotted owl storm and had, perhaps, turned
the corner on this issue, confidently declared that it was
"time for law and order" in the

forests.~

Both the timber interests and environmentalists were
tiring of this annual spectacle of appropriations battles
and court orders as each sought to settle the issue once and
for all in their favor. The Congress, of course, was the
only venue to achieve this, and thus, both sides began to
focus upon a legislative strategy. The environmentalists had
found a very sympathetic patron in the House: Rep. Jim Jontz
(D-IN) who in April, 1990 introduced HR 4492, the Ancient
Forest Protection Act (AFPA). The Jontz bill would create an
Ancient Forest Reserve System designed to protect all "significant stands" of old growth as well as the corridors between them.35 During the course of the year, the AFPA would
pick up 125 co-sponsors.
The Jontz bill incensed members of the Northwest delegation who saw Jontz as a meddlesome outsider with no stake
in the matter. At one point, in fact, the acrimony became
bad enough to violate Congress's usual collegiality as an

34 "Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive" Headwaters
(Late Winter 1991), 9.
35 This would be determined later by a special mapping and
designation process
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enraged Les AuCoin threw Jontz out of his office.36 Jontz
defended himself by claiming ancient forests to be national
treasures no different than the Grand Canyon whose fate, he
argued, no one suggests only Arizonans should determine.37
In July, Rep. Bruce Vento (D-MN) made a far more modest bid for old growth protection, introducing the Ancient
Forest Act (HR 5295), which would reduce Northwest harvests
to three bbf and create a 6.3 million acre Ancient Forest
Reserve.38 Unlike the more preservationist Jontz bill, Vento's bill would only protect a little over half of unprotected old growth, although it would require such forest to be
logged using non-clearcut methods.39 On September 13, Vento's bill was approved nineteen to thirteen by the House Interior Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, but
could not get through the less friendly full Interior Committee.40
36 Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hinterlands" New York Times (11 November 1990), sec. IV, 18.
37 Caufield, 83.
38 This reserve would be comprised of both mature and old
growth forests. Like ancient forests, mature forests contain
some, but not all characteristics of true old growth as defined Franklin.
39 Gerald Gray, "The Politics of Old Growth" American Forests (October 1991), 18. While the national environmental
groups welcomed both the Jontz and Vento bills, many of the
more uncompromising grassroot groups, while backing the
Jontz bill, most preferred the Native Forest Council's unsponsored proposal, the Native Forest Protection Act. The
NFPA would mandate sweeping changes in the entire National
Forest system including the protection of all ancient forest, an end to all clearcutting, and a ban on all timber
exports.
40 Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy", 3106. Even if it
passed Interior, it would also have to clear the even more
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A number of legislative proposals were advanced by
the timber interests' side as well. In spring, the Northwest
Forest Resource Council (NFRC) proposed changes in Wilderness and Wild and Scenic River boundaries to release new
land for logging to offset any future limitations caused by
owl protection measures. 41 At this point, the timber industry was not willing to propose any specific old growth plan
as to do so would, timber feared, would lend credence to the
notion of old growth protection as a legitimate concept in
the first place as well as call into question current forestry methods. 42
Instead, timber interests threw their full weight behind S 2762 and HR 5092, the National Forest Plan Implementation Act, simultaneously introduced into both houses by
Hatfield, Aucoin, Smith, and Rep. Sid Morrison (R-WA). This
bill, dubbed by environmentalists the "Timber Tantrum Act,"
sought what it called "community stability" by mandating for
all 155 national forest units minimum timber quotas that
would absolutely have to be met. In addition, the bill would
limit court challenges and, as the NFRC sought, return portions of Wilderness acreage to commercial use to off set any
hostile Agriculture Committee, as this is a policy area with
overlapping committee juridiction.
41
Les Line, "Gambits and Skirmishes" Audubon (May 1990),
4. Like Wilderness, Wild and Scenic River is a special congressional designation which protects the natural and aesthetic character of river sections by prohibiting development activities on the river or the adjacent land along its
banks.
42
Gray, "Poli tics of Old Growth", 1 7.
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future owl or old growth protection. Despite this flurry of
legislative activity, though, none of the various bills,
whether pro-timber or environmental, had substantially moved
forward in 1990.
Section 318 and Siskiyou Logging
Back on the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the dizzying national
events of the old growth issue in 1989 and 1990 were threatening to turn the new Forest Plan on its head. Judge Dwyer's
March 1989 injunction blocked 79.4 mmbf of the Siskiyou National Forest's 181 mmbf sales plan for 1989.43 In October,
though, that timber was released by the Hatfield rider which
also set an extremely high quota on the Siskiyou for 1990.
Together the freed-up 1989 sales and the 1990 quota required
the Siskiyou to meet an unprecedented 310 mmbf harvest in a
single year. 44 As previously mentioned, Section 318 also required the Forest to minimize fragmentation of large blocks
of old growth and set up a citizen advisory board to review
sales.
By December 1989, the Forest Service picked the Siskiyou advisory board which consisted of two local timber company officials, two moderate and uncontroversial local environmentalists, a county commissioner, a port director, and a

43 Robert Sterling, "Owl Reports Impact Studied" Medford
Mail Tribune (5 April 1990).
44 Gordon Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short of its Timber
Target" Grants Pass Daily Courier (20 July 1990).
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community college president.45 Noticeably absent from this
board was anyone from Headwaters which, more so than any
other local group, commanded technical expertise on Siskiyou
issues and had clearly expressed an interest in participating. Despite its exclusion, Headwaters immediately set out
mapping areas that the Forest Service could harvest without
seriously fragmenting owl habitat and yet still try to meet
Section 318's massive

quota.~

As the 1990 sales began to take shape, however, environmentalists found their recommendations largely ignored.
They charged that the Forest Service was still engaging in
"business as usual" proposing sales in roadless areas and
large stands of old growth in direct violation of the Section 318's provision to minimize fragmentation. Two such
sales, Homestead Butte and Snail Creek particularly rankled
environmentalists as they were in large roadless blocks of
prime old growth surrounded by numerous fragmented little
patches of forest in nearby roaded areas, the very places
Headwaters was urging to cut first. 47 On the northwest side
of the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the Forest Service announced
plans for sales in the Elk River drainage despite the riv45 USDA Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for FY1990, 1st Report (l December 1989).
~Headwaters Press Release (11 December 1989).
47 "The Broken Promise of the Timber Compromise" Headwaters (March 1990), 4. After the Forest Service's adoption of
the Thomas Report guidelines, however, these two sales were
withdrawn.
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er's Wild and Scenic designation and its inclusion in Vento's proposed Ancient Forest Reserve.
The lifting of the Hatfield rider's court ban in September gave back to environmentalists their most potent
weapon as they promptly reinstated suits against four old
growth sales in the Siskiyou: Garden, Sugarloaf, China Left,
and Briggs Secret. In two separate rulings, Judge Dwyer
stopped all four sales, the last three of which were part of
his larger twelve sale injunction (see p.112). In their defense, the Forest Service had claimed such sales to necessary for meeting Section 318's huge timber quota. Furthermore they pointed to the thirteen sales they had modified
thusfar in response to citizen advisory board recommendations as evidence of their

flexibility.~

The Siskiyou National Forest, therefore, found itself
in a nearly impossible position, caught between directives
to minimize fragmentation,

ISC spotted owl regulations, the

extremely high quotas of Section 318, and a very limited
time frame to carry out almost two years of current and
backlogged sales. Despite three-quarters of a million dollars in overtime, by late summer the Siskiyou announced that
it was not quite going to able to meet the quota in the time
allotted. Said one Siskiyou official, "we understand the

~Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementation of
Section 318, 9th Report (1 August 1990); "Siskiyou Sale Bordering Wild Rogue Wilderness Blocked By Court" Headwaters

(Late Winter 1991), 8.
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consequences .... we don't like it .... But Congress gave us an
impossible

task."~

New Perpectives and the Drive for Forest Reform
To most environmentalists, the root causes behind the
destruction of old growth were located in the ill-advised
practices and patterns of public land agencies. While timber
sales appeals and court injunctions were seen as vital strategies, they were still just holding actions; no real, lasting change would ever be realized, argued the environmentalists, until the public land agencies, particularly the Forest Service, were reformed. This represented, of course, a
further expansion of the scope of this issue; from grassroots protests to save particular local forests to coordinated regional efforts on behalf of old growth in general to,
now, a national drive for bureaucratic reform.
The environmentalists' critique of Forest Service forestry was grounded in both ecological and economic arguments. Prior to the 1950s, the Forest Service most commonly
employed uneven-aged selective harvesting methods (see chapter 2, footnote 135). But such methods were not suitable for
the type of highly mechanized, large volume harvesting which
commenced in the post-war era. Consequently, clearcutting
came to be adopted, in a radical departure of Forest Service

~Quote

in Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short."
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practice, as the predominant management style.so While
logistically and economically more efficient, clearcutting
has long been challenged by environmentalists as an ecological disaster. Besides the erosion and biological disruption
the act of clearcutting itself has long been documented to
cause, 51 its critics argue that the tree farms that are replanted in clearcuts are biologically impoverished croplands
whose one or two species create a sterile, vastly simplified
version of the complex ecosystem they have replaced.s2
Environmentalists have also charged that Forest Service practices are economically wrong-headed. While freely
hurling labels such as "timber industry welfare" and "forest

50

Michael Frome, The Forest Service, 2nd edit.(Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1984), 108; Roy Keene, "'New Perspectives' to
Limit Clearcutting" High Country News (19 November 1990). A
typical clearcut involves the complete removal of trees from
a area usually between forty to three hundred acres. Most
often, the cut-over site is then burned to eliminate leftover debris (called site preparation) and then replanted
with one or two species of rapid growing hybrid seedlings.
51
For a discussion of clearcutting and its ecological effects see Frome, 117.
52
Growing in straight, dense, even-aged rows, typical
Forest Service tree plantations do not let enough sunlight
reach the forest floor for understory plants to grow. Also,
because of the lack of organic matter on the forest floor
and the destruction of essential nitrogen-fixing root fungi
during site preparation, tree plantations rely upon heavy
applications of artificial fertilizers to maintain productivity. While many of today's tree farms outgrow natural
forests by 30-40%, biologist Chris Maser warns that there is
no record anywhere on earth of any intensively managed forest maintaining full productivity beyond three rotations.
The exhausted, insect-plagued tree plantations of Germany
and Scandinavia, suggests Maser, ought to serve as evidence
of modern forestry's unsustainability. Kathie Durbin and
Paul Koberstein, "New Forestry: Trying Logging with a Lighter Touch" Oregonian special report, 21; Caufield, 68-69.
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socialism," environmentalists have long maintained that the
three-quarters of the Forest Service budget that goes
towards timber cutting-related activityS3 amounts to little
more than a subsidy for timber companies. Such private concerns, they argue, could never profitably log the mountainous national forests without taxpayer-built roads, replantings, and other services. As a result, the Forest Service,
system-wide, operates at a loss for most timber sales with
the costs of preparing a sale outweighing the value of the
timber itself .S 4 Even in Region Six, by far the most profitable of all Forest Service regions, one study has concluded
that 20% of all sales lose money.ss The Siskiyou National
Forest, meanwhile, was estimated by environmentalists to
operate at a loss in 1989 of $2.3 million, or ten cents on
the dollar.S6
These sorts of charges were not only originating from
environmental circles. Even from within the ranks of the
53 This would include direct expenditures such as roads
and sale preparation as well as indirect spending on things
such as forestry research, firefighting, and local payments.
For complete figures for the FY 1990 budget see, Timothy
Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say" New York
Times (3 March 1990), sec. I, 26.
54 caufield, 69. This is assuming that the Forest gets
fair price market value for the timber it sells, which is
not always the case. On the Tongass National Forest in
Alaska, for example, environmentalists claim that trees
worth $700 on the open market are auctioned off for $1.48.
"Your Taxes Pay for this Outrage" Forest Voice 2:2 (1990),
5.

55 cascades Holistic Economic Consultants, Newsletter (Eugene OR: 23 September 1988).
~Robert Sterling, "Wilderness Group Claims Siskiyou Forest Unprofitable" Medford Mail Tribune (4 October 1990).
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Forest Service itself, dissent began to emerge. While the
most severely dissatisfied formed an organization and a
newspaper dedicated to reforming their agency,57 a number of
mainstream rangers and supervisors also began to voice their
concerns that Forest Service practices could not continue
unchanged for long. In the fall of 1989, supervisors from
all over the system began to warn Forest Service Chief Dale
Robertson that the agency was "out of control." At their annual conference in Las Vegas later that year, the supervisors continued to press their case, even presenting Robertson
with a videotape documenting their concerns.SS
Under widespread criticism and facing growing turmoil
within the ranks of his agency, Robertson in January 1990
announced that the Forest Service would begin experimenting
with a new forest management program called New Perspectives. Employing concepts of New Forestry developed by Forest Service biologist Jerry Franklin, the New Perspectives
scheme officially represented an attempt to harvest forests
without quite so much ecological disruption. New Forestry
attempts to mimic nature by leaving harvest sites in a more
natural condition. This is achieved by retaining some snags
57 The organization that was formed was called the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics
(AFSEEE) and their paper, Inner Voice, has a circulation of
several thousand.
~"Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" Headwaters
(March 1990), 3; Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" New York Times (19
September 1991).
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and large living trees for wildlife habitat and reseeding
and leaving a certain amount of downed logs and other debris
on the ground. In addition, New Forestry emphasizes streamside protection and encourages increased helicopter logging
and the minimization of fragmentation where possible.59 All
of this, although largely untested, has been alleged to allow harvest sites to more readily regenerate into a healthy
natural forest cornrnunity.60
For timber interests, New Forestry represented just
one more threat to their timber supply to contend with. "It
looks to us," claimed a lobbyist for the American Forest Resource Alliance, "like [New Forestry is] going to be an excuse to cut fewer trees. "61 The timber interests, still not
willing to recognize the value of old growth or the ecological problems associated with clearcutting, would not admit
any need for these so-called ''reforms." Claimed one industry
executive:
There's no crisis in our woods and no reason to be
rushing in and making changes when we don't have any
problem replanting trees and regenerating forests.62

59 ourbin and Koberstein, "New Forestry", 21-22; Jon
Luoma, "New Logging Approach Tries to Mimic Nature" New York
Times (6 June 1990), sec. C, 13.
60 oespite its increased ecological sensitivity, New Forestry is not to be confused with selective uneven-age cutting methods (see footnote 135, chapter two); more accurately, it is a modified, environmentally friendlier version
of clearcutting. Also, because its methods result in a reduced harvest volume, New Forestry require logging over a
lar~er area to achieve the same overall volume. Ibid~
Quote in Luoma, 13.
62

Ibid.
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The environmentalists, on the other hand, were far
less certain how to react towards New Perspectives. While,
New Forestry methods clearly represented a genuine and welcorned improvement over traditional clearcutting practices,
environmentalists worried that it might degenerate into a
justification for the continuation of unsustainable harvest
levels and old growth liquidation. A spokesman for ONRC sums
up this ambivalence:
New Forestry would be great if combined with a reduced
cut. We're concerned that it not become a placebo for
the real problem, which is, we're just cutting too
fast in the national forests.~
Another activist had similar doubts:
New Forestry is dangerous because it tells politicians
that they can have their owls and their timber too.
That's a great message if it's true, a risky one if it
isn't. 64
To the most uncompromising environmentalists, however,
New Perspectives was a "kinder, gentler rape of the forest,"
a "bureaucratic response to a public relations problem," or
simply, "New P.R."M The ONRC's Kerr charged that the Forest
Service was manipulating the universally respected Jerry
Franklin and using this "warmed over old forestry" to get at
the last scraps of ancient forest.66 Others sarcastically
noted that:
63
64

Ibid.
Quote in Seth Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?"
Sierra (March/April 1992), 41.
Mibid. 67; Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Perspectives" Forest
Watch (October 1990), 22-23.
66 Kerr also complained that without an accompanying reduction in the overall harvest volume, the practice of New
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.... New Forestry and the rest of the New Perspectives
program, including New Technology and New Alliances
will likely be carried out with New Chainsaws, allowing loggers to buy New Pickup Trucks.67
The Forest Service was, therefore, stuck in the middle between two skeptical foes.

"The industry" observed one agency

official, "says 'That's not a clearcut,' and the environmentalists say 'That's not a

forest'".~

Shasta Costa: True Reform or Trojan Horse?
As was so often the case, the Siskiyou National Forest
found itself once again at the front lines of the old growth
controversy, as the Forest Service chose the Forest to debut
its New Perpectives program. As a "test-run" of sorts, the
Shasta Costa Integrated Resource Project had all eyes upon
it as to whether New Perspectives was feasible or not. The
Shasta Costa watershed in the north-central part of the Siskiyou, north of the North Kalmiopsis, encompasses 23,419
acres, a good deal of this roadless (see figure 6). Not only
is the watershed prime spotted owl habitat, but it also provides an important wildlife corridor between the Kalmiopsis
area and the Wild Rogue Wilderness to the north. In addition, it lies directly south of the only paved east-west

Forestry might in some ways actually be worse for the forests since the achievement of the normal ASQ using such lower yielding methods would require the cutting and roading of
an even greater percentage of forest acreage. Kerr, "New
(Age) Perspectives", 22, 25.
67 Zuckerman, 42.
~Ibid.
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FIGURE 6
SHASTA COSTA AND QUOSATANA PROJECT PLANNING AREAS
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route through the Siskiyou and thus, is an exceptionally
scenic area of high visual sensitivity.69
In 1987 the initial planning process for the timber
sales in the Shasta Costa area began, but was soon interrupted by the Silver Fire. Although the Silver salvage was
mostly seen as a defeat for environmentalists, it did, for
the first time, force the Siskiyou National Forest to clearly admit to the significance of fisheries, biodiversity, organic debris, erosion, and streamside vegetation--all issues
it had previously avoided but was forced to confront in the
extensive and closely scrutinized Silver Fire EIS process.
By the time Shasta Costa planning resumed in 1989, rapidly
changing events made such concepts politically impossible to
ignore.
To design the prototype New Perspectives project, the
Siskiyou brought in some of the best talent from across the
system and spent a half million dollars in preparation and
marketing.ro

"So goes Shasta Costa, so goes the USFS" was a

phrase heard within the Siskiyou which attested to the importance which was being placed on this project. 71 Besides

69 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated
Resource Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 20.
roKathie Durbin, "Innovative Forestry Arrives in Siskiyou" Oregonian special report, 23.
71 Quote cited in letter from Jim Neal, Helicopter.Loggers
Association to Bonnie Wood, Gold Beach District Ranger (20
September 1990) reproduced in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2,
sec. F, 76.
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incorporating New Forestry techniques, another feature of
New Perspectives was to be increased public involvement and
input in the planning process. All throughout the winter and
spring of 1990, therefore, the Forest Service held an extensive series of public workshops.
Meanwhile, the Shasta Costa team closely studied the
natural history of the Shasta Costa region, including its
burn and regrowth patterns and tried to draw up a plan they
claimed would imitate natural processes. The resulting DEIS,
released on July 27, 1990, recommended a management plan for
the three year life of the project which would harvest a
total of 11.2 rnmbf, as opposed to the 17.5 rnmbf originally
slated for that three year period under the 1989 Plan. More
significantly, the draft's recommendation was for no traditional clearcutting to occur, requiring instead that New
Forestry methods be used and very minimal old growth be harvested. 72 To achieve this, only 2.5 miles of roads (as opposed to the Plan's 6.2 miles) would have to be built as the
project intended to rely more heavily upon helicopter
logging. 73
As the draft's comment period commenced, both sides
struggled to comprehend the implications of this "new per-

nThe Shasta Costa DEIS called for a twenty tree per acre
rate of live tree retention as well as no fragmentation of
old growth stands. The Shasta Costa draft alternative is
summarized in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 1, sec. II, 14, 3540.
73
Ibid. sec. II, 14.
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spective." Although they welcomed the access to this roadless region they had long coveted, most on the timber side
were alarmed by the Shasta Costa plan's restraint. SOTIA
protested Shasta Costa on the grounds that it deviated from
the Forest Plan and they could not understand why it was
suddenly so important to keep this area, previously slated
for roads, roadless. Urging the Forest Service to stick to
its Plan, SOTIA complained that it was unfair to local citizens that Shasta Costa be chosen to conduct untried experiments in forestry. 74 Boise Cascade, Douglas Timber Operators, and several county governments echoed these concerns
in their responses to the draft. 75
Most timber interests were very careful not to directly attack the broader goals of New Perspectives but instead,
its specific manifestation as laid out in the draft. Some,
though, were not nearly so timid or politic as evident in
the scathing letter sent to the Shasta Costa planning team
from an executive of the Northwest Timber Association:
It is clear to me that the shift from alternative B
[the 1989 Forest Plan guidelines] to C [the Shasta
Costa draft plan] is no more than a political move to
appease the preservationists and others in and outside
of the agency who hope harvesting of timber will be
ended on public lands in the near future. To those in
the community who have trusted the agency and who depend upon this timber .... this blatant disregard is a
74

Gregory Miller, Executive Vice President, Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association to Kurt Wiedenmann, Shasta
Costa Project Leader (9 October 1990), reproduced in Shasta
Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 116-117.
75
Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 74-75, 113-116,
121-122.
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slap in the face .... You are discrediting the promises
of both the Forest Plan and the hype of new perspectives. U
The environmentalists, meanwhile, faced their own
dilemma regarding how to react to the Shasta Costa draft.
The draft itself represented, to them, a far more enlightened approach to logging and public involvement which they
certainly wanted to encourage now and in the future. Headwater's Norman expressed to Siskiyou officials the group's
desire "to get in line with you" on Shasta Costa.n Still,
there were many unanswered questions about the project which
gave environmentalists some serious doubts. These doubts
focused not so much upon the project itself, but where it
fit into the larger scheme of things.
The Forest Service was extremely vague as to what the
future held for Shasta Costa after the three year life of
the project. Because of its reduced yield, Shasta Costa
would fall short of the Forest Plan's three year target for
that area. If it would not amend the Forest Plan to reflect
this lower volume brought on by New Forestry, then what,
asked the environmentalists, was the Forest Service really
up to? Would Shasta Costa's reduced quota simply be made up
elsewhere on the forest or after 1993 within Shasta Costa
itself? The Forest Service refused to rule out either of
76

R. Dennis Hayword, North West Timber Association to
Abel Camarena, Acting Supervisor (26 September 1990), reproduced in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 126.
nJulie Norman quoted in Gordon Gregory, "Future torestry
Taking Root in Shasta Costa" Grants Pass Daily Courier (12
July 1991).
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these scenarios. The following exchange at a public workshop
between Oregon State University biologist Chris Frissell,
environmental activist Jim Brittell, and a Shasta Costa
planner illustrates the Forest Service's ambiguity and
evasiveness on this matter:
Frissell: Why don't you make a 10 year decision on
this EIS?
Forest Service: we believe that this decision will be
germane for three years.
Brittell: Is the Forest willing to concede that New
Perspectives will reduce the ASQ?
Forest Service: No. For this drainage with this set of
conditions and opportunities, volume harvested will
probably be reduced. This may or may not be true in
another planning area.
Brittell: You need to clearly state that we don't want
to get 32 rnmbf out of the [Shasta Costa] basin.
Forest Service: We can only make a decision for 1991
to 1993. Projecting a decision beyond 1993 is inappropriate. 78
If the Forest Service really believed in New Forestry
and it was not just a trojan horse designed to briefly appease critics in order to enter roadless areas, asked Kerr,
then why did it not amend the Forest Plan's ASQ to reflect
lower volumes.79 By the Forest Service's own estimates, a
Forest-wide reduction of New Perspectives would lower the
Plan's ASQ by

10-20%.~

And yet touting its bold new "light-

er touch on the land" on one hand, "the Forest Service went
USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, ~inutes
from Shasta Costa Workshop, internal document, (June 1991).
79
Kerr, 25.
~Shasta Costa, FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 34.
78
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on to announce that it could "not preclude the future harvest of timber on Shasta Costa.81 Until the Siskiyou National Forest admitted that Shasta Costa-style projects were incompatible with their own Plan and ended the ambiguity surrounding the area's long-term future, many environmentalists
doubted that Shasta Costa could not be said to reflect any
meaningful change in Forest Service

values.~

Timber on the Defensive
Although the spotted owl had been officially listed as
threatened since June 1990, the administration and the Fish
and Wildlife Service had yet to implement any protective
measures for the owl, not even the fairly modest ISC recommendations. To force action, the environmentalists kept up a
nearly continuous stream of lawsuits. One of these, against
Fish and Wildlife, hit paydirt for them in early 1991. In a
ruling on February 26, Judge Zilly chided Fish and Wildlife
for having "abused its discretion when it declined to designate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl" and accused them of deliberately stalling in violation of their
mandate.~

On March 15, Zilly gave FWS forty-five days to

come up with a habitat protection plan.
The court's order moved the agency to produce their
own tentative proposal announced in late April. The FWS plan
81

Ibid.

~Durbin, "Innovative Forestry", 23.
~Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v.

Manual Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621,

(9th U.S. District, 1991).
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identified 11.6 million acres of public and private critical
habitat; the largest habitat designation in the history of
the ESA.~ What Fish and Wildlife's announcement served to
do was to further confuse an already confusing situation.
Nobody it seemed, least of all public officials, quite knew
what this designation really meant or how to react to it.
Hatfield, assuming the worst, quickly condemned the ruling
as "biology run amok" while an AFRA spokesman warned of a
"land lockup equivalent to the size of Massachusetts, Vermont and Connecticut combined. 85 Fish and Wildlife was
11

careful to point out, however, that this designation merely
identified a broad zone of habitat which did not necessarily
preclude timber harvesting and could, in the future be adjusted by the administration or Congress. With time, claimed
Interior Secretary Lujan, the final version of the FWS plan
"might be much, much different than it is

now."~

Another court decision issued on May 23 by Judge Dwyer
further complicated the increasingly byzantine politics of
old growth.87 Dwyer, responding to one of the lawsuits revived after the Section 318 court ban was overturned, ruled
~"U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge in Northwest to Save Spotted Owl" Chicago Tribune (27 April 1991). This figure was
later reduced to 6 million acres as the private portion was
exem?,ted.
8 Margaret Kriz, "Owl 1, Timber 0" National Journal (4
May 1991), 1056; quotes in "U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge"
Chicago Tribune.
~Lujan quoted in Mike Mills, "Spotted Owl Gains Ground
in Timber Controversy" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
(4 May 1991), 1127.
87 seattle Audubon Society v. Evans.
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that the Forest Service's actions regarding the spotted owl
had violated NFMA. This violation, according to Dwyer stemmed from the agency's failure to commit itself to a conservation strategy to save the owl. The Forest Service's tentative and half-hearted adherence to the !SC guidelines, was
not sufficient action for Dwyer who wrote in a strongly
worded opinion:
The problem here has not been any shortcomings in the
laws, but simply a refusal of administrative agencies
to comply with them. This invokes a public interest of
the highest order: the interest in having government
officials act in accordance with the law.~
Dwyer goes on to discuss the job losses which "will
continue regardless of whether the spotted owl is protected":
To bypass the environmental laws either briefly or
permanently, would not fend off the changes transforming the timber industry. The argument that the
mightiest economy on earth cannot afford to preserve
old growth forests for a short time, while it reaches
an overdue decision on how to manage them, is not convincing today. It would be even less so a year or a
century from now.~
As a result, Dwyer announced a comprehensive injunction on all timber sales in owl habitat in seventeen "owl"
forests in Region Six and northern California and gave the
Forest Service until March 5, 1992 to design and implement a
single plan to save the owl. This injunction virtually shut
down the entire Region Six timber program in old growth for-

~Ibid.
89

Ibid.

section VI.
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ests, freezing sales on 66,000

acres.~

While the Forest

Service argued that these sales accounted for less than one
percent of owl habitat, Dwyer was convinced that the loss of
those acres "would constitute irreparable harm and would
risk pushing the species beyond a threshold from which it
could not

recover."~

Environmentalists were delighted by this ruling which
could have been mistaken for something they themselves might
have written. Timber interests, on the other hand, were furious and predictably began to rage against what one official
termed "court lockups" of public lands whose fate was now
being decided by unelected judges with no expertise in forestry. More than ever before, the Dwyer ruling convinced the
timber interests that their only salvation was to be found
in a legislative solution, and so it was in this direction
that they began to pour an increasing portion of their energy. This need for a legislation was, perhaps, the only thing
that all parties could agree upon, as environmentalists,
despite their legal successes, ultimately saw this strategy
as a dead-end road. Either way, the Dwyer ruling's new injunction and the administration's intransigence placed extreme pressure upon Congress to resolve the issue, especially amidst Forest Service warnings of a 1992 log shortage.~

~This injunction was on future sales only; sales already
"in the pipeline" were not included.
91
Ibid.
~Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 18.
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In the summer of 1991, the environmentalists, both
grassroots and national, launched a major lobbying campaign
to preserve old growth and modify Forest Service logging
practices. Early in the 1991 session, the Jontz and Vento
bills (now numbered HR 842 and HR 1590 respectively) were
reintroduced.

Before long, Vento, reportedly impressed by

committee testimony and Dwyer's ruling, began meeting with
Jontz and the Interior Committee's new, pro-environmentalist
chairman, George Miller (D-CA) to discuss possible changes
in his bill that would bring it more in line with Jontz's. 93
Rep. John Bryant (D-TX), meanwhile, introduced HR 1969, the
Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act which,
while having little chance to pass, represented the environmentalists' broadest, most comprehensive goals.94 The biggest news for the environmentalists, though, was in the Senate where Brock Adam's (D-WA) Pacific Northwest Community
Recovery and Ecosystem Conservation Act (S 1536) was the
first old growth-friendly bill to be introduced in that
house. S 1536 would create a fairly extensive Forest Reserve
System, tax log exports, and fund economic transition and
93 Mitch Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis"
Wild Earth (Summer 1991), 32.
94 HR 1969 would ban clearcutting on the national forests
and would specifically require forest management to incorporate biodiversity goals. This bill was sweeping enough to
cause some of the more moderate national environmental
groups to withhold their support. Other bills relating to
biodiversity (HR 2082 and HR 585) were also introduced by
Reps. Gerry Studds (D-MA) and James Scheuer (D-NY). Friedman, 31; Phillip Davis, "From the Shade to the Spotlight"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (l June 1991), 1439.
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diversification programs. More significantly, this bill
represented a major break from the heretofore solidly protimber bipartisan ranks of the Northwest delegation.95
The events of 1991 which allowed the environmentalists
to ride what one Siskiyou ranger termed a "power wave," conversely put timber on the defensive. With unfavorable court
rulings and injunctions, timber was forced to give some
ground and, for the first time, conceded to the legitimacy
of both the owl's threatened status and the concept of preserving some old growth.96 Timber interests yielded on this
point because, in the words of one congressional staffer,
"it's not in the industry's interest to delay anymore. "97
Thus, the strategy of fighting tooth-and-nail any and all
change had now given way to compromising for the best deal
possible. To timber, the best hope for this rested with a
bill proposed by a joint industry-labor coalition. 98
The bill, introduced in the House by Rep. Jerry Huckaby (D-LA) as the Forest and Families Protection Act (HR
2463) and in the Senate by Packwood as the Federal Lands and
~Other

cracks in the delegation appeared as urban representives such as Jim McDermott (D-WA) and newly elected ones
such as Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) began to stake out positions
less friendly to timber. Phillip Davis, "Ruling Gives Lawmakers a Push To Resolve Spotted Owl Issue" Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report (1 June 1990), 1439.
96 Gerald Gray, "Seeing Eye-to-Eye on Old Growth" American
Forests, (October 1991), 20.
97 Quote in Kriz, 1056.
98 This coalition included the AFRA, the National _Forest
Products Association, the Carpenter's Union, the Western
Council of Industrial Workers, and the International Woodworkers of America
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Families Protection Act (S 1156), were the first timbersupported bills to establish old growth reserves for the
spotted owl, albeit far less than the Jontz bill. In return
for allowing some old growth to stand, the bills would limit
legal challenge to timber sales, amend NFMA to require
guaranteed timber quotas, and ease ESA restrictions.99 This
bill, which essentially replaced Hatfield's 1990 bill (S
2767) as timber's main legislative vehicle, was immediately

condemned by Chairman Miller who accused its sponsors of ignoring and complicating the old growth negotiations already
occurring in the House.100
In October the environmentalists' cause in the House
was bolstered by very favorable testimony from a panel of
old growth scientists including Franklin and Thomas who
urged for reductions in logging and roadbuilding. Meanwhile
the FY 1992 appropriation was passed again without any
court-blocking riders or absolutely guaranteed quotas. Despite considerable activity, however, by the end of 1991

99 HR 2463 and S 1156 are described in Kriz, 1056.
100 Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 19. It was hoped that
using Vento's middle-of-the-road bill as a framework and
starting point, both sides could negotiate a compromise from
there. In addition to the Packwood/Huckaby bill, pro-timber
legislators also proposed two other bills: Democrats in Oregon's delegation, uncomfortable with court restrictions proposed their own bill, HR 2807, which also created modest old
growth reserves and maintained high timber outputs, but
without the court-stripping provisions. Another pro-timber
bill, HR 1309, was introduced by Rep. Smith. Davis, "Ruling
Gives Lawmakers a Push", 1438.
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there was still no movement of any bill out of committee, as
the ongoing legislative stalemate could not be broken.
The administration firmly rejected both the Vento and
Jontz proposals, but declined to endorse outright any of the
pro-timber bills. Instead, the only initiative that the administration seemed interested in pursuing at this point was
to try exempt old growth timber sales from ESA regulations
through God Squad proceedings. It got its first chance to
test-run this process when Fish and Wildlife rejected fortyfour BLM timber sales in owl habitat (claiming they would
cause twelve percent mortality of all owls on BLM land). BLM
chief Cy Jamison promptly appealed to Secretary Lujan to invoke the controversial panel. In October Lujan obliged and
the long and cumbersome process commenced. 101

Thus, despite

the changing political climate on this issue, the administration was, nevertheless, showing no signs of fundamentally
changing its commodity-oriented approach to resource
management. 102
101

Phillip Davis, "BLM Calls on God Squad to Let Timber
Go" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (14 September
1991), 2611-2612; Phillip Davis, "'God Squad' Called on to
Weigh Timber Interests, Spotted Owl" Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report (5 October 1991), 2854. While timber interests
eagerly looked to this case as a welcome harbinger in their
efforts to bypass spotted owl regulations, environmentalists
argued that BLM had no legal grounds to seek an exemption
since the God Squad clause requires that all "good faith"
efforts to find alternatives to destroying habitat be exhausted before an exemption could be granted.
102 In fact, in Fall 1991, Jon Mumma, the head forester
for Region One in the northern Rockies was forced to retire
after he resisted pressure to meet a regional timber quota
which he determined was unsustainable. Mumma and the former
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In the Siskiyou, meanwhile, timber sales planning continued as if all were normal. As the Forest Service began
work on the final version of the Shasta Costa plan, it came
to be convinced that such an approach, employing mostly New
Forestry techniques, rather than the standard individual
clearcut sales, represented the wave of the future. Confident of its potential, the Siskiyou officials began to announce plans for more of such integrated resource projects
in similarly controversial and largely roadless areas, including the West Indigo drainage, a 13,500 acre section of
the North Kalmiopsis (see figure 7) and a 23,550 acre partially roadless area known as Canyon in the dry, steep
southeast of the forest where Whittaker conducted his famous
botanical study of the Siskiyou (see chapter 2, p.45 and
figure 7). Because all such projects were slated for roadless or partially roadless areas, a full EIS process would
have to held for each.
In July 1991, the Shasta Costa FEIS was completed. By
boosting the cut by 2.2 mmbf and adding 2.5 more miles of

regional director of the Park Service (who was demoted) testified at Civil Service Subcommittee hearings in September.
Mumma revealed that he faced intense political pressure from
the administration, especially Chief of Staff John Sununu,
as well as certain western congressmen to keep timber output, as in Region Six, at levels which violated sustained
yield. The Mumma controversy, which caught quite a bit of
attention in Washington only served to provide more ammunition for a forest reform campaign that was now spreading
to local national forests from coast to coast. "Park Service
Aide Tells of Sununu Pressure" Chicago Tribune (25 September
1991).
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FIGURE 7
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roads, the final recommendations pulled back quite a bit
from the surprising moderation of the draft . New supervisor
Mike Lunn, however, held off signing the final record of decision until the Forest Service finalized its spotted owl
plan as ordered by Dwyer. In fact, the Dwyer injunctions
brought all new projects on the Siskiyou in the summer of
1991 to a screeching halt as the DEIS target dates for West
Indigo, Canyon, and several other projects were all pushed
back due to the confusion and uncertainty over old growth
and the spotted owl. With so many parallel streams of planning, negotiation, and litigation occurring simultaneously,
the situation on the Siskiyou by late 1991 became, according
to former Supervisor McCormick, "very, very confusing" and
"hard to track," even for the people directly involved in
it. "How in the world," asked McCormick "is this going to
come out?"
The Administration Counterattack
In January 1992, the so-called God Squad began deliberations to decide whether to exempt the BLM sales that FWS
had deemed to be in critical owl habitat from the requirements of the Endangered Species

103

Act. 1 ~

Although the scope

The Bush administration's God Squad was comprised of
the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, and the Army, the
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the heads of
the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and a state representative from Oregon. Phillip Davis,
"Logging Decision Set for May 14" Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Review (2 May 1992), 1154.
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of this exemption would be limited (in terms of all pending
old growth sales), it had the potential to set an enormously
significant precedent. It also dispelled all doubts as to
the thrust of the administration's strategy regarding old
growth--it was clearly to attack and weaken the ESA. Environmentalists, while clearly alarmed by this frontal assault
on a key law, doubted, nonetheless, whether the God Squad's
findings would stand in court (see footnote 101).104
The Fish and Wildlife Service, meanwhile, continued to
work on its long-overdue draft recovery plan for the spotted
owl which was now scheduled to be released in spring. In
January, however, the agency, under tremendous political
pressure, announced that it was reducing the acreage of forest that would be considered critical habitat from the eleven million acres identified the previous April to 6.9 million acres. Still, the as yet unreleased plan was branded by
timber interests as "a legal lynching of an entire region by
an out-of-control federal agency."1m

104 Keith Schneider, "U.S. to Push for Logging in Owl's
Forests" New York Times (21 February 1992), sec. A, 12.
im "U.S. Sets Aside 6.9 Million Acres to Save Owl" Chicago Tribune (10 January 1992), sec.1, 4. On February 20,
1992, the timber interests' and the administration's woes
further increased as Federal Judge Helen Frye, in response
to an environmentalist lawsuit, issued an injunction on all
old growth sales on BLM land on much the same grounds as
Dwyer's injunction on the Forest Service--refusal to follow
federal land management statutes. Although much of this forestland was currently listed by FWS as critical habitat, it
was, in many cases, still being sold for logging. The injunction was to hold until until an adequate BLM owl plan
was formulated. Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging .... "
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With the official release of the draft plan (and its
projection of a loss of 33,000 jobs) still several months
away, Secretary Lujan made a highly unusual preemptive
strike on February 21. Seeking to bypass the anticipated recommendations of his own department's wildlife agency, Lujan
announced the formation of yet another committee, this one
to draw up a plan to merely "preserve" the owl at current
levels rather than restore the species. Since any such plan
would violate the ESA which requires that strategies be developed for endangered species recovery, Lujan conceded that
this alternative plan would need congressional approval.
Timber interests promptly applauded this move which they saw
as a backup to God Squad proceedings in the event that the
exemptions did not work out.106
Soon thereafter, the administration unveiled the last
element of their three-pronged attack on behalf of timber
interests. On March 19, 1992, Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan announced a proposal to repeal the eighty-five
year old Forest Service rule allowing for the written appeal
of timber sales by the public.107 While the administration
portrayed the appeal ban in terms of recession-fighting reg-

106 Keith Schneider, "To Save Jobs, U.S. Seeks to waive
Rule on Saving Owl" New York Times (21 February 1992);
Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging .... "
1ITT Keith Schneider, "Forest Service May Alter Rule Blocking Logging" New York Times (28 April 1992), sec. A, 12.
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ulatory relief, environmentalists howled in protest at what
they saw as another blatant assault upon their rights. 108
That same spring, while the administration pushed hard
to weaken preservation laws, Congress attempted once more to
craft a legislative solution to the old growth controversy.
In the previous session, in 1991, as Congress was deadlocked
over conflicting ancient forest bills, the House Agriculture
Conunittee conunissioned a four-member scientific panel in
Portland (officially, the Scientific Panel on Late Successional Forest Ecosystems) to provide the debate with the
sort of hard numbers and indisputable data they felt was
lacking.
In the spring of 1992, while the Portland panel was
still preparing their report, Interior Chairman George Miller introduced HR 4899, the Ancient Forest Act. This bill
came to be the chief legislative vehicle for old growth
preservation, since the Jontz bill (HR 842) had gotten nowhere in two years. Initially introduced without specifics,
the bill's actual degree of protection was to be determined
after the panel's report. When it was finally released, the
Portland panel's report was developed into a fourteen-point
rating system (with 14c representing the highest level of

108

Environmentalists argued that filing lawsuits would
become their only option, something which small groups with
few resources cannot do. The administration, on the other
hand, claimed that the appeal ban might actually induce
citizens to become more involved in the planning process of
sales. Schneider, Forest Service May Alter Rule .... "

147

protection) to be used to assess the risks of various levels
of logging. 109
By May, both of the subcommittees with jurisdiction
(Interior's Public Lands and Agriculture's Forests), began
an attempt to flesh out HR 4899. Interior Chairman Miller,
fresh from an Easter recess flyover of the Siskiyou and adjacent BLM lands, 11 0

expressed shock over the reforestation

failure of many of the clearcuts he saw:
Putting the best light on it, these tree plantations
just didn't work out folks. Putting the worst light on
it, it's one of the great frauds perpetrated on the
American public, because most people believe the commercials on TV about planting trees, and they're all
coming back, and deer are running through it. That's
not what's happening here. 111
Miller, in fact, was sufficiently impressed by the evidence
that Headwaters presented him regarding reforestation failures, inaccurate yield projections, and NFMA violations that
he ordered his committee staff to prepare a full report on
the matter (issued in June). Among this report's findings
were that "the lack of monitoring and outdated inventories
in the Pacific Northwest have prevented accurate determination of timber cutting levels, to the detriment of America's
forest heritage ... 112
109

199

"Science and the Siskiyou" Siskiyou Project (December

f 6'"M\·11er
1

Gets Aerial Tour of Forest" Medford Mail TribApril 1992).
11
Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Oregon" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 16.
112 u. s. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Management of Federal Timber Resources: The
Loss of Accountability (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992), 1.
une

~20
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Not surprisingly, the Public Lands subcommittee, under
Miller's ally Bruce Vento, had soon drafted and easily passed a version of HR 4899 that had a fairly strong 12c level
of protection which would protect roughly nine million acres
of forest and two-thirds of remaining unprotected old
growth. In the more pro-timber Forests subcommittee, however, several days of intense debate in early May yielded a
version with only an 8a level of protection (6.8 million
acres) which just barely passed seven to six (over the
strenuous objections of the Siskiyou area's Bob Smith). 113
As HR 4899 went to the full Interior Committee, it ran
into increased trouble as Representative DeFazio stalled the
bill for a month. In May, the committee voted to reject both
De-Fazio's 6a proposal as well as Jontz's full-protection
14c amendment, finally settling upon, but not yet voting for
a level of 12a, below which Miller refused to go.11 4 Meanwhile, in the Senate, the Adams/Leahy bill (S 2894), featuring 12c protection and vigorous working retraining provisions, 115

was moving far more slowly, not yet having been

considered in committee. Also stalled in the Senate were
113 Julie Norman, "Forest Protection Leg is lat ion is Moving" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 3. In May, the Forests subcommittee also defeated three to six HR 3414 which
would have prohibited below-cost timber sales. "Panel Fells
Timber Sales Bill" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (16
May 1992), 1335.
114 "House Speaker Tom Foley Crushes Ancient Forest Protection Bill" Save America's Forests D.C. Update (August
1992), 6; "Ancient Forests Legislation Progress Report" Save
America's Forests News, newsletter (no date).
115 Save America's Forests D.C. Update (August 1992), 11.
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timber's bills. Packwood's S 1156 was the same bill as the
previous year's (see pp. 138-139), while Senator Slade Gorton's (R-WA) S 2762, "The Northern Spotted Owl Preservation
and Northwest Economic Stabilization Act" which would allow
about half of the owl's habitat to be logged, was newly
introduced. 11 6

In the House, meanwhile, the Huckaby bill (HR

2463, see page 138) was also reintroduced.
On May 14, at the height of this congressional flurry
of activity, the administration made three major announcements. First, the God Squad had concluded their deliberations and voted five to two to waive the ESA (for only the
second time since the law's inception) on thirteen of the
forty-four BLM sales covering 1, 700 acres .111

Despite its

precedent-setting nature, this decision was only a partial
victory (if at all) for the administration as the committee
directed the BLM, as part of its limited exemption deal, to
follow FWS recovery plans henceforth. 11 8

In addition, the

thirteen sales were exempted only from FWS regulations;
Judge Frye's BLM injunction still held.
The administration's second announcement was that Fish
and Wildlife had formally completely its draft recovery plan
for the owl. Under continuing pressure, the agency further
116
117

Ibid. 9.

Keith Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths as
it Agrees to Protection for Owl" New York Times (15 May
1992), sec. A, 1. Only EPA's William Reilly and the Oregon
state representative voted against the exemptions.
118 "Bush's God Squad Defeated Despite Face-Saving Ruling"
Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 10.
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reduced habitat protection from the 6.9 million acre level
it had announced in January to 5. 4 million acres. 119 Whether
by mere coincidence or with what environmentalists considered "Machiavellian" orchestration, Lujan had one more announcement to make that same

day.1~

Calling his own agen-

cy's plan unacceptable, Lujan revealed that his hand-picked
committee had designed its own alternative to the FWS plan.
This alternative would protect only 2.8 million acres and
supposedly cut the numbers of jobs lost in half. Admitting
that this plan might cause the owl's extinction, the administration conceded that it would require a congressionallyapproved amendment to the ESA. 121 This amendment was to be
introduced in their respective houses the following week by
Senator Gorton and Representative Smith, the latter admitting, "I don't think it has a chance." 122
The reaction from environmentalists and their congressional allies to this rather brazen proposal was one of disbelief and outrage. Vento claimed that Lujan's plan "doesn't
save owls or timber workers--it's just a full employment
bill for lawyers. 123
11

Environmentalists, meanwhile, were

even more blunt referring to the entire episode as "owl119 Schneider, White House on Conflicting Paths .... "
120 "Owl-Gate: Bush's Election Year Extinction Plan" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 10.
1
~ Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths .... ";
Phillip Davis, "Critics Say Too Few Jobs, Owls Saved Under
'God Squad' Plan" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (16
May 1992), 1335.
122 Rep. Smith quoted in Davis, "Critics Say .... ", 1334.
1n Rep. Vento quoted in Ibid. 1335.
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gate. " 124

Even some pro-timber congressmen were somewhat put

off by the confusion and contradictoriness of the fairly
bizarre three-ring spectacle of May

14.1~

The Forest Service on the Defensive
As the summer approached, the politics of old growth
continued to grow even more splintered and confused. In
June, as the Interior Committee's damning report on Forest
Service abuses began to circulate, Miller believed he had
the votes to get HR 4899 out of committee. However, on the
eve of the vote, with success closer at hand than ever before, Speaker of the House Torn Foley (a Democrat who represents a timber-rich district in eastern Washington) made
phone calls to key committee members and succeeded in pressuring six to change their votes. 1U

When Miller found this

out the following morning, he called off the vote rather
than have it defeated.
In the meantime, the Forest Service had finally cornpleted its long-awaited spotted owl EIS that Judge Dwyer had
ordered the previous year. As would be expected, the agency
was eager to get the injunctions lifted and resume logging.
The only problem was that their plan was largely a rehash of
the now two-year old (and increasingly obsolete) ISC (Thorn124
125
126

"Owl-Gate .... " Headwaters Journal, 10.
Davis, "Critics Say .... ", 1334.
"House Panel Cancels Vote on Bill to Protect Fqrests"
New York Times (18 June 1992), sec. B, 12; Julie Norman,
"Legislative Stalemate in D.C." Headwaters Journal (Fall
1992), 3.
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as) Report. According to one bemused timber official, "it is
the Jack Ward Thomas Report. They might as well have just
taken the cover off."
Immediately, environmentalists filed suit to maintain
the injunction on old growth logging based on their allegation that the Forest Service EIS was grossly inadequate given what information was currently available. On July 21,
1992, Judge Dwyer ruled with the environmentalists in a decision perhaps more far-reaching than the first. Dwyer refused to lift the injunction on the grounds that the EIS did
not incorporate the best and latest scientific information
on the owl's decline (including the FWS's Anderson/Burnham
Report which found a startling 7.5-10% rate of annual population decrease). 121

"Highly qualified experts," said Dwyer,

"including some in the employ of the Forest Service, believe
[the Anderson/Burnham report] means the ISC strategy must be
revised.

11

128

This time, however, Dwyer ordered the agency to

consider the impact of their plans upon thiry-two other old
growth species for whom the owl is an indicator species,
thereby complicating the agency's task

considerably. 1 ~

Noting their long history of non-compliance with wildlife laws, Dwyer gave the agency an additional year to pre-

1

v Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1494
(9th U.S. District); Julie Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down USFS
Sales Again" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 4.
128 Judge Dwyer quoted in Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down
USFS ....
1
~ Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley.
II
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pare a new plan. For the court not to require such action,
the Judge wrote, "would invite lawlessness; an agency could
escape its statutory duties simply by procrastinating. 130
11

The Forest Service promptly appealed this ruling, but was
turned down by an appellate court in September. 131

All the

exasperated agency could muster in reponse was a dire warning (considered mere scare tactics by critics) that such a
plan could take two more years to develop, thus destroying
the timber industry through delay. 132
The public scoldings the Forest Service received at
the hands of the Dwyer ruling, the Miller report, and various editorial

pages, 1 ~

only served to deepen the agency's

ongoing public relations problem.134 Whether it represented
1E Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, sec. 5.
131 "Court Won't Lift Logging Ban in Northwest" New York
Times (6 September 1992), sec. I, 29. Timber was also having
scant legal success as a federal court ruled in June against
their claims that FWS logging restrictions were illegal.
"Timber Groups Lose Another Round to Owl" Chicago Tribune (2
June 1992).
12 "2-Year Logging Delay Forecast in Owl Habitat" New
York Times (2 August 1992).
1
~ See, for example, "Mr. Bush's Political Environment"
(editorial) New York Times (19 May 1992), sec. A, 22.
134 This was further exacerbated in June (during the
height of the U.N. Earth Summit), as NASA scientists working
on a satellite mapping project released widely publicized
satellite photographs of the Northwest that show, according
to Egan, "clearcutting .... that is so extensive that the land
looks perforated by buckshot." Most embarrassing were revelations that forest fragmentation in the Northwest was far
worse than in the Amazon. Said project scientist Dr. Compton
Tucker: "When you compare the situation in the Pacific
Northwest to the Amazon of Brazil, the Northwest is much
worse. The pictures show this amazing graphic situation--the
severe fragmentation of the forest in the Northwest · .... It
appears that much of the forest has been literally cut to
pieces." Timothy Egan, "Forest Damage, North and South" New
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a symbolic gesture or genuine change, the Forest Service responded to these pressures with an announcement in June that
the agency's two-year old experiment with New Forestry (the
New Perspectives program) was being adopted as standard procedure. This move to so-called "Ecosystem Management" was
supposedly intended to implement ecological principles into
forest planning and reduce traditional clearcutting by 70%
from 1988 levels. 135

Sounding remarkably candid about past

mistakes, Robertson admitted that the agency "must get away
from practices that make our forests look like tree
farms." 1 ~

To environmentalists, however, the past two years

of New Perspectives did not really seem to change much as
yields continued to be set at unsustainable levels. Timber
interests, meanwhile, were also still quite wary of what
they derisively called "politically correct silviculture" by
an agency seen as caving in to political pressure and
f add ism. 137
The Siskiyou on Hold
Back on the Siskiyou, the whirlwind of political and
York Times (14 June 1992), sec. IV, 6; Dr. Compton quoted in
Timothy Egan, "Photos Show Forests in Pacific Northwest Are
in Peril, Scientists Say" New York Times (11 June 1992).
135
Keith Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service Increases Protection of Public Timber" New York Times (9 June 1992), sec.
B, 10; Julie Norman, "Ecosystem Management Directive is
Here" Headwaters Journal (Winter 1992), 25.
1
~ Robertson quoted in Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service
Increases Protection .... "
1
~ Jon Luoma, "New Government Plan for National Forest
Generates a Debate" New York Times (30 June 1992), sec. C,
4.
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legal activity on the national level brought old growth logging projects on the Forest to a standstill. By early in the
year, as the Forest Service readied its owl plan and anticipated the lifting of the injunction, the Siskiyou was poised
with about 150 mmbf ready to be sold in various backlogged
projects.BB

But this was not to happen anytime in 1992. In-

stead, the local decisions and actions of the Siskiyou's administrators (once fairly sovereign) were becoming increasingly irrelevant in the light of the region-wide injunction,
clashing legislative proposals, pending owl plans from a
number of quarters, and the upcoming elections.
By 1992, then, the Siskiyou came to be suspended in a
sort of policy limbo. The confusion of national events combined with increasingly severe budget constraints (occasioned by the continuing recession) to throw the agency's schedule way off from what was outlined in the Plan. Because the
Forest relied so heavily upon old growth timber harvesting,
most of its projects were frozen in their tracks. Yet this
did not stop the Siskiyou from continuing (as in the previous year) to devise and prepare future sales in a businessas-usual manner, even as their current ones gathered dust.
All told, they had plans in the pipeline for eighteen multisale projects in mostly roadless areas for 1992-1997 representing hundreds of millions of board feet of timber, much

~ Barbara Ullian, "Agencies Continue Plans for Massive
Timber Cutting" Headwaters Journal (Spring 1992), 17.
1
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of that in old growth or mature forest. Just for 1992 and
1993, these timber projects included Shasta Costa (which was
supposed to have begun in 1991), as well as West Indigo, Upper Silver, and Lawson in the North Kalmiopsis, Elk River
and Sixes River in the northwest, Quosatana and Two Forks in
the west, and Canyon and Kangaroo in the

southeast. 1 ~

While their premier effort, the Shasta Costa project,
remained enjoined, the Siskiyou's administrators began to
focus their attention upon the next project in line. The
Canyon FEIS was released in July 1992 and called for four
miles of new roads to be built and nine mmbf to be removed
with New Forestry techniques from a fairly steep, dry, and
lightly forested area adjacent to the designated Kalmiopsis
Wilderness. 140

While Canyon was not prime owl habitat, the

project particularly irked environmentalists since they felt
that the area was both extremely sensitive and had very marginal timber productivity. Furthermore, the New Forestry
techniques would impact three times the acreage of the original plan. 141
Although increasingly distracted by national campaigns, local Siskiyou environmentalists did manage to organize rather vigorously against Canyon, encouraging another
139

Ibid.; Barbara Ul lian, Roadless Area Timber Sales
Headwaters Journal (Fall 1992), 7.
140

11

11

USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992).
1
~ Barbara Ullian, "Roads and Cuts Planned for the Heart
of Canyon" Headwaters Journal (Fall 1992), 6.
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very heavy mail load during the FEIS comment period. With
West Indigo, Quosatana, Lawson and several other projects
scheduled to be logged soon thereafter, environmentalists
sought to publicize how the Siskiyou's plans were part of
the same old discredited way of doing things. Projects such
as Canyon were also seen to be a legacy of the agency's past
failures as one environmentalist argues:
Had [the agency] maintained prudent harvest levels and
encouraged the inevitable transition to smaller renewable timber, there would be less pressure to go into
these steep fragile drainages to remove old growth. 1 ~
For the time being, however, all of these sales, actual or
proposed, were blocked by the injunctions. The most the Forest Service could do was to consider taking a few individual
sales in Canyon that were not owl habitat and try moving on
those.
While the agency's new "ecosystem management" was precisely the sort of more responsible logging the environmentalists had long sought, they felt it was now too late to
use even the best forestry methods to enter the few remaining roadless areas. One activist stressed this point as he
toured the site of the proposed Lawson project:
We wanted to applaud their significant movement
towards a more sensitive, naturally-oriented approach
and agreed that we could have heartily supported this
direction twenty years ago. But given the tremendous
impact on the watershed and the surrounded forest
landscape, from the heavy logging of the past several
decades, we questioned whether any further entry at
1

~ Roy Keene, "Forest Focus: The Siskiyou" Public Forester (Autumn 1991), 3.
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this time would really enhance the desired recovery
and health of the forest ecosystem, wildlife populations, rivers, and fish stocks. 1 ~
Old Growth Forests and the Elections
After HR 4899's committee vote was called off in June,
it did not move forward before the October recess that ended
that session. Nor did any other ancient forest bills as the
legislative stalemate was guaranteed to enter its fourth
year. As usual, the only real congressional action came in
the form of annual Interior appropriations. For FY 1993, the
environmentalists came out better than usual as none of the
guaranteed "hard" targets that timber once again pushed for
were adopted, judicial review was maintained for another
year, and no last minute pro-timber riders were added on. In
fact, the only amendment that was added legislatively formalized the Forest Service appeal process that the administration was trying to

repea1.1~

By late summer, the nation's attention turned to the
presidential campaign. Any doubt that the old growth controversy had fully worked its way into the national political
consciousness was dispelled as the spotted owl and the
plight of loggers came up time and again on the campaign
trail and the nightly news. The national press, in fact,
kept up steady stream of coverage for the third consecutive
143 John Stahmer "Gold Beach RD
Sale" Headwaters Journal (Winter
1
~ Julie Norman "Fresh Breezes
nal, 21; "F.S. Appeals Made Law"
1992)' 33.

Planning Lawson Timber
1992), 23.
in D.C." Headwaters JourHeadwaters Journal (Winter
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year; quite surprising in a venue not noted for encouraging
long attention spans.
In the midst of a grueling recession, President Bush
(especially when addressing Western audiences) began to portray the spotted owl as an extremist's luxury that no jobloving society could afford. Speaking in September to a
crowd in Washington state, Bush promised to veto any reauthorization of the ESA (due for renewal that year) unless it
was subject to a sweeping rewrite that included cost-benefit
analyses and provisions to guarantee annual timber harvests .1~

Calling the ESA a "broken" law that, reminiscent

of his vow against Iraqi militarism, "will not stand," Bush
claimed that it was "time to put people ahead of owls ....
time to consider the human factor in the spotted owl equation." "There are a lot of trees around here," Bush told his
supporters, "so don't listen to some of the

critics." 1 ~

Although he tried to downplay the issue during the
campaign, Bill Clinton was on record as strongly supporting
the ESA, favoring the principle of old growth preservation,
and backing worker retraining for unemployed loggers, positions no doubt influenced by his pro-environmental running

1

~ Michael Wines, "Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers"
New York Times (15 September 1992), sec. A, 25; Timothy
McNulty and Carol Jouzaitis, "Bush, Clinton Try to Balance
Environment and Economy" Chicago Tribune, (15 September
1992J, sec. 1, 4.
1
The first two Bush quotes are in Wines, sec. A, 25,
the last is in McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4.
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mate, Sen. Al Gore (D-TN). 1Q

Clinton's one foray into the

issue came during a Western campaign swing during the summer
in which he promised to convene a "timber summit" between
all concerned parties in order to work out a

consensus.1~

Nonetheless, his candidacy (as well as his running mate) was
not well-received by timber interests who strongly supported
Bush.
While Bush took a jab at "the spotted owl crowd" during one of the nationally televised debates in October, it
was not until a week before the election, running behind in
the polls, that he really let go. Mocking Gore with the tag
"ozone man" in a Michigan speech, Bush went on to warn that
in a Clinton administration, "we'll be up to our necks in
owls and out of work for every American (sic). 149 According
11

to one observer, Strix occidentalis caurina had thus become
the Willie Horton of the 1992 campaign.1so
As would be expected, forest activists cheered Clinton's victory in November, eager to bid farewell to their
various nemeses in the Bush administration (Quayle, Madigan,
1Q Gore outlined these views on old growth forests on a
Sunday morning television talk show. "I think the real question," said Gore during the interview, "is whether [loggers]
will get new jobs before the last 10% of the old growth forest is gone, or after the last old growth forest is gone."
Al Gore quoted from This Week With David Brinkley, (12 July
1992J, photocopied transcripts from Native Forest Council.
1
McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4.
1
~ Bush quotes in Stevenson Swanson, "When in Office,
Gore May Find it isn't so Easy Being Green" Chicago Tribune
(8 November 1992), sec. 1, 8.
1
~ This was the observation of a caller to a talk show on
public radio statio WBEZ Chicago, (November 1992).
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Lujan, and so on) and anticipating new, more environmentally
inclined officials to replace them.151
Epilogue
As 1992 drew to a close, a new chapter in the old
growth/spotted owl controversy, and possibly even forest
management in general, was about to open. While the issue as
of early 1993 was still largely unresolved, it is quite possible that a substantially different policy course will be
followed regarding endangered species and forest management.
Even short of aggressive reform, it is safe to say that the
high-level administrative effort to avoid or amend federal
environmental legislation and push for extremely high levels
of resource production is less likely. While the new administration may treat environmental values differently, the
situation in Congress is less clear. On one hand, non151 All did not go perfectly well for environmentalists in
the November elections, however, as a number of the forests'
most ardent congressional defenders were swept from office,
including Sen. Wyche Fowler (D-GA), and Reps. Peter Kostmayer (D-PA), Gerry Sikorski (D-MN), as well as the patron
saint of old growth, Jim Jontz, who was defeated by four
thousand votes in a very tight race. Considering him their
enemy number one, timber interests targeted Jontz and spent
$100,000 to help defeat him. A number of grassroots environmental activists from southwest Oregon went as far as to
travel to Indiana to help man Jontz's campaign staff. The
def eat of these legislators offered timber interests their
only consolation in an otherwise disasterous election.
Searching for a silver lining, an AFRA spokesman claimed
that "their [Jontz, Fowler, Kostmayer, and Sikorski] absence, combined with what I think will be a greater emphasis
on the economy, suggests to me the prospect of a more conservative Congress on resource issues." Margaret Kriz, "A
New Ball Game?" National Journal (2 January 1993), 23; Norman, "Fresh Breezes in D.C.", 21.

162
Western members of Congress are growing increasingly assertive in matters of public land management, traditionally
left to local, development-oriented legislators. On the
other hand, with the loss of several key forest advocates
and an acute reluctance to cause any further unemployment,
the future of ancient forest legislation (likely to be introduced pending the results of the upcoming "forest summit"152 ) is still up for grabs. If no legislation can make
it through soon (a distinct possibility if one recalls that
an acid rain bill was stymied for over ten years) and the
Forest Service and BLM ever come up with legally defensible
owl plans, then it is in the realm of possibility that old
growth logging projects (albeit with increased restrictions)
could feasibly commence in a year or two.153
Still, the environmentalists, at the end of 1992, were
in a fairly strong legal and political position and thereby
had the potential to eventually resolve this issue on fairly
favorable terms. The movement to save old growth has cer-

152 It was renamed such after environmentalist complaints
over the word timber.
153 The environmentalists, though, might soon have other
legal avenues to pursue. In September 1992, another old
growth-dependent bird, the marbled murrelet, was listed as
threatened by the FWS (under court order, of course). This
might action might have the potential to set off another
round of recovery plans, injunctions, restrictions, etc.
should any solution to the spotted owl controversy not be to
the environmetalists' satisfaction. If anything, this listing shows that the complex interdependence of the old growth
ecosystem cannot be successfully dealt with through piecemeal policies. "Another Bird Ma~ Curb Logging in the Northwest" Chicago Tribune (27 September 1992), sec. 1, 14.
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tainly come a long was since the raggedy blockades and
guerilla theatre on the Bald Mountain Road nearly a decade
earlier.
What exactly will happen in the Siskiyou National Forest itself is far from clear. How increased national protection for the spotted owl and old growth ecosystems will
relate to Forest Service plans to enter eighteen major roadless areas (and eventually all such unprotected areas within
fifty years) depends upon how Siskiyou administrators interpret such restrictions and redesign their plans.15 4 If roadless entries are still to be a priority in the next decade
(rather than a fundamental shift to second growth harvesting, tree farm thinning operations, controlled burning to
restore fire-dependent ecosystems, and, of course, reduced
yields), political activism on the Siskiyou will continue
for some time to come.

154 One legal avenue local environmentalists might pursue
would be to legally challenge the validity of the 1989 Forest Plan which they claim violates a host of environmental
statutes. In 1989, they appealed the Plan administratively
and were turned down. But due to the injunctions and pending
spotted owl plans, they never took the Plan to cour~, something they might do if these roadless projects ever progress.

CHAPTER 4
THE DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST GROUP COMPETITION

We will do anything that's legal, anything.
Andrew Kerr, Oregon Natural Resources
Defense Council.
Tie your yellow ribbons, and keep •em flying for as
long as it takes.
Yellow Ribbon Coalition
To know how interest groups are involved in environmental policymaking is not to know all, or explain
all; but an analysis of environmental policy devoid of
attention to interest group activities would be artless and quite unsatisfactory.
Walter Rosenbaum

Interest Groups and Pluralist Theory
Given pluralist thought's emphasis upon group activity, -it should be no surprise that the topic of interest
groups occupies center stage in the debate between pluralist
theorists and their detractors. "There is no point in the
164
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policymaking process," Walter Rosenbaum reminds us, "at
which group activity ceases to be significant.

11

1

Examining _)

the role and nature of interest group activity is imperative, therefore, in order to gain a useful understanding how
the pluralist process influences politics in the Siskiyou
and whether the assumptions of the pluralists or their critics prove valid. It is the task of this chapter, then, to
consider the organization and mobilization of interests in
the Siskiyou conflict and explore the various dimensions of
their competition.
Types of Interests
In the simplest terms, an interest is, according to
Zeigler and Peak, a "desire for, or concern over, either an
abstract or material political object"; what they term a
"political good."2 An interest group can be understood,
then, as a social aggregate which forms to seek such goods
which, because they are in the political realm, can only be
secured by dealing at some level with the state. Interests
and the goods they seek reflect the diversity of society at
large. Some political goods, termed selective, are divisible
and particular to given beneficiaries, while others, collec-

1 Walter

Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 21.
2L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, Interest Groups in
American Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1972), 1.

166

tive goods, cannot be divided and thus benefit all equally,
even those who did nothing to gain them.3
Mahood also makes the distinction between material,
tangible goods and non-material, intangible ones such as
status, symbolic reassurance, or ideological rewards. 4 In a
similar vein, Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson see political
incentives as being material, purposive, or solidary. Material goods would have a clearly quantifiable value, while
purposive goods, on the other hand, cannot be quantified or
allocated in the same manner as they tend to reflect "suprapersonal goals." Solidary goods, while similarly nonquantifiable, are goods intrinsic to the group itself, bestowing such rewards as the identification and personal
fulfillment that come with group membership. 5
Interest Groups and the Question of Bias
In the debate between pluralists and their critics the
issue of interest groups invariably leads to the question of
whether all the interests in a given issue could initially
form and effectively organize and compete or whether some
bias in the pluralist process prevents this.
Central to pluralist theorists' vision of the American
political process is the notion that the field of competi3

Ibid. 66.
Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 11.
5 Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A
Theory of Organization" Administrative Science Quarterly VI
(September 1961), 124-166.
4 H.R.
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tion among conflicting interests is, for the most part,
open, fluid, and fairly well-representative of the disparate
interests of society as a whole. To the pluralists, fluidity
and openness do not necessarily imply perfect equality
amongst interest groups at any one given time, but rather an
overall balance of power whereby the fortunes of the many
groups in competition wax and wane in a pattern which allows
no one group to consistently dominate.
Even if an interest is not currently manifest, argue
pluralists such as Truman, the mere potential of its coalesence can often exert an influence upon the policymaking
process. 6 Dahl, meanwhile, points to what he calls the "noncumulative" nature of group resources whereby inequalities
in one facet of group resources, such as money, can be offset by other factors such as expertise, intensity of commitment, or status. What this flexibility or "slack" in the
system tends to do, according to Dahl, is level the playing
field. What matters is not so much the amount of a group's
resources, but instead the skill with which it uses them. 7
Thus, a group's raw resources can only imply potential but
not actual power.
The critics of pluralism remain unimpressed with such
notions of flexibility and openness. The central theme run-

6 oavid

Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf,
1951), 114.
7 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), 305-310.
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ning through their work is that the pluralist process is inherently biased against the formation, maintenance, and effective operation of certain types of interests, namely
those that represent the economically disadvantaged and
politically disenfranchised or those that are very broad and
diffuse, what some call "public interests." According to
critics, pluralism responds far more favorably to groups
representing narrow, well-endowed interests which can organize far more readily and effectively than cumbersome mass
interests or the inherently weak and marginal interests of
the disadvantaged. Without proper organization or resources,
the critics argue, the interests of vast sectors of society
go unrepresented.a The proof of this, suggest the critics,
are the vastly unequal outcomes the American system clearly
produces. 9
To Wolff, the problem lies not so much with pluralist
theory, but with pluralist practice:
Thus pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of privilege or injustice--it is a philosophy of equality
and justice whose concrete application supports inequality by ignoring the existence of certain legitimate groups. 10
As Wolff sees it, pluralism guarantees inequality and injustice by responding only to interests currently endowed with

8 E.E.

Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), 35.
9 G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 126.
10 Robert Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968), 154.
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resources and privileges necessary to organize and effectively operate. The gaping disparities in group resources,
Wolff contends, allow no meaningful bargaining and compromise to take place and this essentially cripples fair competition. 11 As if gross inequities in group power were not bad
enough, argues Wolff, the role of government works to reinforce, rather than ameliorate the situation:
It is as though an umpire were to come upon a baseball
game in progress between big boys and little boys, in
which the big boys cheated, broke the rules, claimed
hits that were outs, and made the little boys accept
the injustice by brute force. If the umpire undertakes
to "regulate" the game by simply enforcing the "rules"
actually being practiced he does not thereby make the
game a fair one. Indeed, he may actually make matters
worse because if the little boys get up their courage,
band together, and decide to fight it out, the umpire
will accuse them of breaking the rules and throw his
weight against them! Precisely the same sort of thing
happens in pluralist politics .... The net effect of
government action is thus to weaken, rather than
strengthen the play of conflicting interests in the
society. 12
To Hamilton, meanwhile, the whole notion of a diverse
set of specific interests corresponding to specific publics,
all in competion--a notion at the heart of pluralist thought
--is fallacious. The majority of people, claims Hamilton, do
not belong to any group at all,13 and thus, they and their
interests, the mass public interest, are shut out of the
11
12
13

Ibid. 156-158.
Ibid. 157.

Pluralists would dispute this. For example a 1972 study
by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie finds that 62% of the public
claims to belong to at least one association and 40% claim
that their membership is active rather than nomina1.-sidney
Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America (New York:
Harper & Row, 1972), 41-42.
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process. Even when public interests are organized, maintains
Hamilton among others, such groups are still seriously handicapped since they attempt to secure diffuse, non-divisible
public goods rather than private narrowly focused
benefits. 14
Zeigler and Peak make a similar observation regarding
the easier time that groups oriented towards material or economic goods have in organizing as compared to purposivelyoriented interests.1 5 Robert Paehlke concurs as he notes
that "most political scientists would argue that without an
economically interested attentive public, fewer political
and organizational resources are available. 16 Participation
11

by economic interests, according to Zeigler and Peak has
more readily quantifiable results and can be seen by potential supporters as an investment of sorts. On the other
hand, support for purposive interests because it "result[s]
in benefits whose values cannot be fiscally counted" tends
to be more fickle and less dependable. 17 Furthermore, claim
Zeigler and Peak, members of material/economic interests
tend to give greater per capita contributions to their
14 Richard Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United
States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46; Among a
number of theorists who also make this argument is Philip
Foss, Politics and Grass (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1960).
15 zeigler and Peak, 76.
16 Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy:
The Challenge of the Next Century" in Norman Vig and Michael
Kraft (editors), Environmental Policy in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 352.
17 Zeigler and Peak, 76.
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groups than supporters of more intangible interests do, in
part, they suggest, because of the higher socioeconomic
strata and better-endowed resource base such groups tend to
draw from.18
As a result, argues Rosenbaum, "no interest has exploited this right to take part in the governmental process
more pervasively or successfully than has business." He goes
on to claim that business interests' "privileged status":
.... ensure[s] that its views are represented early and
forcefully ... ,its interests are pursued and protected
carefully at all pollcy stages, and its forces are mobilized effectively for long periods of time. These
are formidable advantages, often enough to give a decisive edge in competitive struggles with environmental or other interests that have not the political endurance, skill, or resources to be as resolute in
bringing pressure on government when it counts.19
Other critics of pluralism stress what they perceive
as the built-in, systemic nature of the pluralist process's
bias, the development of which Schattschneider calls the
"mobilization of bias."20 According to Bachrach and Baratz,
these are the predominant values, beliefs, political rituals, and "rules of the game" which "operate systematically
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and
groups at the expense of

others."~

How this relates to in-

terest groups is that those which are well-organized, well-

18 Ibid. 7 7.
19 Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 38-39.
20 Schattschneider, 71.
21 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 43.
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placed, and status quo-oriented find themselves in a position to control the "context of political conflict" in such
a way that public or reform interests are prevented from organizing effectively, if at a11.22
Bachrach and Baratz have taken Schattschneider's mobilization of bias a step further with their notion of non-

decisionmaking. They define a non-decision as:
.... a decision that results in the suppression or
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the
values or interest of the decisionmaker. To be more
nearly explicit, non-decisionmaking is a me~ns by
which demands for change in the existing allocation of
benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or
killed before they gain access to the relevant
decision-making arena; or, failing all these things,
maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage
of the policy process.n
In other words, by "mobilizing bias" within the system
through the use and manipulation of dominant values, myths,
and procedural and institutional practices, Bachrach and
Baratz argue that the status quo forces in the pluralist
process limit the scope of debate and the range of policy
options considered. The effect of this is to stunt and restrict interests seeking to alter the status quo:
Pluralism fails to consider the case where A devotes
his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
political values and institutional practices that
limit the scope of the political process to public

~Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of
Power in America" British Journal of Politics 17 (April
1987), 132.
23 Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 44.
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consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.~
The pluralist process's tendency to gravitate to "safe
issues" claim Bachrach and Baratz underscores the presence
of what they consider to be the hidden "second face of power." While the process may seem open and decentralized, it
is actually tightly defined and its boundaries clearly delineated by this other face of power.25
In pluralism's defense, Kelso claims that any status
quo bias in the system may have more to do with American
culture and society than pluralist theory. While he concedes
that Bachrach and Baratz may be on target in their description of how biases in values and myths limit the scope of
policy options, Kelso wonders if that would not occur in any
political system.26 Kelso and his pluralist brethren contend
that, in the biggest picture, pluralism still offers the
best chance and most feasible method for marginal groups
with little or no power to gain a forum and influence policy. The critics' vision of a system responding only to
whomever has the most money is too simplistic, maintain the
pluralists. The point, they argue, is not to achieve an essentially unachievable equality of group resources, but in-

24 peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power"
American Political Science Review 56 (1962), 948.
25 Ibid. 952.
26 william Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 107.
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stead to develop adequate countervailing power by effectively exploiting all manner of sources.27
In addition, resource discrepancies can further be
neutralized, argue the pluralists, if a group can reach the
bargaining table and deal directly with policy elites rather
than having to first win considerable mass support, since in
this realm total raw resources matter less.28 From what Dahl
and Truman have argued it can be implied that pluralism's
openness and flexibility stern from an overall balance of
power rather than a constant equality of all groups at all
tirnes. 29 To look at group competition and resources at a
given time in a given policy case is to look at a frozen
snapshot which misses the overall long-term dynamic inherent
in a balance of power in which groups' power is constantly
in a state of flux.
Individual Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action
No work has so powerfully challenged pluralist thought
(at least regarding interest groups) quite like Mancur 01son's seminal study, The Logic of Collective Action. 30 By
suggesting that simple rational choice is the reason that so
many latent interests do not form into active groups, Olson

27 see, for example, Dahl, Who Governs?; Roger Cobb and
Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).
28 Kelso, 107-108.
~Dahl, 305-310; Truman, 26-33.
30 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
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calls into question two basic pluralist tenets: that individuals will band together with other like-minded individuals
to secure their interests and that a group's resources or
effectiveness is a reflection of its degree of support in
society.
Since participation in an interest group incurs a cost
whether in time, money, or labor, Olson contends that no rational individual will assume these costs unless two conditions are met: (1) the likely benefits resulting from participation exceed benefits achieved without participation, and
(2) benefits exceed the costs of membership and participation. The precise reason that these constraints prove insurmountable to many latent interests, Olson argues, is because
of the so-called free-rider problem which occurs when a collective good is sought. Because such goods are nondivisible, they can be shared equally by all regardless of
whether or not they participated. In addition, since collective goods appeal to such a potentially broad population,
the perceived advantage added to a group by any one individual's membership will likely be calculated as insignificant
and so the costs of membership would most often be seen as
outweighing benefits .31
For interests seeking collective goods, therefore,
neither of the aforementioned conditions for participation
would likely be met. The only way in which a potential group
31

Ibid. 1-52.
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could get around this dilemma and attract members, maintains
Olson, is if: (1) selective benefits are offered in addition
to the group's collective goals (these benefits, available
only to members, might include such incentives as magazines,
discounts, travel, or insurance), (2) membership is made
compulsory, or

(3)

the group is small enough to allow an in-

dividual's impact upon achievement of the group's objectives
seem sufficiently noticeable so that the benefits of participation would be seen to outweigh the costs.32
These stringent criteria for successful organization
would seem to put purposive or broad-scale (what some call
"public") interests at a much greater disadvantage than
those seeking more concentrated material benefits. First, as
has been previously noted, the latter type of interest tends
to have a much greater resource base with which to dispense
selective incentives to lure members. Furthermore, since
materially-oriented interests usually seek benefits which
are more narrowly focused, they tend to better avoid the
free-rider problem since they are appealing to a more restricted audience to begin with.
The pluralist response to Olson takes issue with several aspects of his model.33 One problem, argues Kelso, is
32 Ibid.
33 Ironically, argues McFarland, it was Olson's work, considered by so many to have been the most lethal blow to
pluralist thought, that helped revive it by forcing _pluralists to develop well-thought out and empirically grounded
defenses. Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A
Pluralist Response to Olson" from a paper delivered at the
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Olson's suspect portrait of the individual as a fully rational actor with perfect knowledge. A number of influential
studies have long challenged this assumption in fields ranging from voting behavior to bureaucratic behavior to public
policy. 34 Rather than the fully rational minimizer of costs
and maximizer of benefits, Kelso wonders if man the "social
animal" of "limited rationality and limited knowledge" is a
bit more prone to the influences of emotion, passion, ideology, altruism, or obligation than Olson allows.35
Even Terry Moe, who mostly stands behind Olson's thesis, admits that Olson's assumption of perfect information
among potential group members is quite dubious. Moe's modification of Olson's model allows for the possibility that
individuals may misjudge and overestimate the actual impact
that their membership might have and thereby join a group on
that basis alone. 36 Beyond this calculation of one's one efficacy, a number of pluralists find that an individual's estimation of a group's overall chances for success provide

Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle WA (April 1991).
~See for example, Angus Campbell, et.al., The American
Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Herbert Simon and
James March, Organization ((New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1958); Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 6th edition
(En~lewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987).
Kelso, 100.
36 Terry Moe, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 34.
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another alternative incentive for membership which Olson igno res. 37
Moe attempts to bolster Olson's thesis that selective
incentives are better than shared goals in explaining membership by broadening the notion of what constitutes a selective interest. In trying to overcome Olson's onedimensional view of human values and drives, Moe allows for
more "heterogenous value structures" which may include altruism, ideology, morals, status, or duty; items most commonly associated with purposive or solidary benefits.38 The
key to Moe's revised model is that the personal satisfaction
of these values can be considered a type of selective interest as well. According to Moe, therefore, "collective goods
can actually generate their own selective incentives" and
thus become incorporated into the individual's rational calcul us. 39
McFarland, nonetheless, finds any theory of selective
incentives insufficient to explain the complexity of interest group organization as it exists today. Far from being
the mere aggregations of coequal citizens that both Olson
and early pluralists have considered them, interest groups
groups are, according to McFarland, diverse, multidimensional organizations that often do not fit neatly into
37 see, for example, Brian Barry, Economists, Sociologists, and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1910).
38 Moe, 113-118.
39 Ibid . 118 .
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Olson's model.40 For instance, he notes the growing importance of patrons (such as foundations, wealthy individuals,
and even government agencies) which often allow interest
groups to reduce reliance upon, or even bypass individual
member dues. Likewise, the existence of coalition interest
groups with smaller organizations or businesses rather than
individuals as members violates the traditional patterns of
organization that Olson's theory is built upon. Finally,
McFarland calls attention to the role of professional lobbyists and lawyers, whom he terms "agents," in achieving inf luence or effective mobilization for the group. In many
cases, McFarland argues, it is the skill of these agents
rather than overall group numbers or resources which determines a group's

success.~

Pluralists point to the massive proliferation of interest groups since the 1970s, what Mahood calls the "participation revolution," as the starkest empirical evidence of
the deficiencies of Olson's model. 42 Much of this growth,
pluralists stress, has occurred amongst "public interest"
and reform groups, precisely the type alleged to be at the
greatest disadvantage in forming.43

Some other set of moti-

vations besides selective incentives must be at work, they
suggest.
40 McFarland (1991), 10-18.
41
Ibid.
42
Mahood, 1 .
~McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize", 1; Mahood,
vii.
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The Role of Symbolism and Communications
It is argued that one of the reasons for the explosion
in interest group activity in the past two decades has been
the advances in technology and communication which make the
activation of more latent interests possible. 44

If so, this

might lend credence to Roger Cobb and Charles Elder's assertion that the logic of collective action could be better understood in symbolic rather than economic terms. 4 5
Symbols are described by Cobb and Elder as "any object
used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent
in, nor discernable from, the object

itself.~

"Symbolism,

then, can be understood as a patterned and "socially shared
coding system" used to process, simplify, and give meaning
to the deluge of incoming stimuli and information every individual constantly confronts. 47 A number of scholars have
turned to communications theory, political symbolism, and
so-called "socio-emotional" variables to explain group organization and mobilization. 48 Critical and neo-Marxist

44
45

Mahood, 19.
charles Elder and Roger Cobb, The Political Uses of
Syml?ols (New York: Longman, 1983), 1.
~ Ibid. 28.
47 Ibid. 55-56. Cobb and Elder distinguish between two categories of symbols: referential symbols which have a factual, rational base and condensational symbols which have an
emotive base. Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, Participation in
American Politics, 57.
48 For an especially good example of a communicative analysis regarding public lands politics, see C. Brant S-hort,
Ronald Reagan and :he Public Lands (College Station, TX:
Texas A & M University Press, 1989).
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theorists, for example, have long stressed the role of technology and communication as the key to a subtle and sophisticated system of social control which elites use to legitimate the political and economic process and keep potentially
dissenting groups latent.49
The way that this is achieved, argues Murray Edelman,
is by the manipulation of emotionally powerful symbols in
order to encourage quiesence or provoke anxiety as the needs
arise. To Edelman, the political realm is not unlike the religious one in that it is characterized by irrationality and
marked by activity that is fundamentally symbolic and expressive in nature.so Given such elite tampering with symbolic meaning, Edelman finds little evidence that a truly
open and competitive pluralist process could flourish. Instead, he finds a situation where highly organized elites
capture scarce material benefits so that all that system can
off er the vast remainder of the public are symbolic rewards. s1
49 See, for example, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Herbert Marcuse,
One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Jurgen
Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).
50
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana,
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967). Cobb and Elder argue that politics is neither rational or irrational, but
arational, arising "from~ loosely structured process of
interpreting fragmentary information and ambiguous cues in
the light of prior expectation and changing, uncertain or
conflicting political preferences. Cobb and Elder, Political
Uses of Symbols, 1-2.
51 Edelman, chap. 2. This whole process of political symbolism could also be seen as a key factor in determining
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Theorists like Cobb and Elder, however, see in political symbolism not only the risk of manipulation and domination, but also the opportunity for increased organization.
The opiate, therefore, can sometimes also serve as a stimulant. Cobb and Elder have no quarrel with allegations of
bias in the pluralist process, readily conceding that group
influence and access is unequally distributed and that the
scope of decisionmaking is truncated in a way that favors
the status quo. 52 Still, the notion that the strongest group
will automatically determine the agenda is, they suggest,
simplistic and empirically questionable.53
What matters most, Cobb and Elder argue, are not
groups' raw resources or even how these are put to use, but
rather the way in which groups articulate and present their
demands. If groups can do this in a way that increases support, wins over allies, discredits opponents, and ultimately
expands the arena of political conflict into increasingly
broader and more diverse publics (or conversely, prevents
this) they will succeed.5 4 Much of this process, according
to Cobb and Elder, is largely a matter of the effective manipulation of symbols by the groups involved. More precise-

where the line is drawn between "acceptable" politics and
off-limit non-decisions as Bachrach and Baratz describe
them. Thus, their "second face of power" might be understood
as one whose chief tool is the effective use of symbols.
52 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 1011.

53 Ibid. 34.
54
Ibid . 6 7 -110 .
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ly, their theory focuses upon how groups attempt to wrap
themselves and their policy objectives in the symbols of
legitimacy, 55 a point made previously by Richard Merelman:
Indeed, most major political conflicts within any polity may be seen as the attempt by partisans to attach
the available legitimacy symbols to the policies they
advocate and to sever the relationship between these
symbols and the policies of their opponents.56
Success in claiming the mantle of legitimacy and monopolizing those symbols associated with it, therefore, should
translate into an improved ability of a group to enlist
allies, restrict the flexibility of its opponents, and
assure its policy alternatives a place on the agenda.
To Cobb and Elder, therefore, a group's real power
should be measured not by its financial superiority or inferiority but by its skill at defining and redefining an
evolving issue to its advantage as circumstances warrant.
The political system, they contend, is such that any group
with communicative prowess and strategy-making skill can
achieve at least some measure of success. They believe,
therefore, that there is enough slack in the system to allow
for more open, responsive, and flexible politics than most
critics believe.~

55 Ibid. 60.
56 Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy" American
Political Science Review 60 (1966), 553.
57 cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,
164-165.
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Interest Group Competition in the Siskiyou

At the center of all the political activity swirling
around the Siskiyou National Forest has been, of course, the
clash of competing interest groups. Consequently, this case
provides an excellent opportunity by which to apply theoretical questions raised by pluralists and their critics regarding interest group organization, specifically whether
interest group competition is essentially fair and open or
inherently lopsided and biased.
Such assumptions are tested in this analysis by comparing quantifiable measures of group resources (such as
membership, staff, budget) and reviewing how these relate to
group tactics and effectiveness. Additionally, various
harder-to-quantify aspects of group competition that are in
some ways are at least partially independent of material
resources (such as strategy, communication, the articulation
of goals and values, the nature of the issue itself) are
considered in light of how they might alter a simple calculation of raw group resources.
Interest Groups and the Public Interest
According to Rosenbaum, ecological objectives are a
classic example of the type of broad, immaterial political
goods which provide "diffuse benefits" to a "large and amorphous

58

public";~

precisely the sort of benefits which cri-

Rosenbaum, Politics of Ecological Concern, 61.
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distributed among a relatively small set of groups or economic

interests."~

Environmentalism is, according to

Paehlke "an ideology distinct .... in its unwillingness to
maximize economic advantages for its own adherents, or for
any contemporary group .... it may be the least economically
self-interested of all ideologies.

1160

Brock Evans of the

Audubon Society is even more explicit:
.... [there] is no economic gain for us in the policies
and programs we advocate for the public lands. Creation of new parks, wilderness areas, wildlife refuges
.... does not return any specific gain to our treasuries. We work on them, fight for them, care about
these issues because we believe in them, and because
we truly think it is best for the country that we
love. 61
Many other observers, however, see environmentalists
as merely an interest seeking a subjective "good" like any
other, and hence, not deserving of the halo of public
interest.~

Petulla presents this line of reasoning as such:

"You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in
my living room; let's not argue about

59
60

tastes."~

Such logic

Ibid. 104.
Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989), 7.
61
Brock Evans quoted in Short, 127.
~Zeigler and Peak anecdotally note that being identified
as a public interest is something that most all groups seek:
"A few years ago, a state university .... invited several
people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to explain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks
by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group
since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and
Peak, 38.
63 Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12.
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"You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in
my living room; let's not argue about tastes."~

Such logic

would, of course, topple ecological interests from the moral
high ground which public interests seek to occupy. Ultimately, whether or not one views the environmental groups in the
Siskiyou as public interests largely depends upon which conception of the public and its needs and desires one adheres
to. While the pluralist would tend to see environmentalists
wishing to preserve old growth as just one diverse interest
among many, critics of pluralism might be more inclined to
associate the goals of preservation with the general and
long-term interests of society as a whole.
Despite the disagreement regarding their status as a
public interest, environmentalists' goals in the Siskiyou
clearly do stand out as an especially vivid example of fairly intangible, purposive political goods. Conversely, it can
be said that environmentalists' timber interest opponents
have sought benefits that could be defined as primarily economic and material, or what the former Siskiyou National
Forest supervisor terms "corrunodity-oriented." 64

people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to explain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks
by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group
since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and
Peak, 38.
63
Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12.
64
This is not to say that timber's goals are exclusively
economic; there certainly has existed a secondary tier of
less material, purposive goals as well.
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This distinction gives rise to a number of questions
which tie into larger issues of pluralist theory: (1) Did
ecological interests in the Siskiyou, because of the less
quantifiable and material nature of the goods they sought,
face a more difficult time forming politically active groups
and attracting members to these groups than their timber
interest opponents? (2) For these same reasons, were ecological interests, if they did organize, disadvantaged in
terms of resources and capabilities in their competition
with timber interests for support and influence? (3) Of the
groups that did organize, could their existence be explained
by Olson's theory in terms of his criteria for group formation (that is, compulsory membership, small group size, or
selective incentives)? and (4) Does Olson's economic rational actor or the pluralist's socio-political model best explain the motivations behind group organization?
Levels of OrganizationM
What is most striking about the political conflict
over the Siskiyou National Forest is the sheer number and
65

In comparing interest group organization and resources
in the Siskiyou, this study has drawn upon a number of
sources. Using in-depth participant interviews, telephone
surveys of group participants, Forest Service documents (especially EISs), and the general case history as gleaned from
from a variety of journalistic and official sources, a roster of the major interest groups involved between 1983 and
1992 has been compiled. Specific information regarding various measures of group resources as well as measures of intensity was gained from telephone surveys and, to a lesser
extent, written documentation. For a more detailed discussion of the criteria used for each variable, see appendix D.
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diversity of the groups involved on both sides of the issue.
If the question is merely did ecological interests form or
otherwise mobilize to protect the Siskiyou forest?, then the

answer has to be a definitive yes. At all levels of the issue--local, state, regional, and national--there was a good
deal of interest group organization and activity. Including
politically active local sawmills and logging operations, a
survey of the groups directly involved in the politics of
the Siskiyou as shown in tables 1 and 2 shows a rough equality the number of groups on each side. While a number of
groups have faded or merged in the last decade,66 there has
been a steadily increasing presence of environmental groups
involved in the Siskiyou as latent environmental interests
seem to have been readily organized. Thus, within the realm
of the Siskiyou, this study's data suggest vigorous local
organization.
Nationally, the trend has been the same, as Robert
Mitchell reports an average annual membership increase for
several large national groups for 1980-1989 of between 20 to
100%67 Concuring with this trend are Henning and Mangun who

66 For example, in 1991 alone, the Kalmiopsis Alliance became defunct, while the Siskiyou Environmental Council merged with the Siskiyou Regional Education/Action Project (as
the Siskiyou National Park Campaign had done previously).
Similarly, on the timber side the North West Timber Association was absorbed into the Northwest Forestry Association in
1991, while a number of politically active mills have since
ceased operations.
·
~Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Public Opinion and the Green
Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" in Vig and Kraft, 92. The
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estimate that there are now somewhere near forty-thousand
environmental groups in the United States.68 A number of explanations have been offered as to the cause for this growth
ranging from reaction to the anti-environmental hostility of
the Reagan-Watt years, 69 to a power deflation of established
interests in the 1970s, 70 to an overall increase in participation and organization due to changes in demographics and
communication. 71 Whatever the cause, Helen Ingram and Dean
Mann contend that the decade's growth in environmental organization is best explained in pluralist terms.72
The presence and persistence of ecological interests
in the Siskiyou does not by any means imply that such groups
or their timber interest opponents have been marked by uniformity. In actuality, interest group organization on either
side has been characterized by a great diversity of groups
of differing type, size, and scope. Regarding size and
scope, three basic categories--local, regional, and national
--are identifiable in the Siskiyou case. Smaller groups specific to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou area, or even a singroups Mitchell cites are the Sierra Club, the Wilderness
Society, and Greenpeace.
68 Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989),
30. Given the ad hoc and very local nature of many of these
grouf.s, this estimate might actually be a bit low.
6 Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands.
70 Rosenbaum, Politics of Ecological Concern, 61.
~Mahood, 18-20.
nHelen Ingram and Dean Mann, "Interest Groups and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), Environmental
Politics and Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1989), 136.
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gle watershed or portion of the Siskiyou have been fairly
common and have played a large role in the politics of the
case. On the environmentalist side, examples of such groups,
which typically have had memberships numbering in the tens,
hundreds, or low thousands, include Headwaters, the Siskiyou
Regional Education Project/Siskiyou Action

Project,~

local

Audubon chapters, or the watershed-focused Friends of Elk
River. Amongst timber interests, grassroots political representation on the Siskiyou was primarily achieved by individual local mills such as Rough and Ready Lumber or Gregory
Forest Products, although the Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association (SOTIA), the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance (SORA), and the Illinois Valley Resource Coalition
all represent more "typical" interest groups at the local/
sublocal level.
Groups of a state-wide or regional (Pacific Northwest)
scope, with memberships usually in the thousands (if they
were individual membership groups), also figured prominently
in the Siskiyou case. Still, their efforts in the Siskiyou
represented only a portion, often modest, of the group's
overall efforts on behalf of old growth or logging issues.
Examples of such state/regional groups would include the environmentalist Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council
(ONRC) or the Public Forestry Foundation and the pro-timber

~These

are twin organizations, the former being taxexempt and the latter not.
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Northwest Forestry Association or large regional corporations like Boise Cascade.n
While such efforts usually represent only a small
fraction of their overall activities, groups at the national
level, such as the Wilderness Society or the National Wildlife Federation, with memberships often in the hundreds of
thousands or even millions, have also played a direct,
though usually less intense role in the Siskiyou. Finally
there have been groups both grassroots (but from other localities) as well as national which, although not directly
participating in any of the politics of the Siskiyou, nevertheless played an indirect role through their participation
in the larger old growth issue (see appendix C).75
74 Although they were actors in the Siskiyou, big corporations have played a much larger role in the old growth battle further north, especially in Washington, according to
one timber official. It is important to note, therefore,
that the timber industry is really two industries in one.
Large corporate entities, usually with huge private forest
landholdings of their own, cut and mill mostly their own
timber. Because the overseas market is so lucrative, they
have in the past decade shut down many of their own mills
and export much of their timber instead. These companies
extract relatively little timber from national forests, but
indirectly depend on public timber to supply the domestic
market to keep political pressure off of their exports. Independent sawmill operators, on the other hand, rarely own
their own forests and tend to be much smaller and more localized than corporate timber concerns. Lacking their own
supply and denied much private timber due to exports, such
mills are almost exclusively dependent on timber from their
local national forest. Keith Ervin, ''The Tree Fight" Seattle
Post-Intelligencer (24 September 1989).
75 As we have seen in the previous chapters, events that
are part of this larger issue, such as Judge Dwyer's_ 1991
injunction, although out of the hands of Siskiyou administrators, still had a very profound impact upon events in the
Siskiyou.
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TABLE 1
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Group/
Scope

Level of
Partic.l

Group Type Paid
Annual Funding
& Meinbers2 Staff 3 Budget4 Source5

Activities6

EnviroruaentalistsHeadwaters 1
local/SW OR

M/800 (90)
CG/20

Siskiyou
Regional

M/20009
(90)

Siskiyou
1
Audubon IO
local/Sisk.N.F.
Kalmiopsis 1
Audubon
local/NW Sisk.

1

85,000
(90)

1,2,3

m,lt,e,
lb,r

4

100,000
(90)

2,3,1

m,e,lb

M/360

0

5,000

1,4

m,lt,e

M/150
(90)

0

2,000
(90)

1,2,3

5

(90)

Educ:ati~n

Pro)ect
local/Sisk.N.F.8

m,lt,e,
lb,r

11=high level of participation; 2=moderate or infrequent
level of participation.
2M=individual membership group; CG=coalition group or
trade association. Either symbol is followed by the number
of individual or group members. All figures are for 1991
unless otherwise noted in parentheses.
3part-time staff members are given a value of 0.5. All
figures are for 1991 unless otherwise noted in parentheses.
Figures with (*) are approximations.
4All figures are in dollars and for 1991 unless otherwise
noted in parentheses. Figures with (*) are approximations or
the average of a range.
51=member dues; 2=grants; 3=fundraising; 4=sales. sources
are put in order of prominence.
6i=monitoring/tracking; lt=litigation; e=public education; lb=lobbying; r=research; p=PAC.
7The SREP has a non-tax deductable spinoff, the Siskiyou
Action Project.
8Although it is also involved in the regional old growth
iss~e, SREP's primary focus is the Siskiyou.
9This is a mailing list network; contributions are voluntary
IOLocal Audubon chapters are financially and politically
autonomous from the National Aubudon Society.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Group/
Scope

Level of
Partic.

Group Type Paid
& Members Staff

Annual
Budget

Funding
Source

Activities

Friends of
1
Elk River
local/NW Sisk.

M/80
(90)

0

18,000
(90)

2,1

m,lt,e,
lb,r

Earth First 1
Siskiyou
Local/Sisk.N.F.

M/125*

0

500*

1,3

m,lt,e,
r

Siskiyou
1
Environ.
Councilll
local/SE Sisk.

M/75*

2

1,200

2

m,e,lb

213
Klamath/
Siskiyou
Coalition12
local/SW OR, NW CA

M/50

0

2,000

1,2

m,e,lb

Rogue
2
Sierra Club14
local/SW OR

M/1,100

0

3,ooo*

1,2

m,lt,e,
lb

Oregon
1
Natural Res.
Defense
Council
state

M/6,000
CG/56

13.5

650,000

1,2

m,lt,e,
lb

1 mil.

1,2

m,e,lb

Audubon
Society of
stateLreg.

1

M/7,000

8

llThe SEC merged with the SREP in 1991.
12This group is a 1991 incarnation of the Siskiyou National Park Campaign which had previously merged into the
SREP.
13This is more due to the group's relative newness than
to a current lack of involvement.
14Unlike local Audubon groups, local Sierra Club chapters
are closely affiliated with the national Sierra Club.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Group/
Scope

Level of
Partic.

Group Type Paid
& Members Staff

Annual
Budget

Funding
Source

Activities

Public
1
Forestry
Foundation
regional/NW

M/650*

Sierra
2
Club
Oregon Chap.
state

M/11,000

1

n.a.

Oregon
Rivers
Council
state

2

M/3, 000

7

389,000

National
Wildlife
Federation
national

2

M/5,800,000
CG/n.a.

700
(90)

79 mil. 1,4,3, m,lt,e,
2
lb,r

Wilderness
Society
national

1

M/372,000
( 90)

130
( 90)

14 mil. 1, 4, 3

M/n.a.

40

4. 2 mil. n. a.

lt,e

lt,e

Sierra
2
Club Legal
Defense Fund 15
national

6.5

100,000

1,2

m,e,lb,
r

n.a.

m, e, lb

1,2,3

m,lt,e,
lb,r

2

m,lt,e
lb,r

Natural
Resources
Defense
Council
national

2

M/160,000

151

16 mil.

n.a.

National
Audubon
Society
national

2

M/550,000
( 90)

337
(90)

40 mil.
(90)

1,4,2, lt,e,
3
lb

15SCLDF is a distinct entity, independent from the Sierra
Club with separate budgets, members, and even ideology.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Group/
Scope

Level of
Partic.

Earth
First16
national

1

Group Type Paid
& Members Staff
M/15,ooo*

n.a.

Annual
Budget

Funding
Source

Activities

n.a.

n.a.

2

120,000

1

m,e,lt,
lb,r

0

n.a.

1,2

m,e,lb,

m,lt,e

Timber Interests-

Southern
OR Timber
Industries
Association
local/SW OR

1

CG/108

Southern
Oregon
Resource
Alliance
local/SW OR

11 7

M/5,5oo*

North West
Timber
Assoc.18
regional/NW

1

Northwest
Forestry
Association
regional/NW
Northwest
Forest
Resource
Council
regional/NW

r

CG/25
{90)

{90)

1

CG/80

1

CG/1319

300,000*

1

m,e,lt,
lb,r

12

736,000

1

m,e,lb

020

n.a.

n.a.

e,lt,lb

5

r

16Earth First is not a typical interest group with off icial dues and membership. It does have, however, subscribers
and a core of activists.
17SORA is less active now than in the mid-to-late 80s.
18NWTA merged in 1991 with the Northwest Forestry Assoc.
19NFRC is made up of other trade associations rather than
companies.
20NFRC is closely affiliated with the Northwest Forestry
Association and uses its staff and offices.
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TABLE 1 (continued}
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Group/
Scope

Level of
Partic.

Group Type Paid
& Members Staff

Annual
Budget

Funding
Source

Activities

Douglas
2
Timber
Operators
local/county

CG/130

Associated
Oregon Loggers state

2

CG/780

12

250,000*
(90}

1

Western
2
Forest
Industries
Association
regional/West

CG/125
(90)

10
( 90}

750,000
(90}

n.a.

n.a.

60,000

n.a.

m, e, lb

1,3

lb

Helicopter
Loggers
Association
regional

1

Illinois
2
Valley Resource Coalition
local/SE Sisk.
Western
2
Wood Products Assoc.
regional/West

5

250,ooo*

1

m,e,lb,
r

CG/6

M/110

CG/300

n.a.

0

100
(90}

1,000*

>5 mil.21 n.a.

m,lt,e,
lb,r,p

n.a.

21The only information available for WWPA's budget states
that it is in the "above $5 million" range.
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TABLE 2
BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Company

Employees 1

Annual Annual Lumber Level of ActivSales2 Production3
Partic.4 itiess
(mm $)

Rogge Forest
Products6

92

40

Medford Corp.

700

Spalding
& Bros.

(mmbf)

•

60
(88)

1

m, lt

135

144

2

lt,lb

200

26

51

1

n.a.

Gregory
Forest
Products?

448

72

78

1

m, lb

Rough and
Ready Lumber

235
(89)

n.a.

70

1

m, lb

South Coast
Lumber

425

100

78

1

m, lb

Murphy Creek
Lumbers

150

19

96
(88)

1

m, lb

Croman Corp.

150

51

70

2

n.a.

Burrill
Lumber

n.a.

n.a.

107

2

n.a.

Gold Beach
Plywood9

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

1

m, lb

lAll figures are for 1990 unless otherwise
parentheses.
2see above.
3All figures are for 1987 unless otherwise
parentheses.
4l=high level of participation; 2=moderate
participation.
Sm=monitoring; lt=litigation; lb=lobbying;
6Formerly Douglas Pacific (prior to 1988).
7 ceased operations in 1991.
Bceased operations, date unknown.
9ceased operations, date unknown.

noted in
noted in
or infrequent
p=PAC
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TABLE 2 (continued)
BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992
Company

Employees

Annual Annual Lumber Level of ActivSales Production
Partic. ities
(mm $)

Boise
Cascade
Medford Div.

(mmbf)

19,810

4,186

920

1,000

130

75

Stone
32,600
Container
Medford Forest 1,000
Industries Div.

5,360

536

140

n.a.

Weyerhaeuser
Corporation

9,024

3,140

•

1

m, lb,
p

40,621

2

m, lb

2

lb,p
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Perhaps the most notable distinction regarding the
scope of the different groups involved concerns the intensity with which they participated in the politics of the
Siskiyou. Looking at table 3, it becomes clear that the more
localized a group's focus was, the more heavily that group
tended to participate. Two-thirds of all the local groups
measured versus 58% of the state/regional groups and less
than a quarter of the national groups were in the heavy
participation category.
In addition to differences in scope and size, groups
in the Siskiyou were also distinguished on the basis of
their organization. Some groups, such as the Wilderness Society, the Siskiyou Audubon, or SORA were individual membership organizations. Other groups, though, had not individual members, but smaller groups or companies as members.
SOTIA and the Northwest Forestry Association were examples
of this type of coalition organization. Other groups, such
as Headwaters or the ONRC, were a mixture of individual membership and group coalition. These hybrids made for an interest group line-up that could be difficult to keep track of
when groups operated both independently and as coalition
members. For instance, in addition to eight hundred individual members, Headwaters included under its fold twenty watershed groups including the Friends of Elk River. Headwaters, in turn was a member group of the ONRC (althougp the
two acted as very distinct entities). Both Headwaters and

200

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY SCOPE ACCORDING TO
LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION
Level of Participation1
1

2

Group Scope
Local Groups
and Businesses (n=24)

66.7 (16)

33.3 (8)

State/Regional Groups (n=l2)

58.3 (7)

41.6 (5)

National Groups
and Businesses <n=9)

22.2 (2)

77.8 (7)

1 For

an explanation of this variable, see table 1
or appendix D
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the ONRC, incidentally, were both part of the Western Ancient Forest Campaign. Boise Cascade, meanwhile, itself a
player in the Siskiyou, also belonged to SOTIA.
This overlap suggests two things. First, while interest group organization in the Siskiyou has been undeniably
widespread and diverse, these somewhat incestuous patterns
of membership suggest that what may seem like completely
different sets of actors, may sometimes be the same players
operating under several banners. Secondly, the existence of
coalition groups and their intermixture with membership
groups would seem to bypass elements of Olson's theory.
Since coalition groups have other groups and not individuals
as members, Olson's theory of selective incentives for individuals would not seem to apply. Individuals participating
in such groups pay no costs since their parent group picks
up the tab for their participation. The umbrella group,
meanwhile, enjoys increased organizational capabilities as
well as the enhanced clout that often comes with being an
alliance.
This overlap of group affiliations, as pluralists have
long argued, also extends to individual members and group
entreprenuers.76 For example, a key figure in the Friends of
Elk River also featured prominently in the Kalmiopsis Audubon, while the conservation chair of the Siskiyou Aubudon
also simultaneously headed the Siskiyou Environmental Counu Truman,

157-167.
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cil (the former chair, incidentally, was also a past president of Headwaters). Such was the case with the timber interests as well as the president of SOTIA also served as the
past head of SORA, while another key SOTIA official was formerly a leader in the North West Timber Association.
Besides coalition and membership interest groups,
there have been a number of other types of organizations
involved in the Siskiyou. As already mentioned, many active
groups were private businesses, usually local mills or logging operations and as such had no membership per se (although many belonged to one or another interest group consortium). Other partisan interest groups not directly environmentalist or timber-related were, nevertheless active
participants. Such groups included a number of local Chambers of Commerce77 and, in the larger national issue, various labor unions representing woodworkers and carpenters.n
Finally there was very heavy involvement in the Siskiyou
from various county and city governments, 79 at least one
government association (the Association of O & C Counties),
and various federal and state agencies besides those agen-

77 specifically, these were the Bay Area, Brookings,
Grants Pass/Josephine County, Illinois Valley, Medford/
Jackson County, and Roseburg Chambers of Commerce.
78 see previous chapter, note 98 for the unions involved.
79 This would include the governments of Curry, Josephine,
Coos, Jackson, and Del Norte counties as well as a number of
school board districts and city governments such as Brookings, Cave Junction, Glendale, Gold Beach, Grants Pass, Port
Orford, Powers, and Bandon.
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cies with primary jurisdiction in the case.so Those latter
primary agencies, according to pluralist theory ought to
count as distinct interests as well (their influence and
goals will be fully discussed in the next chapter).
The Motivation to Organize
It is clear from examining the roster of ecological
interest groups involved in the Siskiyou that despite the
purposive and less material nature of the goods they have
sought, these interests have made the transition from latent
to manifest groups with little or no more difficulty than
their timber interest opponents. This information, however,
is not enough to fully test Olson's thesis. What needs to be
understood beyond the mere fact of their organization and
mobilization is the motivation underlying this behavior.
If Olson's model was accurate in this case then we
could expect to find that the ecologists' seemingly successful effort to organize into manifest groups was due to
either: (l) the granting of selective benefits, (2) small
group size, or (3) some form of compulsion. It is clear that
the last condition was not a factor for environmental groups
in the Siskiyou as they, unlike labor or professional
groups, have no legal basis for mandatory group membership.
For a few very small grassroots environmental groups,
group size may have been a relevant factor. Several groups
80

Examples would include the U.S. EPA or the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.
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such as the Siskiyou Environmental Council or the Friends of
Elk River had memberships of between seventy to eighty. It
is in the realm of possibility, therefore, that individual
members of these very small groups (usually focused upon a
specific watershed near which many of the members live) have
felt that their support has had a noticeable effect upon the
achievement of their goals.81 Still, this possibility, even
if it were true, would not accouat for the formation of the
majority of environmental groups involved in the Siskiyou
which had memberships ranging from the high hundreds to
several million.
This leaves us then with selective incentives as the
only remaining explanation for the· majority of environmental
group organization according to Olson's theory. Yet for most
of the small and mid-size groups in this case, all that was
offered to members in terms of traditional selective benefits was a newsletter and, perhaps, periodic "action
alerts"; hardly the selective material enticements likely to
make a twenty-five dollar contribution seem worthwhile. Only
the larger national groups could offer greater, though still
fairly modest, selective incentives; usually vivid, wellproduced magazines, travel packages, certain discounts, and,
perhaps, a free patch or keychain.

81 Although it could also be argued that such groups
failed far more often than they succeeded in achieving these
goals.
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Although Culhane implies that this is precisely what
maintains large· environmental group memberships, 82 other
scholars, such as Ingram and Mann, strongly disagree, and
find instead that offering selective benefits provides environmental groups with some spare income and little more.
The real sources of formation, growth, and maintenance, they
argue, are common perceptions of threats to one's personal
or general environment as well as a shared ideological and
emotional commitment to counteract these threats and thus
achieve collective goods.83 This, of course, corresponds
more closely with the traditional pluralist notion that
groups form on the basis of common interests, goals, and
attitudes.
Kerry Smith's survey research supports this assertion
by finding expressive values highly correlated to environmental group membership. He characterizes a public that is
fully aware of the fact that the collective goods they seek
will be shared by all and yet is still willing to shoulder
the costs in time or money. 84 Ingram and Mann, meanwhile,
cite a survey of Sierra Club members in which 64% identify
perceived threats and 42% express a purposive goal as reasons for joining.as More importantly, they raise the point
82 Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1981), 25.
83 Ingram and Mann, 138.
84 Kerry Smith, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Green Lobby" American Political Science Review 79:1 (1984), 137-147,

150.

85 Ingram and Mann, 139.
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that membership for environmental groups has roughly paralleled changes in the popular perception of threats to the
environment. 86 For example, Sierra Club membership growth
was slow during the relatively friendly Carter Administration but skyrocketed after Reagan and his antagonistic appointee Watt took power. Finally, Smith reports a relatively
high rate of environmental group members (ranging from 17 to
49%) who give voluntary contributions in excess of the minimum necessary to secure selective benefits.87 All of this,
then, would seem to imply that public policy concerns and
ideological and emotional commitment were the operative factors here.
McFarland finds the theory of selective incentives to
be an unconvincing explanation for other reasons; namely its
failure to perceive of interest groups as anything other
than spontaneous aggregations of equal members. As mentioned
before, McFarland believes that the role of external patronage, the dominance and dedication of skillful entrepreneurs
and/or agents, and the existence of non-individual membership groups all render the notion of selective incentives
obsolete.BB In the Siskiyou, this unconventionality of interest groups is made abundantly clear. Very few small and
mid-sized groups did not receive at least some some form of
patronage, either from foundations or larger national
86

Ibid.

87 Smith, 137-147.
88 McFarland, "Why Interests Organize", 10-18.
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groups. 89 In fact, some smaller groups, relying exclusively
upon patronage or other sources of funding, did not even require membership dues. Furthermore, many environmental
groups, as previously mentioned, were comprised either partly or wholly of other groups. Taken together, all these
facts would seem to leave Olson's emphasis on individual motivations, cost-benefit calculations, and selective incentives largely irrelevant.
It would certainly be difficult to argue, therefore,
that the chief impetus for group formation and maintenance
in the case of the Siskiyou was selective incentives. Most
of the environmental groups involved offered quite negligable material inducements, if any. Even the more substantial
incentives offered by the large nationals, were not adequate
to explain the patterns and depth of support evident in this
case. Other groups did not even consist of the individual
members central to Olson's model nor did they rely exclusively on the financial support which selective incentives
are supposed to clinch.
Only by using Moe's expansive interpretation of selective benefits which includes the socio-emotional benefits
of striving for a collective good, can one salvage any aspect of selective goods theory in regards to environmental
~In some groups, patronage rather than membership dues
accounted for the bulk of funding in a given year. For example, in 1990 and 1991, respectively, seven-eighths·of the
Friends of Elk River's and all of the Siskiyou Environmental
Council's funding came from patron's grants.
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organization in the Siskiyou. At least in this case, the key
to understanding the motivations behind environmental group
organization is to recognize the role of a shared ideological and emotional commitment and a common perception of a
specific threat or imminent loss (of, for instance, a particular roadless area or salmon stream or old growth in general); all backed up by a fairly effective cultivation of
external patronage.
Why is Olson's celebrated model of such limited applicability in this particular case? First there are the
obvious structural changes in interest group organization
that Olson did not foresee such as agents, alliances, patronage, etc. Beyond that, though, it may be that the theory
of selective incentives is far more useful in understanding
only certain types of organization in certain situations,
namely those which feature a clear free-rider problem such
as union organizing on behalf of better wages (precisely the
type of case from which Olson draws the bulk of his research). Organizing on behalf of ecological goals, on the
other hand, has far less divisible, quantifiable benefits.
These goals and benefits are also seen by their advocates as
being crucially important. As a result, the free-rider problem may not be much of a problem after all. What environmentalist would resent or hesitate sharing the benefits of
clean air or old growth forests with those who did not contribute towards that goal as well? Thus, the intangibility
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and perceived overwhelming significance of such benefits are
probably enough to convince concerned individuals that their
small share on behalf of the cause is worth making.
Grassroots and Nationals
In the Siskiyou as well as in the larger old growth
issue, the environmental movement has never been a single
monolith that has spoken with one voice. In actuality, it
has been a very diverse collection of groups with differing
resources, goals, and tactics which has sometimes found itself deeply divided over various issues. Perhaps the most
relevant distinction in this respect has been that of grassroots versus national groups. In the Siskiyou and elsewhere
in the Northwest, grassroot groups have tended to be more
confrontational, uncompromising, and resource-poor than
their national counterparts. They also tend to have different bases of membership support. While both types of groups
usually to attract members who are white, well-educated, and
politically left-of-center,90 grassroots membership has
tended to be less affluent and more oriented towards political

activism.~

90 This characterization applies only to groups focused
upon the old growth issue. Other grassroots environmental
groups, especially ones active in pollution or toxic dump
issues, tend to be more ethnically diverse, less educated
and not necessarily left-of-center.
~ I observed this in my own research and it is also discussed in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" National Journal
(28 July 1990), 1826.
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Such differences in membership profile has led to a
certain amount of friction and mistrust between the two.
While grassroots groups see themselves on the front-line,
"where the rubber meets the road," as one activist puts
it, 92 the nationals' large size and professionalization are
invariably seen by the grassroots as leaving them out of
touch and far too eager to compromise and accomodate. "National lobbyists think in terms of political reality and
quiet sacrifice," observes one activist, while "grassroots
exclaim ecological imperatives to the grave. 93 Thus, in the
11

Siskiyou and the larger old growth issue the grassroots,
with their more militant and confrontational brand of politics, have come to harbor a certain amount of resentment
towards the national groups who, they fear, will eventually
"sell them out" as a grassroots activist expresses:
The model for conservation politics through the 1970s
and 1980s was this: Grassroots mobilizes around an issue which nationals won't touch; grassroots gets beaten to hell by agencies and media; nationals come in to
gain members off controversy; nationals cut a deal in
D.C. without grassroots input.94
In some ways, though, the old growth issue broke this
pattern in that the grassroots groups have remained an active and potent force even after the national groups jumped
aboard the issue in the mid-to-late 1980s. From Bald Mountain to 1988, claims the same activist, "everything was
92

Kriz, 1827.
93 Mitchell Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis" Wild Earth 1:2 (Summer 1991), 32.
94 Ibid. 31.
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going as usual .... except the grassroots never let

go."~

For

example, when the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society
tried to move the Vento bill out of committee, this so incensed grassroots groups that they formed the Western Ancient Forest Campaign (WAFC) to establish their own D.C. office; a move that the Wilderness Society is reported to have
strongly pressured potentially supportive foundations to
prevent. 96 As a result of WAFC, the grassroots managed to
offset some of the nationals' Washington D.C. influence by
establishing close ties to a number of congressmen including
Jontz and Miller. Thus, the nationals have found themselves
having to share power within the environmental movement.
The effects of this friction, though, are not all negative for mainstream national environmentalists. Grassroots
expand the scope of the debate with their bolder policy demands, thereby making the positions of the nationals seem
more reasonable to policymakers by comparison. This expanded
realm of possibility may even safely allow nationals to
adopt the tougher stances which they truly favor but previously felt were politically unrealistic. This indirect level
of grassroots influence is pointed out by Ingram and Mann:
While such groups [militant grassroots] are small and
outside the mainstream, their significance should not
95

96

Ibid. 32.
rbid. Grassroots activists accuse the Sierra Club and

the Wilderness Society as being the groups most willing to
accomodate and compromise. The National Audubon Soci-ety and
the National Wildlife Federation usually get higher marks
from the grassroots, at least on old growth.
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be discounted. Through their actions, difficult issues
may get placed on the environmental agenda that would
be otherwise ignored. Further, their vocal criticisms
of compromise probably restrain the leaders of mainline groups from the appearance of excessive moderation .w
To paint a picture of grassroots-national relations in
the Siskiyou as being strictly antagonistic, however, would
be seriously misleading. Along with intergroup rivalry and
conflict has been as much or more close cooperation and coordination. In some instances, national groups, especially
the National Audubon Society and the National Wildlife Federation, have outright sponsored grassroots efforts, providing technical assistance, airplane tickets (for grassroots
activists to testify at D.C. hearings), and funding for
local activities and projects.98
Thus, despite their uncompromising battle cries,
grassroots organizations, at least in the old growth issue,
have inevitably found themselves drawn together with the
nationals into a rough symbiosis of sorts with the nationals
depending on the grassroots for local organizing and monitoring and the grassroots relying on the nationals for resources.

97

Ingram and Mann, 154.
98 one of the most successful of these was the National
Audubon Society's Adopt-A-Forest program which provided
funds for local groups to map their nearby national forest
in detail and learn the ins and outs of the EIS process in
order to allow the close tracking of sales and effective
participation in the Forest Service's planning process.
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Group Resources
Even if groups seeking diffuse, intangible goods do
manage to organize, the critics of pluralism argue, they
invariably find themselves seriously outspent and overmatched as their economically-focused opponent's resources
will most often far exceed their own. Henning and Mangun
argue that not only do economic interests tend to be wellfunded, well-staffed, and politically and legally represented by professionals, but they are also heavily favored by
tax laws. 99 Even the pluralist Culhane admits in his study
of various local public lands resource battles that, "environmentalists .... had organizational resources that were signif icantly inferior to those of the consumptive user
groups. "100
To attempt such a comparison of group resources in the
Siskiyou is more difficult than it may seem for two reasons.
First, amongst many of the groups involved, there is a lack
of directly comparable measures of resource strength. As
mentioned before, many of the timber interest participants

99

Henning and Mangun, 31-32. While businesses can deduct
lobbying expenses from their taxes as a cost of doing business, environmental groups risk losing their tax-exempt
status if they use their income for certain types of lobbying which the IRS deems "too political."
100 Culhane, 168. Culhane suggests, however, that the more
focused nature of the environmentalists' goals in his study
may have offset some of this disadvantage. This argument,
though, as we shall see, can work both ways. To measure
group resources, or what he calls "power," Culhane employs
four indicators: staff, budget, gross volume of business,
and membership.
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in the politics of the Siskiyou were individual mills or
corporations rather than traditional interest groups with
memberships and clearly focused operating budgets. While
number of employees and total sales volume do provide some
measure of each business's resources and capabilities, such
figures are substantially different from and much less focused than the paid staff or annual budget of interest
groups.
The other problem standing in the way of a clear comparison of group resources involves groups whose focus and
scope extend well beyond the Siskiyou. Groups such as the
Northwest Forest Resource Council or Boise Cascade or the
Wilderness Society, while directly involved in the politics
of the Siskiyou, were also heavily involved in many other
conflicts and issues throughout the Northwest or even the
country. Thus, while these groups may possess substantial
organizational resources, only a small fraction of that is
likely to have been expended directly on the Siskiyou issue.
On the other hand, groups like SOTIA or Headwaters that
focused only on southwest Oregon would likely spend a much
larger portion of their resources on the Siskiyou. Still
more narrowly focused would be Siskiyou-wide or watershed
groups which could be expected to target the entirety of
their resources upon the Siskiyou.
Despite these constraints it is still possible to gain
some sense of the capacities of the groups involved. One way
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around this methodological thicket, as Culhane demonstrates,
is to restrict comparisons to like-sized groups. 101

Tables 4

and 5 each compare mean resources based on staff, membership, and budget for local and state/regional groups. What
such comparisons show is that at both the local and state
and regional 102

levels as well as a combination of the two

(table 6), timber group staff size and budgets exceeded
those of their environmental counterparts. 103

-·~\

Left out of this comparison have been the national environmental groups directly involved in the Siskiyou. The
problem is that they have no direct timber counterpart since
no national timber interest groups, despite being heavily
and influentially involved in the larger old growth contraversy, met the criteria necessary to be considered direct
participants in the Siskiyou conflict (see appendix D, p.l).
With an average staff of 272, mean membership nearing two

101
1

Culhane, 372.

m Regional in this respect refers to interstate such as

the Pacific Northwest region rather than intrastate such the
southwestern region of Oregon.
1
~ The one exception to this would be for the mean budget
of state/regional groups if the Western Wood Products Association's budget is not factored in. As what may be considered a mega-regional group whose focus is the entire western United States rather than just the Pacific Northwest,
WWPA's scope and size are considerably larger than any other
state/regional group in the study. If one excludes the
group's considerable budget, the state/regional timber group
budget mean drops from $1,182,667 to $419,200 as compared to
the environmentalists' $534,750. See table 5. It is also important to note that the individual membership mean for local and state/regional timber groups was calculated with an
N of only two, while for the local timber group budget mean,
the N was only three.
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million, and an average budget of over thirty million dollars, these national groups, as shown in table 7, cannot be
ignored. Still, it is necessary to keep these figures in
perspective and note once again that only a fraction of
these groups' resources went towards the old growth issue
and an even smaller percentage of that went directly to the
Siskiyou conflict.
Within just the Siskiyou, perhaps the most comparable
timber interest participants to the national environmental
groups (in terms of size and scope) would be the three large
national wood products corporations involved locally. Table
8 shows their mean resources. Like the national environmentalists, these companies command substantial resources-averaging 31,000 employees, annual production of 1.5 billion
board feet of timber, and total sales of over six billion
dollars (of which Weyerhauser and Boise Cascade drew profits
of $601.4 million and $267.6 million, respectively, in
19991~

). Also like the national environmental groups, only

a very small percentage of these figure could be said to
have been applied to the Siskiyou controversy.
Smaller mills were also major players in the Siskiyou,
perhaps even more so than local timber interest groups.
Their mean resources are also shown in table 8. Although
they have no formal membership, staff, or operating budgets,

1~

Figures from chart in "Forests in Distress" special
report, Oregonian (16 September 1990).
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their average workforce of 440 employees, $79 million in annual sales, and 83 million board feet of lumber production1~

(most of which emanating from public land) has as-

sured them a resource base and an overall capacity to participate quite effectively.
Regardless of which side they were on, local groups
(excluding businesses) tended to be, not surprisingly, the
most resource-poor, while the nationals were the most wellendowed. As table 9 shows, all of the poorest groups were
local and nearly 60% of the local groups measured were in
this lowest budget category (<$10,000). On the other hand,
five of the six groups in the highest category (>$1,000,000)
were national (all the nationals measured fell into this category). State/regional groups, meanwhile, mostly populated
the middle categories. The figures also show that environmental groups accounted for the bulk of both the poorest and
richest groups (the latter is partly attributable to the
fact there were no national timber groups) while two-thirds
of all timber groups fell in the mid-high range ($100,001-$1
million).
Regarding levels of participation, table 10 shows the
groups more closely involved in the Siskiyou to be fairly
evenly split between the low and mid-level budget categor-

105 These figure include the local divisions of Boise Cascade and Stone Forest Industries. These mills are of· roughly
equal size and operate similarly to the independents in the
area.
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TABLE 4
MEAN LOCAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES

Environmentalists

Timber

Paid Staff

1. 2

3.5

Individual Membership1

355'+

2,805

Group Membership2
Budget (in dollars)3
Category

N

119
24,078
gs

123,667
46

1Rounded off to the nearest member.
2see above.
3Rounded off to nearest dollar.
4 Because the Siskiyou Regional Education Project/Action
Project considers a large mailing list network and not formal duespayers as its membership, they were not included in
this calculation as it would skew the figures. If SREP/SAP
is included, the mean individual membership would be 2,538.
SFor individual membership, N=8.
6For individual membership, N=2; group membership, N=2;
budget, N=3.
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TABLE 5
MEAN STATE AND REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES

Environmentalists
Paid Staff
Individual Membership

7.2

Category

N

Timber
without WWPA1

27.8

9.8

2192

203

1,182,6673

419,200

5530.0

Group Membership
Budget (in dollars)

Timber

534,750
54

75

66

1The Western Wood Products Association is a group that,
while not national, is far larger in size and scope than any
other state/regional group. Since it may be seen as skewing
the statistics, this additional category is provided.
2This figure does not include the Northwest Forest
Resource Council which has other trade associations as
members.
3The only data available for WWPA is that their budget is
in the "above $5 million" range. The mean budget is calculated using a budget figure of $5,000,000. In actuality,
however, WWPA's budget might very likely be a good deal
higher.
4For budget, N=4.
SFor staff, N=5; groups membership and budget, N=6.
6For staff, N=4; group membership and budget, N=5.
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TABLE 6
MEAN LOCAL, STATE/REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES
Environmentalists

Timber

Timber
without WWPA1

3.4

16.2

5.8

Paid Staff
Individual Membership
Group Membership
Budget (in dollars)
Category N

2 f 345 2
38
181,208
14 3

2,805

2,805

194

179

829,667

302,125

114

10 5

1 See note 1, table 5.
does not include the SREP/SAP (see note 4, table
4). If they are included, mean individual membership is
3,606.
3 For grp membership, N=2; indiv membership and budget,
N=3.
4 For indiv membership, N=2; grp membership, N=8; staff
and budget, N=9.
5 For indiv. membership, N=2; grp. membership, N=7; staff
and budget, N=8.
2 This

TABLE 7
MEAN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP RESOURCES

Paid Staff

271.6

Individual Membership

1,720,500

Budget (in dollars)

30,640,000

N

1The national Earth First movement was deleted from this
calculation since its membership is quite ad hoc and informal and its budget and staff information is missing.
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TABLE 8
MEAN EMPLOYEES, SALES, AND ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF FOREST
PRODUCTS COMPANIES
Local
Businesses1
Employees

National
Corporations

440

31,010

Annual Total Sales2
(in millions of $)

79

6,190

Annual Lumber Production3
(in mmbf)

83

1,532

Category N

11 4

3

1 Includes two local mills which comprise divisions of
large national corporations.
2Rounded off to the nearest dollar.
3Rounded off to the nearest dollar.
4 For sales, N=9; employees and production, N=lO.
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TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ACCORDING TO
BUDGET.

under
$10,000

Budget
$10,000$100,001100,000
l,000,000

over
$1,000,000

Interest Group
Type/Scope
Local Interest
Groups n=l2

58.3
(7)

25.0
(3)

16.7
(2)

State Interest
Groups n=lO

0
0

20.0
( 2)

70.0
(7)

Natl. Interest
Groups n=5

0
0

0
0

0
0

100.0
(5 )

Total Enviro.
Groups n=l8

33.3
( 6)

22.2
( 4)

16.7
(3)

27.8
(5 )

Total Timber
Groups n=9

11.1
( 1)

11.1
(1)

66.7
( 6)

11.1
(1)

0
0
10.0
( 1)

TABLE 10
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF
PARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO BUDGET
under
$10,000

$10,000100,000

Budget
$100,001$1,000,000

over
$1,000,000

Level of
Participation,
1

n=l5

26.7
(4)

33.3
(5 )

2

n=l2

25.0
(3)

0
0

33.3
(5 )
33.3
(4)

6.7
(1)
41. 7
(5)

,For an explanation of this variable, see table 1·or appendix D.
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ies, while the wealthier groups were far less likely to be
heavy participants. These findings, though, probably have
far more to do with the nature of this specific case with
its high levels of grassroots organization than with any
general tendency of well-endowed groups to participate less.
Taken as whole, a comparison of the resources of the
groups involved in the Siskiyou case, however imperfect,
does make two observations fairly clear. First, it can be
said with some confidence that the timber interests could
marshal superior resources, but not by an overwhelming margin. Both locally and state and regionally, timber groups
maintained an edge and adding nearly a dozen local mills
into the equation would probably only strengthen that edge.
While not directly comparable, one has to wonder whether or
not local companies averaging $79 million in sales could
bring more resources to bear than local groups with a mean
budget of less than $25,000.
Although outside the scope of this study's quantitative comparisons, one has to consider as well the influence
of national timber groups and other large wood products corporations106

upon the larger old growth issue. While the

average annual budget of a national timber interest group is
probably roughly similar to that of most national environ-

106 Corporations would include International Paper, Georgia Pacific, Louisiana Pacific, and Plum Creek, to name a
few. Some of the more noteworthy national timber interest
groups are listed in appendix c.
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mental groups, timber's cause nationally has been bolstered
by the additional resources of large, politically active
corporations. In addition, one must consider, once again,
that most environmental groups' budgets are spread thin
across a whole range of issues from air and water pollution
to ozone depletion to public lands policy. Timber interests,
on the other hand, can narrow in upon only one aspect of
environmental policy--timber issues. One indicator of timber's advantage on a national level could be seen in PAC
expenditures. Table 11 offers an overview of relevant PAC
donations for the five election-year cycles from 1977 to
1988. In the 1987-1988 election cycle, for instance, Forest
and paper product industry PACs outspent environmental PACs
by a ratio of nearly three to

one. 1 ~

The second observation made evident from this study's
examination of comparative resources is that environmental
groups, although at some disadvantage, still have had access
to resources adequate to make themselves an effective countervailing force in this policy conflict. At all levels of
the old growth issue, environmental groups, even if strapped
for cash, as local groups have certainly been, have usually
had at least enough resources to make themselves a vocal and
~ In 1987-1988 Forestry and paper products industry PACs
dispensed with a total of $1,308,318 as opposed to the three
environmentalist PACs' combined $459,951 expenditure. Larry
Makinson, Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990). It should also be noted
that the environmental PACs have a broader focus--all environmental issues--than do the forest and paper PACs.
1
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TABLE 11
FOREST AND PAPER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PAC EXPENDITURES IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS BY ELECTION
YEAR 1977-1988. 1

87-88

85-86

83-84

81-82

79-80

77-78

Boise Cascade

83.8

77.9

50.1

96.1

96.8

47.7

Georgia-Pacific

99.1

83.9

93.0

104.2

107.2

86.3

NFPA

81. 4

74.6

64.8

91.4

81.1

60.3

Weyerhaeuser I

63.3

96.4

62.3

70.1

89.9

59.5

Weyerhaeuser I I 3

36.2

24.5

29.4

31.0

32.1

18.2

Louisiana-Pacific

33.9

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Stone Container

80.8

14.4

16.l

9.5

6.6

Internatl. Paper

139.2

106.6

98.4

141.5

163.8

173.1

Westvaco

208.5

143.2

124.0

129.0

129.3

40.0

Mead

68.3

59.2

57.9

70.4

60.6

37.9

Potlatch

37.8

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Kimberly-Clark

36.1

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Scott

47.0

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

292.2

250.0

254.4

231.1

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

185.9

137.0

3.4

•2

2

Sierra Club

Environmental Action 38.1
LCV 4

89.4

n.a.

93.8

1All figures rounded off to the nearest hundred. The
sources for this table are: Edward Zuckerman, Almanac of
Federal PACs: 1990 (Washington D.C.: Amward Publications,
Inc., 1990); Larry Makinson, Open Secrets: The Dollar Power
of PACs in Congress (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990).
2National Forest Products Association.
3weyerhaeuser Corporation has two separate political action committees.
4League of Conservation Voters.
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relatively effective presence. Thus, even if they were outspent, the worst-case scenario painted by the critics of
pluralism whereby marginal or purposively-oriented groups
stay latent or completely ineffective due their resource inf er iori ty cannot be said to apply in the case of the Siskiyou.
Group Tactics
As important as how much money a group has is how they
put it to use. In the Siskiyou, both the environmentalists
and timber interests demonstrated quite a bit of flexibility
regarding the tactics they employed which ran the gamut from
dramatic direct action to careful behind-the-scenes research.
Direct action refers to an activity--usually highly
symbolic, sometimes controversial, and occasionally illegal
--which is outside the realm of standard participation (activities such as voting, attending meetings, negotiating,
litigating, and so on) Designed to dramatize and draw attention to a particular policy demand, direct action is usually
characterized as the alternative of last resort, used when a
group has exhausted all options or has been shut out of the
process. In the Siskiyou, environmentalists, mostly affiliated in some way with Earth First, relied quite heavily upon
direct action and civil disobedience, especially in the
North Kalmiopsis from 1983-1987 and during the Silver sal-
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vage in 1988. Such confrontational strategies had mixed results. While direct actions alienated many people in the
local community, they did gain considerable media attention
which not only nudged certain issues towards the forefront,
but also caught the attention (much of it sympathetic) of an
wider urban audience across the region and even, to a lesser
extent, the nation. With its guerrilla theatre and animal
costumes and militant slogans, 108 Earth First was guaranteed
controversy and as such became a media magnet. But the sensationalism could cut both ways and Earth First was just as
frequently hurt by the media's innuendos and relentless hype
as it was helped by the attention.
As might be expected, direct actions by environmentalists began to subside in the Siskiyou as their political
hand strengthened by 1989 and 1990. With favorable court
rulings standing behind them, they could now cite the rule
of law rather than dire moral imperatives as their motivation. Not long after, it was, ironically, local timber interests, feeling increasingly desperate, who turned to direct
actions including noisy logging truck protests and more frequent demonstrations.109
108 Earth First's offical slogan "No Compromise in the
Defense of Mother Earth" was frequently augmented with the
popular battle cry, "No Deal Assholes." In Earth First's
lexicon, logging executives are known as timber beasts, rangers as freddies, the Forest Service's philosophy of multiple use as multiple abuse, and the Forest Service itself as
either the Forest Circus or the Forest Disservice.
109 One incident in particular, as told by a district ranger, showed how the tables had turned regarding direct ac-
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Ingram and Mann identify a basic distinction between
environmental groups oriented towards confrontation and
those dedicated to working within the system. 110 What is
interesting about the Siskiyou case is that seemingly radical groups and individuals manned blockades one day and participated in a Forest Service planning workshop or met with
congressmen the next. At least at the local level, there was
a curious integration of mainstream and radical tactics that
blur Ingram and Mann's dichotomy.
One strategy which the entire spectrum of groups on
either side were sure to rely heavily upon was to engage in
campaigns to boost publicity, or what interest groups prefer
to call "public education." In fact, for some of the smaller
groups without legal staff or lobbyists this was the main
focus of their efforts. Larger regional and national groups
engaged in their own slicker, better-funded campaigns as
well. Both timber and environmental interests produced a
deluge of press releases, news conferences, fliers, pamphlets, newsletters, letters to the editor, press kits, newspaper advertisements, and, among more well-endowed groups,
even television commercials. 111
tion. After the children's newsletter of the Target department store in Medford featured an interview with Lou Gold in
which he exhorted them to save the forests, a number of protimber protestors filled up shopping carts at the store and
then left them in the aisles.
110
Ingram and Mann, 143.
.
111
Commercials up to this point have mostly been timber
company ads trying to advance a positive image of their industry in general. Although, they have not yet aired their
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One element of these public education strategies that
has been especially widespread in the Siskiyou conflict has
been letter-writing campaigns. Despite the fact that letterwriting, especially form letters, is of "doubtful impact, "11 2

it figured very prominently in the overall strate-

gies of a number of groups including SOTIA, SORA, and the
Siskiyou Regional Education Project. According to Zeigler
and Peak, adoption of letter-writing strategies is a good
indication that a group is working with limited resources. 113 Nevertheless, most of these groups clung to the
notion that that letter-writing was crucial to the success
of their objectives. A timber industry newsletter states,
"The power of your voice [regarding phone calls] and your
pen is a thousand times greater than the power of a logging
truck.

1111 4

Headwaters, meanwhile, as sured members that "your

phones, letters, suggestions, and votes will make a difference!

11 115

As a result, the Siskiyou National Forest was de!-

uged with an unprecendented tens of thousands of letters
concerning major issues such as the Forest Plan and the Silver salvage. These proved, according to the former supervis-

own television commercials, environmentalists have gotten
their anti-logging message across through episodes of various television series including L.A. Law, the Simpsons, and
HarrJ" and the Hendersons.
1
See Zeigler and Peak, 153.
113
Ibid.
114 Yellow Ribbon Express ( 5 June 1989), 4.
115 Headwaters (Late Summer 1991), 8.
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or, to be the highest rates of mail comments ever registered
for a unit in the National Forest system.
A more low key strategy, employed mostly by local and
a few state/regional environmental groups, involved closely
tracking and monitoring Forest Service activities, especially timber sales and roadbuilding. Given Forest Service procedure as well as the sheer size of the Siskiyou and its
timber program, this could prove to be an amazingly complex
and tedious task. Although it is, for the most part, unglamorous drudgery, close and accurate tracking and monitoring
have proven to be absolutely essential in providing groups
their "eyes and ears" on the ground; without it participants, including legislators and sometimes even the bureaucrats themselves would essentially be blind as to what is
actually transpiring in the forests. This, in turn, allows
for far more effective participation, litigation, and lobbying efforts. For environmentalists, this has been, therefore, a very wise investment of resources. 116
While lobbying has also been a widely employed tactic,
the opportunity to effectively engage in it has been far
from universal. Many groups in the Siskiyou have lobbied in
some way or another, but only certain groups have been wellplaced enough to be able to reach key decisionmakers, espe-

116

This is a fact not lost on the National Audubon Society whose old growth effort centers, in part, around· its ambitious "Adopt-A-Forest" program of local tracking and mapping.
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cially at higher administrative levels. Local groups have
tended to lobby local bureaucratic officials and, perhaps,
local congressmen or state officials. Local timber interests
also lobbied county and municipal governments in search of
support and alliances. Only through their affiliations with
larger groups such as the Western Ancient Forest Campaign or
the Western Forest Industries Association, did local groups
get a chance to lobby in Washington D.C .. National environmental and timber groups, on the other hand, had much more
well-developed and professional lobbying operations with
established lines of access to various congressional and
administrative sources. Timber interests have been especially successful in this respect, gaining the close and consistent support of a number of key congressmen, Bush Administration personnel, and Agriculture Department officials.
Another very crucial strategy in the Siskiyou has been
the use of litigation. While this tactic in general has
been, according to Ingram and Mann, of highly variable effectiveness for environmentalists, in the Siskiyou and the
larger old growth issue, it has been the central pillar of
their campaign. Although it has the potential to be a very
costly course to pursue, in the old growth issue it has actually been used quite cost-effectively, at least given the
results. Much of the legal work has been done by highly
skilled, low paid staff attorneys who have managed to win
major, pivotal victories. These legal victories and the
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various policy crises they have provoked, according to one
activist, are the only things that have forced policymakers
to respond to the environmentalists. No amount of lobbying
or educational efforts have come close to the results gained
from litigation. Conversely, timber, while also attempting
to use the legal weapon, has met with little success.
One of the reasons for the environmentalists' legal
success has been a technical mastery of public lands and
forestry issues gained by an effective research strategy.
Ingram and Mann suggest that another basic distinction between environmental groups is based upon whether they engage
in science or activism. 117 Once again, many groups in the
Siskiyou completely blurred this distinction. Groups like
Headwaters, while in the thick of the political action, also
conducted extensive research and developed enough technical
expertise in forestry issues to prompt the House Agriculture
Committee to request research of theirs. They and other
groups such as the Public Forestry Foundation gained a great
deal of respect for this technical mastery. National groups
also conducted or underwrote much research as well. Even
Earth First would send out press releases that were often
filled with detailed facts, figures, and quantitative analyses.
For environmentalists, the payoffs from this research
have been enormous. Active research has provided a great
117

Ingram and Mann, 143.
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deal of information that otherwise would be unavailable
whether due to purposeful neglect or bureaucratic budget
constraints. For example, environmentalists in the Siskiyou
and elsewhere have provided courts and congressmen with previously undisclosed or unknown information, much of it very
damning to the Forest Service, regarding reforestation failures, the actual extent of old growth loss, and the breeding
locations and condition of spotted owl populations. Effective research, therefore, has not only led to a certain legal and scientific edge, but also to increased credibility
within policy circles.
Tables 12, 13, and 14 break down individual activities
according to a number of variables. According to table 12,
what is found is that amongst all groups, lobbying is the
most common activity closely followed by monitoring and
education/public relations. A little over half of the participants engaged in litigation, two-fifths conducted research, and only a few had PACs. Businesses were more likely
than interest groups to have PACS, while interest groups engaged in far more education. Both types of groups monitored
and lobbied in roughly similar proportions. In terms of political orientation, environmental groups had a slightly
greater tendency than timber to do research, were twice as
likely to litigate, and were equally disposed towards monitoring. On the other hand, nearly all timber groups (94.4%)
lobbied as opposed to three-quarters of environmental
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TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ENGAGED IN
SELECTED ACTIVITIES

Activities,
m

lt

e

lb

r

p

Type/Scope
Total n=38

78.9
(30)

52.6
(20)

73.7
(28)

84.2
(32)

39.5
(15)

7.9
(3)

Local Interest
Groups n=13

92.3
( 12)

53.8
(7)

92.3
( 12)

84.6
( 11 )

53.8
(7)

0
0

State Interest
Groups n=lO

90.0
(9)

60.0
(6)

100.0
(10)

100.0
(10)

60.0
(6)

Natl. Interest
Groups n=6

33.3
(2)

83.3
( 5)

100.0
(6)

50.0
(3)

33.3
( 2)

0
0

Total Enviro.
Groups n=20

80.0
( 16)

70.0
(14)

100.0
(20)

75.0
(15)

45.0
(9)

0
0

Total Timber
Groups2 n=18

77.8
(14)

33.3
( 6)

44.4
( 8)

94.4
(17)

33.3
( 6)

16.7
(3)

Total Interest
Groups n=29

79.3
(23)

62.1
( 18)

96.6
(28)

82.8
(24)

51. 7
(15)

3.4
(1)

Total Business
Groups n=9

77.8
(7)

22.2
(2 )

0

88.9
( 8)

1 For

0

0
0

10.0
( 1)

22.2
(2 )

an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or appendix D.
2Excludes businesses.
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TABLE 13
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION ENGAGED IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES
Activities1
m

lt

e

lb

r

p

Level of
Participation2
1

n=l7

94.1
(16)

64.7
(11)

100.0
(17)

88.2
(15)

64.7
(11)

2

n=l2

58.3
(7 )

58.3
(7)

91. 7
(11)

75.5
(9 )

33.3
(4)

0
0
8.3
(1)

1 For an explanation of this variable, see table 1
or appendix D
2Excludes businesses. For an explanation of this
variable, see table 1 or appendix D.

TABLE 14
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY BUDGET ENGAGED IN
SELECTED ACTIVITIES
Budget 2

m

lt

Acti vi ties1
lb
e

r

p

<$10,000 n=7

85.7
(6)

57.l
( 4)

85.7
(6)

57.1
(4)

28.6
(2)

0
0

$10,000$100,000 n=S

100.0
(5)

40.0
(2)

100.0
(5 )

100.0
(5 )

60.0

0
0

$100,001$1,000,000 n=8

100.0
(5)

75.0
(6 )

100.0
(8 )

100.0
(8 )

75.0 12.5
(1)
(6)

100.0 100.0
(5 )
(5 )

60.0

>$1,000,000 n=5

40.0
(2)

( 3)

1For an explanation of this variable, see
or appendix D.
2Annual budget, see table 1.

( 3)

40.0
(2)

0
0

t~ble

1
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groups. 118

Meanwhile, if one looks at activities in light of

levels of participation, as is shown in table 13, what is
found is that monitoring and research are the hallmarks of a
heavily involved group, while both categories are equally
likely to engage in lobbying, education, and litigation.
Looking at the differences according to groups' scope
(excluding businesses) in table 12, one finds local and
state/regional groups extremely likely to be engaged in the
essentially localized activity of monitoring whereas only a
third of national groups monitored in this case. Likewise,
all state/regional and 85% of local groups lobbied on behalf
of Siskiyou issues as compared to only half of the nationals. Nationals were also less likely to conduct research.
What the national groups were more likely to be doing was to
be involved in litigation (83.3%), although more than half
of the local and state/regional groups did as well. All
groups, meanwhile, were heavily involved in education/public
relations efforts. Regarding national groups, it is important to note that some of these differences may be due less
to the nature of national groups themselves than to the fact
that in this particular case, they tended to be less heavily

118

Some of the differences between environmentalists and
timber interests might be attributable to the fact that businesses, all of which were in the timber camp, are by nature
less all-purpose than interest groups when it comes to political activity and thus the figures for timber's activities
may be skewed a bit towards a narrower range.
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involved and hence engaged in a narrower range of activities
than they might otherwise have been.
Finally, the question of how resources affected activities must be considered. According to table 14, the poorest groups engaged in a good deal less litigation, lobbying,
and research than other groups, concentrating more frequently upon education and monitoring, activities which, if necessary, can be conducted on a shoestring. Groups with annual budgets in the low-middle range (10,001-100,000), on
the other hand, engaged in more costly activities nearly as
frequently as wealthier groups, a fact which suggests that
some sort of minimum threshold may exist for broad-scale
participation.
The Less-Quantifiable Aspects of Group Competition

Truman bases his study of interest group influence on
the assumption that the variables of group power are, in
fact, identifiable and quantifiably measurable. 119 Many
years earlier, however, Bentley warned students of interest
groups that group influence resulted from activities that
could not always be precisely defined or measured. 120 This
study works from the assumption that there is some value in
Bentley's characterization. While a group's material
resources and the personnel, publicity, research,

119
120

Culhane discusses this in Public Lands Politics, 311.
Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1908), 214-215.
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or litigation these resources can appropriate are certainly
crucial factors and demanding of close attention, they nevertheless have their limitations. There are other, less tangible and more difficult to quantify, but no less important
variables which Truman's or Culhane's measures cannot capture. Such factors as communication strategies, the dynamics
of public opinion, the role of culture and values, group intensity, and the peculiar quality of the case itself all can
influence the outcome just as surely.
One way to examine the impact that at least some of
these variables have had upon the Siskiyou conflict and
thereby achieve a fuller analysis of group organization and
competition would be to employ Cobb and Elder's framework.
Such an analysis would serve not as an alternative, but instead as a complement to the previous analysis in this chapter. Central to Cobb and Elder's model of agenda-building is
the question of how effectively a group either expands or
contains a policy

conflict. 1 ~

When an issue expands, ac-

cording to Cobb and Elder, it moves beyond the original disputants involved in the first manifestation of the conflict
(such as Earth First, the ONRC, or SORA) to encompass other,
broader sectors of the
121

Specifically, an issue is

Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,

105-111.
1~

public. 1 ~

More specifically, Cobb and Elder identify five categories of the public arrayed like concentric circles. First
are the original disputants. Their earliest support·will
tend to come from identification groups which are very sympathetic and fairly close natural allies (i.e. other envi-
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expanded when people in one of these broader publics become
aware of the issue and subsequently develop either a positive or negative disposition regarding

it.1~

The opposite

of expansion, containment, would occur when a group restricts an issue so that it cannot break outside of its
original boundaries.
Whether an issue expands or is contained, according to
Cobb and Elder, depends upon a number of factors which are
related to the characteristics of that particular issue. The
role of an interest group is to maximize or minimize the impact of these various factors by defining and redefining the
policy conflict to their advantage. This is primarily
achieved, they argue, through effective symbolic communication and skillful strategizing.
Issue Breadth
The first characteristic determining issue expansion
that Cobb and Elder identify is issue breadth and concreteness. Issues that are broad and fairly ambiguous, rather
than narrow and concrete, they argue, are more likely to
ronmental groups, timber workers, etc.) The next realm an
issue expands into is that of the issue public, individuals
or groups who tend to pay attention to the particular sphere
of concern in question or have related concerns. The attentive public is that tenth or so of the public that keeps
closely abreast of and is interested in public affairs. Finally, there is the general public which only the most generalized and symbolic issues can penetrate. Cobb and Elder,
Participation in American Politics, 105-108.
123 Ibid. 111. Awareness, in this case, does not necessarily imply detailed knowledge, something only the mostly
closely involved participants will have.
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expand. 1 ~

This is because such issues have the slack and

flexibility to be defined and redefined in a number of ways
to a number of audiences as the need arises. Conversely,
narrow, concrete issues are more easily typecast as being of
no concern except to a small, specialized audience.
Naturally, it was the environmentalists' strategy to
try to expand the issue at every turn since they were the
group seeking to change the status quo and to do so required
intervention by a broader public. The local timber interests, on the other hand, sought to maintain the status quo
and continue having, as a Siskiyou district ranger put it,
"what they've had in the past." They asked, in the words of
the former supervisor, "why should it [Siskiyou forest policy] change? It's fine, it works good, it pays people, we're
doing great. Who are these latecomers who want to make it
something else?"
Accordingly, timber sought to assure the public that,
despite the environmentalists' hysterics, everything was
fine down in the woods. Using the scientific methods and
technology of modern forestry, claimed timber, healthy forests were being managed into

perpetuity. 1 ~

Focusing on the

fact that many seedlings are planted for each tree harvested, they tried to reassure the public that there was noth-

124
125

Ibid . 112 -116 .

one industry magazine used the phrase Star Wars Forestry to refer to this marriage of modern technology and forestry. "Star wars Forestry" Evergreen (February 1989), 4.
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ing to worry about. While this message aimed at defusing environmentalist charges has never wavered, the timber interests, nonetheless, found themselves increasingly unable to
keep the issue from expanding. They had no choice, therefore, but to play the expansion game themselves, turning to
wider audiences to plead their case and try to gain the edge
in defining the issues.
The central goal of either side's efforts toward issue
expansion has been to gain as many allies and sympathizers
as possible. Not surprisingly, what initially began as an
focused conflict over various roads and timber sales in limited area came to be continually redefined with ever-broader
stokes: family and free enterprise or bureaucratic accountability and reform or the prevention of global environmental
upheaval. Justifications based solely upon local mills' access to a commodity or the vulnerability of a particular
salmon spawning stream or the beauty and biodiversity of the
North Kalmiopsis, while of intense concern to closely involved groups, could not alone be expected to propel an issue outside its original limits. Figures 8 and 9 show just
how each sides' initial demands mushroomed over time as the
issues came to be redefined in a way which widened their
boundaries.
The environmentalists' case proved broad and flexible
enough to allow the expansion and merger of the battle over
roadless areas in the Siskiyou into a wide range of auxil-

Figure 8
Expansion of Issues and Demands
Timber Interests -

Halting threat to free
----enterprise, property
rights, progress
Preservation of family,
----community, way of life

Protecting local accessl
to cornmodity
------------Unlocking public lands/
----amending overrestrictive
environmental laws

Maintaining local funding
----and services/ preventing
higher local taxes

Timber famine/ housing
----shortage

1983-1987

1988-1992

Expansion of Issues and Demands
Environmentalist ___ Preserving old
growth forests

___ Creating national
park

Preventing herbicidel
spraying

Protecting roadless
in the Siskiyou---

I--------- areas

___ Saving spotted------owl

----- Water quality/
erosion

---- Citizen rights to
judicial review

Forest Service
---- reform/ forest
economics

---- Global warming/
global deforestation
___ Protecting salmon
streams

Prese1ving genetic
----biodiversity/potential
medicines, products

1979-1983

1983-1985

1985-1988

1989-1992
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iary issues including old growth, salmon streams, water
quality, erosion, the spotted owl, the Siskiyou National
Park proposal, rights to judicial review, Forest Service
reform, forest resource economics, biodiversity, and global
warming. As the issues diversified, they also began to reach
larger audiences, whether through Lou Gold's coast-to-coast
lecture circuit, coordination with national groups, or the
increased media coverage that both resulted from and fed
further issue expansion.1u
The timber interests likewise began to redefine what
originally for them had been the protection of their access
to a local timber supply. Again, through coordination with
regional and national groups, increased media coverage, and
aggressive public outreach, timber's approach to the issue
enlarged to include campaigns to protect family and community and assure adequate funding for local governments. More
broadly (and nationally), their efforts soon evolved into
campaigns to avert a nationwide timber famine and turn back

iu Evidence of this successful issue expansion could be
seen by the fact that the state of Illinois, rather than
neighboring Washington or California accounted for the
second-highest number of comments to the Siskiyou Forest
Plan. There was also the 1990 case of a Long Island, NY Audubon chapter appealing the Homestead timber sale in the
northern Siskiyou. USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest
Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices
Volume II (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. KA, 3; Paul Fattig,
"New Yorkers Hope to Stop Siskiyou Sale" Grants Pass Daily
Courier (19 May 1990).
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the anti-property rights, anti-progress threat of preservationism and the laws which bolster it.
Thus, timber's new strategy was to actively reach out
to a wider audience with its expanded message rather than
merely react to environmentalist charges. During the thick
of the Silver Fire controversy, for instance, an activist
with the North West Timber Association walked the 150 miles
from Eugene to Grants Pass to call attention to what he saw
as the role of preservationism in creating the homeless
problem. The theme "Salvaging Timber to Salvage Lives" was
used to argue that the timber salvaged from the fire could
build 100,000 starter homes. Referring to the efforts of the
environmentalists' congressional ally Sidney Yates (D-IL) to
prevent Silver roadbuilding, the activist wondered "what
homeless people in Chicago would say about this."1V
In their efforts to achieve issue expansion both sides
also strived to enlist allies amongst groups representing
other sectors of society. For instance, environmentalists in
the Elk River watershed, warning of certain damage to extremely productive salmon fisheries, aligned themselves with
groups representing commercial fishermen and processors. 128
The timber industry, meanwhile, not only sought alliances
with fellow public lands commodity-users such as mining,
ranching, and oil interests, but with labor as well.
1ll

Evergreen (August 1988).
Jeff Muiderman and Carolyn Moran, "Part of the Solution" Talking Leaves (Eugene, OR: September 1991), 12.
1

~
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Consequently, it was a much-touted labor-industry coalition
formed by several carpenter/woodworkers unions with the AFLCIO' s blessing, which sponsored the major pro-logging legislation in the 1991 session of Congress. Recognizing the significance of labor's pro-timber stance, environmentalists,
mostly at the grassroots, have long attempted to counteract
it by endorsing various retraining, worker compensation, and
economic development programs as well as export bans to offset job losses.129
Allies were also found in other, sometimes unlikely
places. When the Section 318 rider banning judicial review
was passed, the civil liberties group People For the American Way jumped into the fray issuing a press release denouncing what they saw as an obstruction of citizens' rights to
judicial access. Meanwhile, when the drug Taxol, which at
the time could only be extracted from the bark of the old
growth-specific Pacific Yew, was found to have powerful
cancer-fighting properties, the American Cancer Society
promptly issued a statement decrying the destruction of old
growth forests.
Issue Significance
In addition to being broad and ambiguous enough, issues in Cobb and Elder's model must also be perceived by
129 Earth First activists in northern California (the same
activists whose car was bombed) went as far in their attempt
to gain labor allies as to jointly form an IWW chapter with
a number of local loggers.
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their target public as significant and salient if they are
to expand. 130 Despite whatever objective importance they may
have, issues such as water quality in the Shasta Costa basin
or a steady timber supply for the mills in the Illinois Valley would simply not prompt much concern outside of a mostly
local audience. Consequently, making the old growth conflict
salient to a wider public required the groups involved to
present their cases in the boldest, most dire, and most personal terms possible.
For the timber interests, this meant characterizing
the environmentalist challenge as a threat to economic
growth, free enterprise, and even human progress. This
"lockup" of resources, it was argued, would eventually impact upon all Americans' lives through housing shortages,
far more expensive wood and paper products, and a general
decline in the standard of living. "We have to be a productive nation," implored one Grants Pass mill executive.
The environmentalists' campaign also attempted to make
the issue more salient by linking the health of the forest
to the well-being of all people. The strategy was to make
the issue as personally threatening as possible, warning of
a bleak future if the logging, which was repeatedly compared
to (and described as progressing faster than) the devastating deforestation of the Amazon, continued. "Deforestation

1~

Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,

116-117.
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and global warming start here" warned a Headwaters advertisement with an accompanying photograph of a Siskiyou
clearcut in progress. 131 Other appeals described the impertance of the forest's genetic biodiversity as a storehouse
of potential medicines and other useful products, a point no
doubt bolstered by the discovery of the old growth-derived
drug Taxol. "Saving this ancestral forest," as one group put
it "is a step towards saving

ourselves."1~

Environmentalists also tried to frame the issue in
politically and economically relevant terms as well. By
focusing on the cost of taxpayer "subsidies" to the timber
industry while the rest of the country suffered through
deficit-induced fiscal sacrifice, environmentalists attempted to portray current public forest management policy as one
which taxpayers could ill afford. Showing rare confidence in
market forces, environmentalists delighted in urging timber
interests to embrace the free market and go it alone by logging without government-built roads and other assistance. 1n
The Time Factor
The factor which Cobb and Elder call temporal rele-

vance simply means that issues seen as having more profound
long-term implications will tend to expand more readily than
131 Headwaters (March 1990), 16.
132 "Saving an American Original" Audubon Activist Special
Report, (no date, circa winter 1988), 1.
1n An example of this sort of argument can be found in
"The U.S. Government Subsidize~ Logging on the National Forests" Forest Voice 4 (Spring 1991), 5.
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those which do not. This commonly engenders the use by interest groups of words like "byproduct" or "fallout"; what
Cobb and Elder refer to as spill-over terms. 134 Furthermore,
this strategy of calling attention to long-term implications
is usually accompanied by reminders that the time to avert
such problems is rapidly running out.
According to timber, the chief fallout down the road,
besides a hundred thousand unemployed workers and dozens of
ghost towns, were tighter and more costly lumber supplies
leading eventually to an all-out "famine.

"135

Environmental-

ists, meanwhile, had their own warnings for the future ineluding the greenhouse effect, imminent extinctions, and an
Oregon with neither jobs nor forests. Environmentalists especially exploited the image of dwindling virgin forests
falling faster and faster, day after day, month after month
until the fateful day when none would be left. Not surprisingly, the image of leaving a legacy for future generations
was a powerful theme in environmental rhetoric as evidenced
by their frequent use of words such as "heritage," "treasure," and "inheritance." Headwaters proclaimed that "these
forests belong to you, your children, and your greatgrandchildren,

1

~

119.

135

"1~

while Lou Gold promised to "keep talking

Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,

Such warnings about the supply of lumber are discussed
in Stanley Ziemba, "Owl Dispute Helped Lift Lumber Cost"
Chicago Tribune (27 June 1991), sec. 1, 1, 18.
1
~Headwaters (Late Summer 1991), 8.
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so that your kids never have to hear a story that begins,
'Once upon a time there used to be big trees .... ' .. 137

"My

vision of the good life," he wrote in a pamphlet, "is a
peaceful forest full of happy children and big old
trees ... 13a
Issue Complexity
While it is advantageous for an issue to be broadly
defined, it still must be kept fairly simple if it is to
expand. In the battle for the public's hearts and minds,
overly complex and subtle messages tend to be forgotten or
ignored far more

readily. 1 ~

Not surprisingly, in the old

growth issue, groups struggled to turn what, in reality, was
an extremely complex policy conflict into a simple bipolar
case of owls versus man or trees versus jobs or greed versus
virtue. If the environmentalists were "tree huggers," then
the loggers had to be

"tree-muggers." 1 ~

An especially vivid example of the advantage of keeping issues stark and simple could be seen in the Silver Fire
episode. The timber interests effectively simplified the issue as being one of burnt timber about to go to waste be137

Lou Gold quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient
Forests" E Magazine (October 1989).
1
~ Lou Gold, untitled pamphlet, Native Forest Action
Council (no date, circa winter 1990).
139 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,
120-122.
1

~ Tree hugger is a very common derisive term in .the
Northwest for an environmentalist trying to preserve forests. "Tree mugger" is attributable to Andrew Kerr, "ONRC's
Legislative Vision" Wild Oregon (Summer 1990), 10.
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cause of stubborn and selfish radicals with ulterior motives. The environmentalists, on the other hand, for all
their effort, could not succeed in similarly simplifying
their case which seemingly violated the average person's
notion of thrift and common sense. After all, salvaging
burnt logs and preventing waste do seem, at least on the
surface, very prudent and reasonable things to do. Ecological arguments, whatever their ultimate virtue, were just too
complex and subtle, requiring burn intensity charts and
stream sedimentation estimates and detailed cost-benefit
analyses. All timber had to do, on the other hand, was show
photographs of blackened snags and scream "waste!" Similarly, on the national level, timber cut away all the messy
layers of multiple factors leading to job-loss such as automation and log exports and proclaimed that the problem was
due to nothing other than an owl-caused lockup of timber.
Environmentalists were not always prisoners of issue
complexity, though, as they have shown that sometimes they
could indeed cut through the intricacies of ecological principles and public lands policy and analyze the issue, as
does one activist, in starkly simple terms: "When a fourhundred-year-old tree ends up on some baby's ass, it's an
insult to all that's good and right with the

world." 1 ~

En-

vironmentalists were especially adept at portraying the Sis-

1

~ Quote in Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New
Yorker (14 May 1990), 79.

252
kiyou conflict as a David and Goliath struggle with impoverished grassroots citizen-activists defending the public interest against the monolithic timber industry; a special interest which, due to its financial might, could keep corrupt
politicians in its vest pocket. Rarely acknowledged in such
portrayals was the heterogenous nature of the timber industry or its grassroots support. The Forest Service and the
Administration were similarly characterized in fairly blackand-white terms; beholden to timber and ever willing to pervert and break the law to accomodate them.
The Emotional Element
One route to very quick issue expansion is for that
issue to be emotionalized in such a way as to elicit powerful affective responses from an audience previously unengaged. The environmentalists have had a number of ready-made
symbols to serve in this capacity. Making widespread use of
photography, they have taken great advantage of the gruesome
visual ugliness inherent to

clearcuts. 1 ~

By widely distri-

buting pictures of the jagged, smoking, stump-filled wreckage of a clearcut, often juxataposed with a photo of a beau-

iQ "There is an old political maxim," said Andy Kerr of
the ONRC, "that one should witness neither laws nor sausages
from being made, lest one loses their taste for them. The
same could be said of wood products." In fact, one district
ranger on a Northwest forest has compared the visual impact
of clearcuts to an atomic blast: "It looks like Alamagordo,
as if it's been nuked." Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Pers~ec
tives" Forest Watch (October 1990), 23; second quote in Ted
Gup "Owls vs. Man" Time (25 June 1990), 59.
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tifully intact forest, the environmentalists exploited what
had to be their most potent symbol for all it was worth. 143
Timber interests fully recognized their disadvantage in this
respect:
In travelling through Oregon, you most likely will see
forest land where the timber has been completely removed. This is clearcutting which, although unsightly,
represents a scientifically sound technique of Douglas
fir tree management .... Many people are not exactly
happy about the shaggy appearance of a cut over area
for the first five to ten years. Even some Oregonians
question the desirability of this practice until they
become better informed as to the reasons why .... 144
Ironically, the timber interests got to turn the tables on the environmentalists in the Silver Fire by exploiting emotionally arousing photographs of the fire's destruction to encourage the salvage operation. Their dramatic pietures of Silver, which showed a charred moonscape of "ash
and ruin" were featured in newspaper advertisements and
warned of the "radical preservationists'" plans to block any
attempt to regenerate the dead and blackened

forest. 1 ~

The little spotted owl with its large eyes and almost
comically big head also served effectively as a visual symbol capable of evoking widespread sympathy, a fact timber

~ Another widely used variation was aerial and even
satellite photographs of the perfectly geometric checkerboard fragmentation of vast acreages of forestland.
144 Oregon State Forestry Department produced in cooperation with the Western Wood Products Association, et~ al.,
Ore~on Trees and Forests, pamphlet (no date).
~ Southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in
Medford Mail Tribune (18 October 1987), sec. A, 12.
1
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also recognized as it offered the following advice to loggers so as not to invite any public relations disasters:
Please don't take your frustrations out on the owl ....
messages that degrade the owl .... "If it's hootin', I'm
shootin'" .... make us look like the rapers [sic] and
pillagers the preservationists say we are. Remember,
the general public has not made up its mind yet concerning the crisis we face. Owl bashing lowers us to
the same level as tree spikers.146
The old growth forest itself, visually the very embodiment of the word majestic, was another common visual
image in the environmentalists' arsenal. Often shown with
near-divine shafts of sunlight pouring down from above and a
dwarfed, barely noticeable figure in the foreground for perspective amongst the giant ferns and immense trunks, the
ancient forest provided an irresistably powerful and moving
image. The language which accompanied such images was also
quite emotionally evocative: "priceless," "irreplaceable,"
"treasured," "magnificent." Attention was also called to the
ancient forest's incredible age through references to great
historical figures such as Chaucer, King Richard II, or
Columbus as having walked the earth as the seedlings of
these giants took root. 147
To disrupt such a sacred place, the environmentalists
seemed to imply, would simply be blasphemy. Logging the Siskiyou for a few hundred jobs, argued Lou Gold, "would be no

146

Yellow Ribbon Express (5 June 1989), 2.
"The Grove" (excerpt) Wild Oregon (Winter
1988-1989, 11; "Saving an American Original" Audubon Activist Special Report, (no date, circa winter 1988).
iu David Kelly,
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different than trashing a cathedral to get at the candle
wax .148

In order to maintain this image of sacredness, en-

vironmentalist language sought to invoke emotionally charged
images of wholeness and purity counterposed by that of violence and even rape. The wilderness, in the environmentalists' vocabulary was "virgin," "untrammelled," and "pristine" while logging and roadbuilding would "violate" and
"penetrate" the forest leaving it shattered and fragmented.
The timber interests just as readily exploited emotional symbols. Rallying behind their yellow ribbon of solidarity, timber forces focused heavily on the gravely threatened sanctity and continuity of family and community. Under
the caption, "Who's endangered?," one pamphlet featured a
photograph of a logger, his wife, and his five small daughters. Their heartbreaking vulnerability comes across quite
clearly as the pamphlet goes on to warn of rural Oregon becoming another western Appalachia. 1 49

In terms of eliciting

strong emotions, timber's strategy of reducing the conflict
to one of people versus owls was another heavily relied-upon
device. To prefer the well-being of a bird over human beings
was, according to timber, a sure sign of moral decay. "I get
real uptight," said one millowner, "when I think they gave

1

~ Lou Gold quoted in Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New
York: Knopf, 1990), 171.
149 Oregon Project, Who's Endangered, pamphlet (no date) .
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my ancestors 160 acres for homesteading and they're giving
the owl 2, 200 acres.

11

150

Group Legitimacy
Perhaps even more important than how a group presents
an issue, argue Cobb and Elder, is whether that group can
create an aura of legitimacy around itself while simultaneously discrediting its opponents. 151

Success at achieving

this, they suggest, can go a long towards expanding or containing an issue. Helping the timber interests' efforts in
this respect was the early prominence of Earth First in the
Siskiyou conflict. While Earth First's direct actions did
attract much-needed attention outside the Siskiyou, their
confrontational behavior, countercultural lifestyles, and
general irreverence left them, and by association all environmentalists, quite vulnerable to attack at the local level. While passing themselves off as a "cross-section of
Americana," as one official put it, timber interests in the
Siskiyou, with rhetoric that strongly resembled the Vietnam
debate two decades prior, sought to portray their adversaries as jobless, ill-washed, marijuana-smoking hippies who
lived on communes. Such characterizations, coupled with
Earth First's own militant tendencies, were quite successful

~ Quoted in Gup, 61. The quote refers to the minimum
amount of territory which the !SC determined that each
breeding pair of spotted owls requires.
151 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Poli tics,
125-127.
1
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in alienating a substantial sector of the local community

from the environmentalists.
As the conflict in the Siskiyou intensified, so did
the timber interests' assault on the environmentalists'
character. "Radical preservationists" (the standard timber
term) soon degenerated in pro-timber rhetoric from hippy
throwbacks into people-hating fanatics and even terrorists.
After a 1987 incident in which a logger in the North Kalmiopsis broke his chainsaw on a tree spike (not long after the
serious spike-related injury of a California millworker),
timber interests had just the ammunition they needed to
brandish environmentalists as

terrorists. 1 ~

If not guilty

of outright terrorism, then environmentalists were in the
least accused of practicing "a brand of mental terrorism" 15 3
in pursuit of their "hidden agenda.

11

154

Part of this hidden agenda, timber revealed, were
plans to halt progress in America. This desire to impose a
new primitivism upon the land was born, argued timber interests, out of a distinctly anti-humanistic streak in the en152

Phil Manzano, "Old Growth Timber Auctioned Off as Protesters Chant, Beat Drums" Oregonian (24 June 1987). Although Earth First had publically renounced tree-spiking,
timber nevertheless blamed them for the North Kalmiopsis incident. In retaliation, someone cut a tree occupied by an
Earth First tree-sitter at the Lazy Bluff sale one-third of
the way through. Although environmentalists were more successfully cast as terroristic, acts of violence or intimidation perpetrated by environmental foes, although mostly
scattered and unorganized, were not uncommon.
153 Quote in Michael Lemonick, "Showdown in the Treetops"
Time (28 August 1989).
154 Yellow Ribbon Express (1 May 1989), 1.
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vironmentalists. "I do not understand," pondered one Illinois Valley mill executive, "how people who say they care
deeply about life and living things could display so little
regard for their fellow man. "155 Others in the timber camp,
meanwhile, tried to link preservationism and its supposedly
collectivist ideology with socialism.156
In tight-knit local communities, another very effective strategy was to unfailingly characterize environmentalists as meddling outsiders, usually from the dreaded East
Coast. According to one logging business owner:
There is a deep resentment of the fact that we are
controlled by people on the East Coast; ninety-ninepoint-nine percent of them have never been out here,
and they're sitting back there and telling us how
to live. 157
In the Siskiyou, which saw a huge influx of newcomers since
the 1960s, this notion of local matters being interfered
with by latecomers or "lawyers from the city" 158 became
155 Quote in Jim Petersen, "In Search of Excellence: Lew
Krauss" Evergreen (April 1987).
1
~ Baden cited in Short, 92. Perhaps the climax of the
timber interests' campaign to discredit Siskiyou environmentalists occurred when SOTIA ran newspaper advertisements
(Grants Pass Daily Courier 1 October 1987) featuring a reprint of an article by conservative writer Thomas Sowell entitled, "Green Bigots." This wide-ranging and quite vitrolic
attack on environmentalism warned of federally protected
predators killing small children, accused wetlands of causing disease, and characterized public television nature programs as a "steady diet of propaganda." The ad proved so
controversial that the normally pro-timber Grants Pass Daily
Courier roundly criticized SOTIA in a full-length editorial
(6 October 1987). In subsequent ads, even SOTIA tried to
distance itself from its own reprint of "Green Bigots."
157 Quoted in John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home"
Audubon (March 1991), 94.
158 Egan, 1 71 .
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quite a source of resentment for some. It ignored the fact,
however, that many environmentalists had roots that went
just as deep into. the region:
In rural Oregon, preservationists are invariably perceived as urban, white-collared, ignorant of where
toilet paper comes from, and eastern. There are no
exceptions to the geographical slur, not even for preservationists born, bred, and housebroken in Portland
Oregon. 159
A final method of discrediting environmentalists involved portraying them as a small, wealthy, and elite special interest. Such a strategy borrowed heavily from earlier
critiques of environmentalism as being primarily an uppermiddle class movement to preserve the status quo and prevent
the formation of new wealth (that would supposedly benefit
the poor).160 Consequently, timber interests cast environmentalists as a very narrow, but highly organized group
which gets their way by playing "tricks with the

law." 1 ~

"There are a lot more of 'us' than there are of 'them',"
claimed one timber official, "But they are well-organized
and we are
troy you" 163

not."1~

By warning of "enemies who want to des-

timber goaded the "sleeping giant" to awak-

159 Quoted in Mitchel 1, 91. For instance, the ONRC' s Andy
Kerr, a fairly militant environmentalist, was born and
raised in a small Oregon timber town.
160 See, for example, William Tucker, Progress and Privilege: America in the Age of Environmentalism (Garden City,
NY: Anchor Press, 1982).
161 Letter to the Editor, Grants Pass Daily Courie_r ( 3
October 1987).
1
~ Evergreen (August 1988).
163 Gup, 61.
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en. 164

If it did not, timber warned, then the silent major-

ity would continue to be overwhelmed by a noisy radical minority with no real stake in the matter. "It's a living to
me"; protested one small mill owner, "it's a hobby to
them. " 165

This small-time grassroots image served timber

interests well in maintaining their legitimacy. Not surprisingly, timber interests all the way up to the largest
mega-corporations actively and quite vigorously cultivated
such a "down-home" image.
If timber's strategy was to be seen as a broad grassroots front, the environmentalists' goal was to paint them
as either greedy, big business interests or else grassroots
dupes blinded by these giant corporate concerns into ignoring the real sources of their problems. The environmentalists' main efforts to bolster their own legitmacy, meanwhile, revolved around wrapping themselves in the cloak of
good science and good government. In their effort to uphold
"law and
the

order" 1 ~

forest",~

and "stand up and patriotically defend

environmentalists tried to be seen as fight-

ing an arbitrary and lawless abuse of public land management

164
1M

Yellow Ribbon Express (1 May 1989), 1.
Quoted in Caufield, 76.
1
~ "Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive"
Headwaters (Late Winter 1991), 9.
167 "The Crisis Mounts" Save America's Forests D.C. Update
(March 1992), 2. Save America's Forests played up this patriotric "apple pie" theme quite vigorously adopting as their
logo three trees superimposed upon a waving American flag.
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guidelines as well as defending the public's right to redress:
Watch out folks! Before you know it, our only handles
on Forest Service and other government abuses may be
taken from us as ultra-conservatives push us toward
authoritarian "democracy." We must insist that our
rights as citizens be protected.168
Far from being the radical and unreasonable militants, then,
the environmentalists argued that they represented scientifie reason, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and
fiscal responsibility regarding taxpayers' money.
Containment Strategies
Cobb and Elder identify a number of ways to contain an
issue besides simply working to reverse the expansionary
factors previously mentioned. Symbol co-optation is an example of one such containment strategy. By co-opting an opponent's symbols, a group can effectively defuse those syrnbols' potency. 169

Timber interests, for instance, made such

an attempt with their frequent terming of themselves as "environmentalists" as well as their association with the syrnbols of environmentalism such as abundant wildlife, healthy
forests, and wise stewardship. It is noteworthy that they,
almost without exception, referred to their opponents as
preservationists rather than environmentalists.
168 "Timber Congressmen and Bush Administration Attack
Citizen Rights" Save America's Forests D. C. Update (_March
1992~,

4.

16 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics,

128.
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While interest groups are of ten the source of such
containment strategies, it is also something that government
agencies with their own active interests (in this case the
Forest Service) engage in. This is especially true regarding
strategies such as tokenism (offering small insubstantial
benefits), the offering of symbolic rather than substantive
rewards, and the creation of delay and/or additional administrative processes1ro

(Forest Service behavior in this re-

spect will be discussed in far more depth in the next chapter).
The Role of Media
One last factor relating to issue expansion/containment is the role of the mass media. As the main vehicle for
the dissemination of symbolic information, the media play a
significant part in determining if or how readily an issue
can enlarge its boundaries. By zeroing in on or sensationalizing some aspect of an issue, the media can create rapidly
heightened interest and subsequently force groups to tailor
their activities accordingly. In the Siskiyou, for example,
the question of tree-spiking, because of its dramatic nature, dominated news accounts of forest issues for quite
some time, often at the expense of more far substantive,
though less splashy issues. While controversial groups such
as Earth First were often penalized by such sensationaliza-

1

ro Ibid.

127-129.
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tion, it had the potential to allow them to profit as well.
This same attraction of the media to flash and drama inevitably led to widespread coverage of bold direct actions.
Such actions were, in turn, planned and coordinated with the
media in mind as news coverage and political action became
somewhat co-generating. What is better news from both a
ratings-conscious editor's and a publicity-hungry activist's
point of view: critiques of Forest Service timber yield models or tree-sitters and road blockades? Rather than merely
being a neutral vehicle to pass along information, the media, especially television, by its very nature became a
heavy influence upon and determinant of the manner by which
groups chose to present their demands.in
The Limits of a Communications Approach
While Cobb and Elder's framework is quite useful in
capturing some of the subtleties left out of traditional,
more easily quantifiable indicators of group competition, it
is not without limitations of its own. The important thing
that Cobb and Elder fail to consider, or at least greatly
downplay, is the likelihood that there is at least some relationship between a group's quantifiable material resources
and its effectiveness at interest articulation and symbolic
communication. They see mastery at formulating a winning

171

For a more detailed discussion of the media's role in
this respect see, w. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of
Illusion (New York: Longman, 1988).
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communicative strategy to be the "great equalizer," and this
is true to the extent that it can prove invaluable at getting issues on the agenda. But Cobb and Elder would be naive
to deny the high probability that more money will buy more
and better media coverage, greater staff to formulate effective communication strategies, marketing experts, consultants, advertisements, a greater ability to secure allies,
and so on. Who, for example, has access to superior tools to
fine-tune and transmit the sort of sophisticated communication that will win support and expand or contain the issues,
Friends of Elk River or Weyerhaeuser? Who is in a better position to research public opinion in order to ingeniously
manipulate symbols or employ a wider and more effective
variety of media, the National Wildlife Federation or the
Illinois Valley Resource Coalition?
Cobb and Elder are right in that competition between
groups cannot simply be seen as a crude match of resources.
The more brilliant and crafty a group's strategy is and the
more "bang" it gets out of each "buck" it has, the further a
group can close the gap between itself and its more wealthy
opponents. Still, it is dangerous to carry this notion too
far and sever all connections between a group's material endowment and its capacity to effectively engage in the more
subtle, communicative aspects of competition. If this shows
anything, then, it is that quantitive and communicative
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analyses are essentially complementary as neither alone can
capture the full dynamic of interest group competition.
Conclusion

There exists a large body of literature, critical of
pluralism, which predicts trouble for interests seeking
broad, diffuse, or what.critics term "public" goods. As part
of this broad category, ecological interests, according to
pluralism's critics, could be expected to face an organizational disadvantage.
What the evidence from the Siskiyou conflict shows is
that contrary to what some might predict, ecological interests did organize into manifest groups or take on the issues of the Siskiyou (if the group was pre-existing) quite
readily. Furthermore, the underlying motivation for this
behavior is not well-explained by any of Olson's criteria
for group formation. Rather, shared goals and values and a
common perception of threat seem to better explain environmental organization in this case. In addition, the groups
involved in the Siskiyou have consisted of more complex networks of individuals, patrons, agents, and groups than 01son' s model allows.
Critics of pluralism also argue that purposively oriented and/or broad-scale interests, even when manifest as
groups, face an inevitable disadvantage in resources as the
pluralist process tends to favor economic and materially
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oriented interests. In the Siskiyou, timber interests, as
predicted, did seem to have a superiority in resources, but
not by quite as large a margin as critics might expect. Although, outspent, the environmentalists were not necessarily
out-matched as their resource base seemed at least adequate
to provide the effective countervailing presence which pluralists claim is necessary to keep the balance of power intact.
Whatever the relative financial and organizational
strength of the groups involved has been, the full dynamic
of group competition cannot be completely captured by quantitative comparisons of group resources alone. By applying
Cobb and Elder's agenda-setting framework to the Siskiyou
case, it becomes clear how important a group's skill and
cleverness in presenting its demands are. In the Siskiyou,
both sides attempted, through a variety of strategies, to
expand the issue on their terms while simultaneously trying
to contain their opponent's efforts to do the same. It was
partly in this way that environmentalists nationalized their
issue and assured it a place on the agenda, while timber
kept up a steady level of doubts and fears amongst the same
public. Overall, the relationship between a group's resources and their capacities in this respect is probably
less than the critics but more than Cobb and Elder and other
pluralists might acknowledge.
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Examining the history of this case from 1983 on is a
very useful way to test some of the claims of the pluralists
and their critics. This is a period when a number of significant issues came to light and major group organization coalesced. Still, it must be warned that the scope of this
study offers only a snapshot or perhaps a series of snapshots. If this study was done for the decade proceeding 1972
or 1966, for example, the findings might have been very different. In fact, some of the critics' claims would probably
have been brilliantly confirmed. We would have seen a Siskiyou forest being rapidly clearcut for the benefit of wellorganized commodity-using interests with virtually no opposition, interference, or dissent. Ecological interests, if
even conceived of, would have been almost entirely latent.
Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power, backed forcefully by the attitudes towards logging and nature dominant
at the time, would, therefore, have rigidly enforced the
status quo through the process of nondecisionmaking. By
truncating the scope of possibilities --forests as being
only for forest products--status quo forces would have succeeded in preventing issues and organized interests from
even arising; that is, until 1983.
The point here is that this study's examination of the
organization of interests in the Siskiyou, and what this
says about pluralism, is essentially timebound to one
decade-long phase of land management in the forest's eight
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CHAPTER 5
BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE SISKIYOU
NATIONAL FOREST

The Forest Service .... has been notorious for its
alignment with lumber companies.
Justice William 0. Douglas
Given the demonstrable impact on public lands policies
of the various opposing groups, the service .... seem(s]
to be striking a valid political balance, which would
satisfy the pluralist notion ....
Paul Culhane
What shall we say to that management that halts between two courses--does neither this nor that, but
botches both?
Henry David Thoreau

Political Theory and Bureaucratic Administration
An adequate discussion of pluralist theory requires an
understanding not only of the role and nature of interest
groups, but of issues of administration as well. The administrative half of the pluralist equation is crucial to con268
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sider because it is where the authority to implement and enforce public policy is located. Although the earliest conceptions of administration (what is usually referred to as
the traditional or Weberian model) envisioned a precise and
automatic enactment of pre-determined legislative mandates,
it is clear that administration involves quite a bit more.
In actuality, bureaucratic agencies exercise a good deal of
independent power and initiative.
Because administration represents, as Rosenbaum puts
it, "the point where (policy) is interpreted and applied," 1
it often equals, or in some cases, supercedes the legislature as the primary battleground of interest group competition:
.... policy is not effective until it is administered;
how it is administered will determine how effective it
will be. This political maxim is lost least of all on
the interests affected by public policy. The administrative apparatus .... is the focus of an intense interplay of group pressures on agency officials leading to
a complex pattern of political understandings and
relations among administrators and pressure groups. 2
This is especially true in this particular case study
where an administrative unit of a larger bureau has provided
the main forum for competing interests to participate in the
decisionmaking process. While relevant decisionmakers certainly existed at many other administrative, executive, legislative, and judicial levels, the chief day-to-day respon-

1

Walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 103.
2
Ibid. 102.
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sibility for the development and execution of policy on the
Siskiyou National Forest lie with the specific administration of that forest.
The examination of the literature on administrative
theory in general and Forest Service administration in particular provides a basis by which to analyze the case of the
Siskiyou regarding questions of bureaucratic decisionmaking.
Specifically, this chapter seeks to address the question of
whether the administrative unit in charge, the Siskiyou National Forest, conformed with pluralist theory when confronting ecological issues.
This is attempted through a three-part test of: (1)
the extent and influence of the participation process,

(2)

the nature of the agency's value system and (3) the agency's
organizational flexibility. This will rely upon data from
in-depth interviews of participants and agency personnel as
well as a comparative analysis of Siskiyou policy outputs.
Pluralism and Bureaucratic Administration
Pluralist theory has never had a unanimous vision of
bureaucratic administration. If the various strains of pluralist administrative theory share anything in common, it is
the view that bureaucratic administration in a pluralist
system has the overall effect of encouraging and adequately
responding to the participatory input of a wide variety of
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interests. 3 As a result, the process leading to the formulation and execution of public policy ought to reflect a fair
degree of openness and equity. Beyond this broad point, however, there exists quite a bit of difference between the two
major pluralist orientations towards towards bureaucratic
administration.
The first tradition, best represented by Dahl, Herbert
Kaufman, Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, or Paul Culhane
suggests that government agencies engage in the delicate
task of mediating interest group competition within the
framework of the agencies' professional goals and standards
as well as their legislative mandate. 4 The agency, in the
3

Although pluralists may disagree about what precise balance of agency autonomy and responsiveness to interests is
ideal, pluralists of all stripes place great emphasis upon
participation since access to decisionmakers is the ultimate
precondition for all pluralist policymaking. Accordingly,
pluralistic conceptions of bureaucratic administration
stress the role and legitimacy of the participation from
which policy outputs must depend. Traditional or neotraditional theories of administration, on the other hand,
frown upon the intrusion of interests into the administrative realm finding that they ultimately interfere with rather than facilitate meaningful public participation. With
bureaucrats properly isolated from the "politics" of interest group competition, traditionalists argue that it is the
legislature and not the implementing branch of government
that is the proper and more democratic forum for participation.
4 Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Herbert Kaufman, The Forest
Ranger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1960); Charles Davis and Sandra
Davis, "Analyzing Change in Public Lands Policymaking: From
Subsystems to Advocacy Coalitions" Policy Studies Journal
17:1 (Fall 1988); Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the
Future, 1981). Although it shares with traditional public
administration theory an emphasis on professionalism, this
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course of implementing legislation, must act, therefore, as
a referee of sorts while simultaneously pursuing its own
agenda as well. 5 According to pluralists who abide by this
view of bureaucracy, the challenge of mediating and balancing conflicting group demands while maintaining professional integrity is best met by agencies which possess a mixture
of competence, flexibility, and responsiveness. While an
agency can never be perfectly neutral (due to both its mandate and its own independent goals), this model of administration suggests that a pluralist agency can still be open
enough to serve as an honest broker between squabbling interests and help, in Culhane's words, in "striking a valid
political balance."6
Other pluralists, however, dispute this view of the
balanced and competent agency and find the fairness and
balance of pluralism to reside instead in the larger plur-

particular model of pluralist administration differs with
the traditional view in one important respect. In the traditional model the only forum for interests to try to influence the system is in the legislature; after a law is passed
all that is left is for the apolitical bureaucracy to
strictly implement the law as Congress intended. The pluralist variant, however, sees political competition between interests as occurring both inside and outside the administrative process. Fighting for or against the passage of a particular piece of legislation is, to pluralists, only half
the story; the administrative realm offers a whole new set
of opportunities and potential strategies for influencing
policy.
5
This degree of autonomy is in contrast to characterizations of the state made by earlier pluralists such as Truman, Latham, or Bentley which conceived of policy outputs as
strictly the sum of interest group pressure.
6 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341.
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alist process's decentralization. This view, held by such
pluralists as Cobb and Elder or Kelso, firmly rejects all
traces of traditional administrative theory which holds
bureaucrats up to be apolitical and highly rational implementors of legislative mandates. 7 Instead, bureaucratic behavior is primarily seen to be driven by internal agency
norms rather than external directives. Far from being
strictly neutral and professional, then, agencies are
characterized as being self-interested, often irrational
(even pathologically so), and highly political.a
Agencies are seen, therefore, as each having different
and often conflicting styles, biases, interests, goals, and
constituencies. Thus, any given agency cannot necessarily be
relied upon to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicting
group claims. The system's fairness, argue proponents of
this model, lies not in the behavior of the agencies themselves, but in the multiple points of access with which the
pluralist process offers interests. They argue that this
messy and often inefficient jurisdictional overlap of agencies nevertheless affords interests a number of options and
inevitably breeds a competition among bureaus that is as
healthy to administration as it is to interest group inter-

7 Roger

Cobb and Charles Elder, Participation in American
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972);
William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1978).
8 For an example of this argument, see Kelso, 231-262.
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action. 9 Out of this "creative disorder" as Kelso terms it,
comes a system that through its very fragmentation guarantees group access and participation which, in turn, provides
a forum for all manner of demands to be heard.10
Agencies and Their Clientele
Traditional administrative theory, as has just been
shown, has come under strong attack from a number of critics. This rejection of Weberian assumptions of rational and
neutral administration guided by statutory law began with
Herbert Simon's groundbreaking work. Simon identified the
primary influences upon a bureaucratic organization to be
its customers and suppliers. The former refers to those who
use the agency's products, 11 while the latter are those
whose support the agency needs in order to produce its products. 12
The theory of clientelism which eventually evolved
from Simon's work takes this idea a step further. Rather
than customers and suppliers, though, it speaks of the agen9

For a particularly illustrative case study of this administrative overlap in action, Kelso cites Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt vol.II: The Coming of the New
Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958).
1°Kelso, 263.
11 Such "products" may be of a material, distributive nature (such as national forest timber) or of a regulatory
nature. Bureaucratic rule-making process and the interpretation of legislation (for example, how the Forest Service
chooses to deal with the spotted owl and thus, NFMA and the
ESA) may allow or prevent an interest from obtaining what it
desires.
12 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 16-17.
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cy and its clientele, the latter defined as those groups
whose interests are heavily dependent upon an agency's activities. As articulated by such students of bureaucracy as
Norton Long or Phillip Selznick, the clientelist thesis
states that agencies, if they are to survive in the highly
competitive and fragmented political realm, must maintain a
satisfied clientele in order to secure the support necessary
for self-preservation. Accordingly, agencies and their clientele tend to develop a mutually supportive relationship
which affords clients the products they need in exchange for
the support an agency requires. 13
Ideally, a successful agency will be able to coopt its
clients in the course of their political exchanges. Unfortunately though, argue the critics of pluralism, it is often
the agency that gets coopted by its clients. It is this
charge of agency capture which is the main pillar of the
critics' attack upon pluralist models of bureaucratic administration. First presented by Marver Bernstein in the
1950s, capture theory represents a degenerate form of clientelism in which the regulated comes to dominate the regulator. According to Bernstein, agencies go through various
stages which inevitably transform them from aggressive

13

Norton Long, "Power and Administration" Public Administration Review 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip Selznick,
TVA and the Grassroots (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1949).
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watchdog over the industries they were created to oversee
into sympathetic allies:
Left largely to its own resources .... a commission will
probably be guided by dominant interests in the regulated industry in its formation of the public interest. Thus the public interest may become more private
than public. 14
He goes on to describe how an agency:
becomes a protector of the status quo and uses its
public powers to maintain the interest of the regulated .... Al though an agency in this situation stresses
its role of mediator and judge among conflicting interests, its actual role is that of advocate and partisan. 15
A variation on the capture theory involves what is
termed iron triangles. 16 According to the critics, situations of undue client influence often lead to the development of rather durable and inpenetrable little triumvirates
or subgovernments in which an administrative agency, the
interests they are to oversee, and the congressional subcommittee which funds and oversees the agency can all be
found locked in a fairly cozy and sympathetic embrace. 17
While capture or iron triangle theories have been employed by a number of theorists, it is the work of two of
14

Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1955), 154.
15
Bernstein, 270-271.
16
For a good summary of the iron triangle thesis, see
Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracr7 and Public Policy (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1984).
Whereas Kelso the pluralist would counsel an interest
locked outside of the triangle to turn elsewhere in order to
be heard, critics would likely argue that for most interests
in most cases an iron triangle offers no where to turn at
least for tangible results.
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pluralism's most prominent critics, McConnell and Lowi, that
has proven to be particularly noteworthy in this respect.
According to McConnell, the chief fault of pluralism is that
it allows private interests to exercise undue and quite undemocratic levels of influence; a situation that comes about
when vulnerable agencies are captured by "those very interests they had been established to regulate." 18 Consequently, the line between state authority and private demands becomes blurred and policy, therefore, becomes perverted to
enhance private rather than the public's interests. By allowing this "conquest of segments of formal state power, "19
McConnell argues that the pluralist ideal of balance and
compromise becomes impossible to achieve:
Often it is assumed that the role of government is
that of arbiter or mediator among the many interests
that exist within society. Neither role is possible
where the distinction between public and private is
lost. 20
McConnell places the blame for agencies' vulnerability
to capture squarely upon decentralization, that same feature
of pluralism that supposedly guarantees open access. To
McConnell, political fragmentation leads less to open access
than to the development of isolated and fairly autonomous
fiefdoms of policymaking authority. At this local level
where the "lonely judicial grandeur of agencies isolated

18

McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1970), 360.
19
Ibid. 162.
20
Ibid. 362.
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from the influence of 'politics'" can prevail, McConnell
contends that it is all too easy for client groups, with the
help of their congressional friends, to dominate at the public's expense.21
Like McConnell, Lowi bemoans the political fragmentation which allows clientele to exert control over bureaucratic behavior. To Lowi, the main problem with the insulated, almost self-governing entities of pluralist administration is their hostility to rational planning or legal standards. "Interest group liberalism," argues Lowi harkening
back to traditionalist models of administration, "has little
place for law because laws interfere with the political process.

"ll

In other words, a clear, detailed legal mandate

precludes the possibility to deal, bargain, or compromise;
all of which are central to pluralist politics. According to
Lowi, the pluralist system's aversion to law along with its
fractured, special-interests dominated policymaking apparatus can only lead to decisionmaking paralysis and an arbitrary, ineffective, and democratically illegitimate system
of privilege. The most that can be expected in the way of
decisionmaking, therefore, would be poorly conceived, ad hoc
policy responses.n
21 Ibid. 360.
22 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd edition (New
York, W.W. Norton, 1979), 92.
23
Ibid., 93, 297. Interestingly, Lowi employs elements of
the capture and iron triangle theses which developed out of
earlier critiques of the traditional model of administration
(as competent and apolitical) and yet he is one of the tra-
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Rather than offering clear and authoritative laws representing rationally derived social goals and priorities,
argues Lowi, pluralism features broad delegations of legislative power to the bureaucratic fiefdoms and their clientele. By constructing purposefully broad and ambiguous mandates, legislators grant agencies the authority, wide discretion, and resources needed to maintain their semiautonmous subgovernments.24

In return, argues Morris Fior-

ina, legislators gain bureaucratic cooperation on matters of
constituent benefits.a

This political "pork," consequently,

goes a long way towards bolstering legislators' reelection
chances. The problem with this mutually beneficial scenario,
maintains Lowi, is twofold. First, broad discretion "makes a
politician out of a bureaucrat" by giving agency officials
too much interpretive leeway, thereby increasing the oppor-

ditional model's staunchest modern advocates. His prescription for overcoming what he sees as the political disaster
wrought by pluralism involves a return to traditional principles of administration such as clear, detailed mandates,
rational planning, politically insulated bureaucracies, etc.
24 Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 281-297.In another famous,
earlier work Lowi draws a distinction between distributive,
redistributive, and regulatory policies and argues that distributive policy areas are most likely to develop into iron
triangles. In The End of Liberalism, Lowi argues that this
distributive style of politics is the one that the pluralist
system naturally gravitates towards and consequently, this
form of politics has proliferated to the point where it often transforms or pushes out the other two. Theodore Lowi,
"American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory" World Politics 16:4 (July 1964), 677-715.
25 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington
Establishment, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1989), 37-47.
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tunity for client mischief .26 Secondly, this voluntary surrender of legislative power to the executive branch is alleged by Lowi to be of questionable constitutionality.27
The Pluralist Response
In the face of such serious charges of agency capture,
collusion, and impotence, pluralists respond by arguing that
capture theory grossly simplifies the often complex realities of administrative politics. While pluralists concede
that isolated incidents of agency capture have occurred,
they (and for that matter, most political scientists) contend that one would be hard-pressed to find a clear case of
capture today as significant developments in American politics have now made capture in the classic sense practically
impossible. Wilson, for example, points out that the massive
proliferation of competing interests in the past several
decades (many of them "public" or at least purposivelyoriented) has tended to neutralize the potential for mischief by entrenched clientele.28

In fact, argue both Wilson

and McFarland, a diverse and competitive multiple clientele
may actually have the effect of bolstering an agency's autonomy since the interests tend to cancel out each others'
influence leaving bureaucrats with a freer hand. 29 And as
26 Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 304.
27 Ibid. chapter 5.
28 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York:
Basic Books, 1980), chapter 10.
~Ibid.; Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize:
A Pluralist Response to Olson" conference paper, Western
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long as an agency can exercise any meaningful degree of autonomy, maintains McFarland, capture can be ruled out.30
In today's political world of multiple clientele,
pluralists argue, the traditional iron triangle or "dominant
subgovernment" model of administration needs to be revised. 31 One such revision involves Hugh Heclo's theory of

issue networks. Rather than existing as a rigid and closed
triangle, Hecla finds subgovernments operating within a larger network of communications revolving around a particular
policy area. These networks involve a multitude of government and non-government actors including congressmen, a wide
range of interest group representatives (including interests
other than those being directly regulated), personnel from
other government agencies, various other public officials,
academic experts, journalists, lawyers, and assorted
others. 32 According to pluralists, the existence of such
issue networks and their interest in and scrutiny of a particular policy area makes the insular business of iron triangles and agency capture all but impossible.

Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA
(April 1991), 23.
30

Ibid. 22.

31 See, for example, Thomas Gais, Mark Peterson, and Jack
Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative
Institutions in American National Government" British Journal of Political Science 14 (1984), 185.
~Hugh Hecla, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King (editor), The New American Political System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).
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Similar to the idea of issue networks is Paul Sabatier's notion of advocacy coalitions. Such coalitions feature a mix of government and non-government actors broadly
advocating a particular interest. Unlike the dominant subgovernment (iron triangle) structure, subgovernments in this
model operate within a much larger context which includes
advocacy coalitions and thus features more varied and active
participants, wider access, and greatly increased competition and conflict among interests.33

In addition, the pres-

ence of advocacy coalitions, according to Sabatier, assures
that policy change will not always originate strictly from
the subgovernment.34

In other words, external pressures such

as particular events or crises, socioeconomic conditions, or
interest group participation also exert influence; a situation which leads, therefore, to a more flexible and mediative role for those bureaucrats in charge. In this new policymaking context, such officials function as "policy brokers."~

Finally, because of this "opening up" of the poli-

cymaking process, Sabatier contends that subgovernments are
no longer solely focused upon the distribution of benefits
as Lowi charges they are.~

nPaul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning,
and Policy Change" Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 8 (1987), 649-692.
34 Ibid.
35 Davis and Davis, 5.
36 Sabatier, 649-692.
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Biased or Balanced?: Models of Forest Service Administration

Broadly, this chapter examines how pluralist and critical theories of bureaucratic administration relate to the
United States Forest Service and its role in the politics of
the Siskiyou conflict. To achieve this, it is necessary to
review the various models of Forest Service behavior and observe what these say about the role and nature of public
participation, agency norms and values, agency responsiveness and flexibility (and from this determine the implications regarding the pluralist process in general). Such a
review creates a framework upon which to specifically analyze the agency's behavior in the Siskiyou.
As the agency with the legal authority and responsibility to administer the national forest system, the Forest
Service, and particularly its local administration in the
Siskiyou, are clearly the primary source of policy outputs
on the Siskiyou National Forest.37 The United States Forest
37 As has been shown in previous chapters, the Siskiyou
conflict has involved at one level or another a multitude of
governmental actors besides the Forest Service including the
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, various state agencies, and an assortment of congressmen, judges, and administration officials. Each of these groups or individual actors has undoubtedly had an impact, sometimes quite substantial, upon
the Forest Service and the politics of the Siskiyou. Because
they do not have the day-to-day responsibility to administer
the national forests, though, these other actors will essentially be considered external influences upon the Forest
Service, which because of its direct jurisdiction, is this
study's main focus regarding issues in administration. The
other governmental actors will be considered in depth in the
next chapter.
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Service was officially created in 1905 to administer the
Forest Reserve System (later to become the national forests). These public forests were established fourteen years
earlier in reaction to the disastrous exploitation of the
nation's woodlands by private loggers in the 19th century.
Given its idealistic objectives, it is not surprising that
the agency and its establishment figured prominently in the
growing Progressive Movement.38
The Forest Service, which oversees approximately 189
million acres of land on 155 far-flung units, is located in
the Department of Agriculture. The agency operates under a
host of statutes (a good portion of them enacted in the
1960s and 70s) that are supposed to define and authorize its
activities. Most prominent among these are:

(1) the Multiple

Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 which directs the Forest
Service to manage the national forests for a multitude of
uses in a manner that perpetuates the outputs of forest resources;

(2) the National Forest Management Act of 1976

which among other things mandates land management planning
and public participation; and (3) the National Environmental
Protection Act of 1969 which establishes the process mandating environmental impact statements.

(For a more complete

list of major laws, see appendix E).

38

For a discussion of the link between the Forest Service
and the larger Progressive Movement, see Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).
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In addition to its legislative mandate, the agency relies heavily upon the Forest Service Manual, a huge and continuously evolving guidebook of internally derived regulations, guidelines, and operating procedures. All together,
the Forest Service mandate might be summarized as follows:
to manage the national forests for a multitude of values and
purposes in a way that involves and best suits the public,
does not impair the land, assures a perpetual flow of resources, and does not violate federal environmental laws.
As one the more closely studied bureaucracies in the
United States, 39 the Forest Service has been the object of
quite a bit of administrative theorizing. From this long and
varied history of research, one can identify four major models of Forest Service administration; each with a unique set
of implications regarding democratic theory.
Clientelism and Capture
Beginning with important critiques by McConnell,
Philip Foss, and Wesley Calef in the early 1960s, a persistent theme has developed in the literature of public
lands politics alleging that administrative agencies have
come under the sway of their resource-using clients to the
point where they have become co-opted by those clients.~
39

catherine McCarthy, Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis,
"Attitudinal Change in the Forest Service: 1960-1990" conference paper, Western Political Science Association annual
meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991), 1.
·
~Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy,
Philip Foss, Politics and Grass (Seattle: University of
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According to critics, public lands politics take the form of
a classic iron triangle which features:
the distribution of tangible benefits to a relatively
small number of individuals and groups (such as ranchers or mining firms) and the inability of agency administrators to exercise independent judgement in the
face of political pressures generated by resource user
groups and their allies in the Interior Committees of
Congress.~

Specifically regarding the Forest Service, capture
theorists suggest that as the agency's dominant client, the
timber industry, has managed, with the help of its congressional allies, to keep the agency pliant and supportive.
McConnell asserts that it is the agency's decentralization
which makes its isolated and vulnerable to local resourceusing interests. The Forest Service, he maintains, has always "wandered before the pressures of all the winds that

In the 1970s, a number of very critical non-academic
studies reiterated this notion of Forest Service capture.
Ralph Nader associate Daniel Barney characterizes "hapless"
Washington Press, 1960), Wesley Calef, Private Grazing and
the Public Lands (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960). Foss and Calef focused their studies upon the BLM and
its predecessor the Grazing Service while McConnell examined
a number of agencies including the Forest Service, the BLM
and its predecessors, and the Soil Conservation Service, the
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation. The
fact that the bulk of case studies used by McConnell to illustrate localism and capture in Private Power and American
Democracy come from the realm of public lands administration
points to the central role that early public lands research
has played in the development of broader theories of capture
and clientelism.
41
Davis and Davis, 3.
42
McConnell, 360.
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Forest Service personnel as being "easy prey for the timber
lobbyist and his political friends" and finds that "the Forest Service has succumbed increasingly to industry schemes
to convert much of the National Forests to timber
factories."~

Jack Shepherd, meanwhile, comes to largely the

same conclusion in The Forest Killers, a book whose title
clearly sums up his

perspective.~

In addition to these journalistic accounts, academic
observers besides McConnell, such as Rosenbaum or Charles
Reich have basically concurred, though in a far less strident way, with this notion of timber interest dominance over
the Forest Service.45 Reich in particular echoes Lowi's critique of pluralism by finding that the Forest Service can
maintain its timber industry bias because of the vague and
overly broad mandates which Congress grants it. This vast
discretionary power, according to Reich, is used by the Forest Service to reinterpret legislation in ways which clearly
favor the timber industry and shut out

environmentalists.~

Not surprisingly, the Forest Service capture thesis is
most enthusiastically advanced by interest group partisans.
One does not have to search far through environmentalist
43 Daniel Barney, The Last Stand (New York: Grossman,
19 7 4 ) I 7 Q I Xiii •
~Jack Shepherd, The Forest Killers (New York: Weybright
and Talley, 1975).
45 Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern, 107;
Charles Reich, Bureaucracy and the National Forests (Santa
Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1962).
~Reich, Bureaucracy and the National Forests.
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literature to find the capture thesis applied to a Forest
Service that supposedly follows "marching orders planned by
the timber lobby" 47 as shown by this passage in the Sierra
Club's magazine:
.... over the years the agencies have strayed from
their missions. Two in particular, the Forest Service
and the BLM .... [have] developed cozy relationships
with the very commercial interests they were designed
to keep at bay .... the general culture of these bureaucracies is prodevelopment .... ~
In a letter to Forest Service Chief Robertson, former Willamette National Forest planner Jeff DeBonis notes how this
perception of Forest Service capture has gained popular currency:
Our basic problem right now is that we are too much
biased toward the resource-extraction industries,
particularly the timber industry .... we support their
narrowly focused, shortsighted agenda to the point
that we are perceived by much of the public as being
dupes of the resource-extraction industries.49
The Forest Service as a captured agency is a characterization that has, according to Culhane, "become accepted theory
among journalists, political activists, and popular writers.

1150

Budget Expansion
Not all observers who notice a pro-timber bias in the

47 "America's Forests in Crisis" Save America's Forests
Citizen Action Guide (January 1992), 7.
~Bruce Hamilton, "Unfinished Business" Sierra (September£0ctober 1989), 50.
9 Jeff DeBonis quoted in Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New
York: Knopf, 1990), 163-164.
50 culhane, Public Lands Politics, 338.
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Forest Service attribute it to outright capture. Some critics, such as forest economist Randall O'Toole reflect the
work of earlier public administration theorists like Long or
Selznick by emphasizing that the main determinant of bureaucratic behavior is the desire of organizations to survive
and expand. According to O'Toole, the Forest Service is simply a large bureaucracy seeking to maximize its budget and
beca~se

of various political realities, it finds the best

way to achieve this by cutting massive quantities of timber. 51
The reasons for this are twofold. First, according to
one critic, is the fact that timber sales represent a form
of political "pork" for congressmen who find it a far more
lucrative constituent benefit than any other forest use. As
such, timber sale activity is rewarded by Congress with high
budgets.52 Often, Congress even imposes yearly timber quotas
(ASQs) higher than Forest Service plans call for, but the
agency rarely complains since this translates into higher
budgets. Given this politically valuable product it produces, it is little wonder, argue critics, that the Forest
Service with its roughly $2 billion appropriation is funded
at sustantially higher levels than just about any other pub-

51 Randall O'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1988).
52 Tom Ribe, "Pork Barrelling Our National Forests" Inner
Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 1, 5.
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lie lands agency. 53 Table 15 details this massive budget.
The Forest Service roadbuilding budget alone has made it the
world's largest roadbuilder, having constructed 340,000
miles, or eight times the entire U.S. interstate system in
the last fifty

years.~

Another factor which provides incentives for the Forest Service to overcut, according to O'Toole, is the nature
of the laws it operates under. The chief culprit in this
respect is alleged to be the Knutson-Vandenburg Act of 1930
which allows local managers to keep a certain percentage of
timber sale receipts (the rest of which go to the U.S. Treasury)

.55

The effect of this and other similar

legislation~

(which together account for more than a fifth of the Forest
Service budget), O'Toole argues, is to provide an irresis53

The Forest Service with a 1991 appropriations of $2.33
billion is nearly a billion dollars ahead of its closest rival, the National Park Service whose '91 appropriations totalled $1.36 billion. Lagging far behind were the Bureau of
Land Management ($906 million) which administers nearly a
third more land than the Forest Service and the Fish and
Wildlife Service ($698 million). Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report (3 November 1990). Figures have been rounded
off.
54
Timothy Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents
Say" New York Times (4 March 1990), 1; Catherine Caufield,
"The Ancient Forest" New Yorker (14 May 1990), 61.
55 Randall O'Toole, "Incentives to Mismanage" Inner Voice
3:2 (Spring 1991), 6. Ostentibly, these funds are to be
spent for improvement of the cut-over area, but in reality,
according to O'Toole, their expenditure is left largely to
the rangers' discretion.
56
In addition to Knutson-Vandenburg (K-V), there is the
Brush Disposal Act of 1916, the National Forest Roads and
Trails Act of 1964, and provisions in NFMA which all allow
district rangers to keep receipts from various timberrelated Forest Service operations. Including K-V, these laws
add about $600 million a year to the Forest Service budget.

291

tible temptation for district rangers to make as many timber
sales as possible, even if they are money-losing, below-cost
sales (since the ranger is granted a budget to make those
sales anyway and gets a reward in addition).57 According to
proponents of this theory of budget-driven administration,
the timber industry, though it benefits mightily, is clearly
not the chief motivator of Forest Service policy. Instead,
it all boils down to a simple formula: increased timber
sales equal increased budgets, decreased sales equal decreased budgets.

Naturally, claim critics, such a process of national
forest administration becomes "almost entirely divorced from
biological reality" and at odds with environmental laws
passed by Congress. 58 Forest Service management becomes instead a desperate scramble to squeeze out every last budgetexpanding timber sale possible in a style of incentives,
penalties, and quotas which, according to O'Toole:
most clearly resemble the Soviet system of management
where a central committee determines production targets and the local mangers are required to meet those
targets at any cost. n59
57 Ibid.
58 Ribe, 5.
59 0'Toole quoted in Ribe, 5. Critics maintain that a
large part of Forest Service personnel's annual performance
rating depends upon how well they met their timber output
target. Neither environmentally-based reluctance or legal
tie-ups help to reach this target. According to O'Toole,
rangers of-ten find themselves "walking on a tightrope. If
they don't meet their target, they won't get promoted. If
they get sued for breaking environmental laws, they won't
get promoted either." O'Toole quoted in Kathie Durbin,
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TABLE 15
FOREST SERVICE FY 1990 BUDGET1
(in millions of dollars)
Timber Sales ................ $921
Firefighting ................

551

Payments to Local Govt ......

363

Research....................

131

State and Private Forestry ..

104

Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

Other Construction..........

88

Fish and Wildlife...........

71

Land Acquisition............

63

Soil, Air, and Water Mgmt...

41

Trails. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

392

Timber-related Subtota12 .... 2,166
Total3
1

••••••••••••••••••• .

2,845

These figures represent official budgets. Unofficially,
however, the Forest Service has been widely accused of
spending non-timber related funds on timber-related activity. A GAO investigation, in fact, found that 60% of the
funds earmarked by Congress for wilderness management were
diverted to other activities, mostly timber-related. GAO
report cited in "Forest Service Illegally Diverted Wilderness Funds" Inner Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 3.
2This figure is a subtotal of the timber sale budget and
those accounts indirectly related to timber activity (firefighting, research, payments to local government, state and
private forestry and roads) . This conservatively assumes
that none of the other construction budget or the huge other
account goes towards any timber-related activity. This
timber-related category accounts for 76% of the total budget
3 This figure represents total Forest expenditures, some
of which comes from timber sales and related revenue rather
than direct congressional appropriations which are roughly
$2 billion.
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Organizational Values
Another school of thought critical of Forest Service
management stresses internally-derived organizational values
as the source of what it sees as the agency's stubborn timber production bias. Drawing from Simon's seminal work, a
number of observers, including Ashley Schiff, Ben Twight,
Twight and Fremont Lyden, and Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, all work from the assumption that administrators are
heavily influenced by their own and their agency's values.W
In the case of the Forest Service, these values are alleged
to have an especially firm grip.
As the agency that many claim spearheaded the twentieth century Progressive Movement, the Forest Service was
created, in the words of Samuel Hays, according to "the gospel of

efficiency."~

Accordingly, this gospel accurately

reflected the values of the larger Progressive crusade;
elite technical expertise, rational planning, and apolitical
administration all coupled with an almost religious moral

"Rangers Scramble to Meet Timber Quotas" special report:
"Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 October 1990).
wAshley Schiff, Fire and Water (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1962); Ben Twight, Organizational Values
and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic
National Park (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983); Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Commitment" Forest Science (June
1988); Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, "Value Conflicts and
Policy Interpretation: Change in the Cases of Fisheries and
Wildlife Managers" Policy Studies Journal 19:3-4 (1991).
61 Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency.
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certainty and confidence that what the agency was doing was
"intrinsically right. 62
11

More specifically, Twight identifies the organizational values of the Forest Service as being based in a utilitarian theory which includes: (1) an emphasis upon timber
and other resource production as the primary purpose of the
national forests, (2) a faith in planned forestry to achieve
social ends such as the stability of the nation's wood supply, local wood products industries, and the communities
that depend on them, and (3) a faith in technical rationality as guidance in forest management. This technical orientation is closely tied to what Twight calls "scientific
elitism"; the idea that professional foresters and not the
public or politicians are best equipped to know what the
proper course of forest management ought to be.63
~Hal Rothman, "A Regular Ding-Dong Fight: Agency Culture
and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute 1916-1934" Western
Historical Quarterly xx:2 (May 1989), 146.
63 Twight, 23-25. There is much debate over whether the
multiple use doctrine is part of the Forest Service's basic
value system. Culhane, for example, sees multiple use as a
primary Forest Service value, adopted and enthusiastically
followed since the 1930s. Twight, on the other hand, argues
that the concept of multiple use violates the agency's utilitarian founding values which strongly emphasize a single
dominant timber-oriented course of forest management. Multiple use, claims Twight, was a gradually developed strategic
response to political pressure and especially Park Service
competition over jurisdiction, the true meaning of which the
Forest Service has never internalized. Henning and Mangun
concur, finding multiple use to be merely a "convenient slogan covering a 'dominant use' decision that really fails to
take into consideration other uses and values. In this case
multiple use can be considered a devious ploy .... " Daniel
Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 109.
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According to organizational values theorists, this
value orientation automatically biases the Forest Service in
favor of timber production and against all other nonconsumptive uses 64 as the words of the agency's founder,
Gifford Pinchot can be presumed to show:
the object of our forest policy is not to preserve the
forests because they are beautiful .... or because they
are refuges for the wild creatures of the wilderness
.... but the making of prosperous homes .... Every other
consideration comes as secondary.65
In another pronouncement, Pinchot confirms that "a
forest is a crop, and forestry is uniformly classed as a
branch of

agriculture."~

This confident utilitarian/techno-

logical tone has not changed much since Pinchot's turn-ofthe-century proclamations: "We know what nature can do,"
states the contemporary Deputy Chief George Leonard, "and
we're relatively certain that we can do better than nature."~

The structural characteristics of the Forest Service
which values theorists claim have so strongly bound personnel to such orthodoxy were first identified in Herbert Kaufman's groundbreaking 1960 study of the agency. Although
Kaufman himself was a great admirer of the Forest Service,

64

Twight and Lyden's 1981 data finds Forest Service personnel to hold values very closely in synch with members of
commodity user groups. Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Measuring Forest Service Bias" Journal of Forestry 87:5 (May
1989), 35-41.

65 Pinchot quoted in Davis and Davis, 5-6.
~Pinchot quoted in Twight, 111.
67 Leonard quoted in Caufield, 61.
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his work has been extensively cited by outspoken critics
such as Twight. What Kaufman found in his examination of the
Forest Service were various internal mechanisms at work
building loyalty and commitment to the agency and its values
and ideology, while simultaneously discouraging nonconformity. According to Kaufman, it is no small task to
homogenize so highly decentralized an agency with such naturally strong centrifugal tendencies.68
The specific mechanisms aimed at achieving this, Kaufman found, included selective recruitment and staffing
(which not only heavily favored foresters, but those from
certain schools of forestry), an elaborate system of incentives, promotions, transfers, inspections, ratings and sanetions (to discourage disobedience and reward conformity),
rigorous training and socialization techniques, and the
strategic use of agency symbols. 69 As a result, Kaufman contends that the agency has achieved a high degree of integration:
Much that happens to a professional forester in the
Forest Service thus tends to tighten the links binding
him to the organization. His experiences and his environment gradually infuse into him a view of the world
and a hierarchy of preferences coninciding with those
of his colleagues. They tie him to his fellows, to the
agency .... They practically merge the individual's
identity with the identity of the organization. 70

68
69
70

Kaufman, 66-87.
Ibid. 126-197.
Ibid. 197.
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By internalizing and adhering to a definitive set of
organizational values, then, geographically scattered agency
personnel operate within what is actually a "mythology of
decentralization"n

in which they can always be counted on

to voluntarily conform. Kaufman states that the various
tech-niques of integration:
.... actually infuse into Forest officers the desired
patterns of action in the management of the districts,
so that the Rangers handle most situations precisely
as their superiors would direct them to if their superiors stood looking over their shoulders, supervising every detail. To overstate the case, their decisions are predetermined.n
Although it certainly prevents capture, such a cohesive value system in the Forest Service is argued by some to
have quite negative consequences as well. Critics such as
Schiff or Twight describe an agency so blinded by its own
ideology that it becomes isolated, inflexible, and unresponsive to public demands or other external pressures or
even, in some cases, principles of sound scientific management. According to Twight, the Forest Service is so strongly
influenced by its ideology that it will stubbornly stick to
decisions even if they cost the agency dearly as Twight's
case study of the Forest Service's loss of jurisdiction over

n Terence Tipple and J. Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and
Homogeneity to Complexity and Diversity" Public Administration Review 51:5 (September/October 1991), 422.
72
Kaufman, 222.
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a nearly one million acre chunk of the Olympic National Forest suggests.n
Twight and Lyden argue, therefore, that the Forest
Service tries to control change rather than accomodate it.
If faced with political pressure that is counter to its values, Twight contends that rather than engage in the "politics" it abhors, the agency will usually try to explain to
the public its values and why these are correct, often employing costly public relations campaigns. If that fails,
the last resort, according to Twight, is to attempt to fit
the new directive or program into its existing framework of
values as well as possible. 74 In sum, the proponents of organizational values theory argue that the Forest Service
represents a closed system of organization which makes decisions that are "pre-conceived," is resistant to change or
innovation, and hostile to or at least uninterested in outside, especially public, input.
The Pluralist View: Balance and Professionalism
A final and quite influential school of thought regarding the Forest Service portrays the agency in a largely
positive light; as professional, competent, and balanced.

nTwight, Organizational Values and Political Power.
For example, the Forest Service approaches the management of wilderness areas (which they vigorously oppose, for
the most part, but have been mandated to protect) not in
terms of the intrisinic value of wilderness (which would violate its own values), but as one of many "multiple uses" to
which the forest can be subjected.
74
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Defenders of the Forest Service firmly reject the notion of
the agency as captured. Some observers, beginning with Kaufman, emphasize the agency's professionalism and internal cohesion, alleging that not only do these qualities encourage
operational efficiency, but also the autonomy necessary to
thwart domination by clientele. Citing its widespread reputation as one of the most effective and well-managed agencies in the entire federal government, 75 the Forest Service
is cast by its scholarly admirers as a "bureaucratic
superstar"n with personnel "in charge of the national
forests and in control of their destinies.""
Other scholars who reject the capture thesis argue
that Forest Service policymaking "meets the pluralist criterion" because the agency acts through decentralized authority to balance interests within a strongly pluralistic
and competitive political environment.78 In his 1981 study,

Public Lands Politics, Culhane offers strong support for
this pluralist view of the Forest Service. He argues that
the Forest Service is a consensus-seeking, conflict-avoiding

75 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 29. In fact, a 1981
study by Penn State and the Off ice of Personnel Management
rated the Forest Service as among the ten most successful
organizations in the United States. Study cited in Michael
Frome, The Forest Service (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1984), 32.

76 Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, Staking Out
the Terrain (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1985), 33-47.

"This quote is used to describe Kaufman's position. Tipple and Wellman, 422.
78 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341.
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agency that is responsive to a broad range of competing interests. 79 Unlike what capture theory would imply, Culhane
finds that local land management constituencies are not completely dominated by resource-using interests. To Culhane,
this multiple clientele, which reflects the agency's multiple use mission assures that the Forest Service almost always occupies the middle ground and fulfills the broker's
role. 80

Discontent on all sides, claims a former chief of

the Forest Service, is a sign of the multiple use concept in
action.~

This characterization of the Forest Service as an essentially pluralist organization is reinforced by a number
of other studies. Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, for example, find in their Wyoming case study that a pluralist advocacy coalition model with its multiple actors and access
points offers a much better explanation of local Forest Service and BLM administration than the traditional iron triangle

model.~

Although their focus is a bit broader, William

Klay and James McElveen come to a similar conclusion in
their Florida case study of wildlife management. In this
79

Ibid. 280. According to Rosenbaum, pleasing as many
parties and making as few enemies as possible by bringing as
many interests into the fold as it can, is the overriding
desire of all agencies. In many ways it is simply a function
of organizations' inherent desire to expand. Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policies (Washington D.C.:
CQ Press, 1985), 35.
80 culhane, Public Lands Politics, 332-339.
81 Former Forest Service Chief Richard McArdle cited in
Henning and Mangun, 194.
~Davis and Davis, 18-19.
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case, the authors find Heclo's issue network model more appropriate than the iron triangle due in part to the uncooptable zero-sum nature of the policy demands of the competing interests involved.83
Although it certainly increases political conflict, a
multiple clientele, pluralist theorists suggest, presents
certain important advantages to the Forest Service as well.
Besides preventing capture, a fragmented and competitive
constituency, as mentioned previously, inevitably strengthens an agency's

autonomy.~

In the case of the Forest Ser-

vice, Culhane reports that agency personnel routinely use
interests as buffers to off set the pressures of other interests.as Such a situation, pluralists argue, actually has
the fortuitous effect of integrating pluralistic administration with agency values and expertise. "Political bargaining" claim Simmons and Dennis, "is supposed to establish the
parameters within which scientific management can be used by
trained land managers."U According to Culhane, this integration is due to a rare coincidence of agency mandate and

83

William Klay and James McElveen, "Planning as a Vehicle
for Policy Formulation and Accomodation in an Evolving Subgovernment" Policy Studies Journal 19:3-4 (1991), 527-533.
~McFarland, 23; Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 227.
85 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 228.
u William Dennis and Randy Simmons "From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands"
in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke
(editors), Controversies in Environmental Politics (Albany
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 68. ·rt is important to note that the authors are actually critical of
this model they describe.

302

the political environment. Both the Forest Service and the
BLM:
.... have so arranged matters that the political necessity of responding to their multiple clienteles reinforces the dictates of their professional experience
and statutory mandates [i.e. multiple use laws]. Most
agencies in the federal bureaucracy are not so f ortunate.~

This resulting hybrid of professional values and pluralist mediation differs somewhat from classic pluralism, according to Davis and Davis, in that the Forest Service's
role as a broker:
.... is less a process of bargaining between PLMs [professional land managers] and interest groups than a
relatively open decisionmaking process guided by administrators who rely heavily upon professional values
to justify their actions.~
What this balance of professionalism and responsiveness brings, according to the Forest Service's defenders,
are enhanced opportunities for the agency to be flexible,
innovative, and open enough to encompass changing clients,

87

Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341. It is important to
note that this pluralist model of Forest Service administration is at odds with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's vision of
non-rationalist pluralist agencies from which only responsiveness and not rational, impartial implementation can be
hoped for. Proponents of Forest Service pluralism, on the
other hand, tend to argue that the agency can "have its cake
and eat it too" so to speak by being responsive and balanced
while also maintaining it professional competence and integrity. It is equally important to note that the ideology of
the Progressive reform movement from which the Forest Service sprang relied heavily upon the traditional model of
professional, apolitical administration. This may, therefore, account for the agency's traditionally close association with elite, professional administration.
~Davis and Davis, 18-19.
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demands, and policy challenges; precisely the opposite qualities attributed to the agency by its critics.
Participation and the Forest Service
One of the most important indicators of how open
Forest Service administration is would be the role which
participation plays in the agency's decisionmaking
process. 89 The institutionalization of public participation
in Forest Service policymaking has come about through both
externally imposed mandates and internal agency directives.
Legislatively, public participation has been established,
expanded, and/or specified by a number of statutes including
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, RPA, FLPMA, NFMA,
and NEPA. 90 NEPA especially has been a cornerstone of the
participation process. By requiring an environmental impact
statement with mandatory public input for any federal action

89

Public participation is defined by Henning and Mangun
as "that part of the decisionmaking process which provides
opportunity and encouragement for the public to express its
views. It assures that proper attention will be given to
public concerns and preferences when decisions are made.
Such participation includes involvement or consultation in
planning, decisionmaking, and management activities dealing
with environmental affairs .... Effective participation requires the availability of adequate non-technical information, public encouragement, and opportunities to use that
information." Henning and Mangun, 61. With the Forest Service, participation usually takes a number of forms including written comment, public meetings, field trips, public
workshops as well as informal interaction and negotiation.
90 The Administrative Procedure Act established the initial basis for public participation in administrative policymaking; RPA, FLPMA, and NFMA all established specific
guidelines and mechanisms for participation in the Forest
Service policymaking process.
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with potentially significant environmental effects, NEPA
provides the framework for most of the formal participation
that occurs in the Forest Service's policymaking process.
Besides these legally mandated participatory requirements, there have been a number of internal Forest Service
directives and initiatives (New Perspectives being the most
recent) which over the past several decades have supposedly
established and reaffirmed the role of public participation
and the agency's commitment to incorporating it. As a result, there are very few observers today who would deny the
institutionalization of at least some degree of participation into the Forest Service policymaking process.91
It is not, therefore, the existence of opportunities
to participate that is at the center of most academic debate. What the debate focuses on is whether this participation is substantive and truly influences and is incorporated
into Forest Service policymaking or whether it is an elaborate and highly symbolic facade aimed at achieving a veneer
of legitimacy for essentially pre-determined policy outputs.
91 0ne notable exceptation to this would be Nickolas
Facaros, who takes a very strict legal view. He argues that
the Forest Service does not live up to even the most basic
requirements of NFMA and CEQ regulations. In his case study
of the Willamette National Forest, he finds that the Forest
Service "did little to affirmatively encourage and facilitate .... involvement in the planning process" and "next to
nothing to bring .... the general U.S. population into the
planning process." Nickolas Facaros, "Public Involvement in
National Forest Planning: What the Council on Environmental
Quality Requires and the Forest Service Neglects" Journal of
Environmental Law and Litigation 4 (1989), 34.

305

The pluralist position, of course, clearly supports
the notion that participation is a major and meaningful component of Forest Service policymaking and that the agency is
very much responsive to public and interest group input.
Culhane states that:
Public participation is not a passive public relations
exercise. It is so thoroughly intertwined in the agencies' formal decisionmaking sequences that it is an
integral part of public lands policymaking.92
The main conclusion of Culhane's detailed analysis in

Public Lands Politics is that a great deal of variance in
local public lands policies can be explained by the makeup
of local administrators'constituencies. In other words, interest groups were found to have a significant influence on
Forest Service policymaking (though in a manner far different than a capture or iron triangle situation).93 In a followup test of Culhane's findings which examined mail comments, Paul Mohai also found public input to be influential
in the policymaking process, although he left open the possibility that this responsiveness may be shaded by some degree of agency subjectivity.94 Later research by Culhane,
meanwhile, finds the Forest Service as firmly committed as
ever to participation but somewhat overwhelmed by the rising

92 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 333.
93 Ibid.
~Paul Mohai, "Public Participation and Natural ~esource
Decision-Making: The Case of the RARE II Decisions" Natural
Resources Journal 27 (1987), 153-155.
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volume of written comments it receives.95 He claims that
this has prevented meaningful responses to much written
input and suggests that the agency reduce its reliance on
coding and analyzing mail and emphasize instead workshops
and public meetings.%
Critics of the Forest Service, on the other hand, take
a far dimmer view of the true role and nature of participatioa. Although most will concede that the opportunities to
participate are fairly plentiful, they argue that participation as it occurs today is essentially an exercise in public
relations; a formality to satisfy legal requirements and
lend an air of legitimacy to internally (or worse, timber
industry) derived policies. Twight, for example, finds the
Forest Service, regardless of mandated requirements, to be
hostile towards and suspicious of public input:
.... despite massive public involvement efforts, feedback from clients and supportive groups is treated
perfunctorily or has little apparent effect on organizational decisions .... structural characteristics of
the Forest Ser~ice appear to preclude adaptive negotiations or decisions made through citizen participation. 97
This "anti-political" attitude, contends Twight, has
its roots in the agency's elitist rationalist origins which
emphasize the agency's technical expertise and distrusts any

~Paul Culhane "Public Participation in National Forest
Planning: Is it Different or Just More?" conference paper,
Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seattle% WA (April 1991), 1-11.
97

Ibid.

10-12.

Twight, 27.
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alternative source of policymaking.98 If the increased requirements for participation (in NFMA or NEPA) have achieved
anything, argue Twight and Lyden, it is that agency values
have entrenched and hardened further as an adaptation to
guarantee cohesion in the face of new demands and increased
scrutiny. 99
Jim Britell, an environmental activist and veteran of
numerous Forest Service meetings and workshops on the Siskiyou, strongly supports this view of Forest Service participation as being less than authentic.100 Regarding public
input in the formulation of ten-year forest plans, he claims
that:
In theory, forest planning is a rational sifting and
evaluation of facts and observations which produces
possible courses of action that logically flow from
the facts. In reality, most government planning is the
systematic collection of evidence to justify predetermined conclusions. The important outcomes of most
planning processes are decided before planning begins
.... Information is gathered so the agency can proceed
with what it intended to do all along. Agencies seek
your input not to act on it, but to document for the
file the fact that they made an honest attempt to obtain it. Thus, agencies collect data to file it and
thus satisfy NEPA requirements .... From an agency's
point of view it is perfectly logical to aggressively
seek your input, then just as aggressively ignore
it. 101
In order to maintain its masquerade as an agency truly
concerned with public input while still getting what it
98 Ibid. 111.
99
Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Commitment," 481.
100 Jim Britell, "When You Must Negotiate .... Negotiate to
Win" Forest Watch (May 1991), 17-24.
101 Ibid. 18.
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wants, Britell argues that the Forest Service has become extremely sophisticated in its orchestration of public meetings and negotiations. By employing principles of group psychology, conflict management, and other persuasive techniques, Britell finds that:
managers or facilitators choreograph meetings so that
peer group pressure smothers substance. Even people
who strongly disapprove of deforestation are often
carried along into acquiescing to things they know are
wrong. 102
According to Britell, their never-ending quest for the
appearance of consensus leads the Forest Service to "classify public reaction in two categories: 'yes' and 'maybe' ....
nonresponse is as good as a positive and enthusiastic 'yes'.
Silence is

endorsement." 1 ~

Other critics point to the entire EIS process as being
of questionable substantive value. While it has led to substantial changes in administrative procedure, argues Rosenbaum, NEPA has yet to translate into real changes in policy.
This is because the courts have thus far interpreted the act
to require an agency to merely list impacts, however damaging, rather than actually alter its policies. 104 According
to critics, this reduces the EIS to nothing more than a pro-

102
103
104

Ibid. 21.
Ibid. 19.

Walter Rosenbaum, The End of Illusion: NEPA and the
Limits of Judicial Review" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Environmental Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974),
261-268. The courts' interpretations notwithstanding, the
truest original intentions of NEPA are, to this day, unclear
to scholars.

309

cedural requirement. "Virtually nobody," claims Lynton Caldwell, "seems to read and make use of environmental impact
statements, particularly the decisionmakers who must act on
the projects for which the statements are

prepared.",~

Can the Forest Service Change?
An issue that has long concerned students of bureaucracy involves whether agencies are flexible enough to
change or whether principles of bureaucratic structure or
behavior prevent this. Most critics of the Forest Service
tend to discount the possibility for any meaningful change
in the agency. While capture theorists would implicate
single-client domination 106

,

organizational values theorists

argue that rigid socialization breeds a stubborn adherence
to agency norms and values which resists change at all
costs. Budget driven models, meanwhile, would stress the
constraints placed upon the agency's policy outputs by budgetary realities. In any of these scenarios, the most that
can be expected are superficial and highly symbolic gestures
which attempt to put a new face on business as usual.
There are other theorists, though, most notably Daniel
Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, who suggest quite the oppo1

~ Caldwell quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy
and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), Environmental Politics and Policies (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press), 218.
106 Capture theorists would have to admit, though, that a
captured agency did change from its earlier "watchdog" phase
into being captured. Still, they tend to stress the persistence of this situation once it develops.
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site; any agency interested in maintaining itself as a viable organization can and will adapt to a changing political
environment. 1 ~

In fact, Clarke and McCool consider this

adaptability to be one of the primary reasons for the Forest
Service's "superstar"

status.1~

The issue of whether the Forest Service can change has
become especially important in the last several decades because of profound changes in the political context within
which the agency must operate. There is near-universal consensus among scholars that the Forest Service began as a
strongly utilitarian and elitist agency. For a good deal of
its history, it operated with little outside interference,
fulfilling its preferred role as technical expert. In the
last several decades, however, the agency's mandate has been
expanded to embrace what Culhane considers two fundamentally
contradictory elements: rational, comprehensive planning as
well as a high degree of responsiveness to public

input. 1 ~

The primary question, then, revolves around whether the Forest Service will successfully make the transition and adopt
roles and attitudes traditionally anathemic to it or respond
with hostility, reluctance and symbolic gestures?

107 Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, Can Organizations Change? (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute,
1979cJ.
1

Clarke and McCool, 38.
Culhane, "Public Participation in Forest Service Planning," 1.
1

~
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As we have seen, most agency critics dispute the possibility for real change in the Forest Service. As recently
as 1988, Twight and Lyden found commodity production to
still clearly be the primary value of the agency despite all
of the changes that were supposed to have taken place. 110 A
growing body of evidence, however, comes to the opposite
conclusion. Those who characterize the Forest Service as
flexible see it as a dynamic agency with a diverse personnel
from which to draw new ideas. Even a half-century ago Aldo
Leopold recognized a diversity of values in his agency where
one group was "quite content to grow trees like cabbages"
with "no inhibition regarding violent manipulation of nature," while another group "worries on biotic as well as
economic grounds . "111
According to a number of researchers, trends in the
Forest Service indicate that the dominant "cabbage-growers"
of Leopold's dichotomy are steadily losing influence to the
latter group. Attitudinal studies by Catherine McCarthy,
Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis, Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, and Kennedy and Thomas Quigley all show values among
Forest Service personnel during the last decade to be shifting away from a strict commodity orientation and more favor-

110

Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational
Commitment."
111
Leopold quoted in Frome, 4.
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ably inclined towards public input. 112 According to Bullis,
the agency's role is thus shifting from expert to servant
while its culture is transforming accordingly.113

No longer

just aloof technicians, rangers are now alleged to see their
proper role to be as facilitators and mediators. The Forest
Service, then, has come to be seen by change model advocates
as less strictly aligned with a single set of traditional
agency values. One reason, according to Bullis and Kennedy
and Culhane, is that it has internalized the multiple use
values foisted upon it by Congress long ago.114
One reason put forth for this supposedly greater diversity of values is a growing trend in the agency towards
the inclusion of specialists besides foresters within the
ranks. It is argued that this new breed which includes wildlife biologists, landscape architects, hydrologists, and
soil scientists (as well as more women and minorities) have
brought new perspectives and values to the agency. 11 5

112 McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 12; Bullis and Kennedy, 550-551; Kennedy and Quigley study cited in McCarthy
and Loomis, 8.
113 Bullis cited in Tipple and Wellman, 424.
114 Bullis and Kennedy, 542; Culhane, Public Lands Politics 125-129.
11 ~ Tipple and Wellman, 424. Christopher Leman claims that
non-foresters now outnumber foresters among Forest Service
personnel. Even Bullis, generally an advocate of the change
model, admits, however, that many of these newer specialists
are not well-integrated and cannot break into the "old-boy
network" of foresters who still constitute the real power
structure in the agency. Leman and Bullis cited in Tipple
and Wellman, 425

~
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Tipple and Wellman argue that along with increased
agency heterogeneity has come more internal contention. 116 A
letter written by disgruntled Region One supervisors to
Chief Robertson in early 1990 vividly illustrates the growing dissatisfaction within the ranks in the late 1980s and
early 1990s:
Many people, internally as well externally, believe
the current emphasis of national forest programs does
not reflect the land stewardship values reflected in
our forest plan .... we have become a dysfunctional
Forest Service family. 117
The agency's legendary esprit de corps has been further undermined recently by highly controversial whistleblower allegations and forced resignations of a number of
employees, most notably Region One Forester Mumma who refused to meet what he felt were unsustainably high timber
quotas for his region. 11 8

Perhaps the clearest indication of

this growing dissent has been the formation of the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics
(AFSEEE). The organization, to which several thousand Forest Service employees belong, advocates strong measures for
environmental protection and represents a dramatic schism in
agency values. 119
116
117

Tipple and Wellman, 424.
Letter quoted in Egan, "Forest Service Abusing
Role ... , " 2 6.
118 For a summary of recent whistleblower controversies,
see Paul Schneider, "When a Whistle Blows in the Forest .... "
Audubon (January/February 1992), 42-49; "Forest Service
Chor,s Whistleblowers" Environment 34 (April 1992), 23-24.
19
A University of Idaho survey found that 93% of AFSEEE
members vs. 45% of line officers (rangers and supervisors)

314
Tipple and Wellman attribute recent changes in the
Forest Service to a number of factors that did not exist in
Kaufman's day when he portrayed the agency. First, there has
been a slew of land management legislation in the 1960s and
70s which imposed a host of new regulatory requirements upon
the agency. Kaufman's rangers, for example, would have never
heard of forest plans, EISs, federally endangered species,
or designated wilderness to name but a few. These same laws
also mandated that the decisionmaking process be opened up
to public input and in many cases specified how that was to
be achieved. 120 A good argument could certainly be made that
the Forest Service would never have embraced public participation on such a scale on its own. Finally, changes in the
larger sociopolitical context, such as the growth of the environmental movement, changes in social values, or the increased incidence of litigation and citizen monitoring, are
alleged to have generated monumental pressures upon the
agency. 121

and 58% of all employees favor increased preservation of old
growth while 21% of AFSEEE employees vs. 84% of line officers and 62% of general staff believe the agency has maintained environmental laws to the letter and spirit. Survey
cited in "Studies Probe Bias in Forest Service" Inner Voice
(Spring 19 91) , 8.
120
Tipple and Wellman, 423.
121
Ibid.
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Bureaucratic Administration in the Siskiyou Rational
Forest

As previously mentioned, it is the ultimate aim of
this chapter to test whether or not bureaucratic administration in the Siskiyou has conformed to pluralist principles,
at least for the period of 1983 to 1992. Specifically, this
is achieved through an analysis of the Siskiyou case within

the context of the models of Forest Service behavior we have
just reviewed. For the most part, the capture, organizational values, and budget-driven models are critical of the Forest Service. For different reasons, each model finds the
agency biased towards the interests of timber producers and
thereby in violation of a number of criteria for pluralist
administration. Only the pluralist/professional model,
therefore, finds the Forest Service to be behaving in a balanced, responsive and flexible manner. Table 16 sums up the
main points of these four models.
If the administrators of the Siskiyou National Forest
are to be characterized as balanced, responsive, and open to
ecological values, one would expect their behavior regarding
the formulation and implementation of the major policy outputs in the Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992 to conform more
closely to the pluralist/professional model. On the other
hand, if the administrators' behavior more closely resembles
any one critical model or combination thereof, it could be
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TABLE 16
SUMMARY OF FOUR MODELS OF FOREST SERVICE
ADMINISTRATION1
Captured

Nature of
Clientele

single/
dominant

Access to
Agency

only for
dominant
client

Influence
of Partic.

high only
for dominant client

Chief
Determinant
of Policy

dominant
client's
demands

Budget
Driven
irrelevant

low/
closed

low

expansion
of budget

Organizational
Values-Driven
irrelevant

Pluralist

multiple

low/
closed

high/open
to all
clients

low

high

utilitarian values

public
input/
professional values

Overall
Competence

low

low

low

high

Flexibility/
Innovation

low

low

low

high

Balance of
Interests

poor

poor

poor

good

1 Kaufman's work falls somewhere between the organizational values and pluralist/professional categories. While he
stresses the role of internal norms and values and characterized the agency as a closed system, he still found the
Forest Service to be extremely competent and fairly flexible.
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said that the Siskiyou National Forest did not operate as a
pluralist

agency.1~

In order to determine whether the Siskiyou National
Forest has been as open, flexible, and responsive as pluralists might predict, the following questions must be considered:
1. Did Forest Service administrators recognize and in-

teract in good faith with a multiple set of clients including ecological interests? While a pluralist agency would be
expected to identify as clients and cultivate good working
relations with any and all interested parties, administrators in a closed or captured agency would probably only recognize one interest--the timber industry--as its client or
at least treat that client in a clearly preferential way.
2. Did the Siskiyou National Forest provide adequate
opportunities for public participation and were these opportunities sufficiently advertised and carried out in a
fair and balanced manner? A pluralist agency could be expec-

1

~ Keep in mind, however, that this chapter's analysis
tests only that variant of pluralist theory which characterizes agencies as balanced and administrators as policy
brokers. None of the critical Forest Service models are
necessarily incompatible with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's
less idealistic vision of bureaucracies in a pluralist system--that agencies may indeed be biased, but the system's
overall fragmentation overcomes this. Also, it is important
to note that technically, this chapter's analysis will not
specifically test in any systematic way all aspects of all
the critical models, but instead, whether the pluralist or
critical models, broadly conceived, are more accurate. This
does not rule out, however, speculation as to which critical
model might be most appropriate in a given instance.
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ted to hold numerous and varied forums as well as keep all
potentially interested sectors of the public adequately informed as to both the issues facing the Forest and upcoming
opportunities to participate. A non-pluralistic agency, on
the other hand, might be expected to act in a purposefully
lax, negligent, and/or biased manner regarding both opportunities :o participate and the dissemination of information
to the public. For example, key individuals or groups may be
left out of participatory forums, certain types of forums
might be avoided, or crucial information regarding Forest
Service policies and intentions might be withheld.
3. Did the various participatory forums represent
meaningful opportunities for public input as pluralists
would suggest or were they merely pro forma exercises designed to appease critics and technically satisfy mandated
participation requirements?
4. Did Siskiyou officials' values seem to be closer to
utilitarianism and a strict timber production orientation as
critics would charge or did they conform more to principles
of multiple use and agency responsiveness? Was there evidence that any of these values were a primary determinant of
agency decisions?
5. Did the Siskiyou National Forest display evidence
of flexibility and an authentic willingness to change or did
the agency resist accomodation and try to co-opt change
through skillful public relations?
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The Siskiyou National Forest and Its Clientele
A multiple set of clients is a prerequisite for any
agency to act as a policy broker. The previous chapter has
made it clear that the politics of the Siskiyou have involved two very well-organized interests locked in competition. To some pluralists, this fact alone rules out any potential for capture. This study, however, holds out the possibility that an agency may not recognize as clients or interact with all manifest interests, thus the mere existence
of multiple interests is not enough to rule out capture. The
real question, then, is whether ecological interests were
fully recognized and dealt with by Siskiyou personnel.
Amongst most all the participants interviewed, whether
agency, timber, or environmentalist, there seemed to be a
consensus that, at least after 1983, the Forest Service has
recognized and granted access to a multiple clientele. That
environmentalists were recognized as a legitimate interest
seems to be a fact pretty much taken for granted by all concerned parties. The articulate, well-organized ecological
interests that have sprung up in the 1980s have become politically impossible to ignore.
It was not always this way on the Siskiyou, however.
According to the former supervisor, environmentalists had
"been shut out on this forest for some time. I opened my
doors .... unfortunately my predecessor hadn't." Thus, McCormick had made a point to consider environmentalists as well
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as timber interests as clients of the agency.

"I saw both of

them," states McCormick, "as valid parts of the south Oregon
community." Even members of Earth First Siskiyou, a source
of unending grief for the Forest Service were considered by
McCormick, at least, as legitimate constituents of his agency. 123
While Siskiyou environmentalists do not deny that the
Forest Service has recogized them and granted them access,
many have characterized their interaction with the agency as
strained and, as one activist put it, "adversarial." One
common complaint of the environmentalists has been a lack of
informal access, something which all Siskiyou personnel interviewed claimed they granted to all clients. More than
anything else, this discrepancy seems to be a case of differing interpretations of what constitutes informality. To
the Forest Service, informal access is any contact outside
of the formal participation process (meetings, workshops,
field trips, etc.). Environmentalists, on the other hand,
tend to perceive of informal access as their being closely
confided in rather than merely heard or sounded out. While
the door to the supervisor's office was, for the most part,
literally and figuratively open to environmentalists, the

1

n To their credit, even the most radical environmental
groups, such as Earth First, did their homework regarding
forest policy; a fact that the Siskiyou National Forest
could not help but respect. This knowledgability and articulateness, despite all their militance and drama, won certain
members of radical groups a place at the table.
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timber interests did seem privileged to more informal access, even using the Forest Service's broader definition of
such access. The majority of impromptu phone calls, office
visits, and social meetings (such as SOTIA's weekly breakfasts or dinners to which the supervisor was routinely invited) tended to be between Forest Service personnel and the
timber interests. 124

"We get to see all fifty-two cards,"

claimed one timber official who reported a great deal of informal contact with the Siskiyou, especially at the lower
ranger district level.
While their access to the policymaking process increased dramatically after McCormick's arrival in 1983, environmentalists feel that McCormick's replacement has been
somewhat less open to them. Not surprisingly, timber officials report a much improved relationship with the supervisor's office since McCormick's departure in 1990. According
to the former supervisor, timber interests were suspicious
of him from the start due to his background in recreational
management rather than forestry. McCormick claims that he
arrived at the Siskiyou "with a cloud over me. I wasn't a
traditional timber-oriented forest supervisor."
Timber's coolness towards McCormick did not necessarily translate into close relations between the supervisor and

1

~ This seems to confirm Henning and Mangun's observation

that environmentalists concerned with noneconomic land uses
tend to have more fleeting contact with field personnel than
do commodity interests. Henning and Mangun, 57.
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environmentalists. Although his office was open and he professed to have a good working relationship with both national and local environmental groups, McCormick expressed his
exasperation at what he perceived as environmentalist intransigence:
In some ways, environmental folks were getting more
militant in spite of as much as I had invited them to
the decisionmaking table .... I was getting frustrated
.... it could never be good enough .... No matter what I
cid or we did together, it was never enough .... it was
always more they wanted.
Under the new supervisor, though, this relationship
has strained further. The supervisor himself characterizes
it as "frank and candid." While there is no turning back on
the environmentalists' hard-won access, they have now come
to look back on McCormick's tenure far more fondly. Whether
the new supervisor's more distant style has been a function
of personal style, deep-seated conviction, or orders from
above remains to be seen.
Formal Participation: Opportunity and Conduct
As mentioned before, a pluralist agency would be expected to offer sufficient opportunities, conducted in a
fair and balance manner, for all interests to participate.
While it can be said that the Siskiyou National Forest recognized environmentalists as legitimate interests, the
question remains as to precisely what opportunities for participation were extended to them and whether these satisfied
the criteria for pluralist administration.
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The opportunities for formal participation required on
the Siskiyou, as with all national forests, are spelled out
in a variety of statutes including NEPA, NFMA, RPA, and
FLPMA as well as the Forest Service's own Manual. While
there are opportunities for participation on the Siskiyou
for a whole range of decisions down to the most local and
mundane, the most widespread and important of this participation corresponds with NEPA's EIS process. NEPA provides
for comment periods and public meetings to accompany various
stages of the process (see appendix F for a detailed description of these stages). Since this study concentrates on
a series of major policy decisions, most of which required
an EIS, the participation that is focused on here has
largely revolved around the EIS process.
The first step in any meaningful participation program
is for the administrating agency to provide information on
its plans and intentions as well as adequately announce in
advance opportunities for participation to all potentially
interested groups and individuals. Especially vigorous forms
of participation may require even more detailed information
on Forest Service activities.
For the most part, the Siskiyou National Forest has
strictly followed NEPA regulations and has been fairly scrupulous in announcing upcoming opportunities to participate,
notifying potential participants, and keeping the public informed of its general intentions. After issuing a notice of
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intent (usually in major local newspapers) regarding a timber sale, or a group of sales, or other such projects, the
Forest would rely on fairly extensive mailing and phone
lists of potentially interested groups and individuals in
order to solicit participants and identify key issues regarding the specific sale or project. Such issues are then
developed into the various alternatives to be considered in
the EIS. This initial process is known as scoping.
Specific public meetings and workshops were usually
advertised (often with full-page spreads) in a number of
daily newspapers and radio stations in the area. In addition, the Forest Service has sometimes even produced and
distributed their own brochures describing a proposed action
and (when the process has proceeded to that point) listing
and explaining the various alternatives to be considered.
One major opportunity for public participation on the
Siskiyou has been via the comment periods that follow the
release of the draft and final EISs. Much of this input
takes the form of comments sent through the mail to the Forest Service. As discussed in chapter two, the Siskiyou has
seen some of the highest rates of mail response in the entire national forest system. 125

1

Mail comments, therefore,

a The Silver Fire Project elicted 28,000 post-draft responses, while the Forest Plan got 16,983 (compared to two to
three thousand for an average plan). The Shasta Costa and
Canyon Projects, for their size, also prompted extremely
large amounts of mail; six hundred and eight hundred respectively. Much of this volume might be attributed to the high
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have clearly been the most widespread form of participation
in terms of total number of people involved. Letters have
ranged in length from the very brief and to the near-epic,
while their content has run the gamut from completely uninformed to extremely technical and/or articulate. Many other
letters were of a mass-produced, interest group-sponsored
"fill-in-the-blanks" variety (such as SORA's Silver Fire
salvage campaign).
The Forest Service's official line regarding mail is
that it is an integral part of its decisionmaking process
and that each letter is thoroughly reviewed and fully considered. 126 A number of participants, though, have their
doubts about the agency's sincerity as well as the ultimate
usefulness of what Culhane derisively terms "mailbagstuffing games. "127

The most generous assessment of mail

comment would be that it helps the agency take the public's
pulse and identify and define issues and areas of concern.
Even Siskiyou personnel, however, agree that it is not much
of a factor in shaping or changing actual decisions. Although the Forest did categorize and conduct content analyses of the mail it received, out-and-out "vote-counting,"
according to one official was never done. Participation,
r

levels of interest group organization in the Siskiyou as
well as its high national profile.
126
Culhane, "Public Participation .... ," 11.
127
Ibid. 12.
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claims the supervisor, is not a

"contest."1~

As a result of

this attitude, complains one timber interest participant,
the Forest Service is always free to implement whatever
course it chooses regardless of a clear trend in the public's response (which timber felt favored them): "If comments go their way, they claim support; if comments go
against them they claim they're not substantive."
Siskiyou personnel seem to agree with Culhane's 1991
study which finds meetings and workshops to be a far superior forum for participation than mail comments.129 Although
they involve far fewer individuals, such face-to-face meetings tend to bring together key local actors and facilitate
the sort of political interaction that is more influential
than merely mailing in one's opinion. Face-to-face interaction on the Siskiyou has largely taken the following
forms: (1) formal informational gatherings (public meetings,
field trips, or small group briefings) in which Forest Service officials give a presentation on their tentative plans
128 In terms of raw numbers, timber interests, with their
well-organized campaign of mail-in forms outnumbered environmental responses in the Silver Fire and the Forest Plan.
In Silver, for example, environmentalists sent only 38% of
the responses of timber. In some of the smaller projects,
however, environmental responses were in the majority. For
instance, support for the environmentally preferrable alternative in the Canyon DEIS outnumbered that for timber's
alternative 69% to 18%. Siskiyou National Forest. Also, according to the Forest Service's content analysis, longer and
more detailed letters tended to favor environmental positions. USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Content Analysis Report for Silver Fire Recovery Project DEIS,
internal document, (May 1988).
1
~ Culhane, "Public Participation .... ," 11-12.
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and proposals and then answer questions or (2) workshops
which have been designed as more open and informal "giveand-take" sessions between all parties. Such workshops have
most commonly been held in the planning periods preceeding
the draft

EIS.1~

Under McCormick, the Siskiyou began to rely upon workshops more heavily than formal public meetings, keeping the
latter jown to the minimum required by NEPA. Applying the
philosophy that it is "better to have [interests] on the
front end than the back end," McCormick contended that workshops were the best way to encourage issue resolution and
creative solutions and break out of the old patterns of
"business as usual." McCormick clearly expressed his faith
in the unabashedly pluralist notion that "creative solutions
can come out of mixed groups with different values .... just
sort of fightin' it out." He further reinforces this notion
of administrator as mediator when he explains that:
I just didn't have the idea were the balance was. I
wanted to put the responsibility there .... with those
~Whereas the vast majority of mail comment is sent to
the Forest in response to a DEIS or FEIS after it has been
released, interactive participation on the Siskiyou has
tended to occur before these decisions were made (in other
words, before and after the DEIS). According to many participants, the most meaningful negotiations took place before
the draft EIS. Post-DEIS participation, both mailed and interactive (usually formal meetings), has tended to focus
more upon the draft's alternatives (especially the Forest
Service's preferred alternative) and why a given alternative
is opposed or supported. Post-FEIS participation, meanwhile,
is usually by mail and most often is a last-ditch critique
or appeal to the administrators to reconsider their decision
before the Record of Decision is released.
1
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folks [the various interests)
with us where the appropriate
could on a local basis .... The
do that was to bring folks to

and help them decide
balance was as best we
only way I knew how to
the table.

This new emphasis on less formal, more interactive
workshops was first implemented in the Silver Fire Project.
It reached its peak, however, during planning for Shasta
Costa in which interests were intensely involved and kept
closely informed. Whether workshops are truly the wave of
the future on the Siskiyou is still not quite clear, though,
as a number of district-level projects since Shasta Costa
(including Canyon, Quosatana/Bradford, Two Forks, and West
Indigo) have backed away from workshop-style
participation. 1 ~

The reasons for the Forest Service's

retreat are not certain. Time constraints, these projects'
smaller-scale, changes in the supervisor's management style,
exter-nal pressure from upper levels of the agency or the
Depart-ment of Agriculture, and severe budget

problems 1 ~

have all been offered as possible explanations.
Some environmentalists take this as evidence that the
Siskiyou is still not truly committed to workshops or participatory decisionmaking in general. While they generally applaud the planning process for the Silver Fire and Shasta
Costa, environmentalists worry that the dearth of workshops
and emphasis on presentational public meetings in succeeding
131

The Canyon project did, however, permit a few environmentalists to sit in on a several project planning sessions
as observers.
1
~ Workshops are expensive and labor-intensive; the planning process for Shasta Costa alone cost nearly $1 million.
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projects may be the shape of things to come. One activist
complained that environmentalists even had to go to the extent of filing Freedom of Information Act requests for information on the recent Canyon decision. Environmentalists
allege that the Siskiyou has not always been forthcoming
with more detailed records and data that have been requested
at other times (especially concerning sensitive isues such
as refcrestation failure rates or sustained yield models).
According to one environmentalist, the Siskiyou would
like to have everyone believe that it is on the cutting edge
regarding workshop participation. Perhaps in the late 1980s
it was, but other forests have certainly surpassed it. The
activist, who once considered the Siskiyou as the vanguard,
has since been exposed to the participation processes on
other national forests (some of which regularly hold negotiating workshops all the way up to the release of the FEIS)
and now characterizes the Forest as "extremely behind the
times."
While these complaints and doubts cannot be brushed
aside, it is still probably fair to say that, overall, the
trend in the Siskiyou, at least for most of the time frame
of this study, has been towards the increased sharing of
information and opportunities to participate. "Generally
there's more [meetings] than you could keep up with," admitted one environmental activist. What is less clear is how
meaningful these meetings and workshops, however plentiful,
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have been. Timber industry participants, for example, tend
to be skeptical about the value of sitting everyone down at
the same table. One timber official acknowledged the necessity of speaking up and being counted, but doubted the probability of finding consensus in such a polarized environment:
They get you together and we're supposed to all hold
hands and go home happy .... it doesn't work that way.
If we move off our polarized position and they move
off theirs, then they've given up ground or we've
given up ground. That's what it amounts to. So you
can't--you have to go in there and say "we want max
timber" and they go in and say "we want max environmental protection" and try to let the Forest Service
sort it out ....
The Forest Service, according to the timber official,
is thus plagued with indecision; by trying to "make everyone
happy" and not "raise a red flag" to anyone, it remains paralyzed. Another timber official, meanwhile, had a different
complaint in that he found workshops to be just a big sales
pitch: "It reminds me of going to an Amway meeting .... They
just try to sell you on how wonderful it is."
Not surprisingly, the former supervisor reports that,
at least initially, he met quite a bit of resistance from
timber interests, especially the head of SORA at the time,
who "just didn't like to sit around a table and work things
out with [Earth First members]." The workshops, says McCormick, "caused some people some heartburn."
Although McCormick reports that the environmentalists
have generally been far more willing and eager to sit down
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with the enemy and

negotiate, 1 ~

they too have had serious

misgivings about the workshop process. Environmentalists in
the Siskiyou have tended to have a fairly low sense of eff icacy regarding their participation. They seem to perceive of
workshops and even the whole EIS process as a combination of
public relations and a minor regulatory obligation that the
agency must attend to before doing what it plans to do anyway. As a result, they come to see themselves on a workshop
panel as "sacrificial lambs ... 134
Siskiyou environmentalists, therefore, tend to believe
that the EIS process has forced the Forest Service to make
only procedural rather than substantive changes in its policy. One activist argued that "planners must collect environmental information before they can legally off er timber
sales, but if they acted on the information they collect
they would often have to abandon the

sales."1~

Similarly,

another environmentalist complained that regarding NEPA, the
Siskiyou was "following the letter of the law, but not necessarily the intent of the law."
A Siskiyou official, however, disputes this, arguing
that NEPA requires policymakers merely to look at all angles. It does not, he offers candidly, legally require the

1

~ One district ranger, however, has noticed that the environmentalist's interest in coming to the bargaining table
has waned somewhat since their hand has been strengthened by
successful lawsuits.
134 Britell, 18.
135 Ibid. 18-19.
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agency to be more democratic or even make better decisions .1~ Not all Siskiyou officials see the purpose of participation to be the achievement of consensus as the former
supervisor had. Instead, the current supervisor describes a
successful program of participation as that which minimizes
objections rather than maximizes support. The supervisor's
rationale is that the high level of political conflict in
the Siskiyou makes consensus impossible.
Ironically, the supervisor's perception of the goal of
workshops and participation as the minimization of objection
is not all that far removed from the environmentalists'
claim that workshops are designed to manage dissent. According to a veteran participant of Siskiyou workshops, the main
use of such public forums is for the Siskiyou's planners to
promote the appearance of approval as they scramble to meet
unsustainable quotas on a rapidly depleting forest base.137
Because they are "planning timber sales that are worse and
worse"138

in roadless areas, steep inclines, owl habitat,

and similarly controversial areas, it is argued that they
desperately need environmentalist acquiesence to avoid
lengthy appeals and lawsuits. Using the workshop process and
136 A number of court rulings on NEPA suggest that at
least in terms of judicial interpretation thus far, the Forest Service official is right. What Congress truly intended
this somewhat ambiguous mandate to be is another question.
It does seem to defeat the law's purpose to just identify
harmful impacts and then carry them out anyway. See Rosenbaumf "The End of Illusion .... ," 261-268.
13 Britell, 17-18.
138 Ibid. 1 7.
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highly skilled facilitators, the Siskiyou, more than ever
before, has sought to tame the environmentalist threat by
letting them in on the process, and, as any normal bureaucratic agency would would be expected to do, co-opt the
client. Says the activist:
Agencies are willing to give activists an endless supply of elk viewing areas, maps, rides in helicopters,
new trails and schmoozing. Anything and everything except trees. 139
Unfortunately for the Forest Service, though, it is
this last item that the environmentalists want most. As
pointed out earlier, Klay and McElveen identify zero-sum
interests as the hardest of all to co-opt, hence the conf lict and sense of inefficacy and dissatisfaction on the
part of the environmentalists.
How Influential Was Participation?
The ultimate question regarding participation, then,
is: did it really matter? Was public input truly incorporated into the agency's decisionmaking process and did this
input really have the power to influence or change the agency's decisions? As might be expected, the Siskiyou's administrators were confident that participation on their forest
really did matter and accounted for "a lot of decisionmaking."

They characterized it as "very important," and having

a "major influence."

139

Ibid. 20.

334

Interest group participants, however, have tended to
be far less convinced of their influence and efficacy as we
have previously seen. Both timber interests and environmentalists have generally felt that participation has been effective only when it concerns minor issues. "The big picture
issues," complains one timber official, "don't change at
all." Only in rare cases when the stakes are low enough, reports one environmentalist, has she seen workshop participation have a direct effect in swaying or altering a decision.
Otherwise, she claims, the Siskiyou just goes through "lockstep NEPA." According to another activist, it is usually a
matter of "justifying a decision already made."
Some of the interest group participants' characterizations, though, were a bit more charitable. One activist, for
instance, conceded that the Siskiyou's administrators "do
change some of their decisions if we put enough pressure on
them," but, she was careful to add, "I don't feel that they
significantly change them." Another interviewee admitted
that participation was at least partially effective at encouraging New Forestry techniques. According to one environmentalist, the Siskiyou's administrators do occasionally "do
some things in response to the public." To timber, meanwhile, the importance of just getting in there around the
table to off set the demands of the environmentalists was
justification enough to participate.
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Still, real change, environmentalists argue, has come
thus far only from lawsuits. Because of this fear of lawsuits, environmentalists maintain that the Siskiyou tends to
use the participatory process "to write litigation-proof
documents" by using environmentalist objections to point out
to the agency their own legal weak spots. While the activist
meant this as a criticism, others might construe some positive effects in such influence if, in fact, it leads to less
violations of environmental laws.
Actually measuring the influence of participation upon
policymaking in a systematic way is an incredibly difficult
task. One problem is there is a certain amount of subjectivity inherent in any such analysis. While a well-designed analysis will eliminate some of this, in the end, the nature,
motives, and intent of Forest Service actions as well as
where these decisions fall on a political spectrum are still
largely subjective matters. For example, Culhane, who sees
the Sierra Club as "radical" and

"extremist" 1 ~

could be

criticized by some as seeing even the slightest policy crumb
thrown to environmentalists (an elk viewing area, perhaps?)
as sufficient evidence of Forest Service balance and responsiveness to input. Another analyst with a different set
of expectations as to what constitutes fair and balanced, on
the other hand, might abide by far more rigorous criteria
for evidence of responsiveness.
1

~

Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 154, 167.
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Is it, for instance, the sign of a balanced compromise
or just "policy crumbs" to plan to log only 65% of old
growth instead of 75% or enter roadless areas from the edges
rather than through the center? How can one precisely identify so relative a concept as compromise when dealing with
so non-quantifiable a concept as ecological values and demands? Likewise, what precisely distinguishes a meaningful
response from a f radulent or symbolic one? Which was Shasta
Costa? A strong case could certainly be made for either
characterization.
Another problem in trying to determine the true influence of participation is the unavoidable subtlety and
multi-dimensionality of the relationship between participation and Forest Service behavior. While it would certainly
be analytically more tidy if the former led directly to the
latter, reality is a much messier situation as a multitude
of other variables make the politics of the Siskiyou far
more complex. What portion of a policy decision, for example, could be accounted for by agency goals and values, personal values, external political pressures, internal budgetary constraints, or legislative directives?
Proving the influence of participation becomes even
more difficult when there are two interests of roughly equal
power pulling in different directions. The thesis of Culhane's study is that a local manager's policy outputs will
roughly reflect the makeup of his or her constituency; if
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the environmentalists are better organized in one area, then
policies could be expected to be more favorable to them than
in an area where mining or timber interests hold an edge.141
As clearly shown in chapter four, competing interests in the
Siskiyou were in a rough balance of power. Should we then
expect a corresponding middle-of-the-road balance of Forest
Service outputs or does this, as Culhane admits happens
someti~es,

lead to both interests cancelling each other out

so that the agency "could effectively ignore public
participation input" and act

autonomously?1~

Despite all the difficulties, limitations, and imprecisions inherent in such an analysis, it is still clearly
worth trying to systematically determine as well as possible
to what extent participation on the Siskiyou has had a real
influence. This shall be attempted by examining all of the
post-1983 policy initiatives on the Siskiyou which required
environmental impact statements and the formal participation
process that accompanies it up until the end of 1992. Of
these, four were final

EISs 1 ~

, while three other projects

had reached only the draft EIS stage by the end of this

1
1

1

~ Ibid.
~ Ibid.
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240.

~ Technically, the FEIS merely states the final preferred alternative for policy action. The true final decision after which policy can actually be implemented is the
Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD, though, almost always
formally chooses and authorizes the FEIS-preferred alternative. As of the end of 1992, only the Silver Fire project
and the Forest Plan had had formal RODs issued.
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study's time

frame. 1 ~

In addition to these EIS decisions,

one non-EIS policy output is considered here as well. This
decision, involving roadbuilding and timber sales in the
North Kalmiopsis was made prior to the point in late 1980s
when roadless entry automatically required an EIS. In all,
these eight policy initiatives account for the overwhelming
portion of political conflict and interest group activity on
the Siskiyou from 1983-1992.
As we have seen in this chapter and the last, interest
group participation in the Siskiyou has involved in roughly
equal proportions both timber interests and environmentalists. However, one also needs to consider the historic dominance of timber interests in the Siskiyou's participatory
process all the way up until the point when environmentalists began to seriously organize and challenge the Forest
Service in the early to mid-1980s. If one assumes that participation really matters, then it could be said that prior
to 1983, the Siskiyou's administrators were being influenced
by the participation, largely

informal, 1 ~

of predominantly

one interest--the local timber industry. Presuming then that
1

~ While the final decision is sometimes quite a bit different from the draft, the preferred alternative identified
in the draft usually serves as a starting point from which
Forest Service decisionmakers can then modify or fine-tune
their final decision. As such, the draft stage policy decisions represented by these three cases, though they may
eventually be altered, still provide a fairly useful indicator of the substance and direction of Siskiyou policymaking.
1
~ It was not until the EIS process was establish~d by
NEPA that there was much of a formal participation process,
besides the written appeals of timber sales.
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timber voices were essentially the only ones being heard by
the Forest Service before 1983, any increase after that
point in bipartisan participation might be expected to lead
to more ecologically sound outputs than had been generated
before, even if that participation also included a fairly
equal presence of timber interests.
The assumption that this study works from, then, is
that timber's participation has in one form or another been
there all along and thus it tends to merely reinforce pressure that is already there. Environmental participation, on
the other hand, presents a whole new set of demands that
have never before been confronted or addressed. Thus, if
participation is truly influential on the Siskiyou, we could
expect increased formal participation in general to lead to
more environmental outputs. Less formal participation, on
the other hand should lead to an increased reliance upon the
agency's own timber production goals and the informal contacts and previous patterns of influence that have historically favored timber interests.
Among the eight Siskiyou policy decisions this study
compares, distinctions can be made as to the degree of formal participation (high, medium, or low) which occurred prior to the decision as well as the decision's relative position on a timber-environmental continuum in which 0 = the
timber position and 1.0 = the environmental position. A decision's overall value on the scale is determined by where
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it fell relative to the timber industry's and the environmentalist's preferred alternatives in regards to four variables: timber harvest volume, road construction, roadless
areas, and old

growth. 1 ~

If increased participation truly

helped environmentalists' to better achieve their goals,
then index values should be higher in those decisions featuring increased participation and lower in decisions made
with lowers levels of participation (for details regarding
how categories were determined and what the participant's
pre-draft positions and concerns were, see appendices G and
H).
Table 17 shows that there seems to be at least some
correlation between the level of formal participation and
how strictly timber-oriented a decision was. For example,
the two most clearly timber-oriented decisions, the Two
Forks draft and the North Kalmiopsis timber sales of 19821987 both featured the least formal participation. The North
Kalmiopsis sales, for which EISs were not prepared, featured
no real formal participation at all, while the Two Forks
project held no public meetings in the crucial period before
the draft when issues are identified and alternatives drawn
1

~ The position of the North Kalmiopsis decision, because
no EIS was prepared for it, does not have an exact value on
this scale, so its position is less quantitatively precise.
I have placed it where I have on the low end towards timber
due to its aggressive harvest targets (employing standard
clearcut methods), high road mileage, including the extremely controversial Bald Mountain road, and entry into a fragile roadless area with the largest stands of old growth in
the Forest.
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TABLE 17
SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST POLICY OUTPUTS 1983-1992:
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION BY TIMBER-ENVIRONMENTAL INDEX VALUE1
Timber

Environmental

I

o

I

I

2

Formal
Participation

High

FPD

/*-FPF

*-SCF
**-SFD
SFF/

*-SCD

CF-*

*-CD
**-WID
QD/

Moderate

Low

*-TFD
*-NK

CD = Canyon project DEIS (T-E index value=.49)
CF= Canyon project FEIS (.42)
FPO= Forest Plan DEIS (.17)
FPF =Forest Plan FEIS (.20)
NK = North Kalmiopsis timber sales2
QD = Quosatana/Bradford project DEIS (.48)
SCD =Shasta Costa project DEIS (.62)
SCF =Shasta Costa project FEIS (.41)
SFD =Silver Fire Recovery Project DEIS (.43)
SFF =Silver Fire Recovery Project FEIS (.41)
TFD =Two Forks timber sales DEIS (.08)
WID =West Indigo project DEIS (.50)

1 In the timber-environmental index, O =the timber position and 1.0 = the environmental position. For details as to
how this index was calculated as well as how levels of participation were determined see appendix G.
2 The North Kalmiopsis timber sales do not have a specific
index value. See page 340, footnote 146.
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up. The only meeting held for Two Forks was to announce and
explain the DEIS after it was produced. As for outcomes, the
preliminary Two Forks decision features a substantial timber
harvest that consumes old growth and roadless areas to a degree higher than even the maximum harvest alternative. The
agency's preferred alternative will have, in their own
words, a "moderate to high impact" on interior forestdependent species. 1U

The North Kalmiopsis sales were also

extremely timber production-oriented; they opened up parts
of the largest roadless area outside the wilderness to
clearcut sales and mandated the construction of the very
controversial eighteen mile Bald Mountain Road to sever the
North Kalmiopsis from the Kalmiopsis Wilderness.
Those decisions featuring moderate levels of formal
participation (mail comment and pre-draft public meetings,
but no workshops) scored higher on the timber-environmental
scale. Though still quite timber production-oriented, they
made some environmental modifications and concessions. Like
the previous decisions, these too entered roadless and old
growth areas, but most of these decisions were somewhat
scaled down from the timber volume and road construction
targets found in the Forest Plan or the projects' original

1

u USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Two Forks .Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Siskiyou National Forest, 1992), sec. II, 17.
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proposed action. 148

They also tended, to one extent or

another, to incorporate more environmentally sound logging
practices regarding both silvicultural techniques, stream
protection, and the minimization of fragmentation.
Those decisions in which there was heavy formal participation (mail comment, pre-draft public meetings, and workshops) tended to cluster around the same position on the

scale as the moderate participation decisions. The Shasta
Costa FEIS and Silver Fire decisions featured considerable
logging but also at least some features for environmental
protection. Only the Shasta Costa draft clearly conformed to
the expectations of high participation/high environmental
protection. The draft of this project, which featured perhaps the most intense participation of any decision on the
Siskiyou went pretty far not only in instituting fairly farreaching changes in forestry practices, but also in reducing
timber harvests, roads, and intrusions into old growth and
roadless areas from the levels suggested in the Plan and the
proposed action.10
148

The proposed action (PA) is the original tentative
proposal to commence activities in a given area according to
the Forest Plan. It serves as a starting point from which
the scoping process takes place and alternatives to this
action are drawn up. On rare occasions, the draft EIS will
stick to the PA as its preferred alternative.
16
The reason the draft and final EISs are considered
separately in this analysis is because FEISs are usually
subject to more outside political pressures. For example the
Forest Plan and Shasta Costa drafts were released af~er some
fairly heavy public participation only to be altered in the
final stage by external political pressures coming from Congress, the state, or the upper levels of the agency. Consi-
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In sharp contrast to the Shasta Costa draft was the
Forest Plan decision which, although it included some fairly
heavy levels of participation, was strongly timber-oriented.
The fact that only the Shasta Costa draft among the high
participation decisions also had a high environmental score
may suggest that some sort of threshold exists whereby participation beyond a certain level often hits the brick wall
of

othe~

decisionmaking factors such as agency goals, exter-

nal political pressures, and so on. Still, the Siskiyou's
policy decisions do show at least some support for the notion of low participation leading to more pro-timber outcomes and vice versa. Overall, then, the layout of points in
table 17 is configured in such a way as to suggest that participation is necessary to achieve greater balance in Forest
Service decisionmaking, but not sufficient by itself to do
so.
If participation on the Siskiyou truly mattered and
the Forest Service did indeed meet the pluralist ideal of
responsiveness, we could theoretically expect one of two
things to occur in this polarized political realm: (1) the
agency's decisions would consistently feature a blend of
ecological and timber-oriented provisions or (2) looking
back over time, some policy outputs would be primarily
timber-oriented while others would be predominantly disposed
dering the draft separately can thus provide an additional,
perhaps even more authentic measure of the impact of participation.
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towards ecological principles. In either scenario a certain
overall balance between commodity production and preservation could be expected.
Judging from the actual policy decisions issued in the
Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992, it seems that the second scenario could safely be ruled out. All major policy outputs
during that time involved substantial commodity production
activities; no decision rejected in any significant way the
opportunity for timber production in favor of wildlife or
ecosystem preservation. Perhaps this should be no great surprise; after all, the agency's self-proclaimed business is
to produce timber (more on values later) and most of these
decisions revolved around mandatory EISs required to commence logging activities in environmentally sensitive areas.
If the agency did not occasionally support the ecologists' position wholeheartedly in the various major decisions, then the question must shift to whether ecological
values were at least partially incorporated somehow into the
agency's decisions. This is a much harder and more subjective judgement to make. To the fairly neutral observer, however, the answer would have to be yes, but not to a very
great extent. And certainly not anywhere near to the extent
that commodity production goals are currently stressed. Environmental participation has, nevertheless, had at least
some impact. Most timber projects on the Forest today employ
some sort of New Forestry techniques and the agency is far
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less likely to engage in the full-blown, at-all-costs clearcutting of the 1960s, 70s, and early to mid-'80s. The Forest
Service has been forced to at least slow down and consider
stream quality, wildlife, roadless areas, and old growth,
all of which were of no real concern to the forester of
thirty or forty years ago. To be sure, the agency is still
as eager as ever to cut timber, but environmentalist participation has, in the very least, forced them to seriously
confront these issues.
The effect of participation found in this study, then,
is not unlike that found by Mohai in his study: participation can have some real influence even if that influence is
realized in ways that are not always equitable, balanced, or
what the participants really wanted. The mere fact that environmentalists still insist on participating despite that
act's alleged uselessness shows that they are probably underestimating, to some extent, their effect. All things being equal, most interests, timber or environmental, tend to
feel inefficacious anyway, and given the Forest Service's
performance in the last forty years, environmentalists might
especially be excused for this perception. Participation's
effects, though, can be quite subtle. While Siskiyou officials are not about to recommend wilderness area additions
or a significant long-term reduction in harvest rates, they
do now behave differently than when did before environmentalists took up the cause.
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While much of what the critics of participation say
rings true to some degree, to say participation is completely useless and a total fraud is simply inaccurate. The effect of participation could be summed up, then, as limited,
but real. There is no direct line between the articulation
of interest group or public demands in the participation
process and the Forest Service's response. In the Siskiyou,
participation matters more as a way to construct very broad
boundaries for actions to occur within, rather than as a
direct and absolute influence. It is probably true, as critics claim, that much participation is used to formally satisfy EIS requirements and justify pre-determined decisions.
But how those broad decisions which perhaps cannot be
changed are actually designed and executed is where participatory input can be influential.
For environmentalists, then, the most useful part of
participation is to try to offset timber's influence and
constantly remind the agency of its obligations to protect
non-commodity forest values, not to convince the Forest Service to actually implement their policy desires. While such
a modest payoff does little to boost a group's sense of efficacy and faith in the process, it still minimally satisfies pluralist requirements. Thus, the administrators of the
Siskiyou are not the ideally responsive servants that some
pluralists might claim nor are they the cynical and closedoff manipulators of participation that some critics suggest.
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The Role of Values in the Siskiyou
The role of values in the decisionmaking process must
also be considered if one is to test the various models of
Forest Service administration we have identified. A pluralistic Forest Service, it should be remembered, would be expected to maintain a fairly open, diverse and nondeterministic value-set rooted in multiple use principles.
In trying to pinpoint the exact amount of influence that
agency values command, however, one runs into the same difficulty that arises when trying to gauge the influence of
participation--it is impossible to completely isolate and
measure in any precise, quantifiable way. Still, the evidence from this case can tell us a lot about values; what
they are and how important a part they play.
If the organizational values model of Twight and
others is to be found valid in this case, one would expect
to find evidence that local officials strongly hold a certain set of values and that these have the potential to
overrule alternative sources of influence such as public
participation or interest group lobbying. As was discussed
earlier in this chapter, these allegedly rigid organizational values of the Forest Service would include a strong utilitarianism which stresses commodity production above all
other forest values, a strong faith in supposedly rational
and highly technical methods of forest management, and an
overall belief in planned forestry to achieve social ends.
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Pluralist conceptions of the Forest Service, on the
other hand, see managers as holding far more diverse and
open-ended sets of values. If these sets of values share
anything in common in the pluralist view, it is a strong
commitment to the principles of multiple use (which is, in
many ways, the forest management analogy to pluralist
thought itself). Unlike Twight's strictly utilitarian timber
production orientation, which would tend to pre-determine
policy decisions, multiple use values can essentially be
reconciled to just about any type of policy output. Another
type of overarching value that one would expect to find in a
pluralistic Forest Service is an understanding of and dedication to its role as public servant and facilitator of publie participation as opposed to the scientific-elitist characterization advanced by organizational values theorists.
The data from the Siskiyou

case 1 ~

finds fairly wide-

spread evidence that both types of value-sets occur amongst
Siskiyou officials. As far as utilitiarian values are concerned, these managers seemed very comfortable speaking in
terms of "outputs and services" "commodity production,"
"ASQs," "MMBF"--all the language of timber production. In
fact, the current supervisor was quite blunt as to what he
saw the Forest Service's job to be: " .... our objective,

~ This data was gathered mostly from in-depth interviews
with various Siskiyou National Forest administrators and, to
a lesser extent, various written decisions and opinions of
the Forest Service.
1
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we're very clear, we're going to harvest timber from the
national forest--that's what it's all about." He minced no
words in expressing that the agency's primary objective is
to "produce things and opportunities." Although he claims it
has since changed, the former supervisor admits that the
pre-1983 Siskiyou National Forest was "just a commodity production forest" which operated under a fairly narrow set of
values and objectives; a characterization that closely corresponds to pre-1983 management priorities and policy outputs.
This commodity production orientation was often accompanied by a great deal of confidence in technical solutions.
A Siskiyou National Forest press release eagerly reflects
this technological faith as it optimistically assures that
"with fertilization and other intensive timber management
techniques, we can sell an average of 160 million board feet
annually, forever." 151 Another sign of this highly technical
orientation was the scientific jargon such as "resource enhancement mitigation," "integrated resource analysis," "partial retention viewsheds," or "culmination of mean annual
increments" that the agency commonly employed.
Siskiyou administrators also paid heed to the traditional concept of using forestry to promote other social and
economic ends. The agency's obligation to both local econo-

151

Siskiyou National Forest press release (10 March
1989).
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mies and the nation's timber supply were constant themes
sounded by most agency interviewees. "While recognizing and
protecting the special places on the Forest," claims a Siskiyou press release, "we need also recognize the Nation's
timber needs and the role timber plays in community
stability. "152
Although they mostly spoke glowingly of the role of
public participation, Siskiyou personnel occasionally displayed the irritation with outside interference and siege
mentality that Twight claims is a result of their value bias
and self-imposed isolation. One district ranger, for example, spoke testily of "a movement out there to try to have
the Forest Service grind to a halt and any way is OK."
Others echoed his beleagured attitude complaining of activists who wanted to shut them down and did not know when to
stop pushing. One official, meanwhile, supported the Forest
Service's very controversial proposal to ban administrative
timber sale appeals (several other interviewees, however,
opposed this move) on the grounds that they were a "bureaucratic nightmare to deal with."
The interviews seemed to confirm the great tension and
uneasiness between the Forest Service roles of expert and
servant. An example of this ambivalence could be seen regarding the subject of judicial review. Some personnel welcomed it as a legitimate form of citizen participation,
152

Ibid.
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while others saw litigation strictly as a burdensome nuisance. While many personnel spoke as if they truly valued
and respected public input, sometimes a certain elitist condescension would surface as when a district ranger explained
that part of their job was to "help" congressmen who sometimes "get confused over their role .... with better understanding." Statements such as this might be interpreted as a
reflection of Twight's allegation that when confronted with
challenges, the agency will circle its wagons and reaffirm
its values rather than adapt or negotiate.
Siskiyou officials often conformed to Twight's model,
but at other times though, they seemed authentically committed to multiple use principles. While Twight argues that
the Forest Service abides by multiple use only in a reluctant and disingenuous way (under legal duress, so to speak),
pluralists claim that the agency, having operated so many
decades under this mandate, has truly internalized its values. The former supervisor, for example, seemed to invest
the concept with great importance, describing how he worked
"hard to place additional values on the (forest's] other
resources." These other values that a number of officials
professed to be crucial included fish and wildlife, recreation, and biological diversity, the last of which McCormick
argued was "so important that our decision .... was to make
sure it was fully recognized in any management decision we
took." Fish habitat, meanwhile, was asserted to be "co-

353

equal" to timber. In a similar vein, the current supervisor
spoke frequently of "balance" and described the Siskiyou as
a multiple use agency whose goal is to implement the Forest
Plan "in a sustainable way without affecting the diversity
and values we have here on this national forest." A number
of other personnel strongly reiterated this multiple use
ideal with its diverse goals and emphasis on balance.
As we have seen, Twight draws a sharp distinction between

utilitari~nism

and multiple use values and announces

them to be incompatible. 1 n

In reality, however, the latter

concept, as currently interpreted, is so vague and relative
that it can mean just about anything and still be abided by
in seemingly good faith. True multiple use to an environmentalist might mean setting aside 500,000 acres of a million
acre forest for old growth, spotted owls, and recreation,
while a Forest Service official might believe with equal
sincerity that the creation of a 5,000 acre botanical reserve or a narrow visual impact corridor along a highway
truly constitutes multiple use. With so diffuse and amorphous a concept, it may well be very possible, therefore,
that a strong utilitarian bent and some sort of sincere
commitment to multiple use principles can co-exist simultaneously within both the agency as a whole and its individual personnel. Unless multiple use is defined in a very
specific or formulaic sense (which it usually is not), the
153

Twight, 111.
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two values may not, therefore, be as mutually exclusive as
Twight presumes.
In their article detailing how the Forest Service has
changed, McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis describe the agency
circa 1960 as a "multiple use agency with a strong emphasis
on timber production ... 154 At least in terms of values, this
study would argue that that basic description still holds;
the agency's value set seems to be a fusion of Twight's
utilitarianism and Culhane's pluralistic/ multiple use orientation. We can, therefore, characterize the value system
of the Siskiyou National Forest as being one dedicated to
multiple use principles within the larger context of a traditional commodity production-oriented utilitarianism and
technical rationalism. This larger context, of course, defines and limits the scope of multiple use decisionmaking
possibilities. A similar dedication to multiple use principles but within the larger context of an ecological rather
than timber orientation, for instance, might entail an entirely different range of values, priorities, and policy
preferences.
The identification of a particular value orientation
on the Siskiyou still leaves unanswered one critical question: was the value bias, in this case towards timber production, strong enough to determine policy outputs? To have
a set of values is one thing, to allow those values to be
1

~

McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 1.
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the chief determinant of one's decisionmaking is quite
another. While the discussion of this question must remain
largely speculative, it seems nearly inconceivable that Forest Service values did not play at least some role in determining policy outcomes. Given the long history and deep hold
utilitarian values have been shown to have, and the psychology of organizational values in general, 155

the ideal of a

Forest Service official as a neutral "empty vessel" (within
the bounds of discretion) waiting to be filled with the public's desires seems rather

dubious.1~

The most likely scenario in this case is that values
played a very prominent, though not entirely absolute role
in decisionmaking. The role values probably served was to
set broad-scale priorities as well as limit, to some extent,
the scope of policy consideration (in a way similar to what
Bachrach and Baratz would suggest; see chapter four). Within
that scope, however, a number of other factors, such as bureaucratic structure, participation, and external political
forces, were probably also quite influential. This chapter,
then, can offer only partial support for Twight; the agency
does have a distinct and noticeable and probably very inf luential utilitarian values bias (though one tempered somewhat
by a simultaneous commitment to multiple use). Whether this
155 See Twight's discussion of values, 16-17, 137-139.
1
~ To be fair, however, one should note that the pluralist model does not strip the land manager of his or, her values. Indeed, what the pluralists call "professional values"
play a large role in this model.
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bias controls every aspect of the agency's decisionmaking as
Twight implies, however, is far less likely. Even the partial, limited influence of participation this study has
found would seem to dispute this notion of the complete omnipotence of organizational values. While values are crucial
to understanding policymaking in the Siskiyou, it should be
clear that Siskiyou personnel are not values-driven robots
impervious to all forces save their own values.
Is the Siskiyou National Forest Changing?
Any discussion of Forest Service values is destined to
raise the issue of whether or not those values can change.
The centerpiece of the pluralist model is a characterization
of the agency as dynamic, flexible, and responsive to
changes in the political environment. Thus, the question to
consider is whether the values, priorities, and actions of
the Siskiyou National Forest have indeed shown signs of
changing during the time frame of this study. While pluralists would assume that it has, Twight would probably predict
that the agency has responded to opportunities for change
with only symbolic, non-substantive words and measures,
clinging all the time to its unshakeable core beliefs.
Regardless of their value orientation, Siskiyou officials seemed to share a consensus regarding change on three
points: (1) things have been changing on the Forest in very
substantial ways, (2) this particular period in time marked
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a watershed of sorts in the entire agency's evolution, and
(3) the Siskiyou was in the vanguard of this larger trend.
Those agency personnel interviewed all claimed to welcome
such changes and expressed confidence that the agency would
be better for it. "This is a real good time to change the
way the Forest Service does things" the supervisor told a
newspaper upon entering his job in 1990. The former supervisor also heavily stressed the theme of change recalling
his tenure as a sharp departure from business as usual. By
opening doors to the previously shut-out environmental community, he told of how he incurred the wrath of formerly
contented timber interests: "I had an industry person tell
me that 'we used to have supervisors who were supporters of
industry; we're not so sure you are.'"
McCormick, a recreation specialist who came from California's Inyo National Forest, in and of himself represented
what many observers have noticed as a changing trend--the
increased prominence of non-foresters in the agency:
The timber industry folks, I felt, were always a little suspicious of me, I attributed that to the fact
that I had a strong recreational management background.
Another interviewee, a female district ranger who was
a wildlife biologist and of Asian descent perfectly embodied
the agency's move away from the traditional white male foresters' club. Given time, argue many students of the Forest
Service, this trend in staffing alone would be enough to
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shift priorities and infuse new values. Even one fairly uncompromising environmentalist admitted that within the ranks
of the archfoe Forest Service were "some of the only allies
we have." There was, for instance, one Siskiyou employee in
particular, a soil scientist, who was quite sympathetic to
the environmentalists' concerns and could be counted on to
plead their case within the

agency.1~

Perhaps the truest test of change is accomplished by
examining manifestations of change that are more concrete
than a policymaker's opinions on the subject. The changing
agency demographics just discussed is one such measure, but
perhaps the most concrete evidence might be gained by reviewing actual trends in policy outcomes. Was the Siskiyou
National Forest churning out qualitatively different policies in 1992 than it did in 1983?
The evidence is certainly mixed, but the overall conclusion would have to be that there has been at least some
change in the overall direction and tenor of Siskiyou policy. In those nine years, for example, traditional clearcutting has gone from a much-heralded and ubiquitously practiced silvicultural method to a biologically disruptive con-
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While the existence of such individuals represents to
many clear evidence of a new pluralism in the agency, others
might argue that the Forest Service has long tolerated a few
ecologically impassioned dissenters within their ranks--Aldo
Leopold in the 1920s and Bob Marshall in the 1930s to name
but two--but has never allowed any of them to assume positions of real power or influence, a realm still dominated by
utilitarian foresters.
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fessed error of the past. Nearly all proposed timber sales
on the Siskiyou today employ some variation of New Forestry
techniques. 1 ~

In response to environmentalists' concerns,

timber sales are frequently adjusted to move further from
stream banks or to avoid certain crucial wildlife corridors.
Terms such as biodiversity, stream temperature, sedimentation delivery rates, riparian zones, or large woody debris,
if not truly taken to heart, have at least gone from being
alien and ignored concepts to powerful buzzwords the agency
cannot avoid confronting. Similarly, EISs and workshops now
grapple with issues of roadlessness and fragmentation once
rejected out of hand.
Perhaps the single biggest change on the Siskiyou,
though, has involved the Forest's participation style. The
decisions of the early 1980s and before were made pretty
much in administrative isolation with relatively little outside input or consultation. This constrasts sharply with the
aggressive scoping process, blizzards of brochures and newsletter updates, far more frequent public meetings, and most
notably, workshop opportunities of the later half of the decade.
A major problem with discussing the issue of change,
however, is that perceptions of change cannot help but be of
~ Critics, however, are quick to point
New Forestry is merely a modified form of
er than a wholly different approach, such
ting. To them, it represents "politically
ting as it were.
1

out that much of
clearcutting rathas selective cutcorrect" clearcut-
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a largely subjective nature. The line between a real change
and a symbolic distraction can be very difficult to distinguish. For example, the Siskiyou may now address issues of
biodiversity and roadlessness in its EISs, discuss it in its
workshops, and even minimize fragmentation in its New Forestry timber sales (cutting from the edges rather than the
center), but the current long-term plans still aim to eventually log and road all roadless areas outside designated
wilderness. Critics understandably perceive this more as a
clever campaign to placate foes and distract them from an
essentially unchanged mission of full-scale logging.
In the previous chapter we saw how competing interests
in the Siskiyou used various communicative strategies and
symbolic manipulations in an attempt to achieve their policy
aims. Others claim the government does this as well. 15 9
Edelman, in fact, goes as far as to suggest that this is the
state's chief role. 160

It is, therefore, certainly reason-

able to expect that the Forest Service, as an agency with
its own set of goals and interests, employs its own brand of
highly symbolic language and action as any interest would.
And much of this symbolic communication could be expected to
be employed to support positive perceptions of the agency
and what it is doing (such as wisely stewarding America's

159

See, for example Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy" American Political Science Review 60 (1966).
160 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana,
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
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forests into the future or, perhaps, being in the process of
revolutionary change).
One Siskiyou environmentalist who found the Forest to
have a strong "public relations

side," 1 ~

noted the agency's

proclivity to use such heavily coded messages. What she
calls the "language of dissociation," attempts to detach the
current debate from the unpleasant realities of

logging.1~

Hence, ancient trees are verbally converted to mmbf, fire
salvage clearcutting becomes "restoration," groves of old
growth are turned into numbered units, and landslides become
as the Chief of the Forest Service once called them, "mass
soil

movements."1~

Such language should hardly come as a

surprise; indeed it would be a bigger surprise if a larger
government agency did not communicate strategically. What is
important here is to determine if this predictable use of
strategic communication and symbolic action is sometimes
mistaken for authentically changing trends in agency attitudes and behavior.
No aspect of the Siskiyou's, or for that matter the
entire agency's, recent history embodies this analytical
dilemma better than the New Perspectives program. On one
161 This activist did, however, observe that lately the
Siskiyou seemed to be turning away somewhat from its concern
over public relations and seemed to be more forthright as to
its intentions to harvest timber.
1
~ Barbara Ullian, Siskiyou National Forest Roadless
Areas: The Dissociation of Words and the Paper Fores_t, Siskiyou Environmental Council press release (undated).
1
~ Then-Supervisor (of the Suislaw National Forest) F.
Dale Robertson quoted in Frome, 120.
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hand, this ambitious program, best typified by the Shasta
Costa project, is held up by the Forest Service as the centerpiece of the positive changes sweeping the agency. It is
a program described by the Siskiyou's supervisor as giving
"heartburn" to the forces of the status quo; a program that
has moved away from clearcuts as we know them, incorporated
a number of fundamental, heretofore alien, ecological principles into forest management, and instituted a far more
open partnership of agency official and concerned interests.
It is, on the other hand, also a program that exists
within a context of still unreduced long-term harvest targets for both the Shasta Costa basin and the forest in general as well as an unaltered commitment to eventually log
all unprotected old growth and penetrate all roadless areas
on the Forest. With such incompatible goals something eventually has to give, and as of now, these latter goals seem
to be the dominant ones on the Siskiyou. Even the Shasta
Costa project leader admits that the project ultimately does
little but buy three more years' time for the basin's old
growth: "As you go further out in time, you can't hang onto
goals like avoiding fragmentation.

11

164

As we have seen, determining what accounts for real
change is an extremely complex challenge in which the objective and subjective are difficult to separate. It is
164

Shasta Costa Team Leader Rod Stewart quoted in Seth
Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?" Sierra (March/April
1992), 67.
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tempting to claim that cases such as Shasta Costa are merely
public relations scams that give lie to the Siskiyou officials' claims that the winds of change are blowing. But one
can choose to focus instead on a number of real, and in some
cases undeniably significant changes that have occurred in
the past half-decade (including, perhaps, at least some elements of New Perspectives) in order to substantiate the
pluralist's vision of an agency in flux.
There is a third possibility which exists: both scenarios are, to some extent, accurate. The Siskiyou National
Forest and probably the Forest Service at large are in the
throes of authentic and maybe even far-reaching change
brought on by a number of forces inside and outside the
agency. The widespread internal dissatisfaction felt by line
officers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Mumma affair, and the formation of AFSEEE (see this chapter and
chapter three) all represent the beginnings of what very
well might be a profound shift in the agency. But the values
and imperatives that have previously defined and guided the
agency are, as Kaufman shows, exceedingly deep-rooted, and
as Twight suggests, difficult to move.
The result may be a body of actions, decisions, and
communications that in representing both realities, seems
increasingly chaotic, contradictory, or hypocritical. What
may seem like strictly a cynical ploy or distraction might
sometimes be at least partly the product of the internal
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clash of the forces of change and status quo (the latter of
which, though, certainly seems to be holding its own, if not
temporarily triumphing). 1M

Thus, Shasta Costa may not sim-

ply be a cruel hoax, but also a sincere attempt by certain
more ecologically-minded employees to introduce change into
a largely hostile environment. The project's overall failures may represent their incomplete success.
Once again, both Twight and the pluralists are proven
partially correct in the Siskiyou case; the agency can be
flexible and adaptive to changing realities, but only to a
point. While it is capable of change, this ability is, to
some extent, constrained by other powerful forces such as
traditional utilitarian values or, as O'Toole would argue,
structural budgetary realities, both of which dictate the
continued harvest of timber above all. The result seems to
be a state of tension wherein the inevitable, sociallyderived push towards reform is off set by tenacious attempts
to maintain the status quo. These attempts may include overt
and quite clear rejections of ecological initiatives or the
more subtle use of symbolism to affect an air of change when
little or none exists.

iM Such internal schisms would be unthinkable in Kaufman's Forest Service of the 1950s. It was precisely its discipline and rigid adherence to a single set of norms and
values which allowed the agency to be so decentralized, in
both its geography and power structure. Evidence of widespread internal dissatisfaction, especially in the lower
ranks, would imply the existence of new values and expectations in the agency.
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Conclusion

When confronting the question of why the Forest's administrators act as they do, one realizes that the evidence
from the Siskiyou case is by no means as clearcut as are the
various models we have used as a framework. One can, nevertheless, draw important conclusions from this analysis.
First of all, the evidence from this case offers very
little support for the assertion that during the period of
1983-1992, the Siskiyou National Forest was captured by timber interests. The capture of local land managers becomes a
possibility when the agency answers to a single dominant
client. In the Siskiyou, it is clear that this was not the
case. While local capture might technically have been feasible in previous decades in the Siskiyou before environmentalists became organized (especially prior to the 1970s),
the post-1983 political landscape was one which clearly saw
the Forest dealing with a multiple clientele which prominently included environmentalists. As such it could be said
that, in the course of making policy, the Siskiyou's administrators dealt with two advocacy coalitions of interests
and their assorted governmental and non-govermental allies.
It is important to note, however, that like Culhane's
Public Lands Politics, this study tests capture only at the

local level of Forest Service administration. One must keep
in mind the untested possibility of capture or a situation
akin to it occurring at the higher regional or national
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levels of the agency or even higher in the administration
(such as the Department of Agriculture or the executive office). Indeed, one district ranger Culhane interviewed reported that the forest products industry's influence was
most clearly felt higher on up the administrative ladder,166
a notion echoed by several interviewees, both timber and environmentalist, in this study. It is within the realm of
possibility, therefore, that an executive who is exceptionally hostile to environmental goals (Reagan perhaps?) could
appoint top administrators (Crowell?) who would essentially
provide high-level access to only one set of interests while
excluding all others.
Rosenbaum calls this top-down influence of a dominant
interest "backdoor

capture" 1 ~

and although it violates the

traditional local subgovernment capture theory (ala McConnell), it might be the more appropriate model of undue client influence in the post-Reagan

era. 1 ~

Indeed, the history

166 Culhane, Public Land Politics, 270.
1
~ Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy,"
226.
1

~ There are two important points to note here: (1) Despite a number of similarities, it is very debatable whether
backdoor capture technically represents agency capture in
the literal sense. When such collusion takes place at the
highest administrative levels, it might more appropriately
be conceived of as an ideological/political decision which
has an effect similar to true capture; (2) Backdoor capture
does not require the actual jurisdictional agency (in our
case the Forest Service) to be fully involved in such collusion. The favoritism towards a certain interest that works
its way down might originate in the Oval Office, various external agencies or committees (such as OMB, the God Squad,
the Council on Competitiveness) or at the Cabinet level. Although the Forest Service is clearly more favorable to tim-
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of the Siskyou case lends some credence to this notion of
grossly inequal access and client recognition at higher administrative levels (more about this in chapter six).
To rule out capture theory at the local level is not
the same thing as finding the Siskiyou National Forest completely balanced, pluralistic, and innocent of any bias.
While the Forest is caught between two highly polarized interests, it does not sit squarely in the middle. Given its
organizational values and judging from the policy outputs it
has produced from 1983 to 1992, one can fairly characterize
the Siskiyou as biased to some extent towards commodity production over any other uses and values of the forest. Because its interests coincide far more closely with the interests of the timber industry, the agency's own inclinations clearly lean towards the cutting of timber over ecological preservation, a point even a staunch defender of the
agency like Culhane admits. 169 As Culhane notes, agencyclient relations need not degenerate into capture when both
groups values and interests are more similar from the outset.1ro Why go through the trouble of co-opting an organization that wants to harvest trees nearly as much as you do?
It is in this realm of organizational values that we
can find one of the keys to understanding what motivates the
ber at its higher levels, given its history and value structure, one might hesitate before hurling the charge of capture at the agency.
1
~ Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 229.
170

Ibid. 324.
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Forest Service. This chapter finds partial support for
Twight's emphasis on rigid agency values; these pro-timber
utilitarian values do exist and are probably quite inf luential, but they are not the absolute determinant in the formulation of policy. This study also finds utilitarian and
multiple use values to be less incompatible than Twight assumes as the value-sets of nearly all of the Siskiyou policymakers interviewed consisted of both types of values held
in seemingly good faith. We might be able to attribute this
to the extremely ambiguous nature of the multiple use concept or perhaps the changing sociocultural context of public
land management.
Another possible element in the Siskiyou's timber production bias could be structural budgetary factors as proposed by O'Toole. While this study has not systematically
tested this possibility, it certainly cannot be ruled out as
a potential source of this bias. While the Forest Service
interviewees largely discount the idea, much of what we know
about organizational behavior supports this notion of budget
maximization by way of timber sales. Since much of this system has been in place since 1930 (nearly a quarter century
before the agency fully got into the timber production business), there is really no way to tell if district rangers
would be inclined to make less sales or at least more ecologically sound ones unless profound structural changes are
made in the agency's budgetary process. There is, neverthe-
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less, a powerful logic in the speculation that budget reform
would go a long way towards altering Forest Service behavior.
Just as ruling out capture theory does not guarantee
pluralism, neither does finding a timber production bias necessarily preclude pluralism. Culhane's findings, in fact,
find just that--an agency with a timber-oriented professional ideology that, nonetheless, answers to a diverse, multiple clientele and comports itself as a responsive, pluralistic agency would. Perhaps the important measure of an agency's pluralism is how it deals with public participation.
The evidence from the Siskiyou case suggests that while the
Siskiyou National Forest's relationship with the participation process is far from the pluralist ideal, it is certainly not the mere public relations ploy that some critics
claim it is.
Participation on the Siskiyou matters, but only to a
point. It rarely steers decisions in any substantial way or
changes the minds of policymakers, but rather exercises its
limited influence in far more subtle ways. In identifying
the participants' major concerns, the participation process
might, for example, define some broad parameters within
which the agency can feel free to act. One important factor
here besides organizational goals and values, might be the
individual values or personality of key administrators (including their personal relationship with the various inte-
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rests). The history of the Siskiyou shows that while participation may help construct a range of options, the simple
matter of who is in charge often determines how final decisions are reached.
Whatever influence participation has, then, exists
firmly within the framework of other realities such as individual and agency goals and values, budgetary concerns,
and external political pressures, all of which, in the environmentalists' case, are usually pushing in the opposite direction. That last factor, outside political pressure, can
be the most confining aspect of such a larger political
framework. Indeed, while Siskiyou officials do have authority and discretion over a wide range of important decisions,
the fact remains that some larger, broader decisions--the
annual timber quota, for instance--are simply out of their
hands and sometimes even force their hands on other matters.
Thus, it must be reiterated that this chapter's analysis is
of local Siskiyou administration as it occurs within the
confines of these external decisions (this will be discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter).
Another factor limiting the effectiveness of participation in the Siskiyou has been the existence of two fairly
equal and highly polarized local interests--a situation
which tends to minimize the pressure of the participants'
demands upon the Forest Service and give the agency a somewhat freer hand. Still, even the limited influence of parti-
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cipation in the Siskiyou certainly seems sufficient enough
to satisfy the minimal requirements of pluralist administration.
Another test of pluralism is how flexible and amenable
to change an agency is and in this regard, the findings in
the Siskiyou are once again somewhat ambiguous. While the
Siskiyou National Forest does seem to have changed in several significant respects since the late 1970s, much more supposed change is less clearly authentic and may, in fact, be
largely symbolic rather than substantive. Whatever changes
have occurred, though, are most likely the result of a slowly evolving shift in values and more importantly, an attempt
to adapt to and thrive in a changing political milieu that
is increasingly aware of environmental concerns. As such,

the Siskiyou once again seems to minimally satisfy the pluralist criterion regarding agency flexiblity.
The motives underlying the behavior of the Siskiyou
National Forest's administrators cannot be explained by any
one model of the Forest Service or larger administrative
theories. When Paul Mohai studied the Forest Service's wilderness recommendation process of the 1970s, he found the
agency to be "acting between the two contrasting poles of
the Twight-Culhane perspectives.

"111

Accordingly, he argued

that there was a dual influence upon the agency wherein both
client's participation and the agency's timber-biased values
171

Mohai, 155.
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and ideology had a role. 172

In many ways, this chapter can

draw a similar conclusion. Forest Service behavior in the
Siskiyou can be traced to a number of factors.
While the agency can be deemed pluralistic for the
period of 1983 to 1992, 1n

its pluralism is of a somewhat

minimalistic variety that is far removed from the ideal of
balance and responsiveness that mainstream pluralist theory
advances. It is more akin to the pluralism described by
Davis and Davis (see page 302). What limits such pluralism
is the fact that it exists in a context of fairly strong organizational values that favor commodity production, a budgetary structure that rewards timber sales, and an external
political environment which includes congressional, state,
executive, and cabinet-level demands that are difficult to
ignore.
This limited pluralism found to characterize the Siskiyou National Forest regards pluralism in the "administrator-as-honest broker" mold. What about Kelso's or Cobb and
Elder's "big picture" pluralism which recognizes and even
expects severe agency biases and looks instead to pluralism's decentralization to provide numerous points of access
to an aggrieved interest? If the environmentalists cannot
1

n Ibid. 153-155.
n One could certainly cast grave doubt upon the notion

1

of a Siskiyou National Forest that was pluralistic even to
the most humble extent prior to the 1970s. Its client set
and patterns of behavior, especially regarding public participation, would most likely have precluded the possibility
of satisfying even the most minimal pluralist criteria.
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get a fair shake with a biased Forest Service, then how
about other avenues for redress such as Congress, the
courts, or other agencies? These questions are what we turn
to in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6
THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF PLURALISM:
CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND ECOLOGY

Planning and authority have been fragmented into a
bewildering mosaic of different agencies and levels of
government, producing frequent confusion, contradiction, and frustration in environmental management.
Walter Rosenbaum
Given its inability to demand a place on the policy
agenda because of its trancendant importance to voters
and politicians, the fragmented structure provides opportunities for environmentalists to undertake initiatives, put together their own ad hoc coalitions, and
gain a significant measure of success they might not
achieve in a more orderly, coherent process where a
clear center of power exists.
Dean Mann

As we have seen, critics have argued that the pluralist system is biased against ecological and other such nonmaterial or supposedly public interests. The last two chapters have examined the critics' charges regarding the alleged inability of such interests to adequately organize and
compete as well as the lack of balance that supposedly char374

375

acterizes their dealings with administrators. There is one
last area that these detractors focus upon in their critique
of pluralism. The structural characteristics of pluralism,
specifically the level of decentralization amongst policymakers, are alleged by critics to serve as another serious
impediment to interests attempting to challenge the status
quo.
This chapter explores the debate between pluralist
theorists who find pluralism's decentralization largely
beneficial and desirable and their critics who see it as
harmful to the political process and propose as a remedy
increased centralization. After detailing the theoretical
dimensions of this issue, this analysis turns specifically
to the case of the Siskiyou conflict in an attempt to determine how decentralization has affected environmental
policymaking and whether it or more centralized modes of
decisionmaking are more amenable to the demands of ecological interests.
Centralization, Decentralization, and
Political Theory

Pluralism's supporters and detractors alike see the
ultimate reality of American politics today to be the fragmentation of authority. According to many observers, whatever remains of potentially unifying forces such as political
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parties and congressional leadership continues to decline,1
as the political landscape devolves into a fractured system
of "political molecules"2 each exercising, according to
Rosenbaum, "its own tiny ration of authority."3 This fragmentation is so thorough, argues William Ophuls, that:
In reality, the "American political system" is almost
a misnomer. What we really have is a congeries of unintegrated and competitive subsystems pursuing conflicting ends--a non-system.4
In the realm of environmental politics, this governmental fragmentation is especially notable. According to
Mann, environmental policy is:
.... a jerry-built structure in which innumerable individuals, private groups, bureaucrats, politicians,
agencies, courts, political parties, and circumstances
have laid down the planks, hammered the nails, plastered over the cracks, (and] made sometimes unsightly
additions and deletions .... s
Varieties of Decentralization
Within the context of American politics, decentralization can take a number of forms. It can refer to a vertical

decentralization of power such as the constitutionally sanetioned principle of federalism wherein considerable segments
1Dean Mann, "Democracy and Environmental Policy" in
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke
(editors), Controversies in Environmental Policy (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 5-6.
2Joseph Califano quoted in H.R. Mahood, Interest Group
Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1990), 1.

3walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 109.
4William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1977), 189.
5
Mann, 4.
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of decisionmaking and administration are reserved for state
and local governments (but with federal statutes, where they
exist, ultimately prevailing). In addition to federalism,
the downward diffusion of authority can also be found in the
decentralized structure of various federal agencies and
other governmental bodies. For instance, the decentralization that Kaufman observes in the Forest Service occurs because the agency's central headquarters distributes significant decisionmaking authority to its lower regional, local
forest unit, and even sublocal ranger district levels.6
While vertical decentralization occurs within a hierarchical context of sorts (federal-state-local or HQ-regionranger district), pluralism is also marked by horizontal de-

centralization which refers to the fragmentation of political authority across a great diversity of jurisdictions,
each having only limited authority. Like federalism, a good
deal of this sort of decentralization is, of course, by constitutional design. The executive, legislative, and judicial
branches all must share power in a divided system established to maximize the principle of "checks and balances." This
horizontal decentralization can also be manifest within the
branches as can clearly be seen in the fragmentation of the
executive bureaucracy. There is hardly a single issue area,
except perhaps something like mail delivery, where only one
6Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future,
1960).
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agency has complete and clear jurisdiction. It is far more
typical for a host of agencies and sometimes even several
cabinet departments to be involved in some capacity in a
given policy issue.
There occurs a good deal of legislative fragmentation
as well. While Congress as a national legislature could theoretically be perceived as a more centralized source of policy, in reality, it is as fragmented as the executive bureaucracy if not more so. It acts more as a loose collection
of semi-sovereign local representatives, committees, and
subcommittees than a single, unified policymaking body. And
the trend in Congress in the last several decades has been
towards even more decentralization as the subcommittee
structure has expanded and specialized further, while the
centralizing authority of congressional leadership has dispersed far and wide across the body. 7
In addition to numerous agencies, cabinet departments,
and congressional committees, horizontal decentralization
can manifest itself in a given policymaking case through the
involvement of a number of other governmental actors including the executive office, state agencies, governors' offices, various advisory commissions, and perhaps the state
7

See, for example, Roger Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making" in Thomas Mann and
Norman Ornstein (editors), The New Congress (Washington
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Steven Smith,
"New Patterns of Decision Making in Congress" in John Chubb
and Paul Peterson (editors), New Directions in American Politics (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).
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or federal judiciary. 8 While each of these players may possess more or less authority in a particular case, such horizontal decentralizational is less a downward diffusion of
authority than it is a centrifugal atomization of it. In the
midst of such fragmentation, diverse and often competing
governmental entities scramble to most fully assert their
limited share of authority.
Pluralism and Decentralization
The decentralization of political authority, both vertical and horizontal, is at the heart of pluralist theory.
To pluralists, the existence of multiple points of access
into the system is the key to assuring the balanced and democratic representation of interests which will, in turn,
lead to more equitable policy outcomes. For one thing, decentralization and the numerous points of access it provides
are alleged by pluralists to serve as an antidote against
bureaucratic capture and other biases in administration. As
we have seen in the last chapter, pluralists such as Kelso
acknowledge that due to inherent patterns in organizational
behavior, agencies will often be biased in favor of a particular, well-positioned client.9 The only way to overcome
such inevitabilities, it is argued, is for the system to
8

rt should be noted that when state and federal officials
have joint jurisdiction in a given policy area, federalism
may actually more resemble horizontal than vertical decentralization.
9William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1978), chap. 10.
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provide alternative avenues for interests to find a sympathetic ear and attempt to influence the policymaking
process. 10 Such detours around captured or biased agencies,
whether they be through other agencies, particular congressmen, the executive office, or the courts, supposedly assure
that the fullest range of voices are heard during the complex business of making policy.
Just as competition among interests nourishes democracy by leading to bargaining, compromise, and accomodation,
pluralists claim that competition amongst the scattered jurisdictions of a pluralist government is equally healthy.11
Not only do competing agencies or even branches of government assure responsiveness to a diversity of interests, but
they also act as watchdogs over one another. Because of
pluralism's necessary sharing of authority, these countervailing forces serve to check the worst abuses of single
client domination and other such undemocratic mischief.
By forcing policy to be formulated and implemented in
this decentralized context, the entire process becomes, according to pluralists, one of inclusion. Conversely, notes
Kelso, the smaller the policymaking realm is, the fewer the
players, the more concentrated their power, and the greater
the chance for a monopoly of influence. 12 This cannot happen, pluralists emphasize, when policy is constructed under
10

Ibid.

119-120, 263-265.

11 Ibid. 264-266.

12

Ibid. 21.

381

influence of pluralistic policy structures such as Heclo's
broad and diverse issue networks or Sabatier's equally inclusive advocacy coalitions. 13 Pluralists suggest that by
guaranteeing the participation of the broadest possible
spectrum of interests and necessitating coalition-building,
a pluralist system thus bestows considerable legitimacy upon
the policy outputs that it produces.14
Many pluralists admit that this fragmented landscape
of political authority can be frustratingly contentious and
inefficient. 15 Still, they contend that this is a necessary
and ultimately worthwhile price to pay for its indispensible
democratic virtues. Other pluralists, however, do not concede that pluralism is so inept, characterizing it instead
as actually quite flexible and innovative. Helen Ingram and
Scott Ullery, for example, find that pluralism's decentralization actually encourages policy entreprenuership by presenting increased opportunities and motivation for risktaking in the policy realm. The fragmentation of pluralism's
policymaking structure, according to Ingram and Ullery, low13 Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishments" in Anthony King (editor), The New American Political System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); Paul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented
Learning, and Policy Change" Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion,
Utilization 8 (1987), 649-692.
14 Helen Ingram and Scott Ullery, "Policy Innovation and
Institutional Fragmentation" Policy Studies Journal 8:5
(Spring 1980), 664-682.
15 see, for example, Mann, 4. or Peter Stillman, "Ecological Problems, Political Theory, and Public Policy" in Stuart
Nagel (editor), Environmental Politics (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974).
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ers the costs of innovation by offering numerous routes for
influence as well as widely-dispersed resources. The pressure of competition between interests and agencies, they
argue, also serves to push actors towards seemingly risky
innovation and large-scale change. 16 Not only might this
innovation bloom from the horizontal competition of rival
agencies and their constituent interests, but from the tinkerings and experimentations of the myriad policymaking entities at the grassroots level (that is, among state and local
bodies and sometimes even federal field offices).
Specifically regarding environmental policy, Dean Mann
finds empirical support for Ingram and Ullery's thesis in
the wave of environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s.
Such bold action, Mann confirms, was largely the result of
entreprenuership on the part of various interests and congressmen, made possible due to political fragmentation. 17
More broadly, pluralists such as Mann, Michael Kraft, and
Howard Mccurdy see the system's fragmentation as providing a
crucial forum for ecological values and demands to be expressed and one that should not be taken for granted. 18 This
hard-won place at the policymaking table, it is argued, can-

16
17
18

Ingram and Ullery, 664-682.
Mann, 20.
Mann, 18-19, Michael Kraft, "Conclusion: Toward a New
Environmental Agenda" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editors) Environmental Policy in the 1990s, (Washington D.C.: CQ
Press, 1990), 385; Howard Mccurdy, Environmental Protection
and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond"
in Kamieniecki, et.al., 103-106.

383
not be guaranteed in a more centralized system. Because of
its decentralization, claims Mann, the system "has responded
well to the challenge of environmental damage and scarcity";
so well, in fact, that it "makes reversal towards antienvironmentalism almost unthinkable." 19 Mccurdy, meanwhile,
claims that in terms of fairer environmental representation,
"pluralism .... is an imperfect solution, but it probably
stands a better chance of reaching its payoff than the other
alternatives."~

According to Mccurdy, environmentalists'

best representation comes about through the balance, competition, and cooperation between diverse agencies and the
programs they administer as he shows in his case study of
the multi-agency management of Louisiana's Atchafalya Basin. 21
The Costs of Fragmentation I: Subgovernments
Where the pluralists see opportunity and access in the
system's significant levels of political fragmentation,
their critics see chaos and bias. This view is not strictly
limited to academic critics; in the 1970s the President's
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) identified pluralism

19
20

Mann, 28.
Mccurdy, 106.
21
Ibid. 103-106. Unlike Kelso, however,
see the inevitability of biased or single
agencies as he calls for increased agency
technical focus (ala Lowi) in addition to
decentralized administrative context.

Mccurdy does not
client-dominated
neutrality and
maintaining a
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in government as a major structural impediment to the development of environmentally sound policies.22
As was discussed in the previous chapter, one of fragmentation's greatest flaws, according to critics, has been
that it leaves lawmakers and administrators vulnerable to
capture by parochial interests. While pluralists perceive of
fragmentation in terms of open windows of opportunity and
checks and balances, critics such as McConnell or Lowi see
it more in terms of isolated and inpenetrable knots of nearsovereign political power. 23 In these closed subgovernments,
claim critics, the line between regulator and regulated disappears as the most well-established local interests form a
stranglehold upon political influence in the extremely narrow and/or localized policy area that concerns them. To critics then, decentralized and thus localized administrators
sit alone as isolated targets.
The other part of the decentralized subgovernment
equation is, of course, the Congress. It is argued that the
diffusion of power all the way down to the subcommittees
along with the associated decline of parties and congressional leadership have spread legislative authority thin. 24

22 Rosenbaum, 282.
23 Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy,
revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1970); Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton,
1979).
,
24 Davidson, "Subcommittee Government." It should be
noted, however, that not all scholars would agree that parties are in decline. See, for example, Cornelius Cotter, et
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As in the case of their bureaucratic brethren, the numerous,
atomized little clusters of committee and subcommittee power
supposedly present easy pickings for interest groups in
their attempt to gain influence. In some ways, congresspersons are even more vulnerable than bureaucrats since unlike
the latter, their political survival depends directly upon
reelection by locally-minded constituents. And this, in
turn, requires a constant and substantial flow of funding
which interest groups are all too able and willing to
provide . 25
This committee fragmentation is reinforced by the inherently local nature of Congress's representative function
which has traditionally manifested itself through the distribution of tangible, material benefits to one's district. 26 The immense value of such political "pork," in
fact, is alleged by critics to be a crucial component in the
maintenance of iron triangles as bureaucrats acquiesce to
the dispensation of such benefits in exchange for high budgets for their agencies.27 Rather than lawmakers or honest

al., Party Organization in American Politics (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.
25 For a good discussion of this, see Philip Stern, Still
the Best Congress Money Can Buy (Washington D.C.: Regnery
Gateway, 1992).
26 John Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics (Palo Alto CA:
Stanford University Press, 1974); David Mayhew, Congress:
The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1974).
27 Morris Fiorina, Congress: The Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
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brokers, critics see the congresspeople who populate these
political fiefdoms as, in the words of James Burns, "little
more than elected

lobbyists."~

According to Lowi, the key ingredient that keeps these
localized subgovernments viable is the broad discretion that
Congress grants bureaucratic administrators.29 If legislated
rules are to bend to the demands of special interests and
their congressional patrons, they must, after all, be flexible enough. Lowi argues that by passing these purposefully
broad and ambiguous mandates, Congress effectively surrenders its traditional policymaking authority to bureaucrats
who thereby gain the leeway necessary to pervert statutes in
ways that benefit dominant clients, both bureaucratic and
legislative. 30
The Costs of Fragmentation II: Incrementalism
According to critics of pluralism, fragmented policymaking structures possess another fatal flaw in that they
inherently produce short-sighted, piecemeal, and status-quooriented policy. Best described by pluralist Charles Lindblom, incrementalism refers to the type of policymaking
which tends to thrive in a highly fragmented system. 31

Sim-

28 James Burns quoted in L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne
Peak, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 136.
29
Low i , 2 7 4 -1 7 5 .
30
Ibid. 105-108.
~Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'"
Public Administration Review 19:4 (Spring 1959), 79-88.
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ply put, incrementalism (or what Lindblom specifically calls
"disjointed incrementalism"32) occurs when policymakers,
both legislative and administrative, rely upon previously
established ideas, technical orientations, budgets, and policies as a starting point from which to modestly alter or
"tinker" with existing policy rather than establish a substantially different course or plan.
One reason the pluralist system tends to adopt the
incremental style is due to its reliance upon bargaining,
competition, and consensus among numerous interests in a
fragmented policy structure.33 Each limited unit of authority in such a system can exercise some degree of veto power,
thereby reducing the chance that bold, innovative, or controversial proposals could clear all potential hurdles.34
Thus, the only proposals fit to emerge from such a fractured
obstacle course of a system, argue critics, are heavily com-

32 Ibid.
33 There are, one must note, a number of other explanations put forth for why incrementalism prevails including
limits to policymaker rationality, the caution inherent to
organizational behavior, other aspects of human nature, and
the considerable "sunk costs," material and psychological,
invested in a previously established policy program. For a
general discussion, see Thomas Dye, Understanding Public
Policy, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1987).

34 For a discussion of the difficulties implementation
faces see, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation 3rd edition (Berkley, CA: University of California
Press, 1984); Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy revised edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).
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promised, relatively innocuous policy tinkerings that closely represent the previous policy.
While critics argue that incrementalism, or "the politics of muddling through" as many call it, limits policy
formulation in all areas, a great number of them find that
it is especially deadly for environmental policy.35 The
"ecological vices of muddling through," as one critics puts
it,36 stem from the fact that environmental problems by nature tend to be exceedingly complex and long-term--precisely
the sort of issues incrementalism allegedly is least suited
to address. With its focus on minimizing conflict and relieving the most political pressure, critics charge that
incremental decisionmaking takes the path of least resistance rather than the path that will most effectively address intricate and thorny environmental policy problems.
Where bold and comprehensive solutions are called for, then,
incrementalism is said by critics to offer only the "tyranny
of small

decisions"~--weak,

piecemeal responses and tiny

35 Arnongst the critics who make this point are Ophuls,
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity; Rosenbaum,The Politics
of Environmental Concern; Charles Hardin, "Observations on
Environmental Politics" in Nagel; Lynton Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society, (Garden City, NJ:
Doubleday, 1971); and Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The
Context of Environmental Politics (Lexington, KY: University
Press of Kentucky, 1978).
36
Ophuls, 191.
.
37 Alfred Kahn quoted in Robert Bartlett, "Comprehensive
Environmental Decision Making: Can It Work?" in Vig and
Kraft, 244.
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modifications of the existing patchwork of policy compromises.
Thus, through its cautious love of precedence and the
tactical advantage it gives to the forces of the status quo,
critics find that incrementalism thus renders bold ideas impotent as Peter Stillman shows:
.... incremental decisionmaking--"muddling through"-is, as even its proponents realize, inherently stagnant in that it tends to be bound by the logic of past
decisions and not to consider nor strike out in new
directions .... because it is narrow and backwardlooking, "muddling through" tends not to be a good
method for the formation of ecological policies, ... 38
To this characterization, Ophuls would add that:
.... incremental decision-making largely ignores longterm goals: it focuses on the problem immediately at
hand and tries to find the solution that is most congruent with the status quo. It is thus characterized
by .... a remedial orientation in which policies are
designed to cure obvious immediate ills rather than to
bring about some desired future state.39
Such an "adhocracy" as Ophuls terms it in his scathing
critique of pluralism is utterly oblivious to the long-range
consequences of the actions it

takes~;

it can recognize no

common interests besides the short-term incremental compromises it spits out. Thus, major decisions of life-and-death
importance are made almost by default by what Ophuls calls a
"brokerage house government. " 41

"Muddling through," contends

Ophuls, "is almost tailor-made for producing policies that

38
Stillman, 50.
39 0phuls, 191.
~ Op h u ls , 19 3 .

41

Ibid. 190.
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will generate the tragedy of the cornmons" 42; that is, individual interests and decisions adding up to collective disaster. Ophuls borrows a famous line to describe the system's
maximization of current benefits at the future's expense:
"After us, the

deluge."~

Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout,

meanwhile, find the skeptical question "what has posterity
ever done for me?" to best sum up the spirit of pluralist
politics. 44
To critics, therefore, incrementalism automatically
rules out precisely the type of holistic, "big-picture" solutions that ecological problems require. To be effective,
claim critics, such solutions would have to incorporate an
understanding of systems, interrelationships, and long-term
consequences. They would also have to comprehensively respond to the causes of ecological problems rather than react
to their symptoms on a crisis-by-crisis basis in which environmentalists always suffer the burden of proof . 45
According to critics, then, an insidious reductionism
afflicts policymakers who operate in an incremental system
which, in words of Mann, has "generally defied 'holistic' or
'ecological' principles of policy
42
43

design."~

Ophuls, for ex-

Ibid. 192.
Ibid. 169.
~Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Politics: What Role for Political Scientists?" in Nagel, 9.
45
Sprout and Sprout, The Context of Environmental Politics, 71, Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the
Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1989), 34.
~Mann, 4.
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ample, notes how the bureaucratic division of labor bears
little resemblance to ecological realities and environmental
needs. 47 Bartlett makes this same point:
The whole emphasis of comprehensiveness runs counter
to the modern nature of expertise .... Expertise almost
always means narrow, specialized, disciplinary expertise; few persons by training, experience, or predilection are prepared to engage in or promote comprehensive environmental decisionmaking. The idea of comprehensive environmental decisionmaking finds little
institutional support in the ways universities, science, or the professions generally are structured, or
in the ways persons in government or business are employed. 48
In such an inappropriately fragmented administrative
and legislative realm, each policymaker operates, argue critics, according to his or her own rationalistic and reductionistic mindset. 49 As a result, they cannot help but perceive of ecological problems in ways severely restricted by
the blinders of their organization's or committee's particular specialization or technical orientation. Like a pulmonary specialist who sees his patient as only a pair of
lungs rather than a whole body, critics would suggest that
environmental administrators look at a complex forest ecosystem and see only big game or merchantable timber or navigable waterways or recreational opportunities or whatever
their particular specialization leads them to see. As a result, truly comprehensive, holistic solutions which attempt
to address ecological problems at their most fundamental
47
48
49

0phuls, 194.
Bartlett, 242.
Ophuls, 195.
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levels become all but impossible for the reductionistic politics of a fragmented system as Walter Truett Anderson
points out:
.... the whole style of American politics is nonecological. Ecology is a comprehension of systems,
interdependencies, webs of relationship, connections,
extending over space and time--and the very essence of
our politics is to zero in on single causes .... Environmental positions are required, by the very rules of
the political game, to fix on a single issue - save
the whale, clean up the air--that allow the real issues to recede into the background.so
Capitalist Values and the Status Quo
To many critics, pluralism and its incremental, reductionist style of policymaking most often serve to perpetuate
a status quo that heavily favors business interests, economic growth, and the current distribution of wealth, all of
which are seen by many as being in direct conflict with ecological goals.51 This argument, which assumes that pluralism
is inseparable from capitalism, is a staple of many environmental critiques of the political process. To critics, this
economic status quo, therefore, represents another sort of
deep structural bias which environmental policy must con50 walter Truett Anderson quoted in Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 210-211. Pluralists,
though, might claim that these failings are just as much the
product of inadequate efforts on behalf of advocates to articulate the issue in such a way that it will be conceived
by the public and policymakers in a more holistic and ecological way in the first place. The fact that Greenpeace
adopts splashy whale and seal campaign does little to advance appreciation of the intricacies of marine ecology.
51 Sprout and Sprout, The Context of Environmental Politics, 53-54, 129-154.
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front. Given that these economic values have such a tenacious hold upon and fundamental position in American society, this is no easy task.
Perpetual economic growth, for example, seems at times
to be no less than the foundational myth upon which all economic, social, and political structures in this country, and
more broadly, Western society, have been built. As Ophuls
puts it:
Growth is the secular religion of American society,
providing a social goal, a basis for political solidarity, and a source for individual motivation; the
pursuit of happiness has come to be defined almost
exclusively in material terms, and the entire society--individuals, enterprises, the government itself-has an enormous vested interest in the continuation of
growth. 52
As such, growth has become, in the words of Daniel
Bell, the quintessential "political solvent"53; the engine
which endlessly churns out the stuff of pluralist distributive politics, the raw material of compromise and political placation. So central is it to the political structure
that any policy proposal (such as protecting owls instead of
cutting forests) which limits growth and its ability to
serve in this capacity will likely be looked upon by many
policymakers with a great deal of skepticism. Like incrementalism in general, critics argue that the pressures of
growth and the market have the effect, therefore, of seriously limiting options for comprehensive, long-term action
52

Op h u ls , 18 5 •
53 Daniel Bell quoted in Ophuls, 186.
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on behalf of less tangible goals. The market, both economic
and political, favors instead, short-term, distributively
oriented outputs as Henning and Mangun observe:
Often environmental administrators are pressured to
elevate the short-term material standard of living
rather than maintain or improve long-term quality of
life and environment. Those agencies managed under
multiple use and sustained yield principles are most
heavily affected by such pressures.S4
Thus, the policy response to dire environmental problems is forced to bend to economic realities rather than the
other way around.ss Kraft, for instance, observes that in
the course of environmental politics thusfar:
There has not yet been a serious challenge to the
dominant or core values of American politics (for example, private private property, capitalism, individualism, and the unrestrained right to pursue one's
self-interest, limited government, and, perha~s above
all, material abundance and economic growth). 6
To many critics of pluralism, then, the market system
to which it is so closely aligned is an "environmental villain" s7

that at best, is incapable of recognizing and res-

ponding to complex ecological concerns, and at worst, is, in

s4 Henning and Mangun, 10.
ss Many others, though, argue that without a strong
economy, there are less resources available to protect the
environment or public welfare in general. Thus, the economy
should justifiably be a society's main concern. Some environmentalists, on the other hand, like to argue that "there
are no jobs on a dead planet," as they tend to see environmental problems as the paramount issue society faces. Thus,
this most central (and perennial) of policy debates largely
hin~es upon how priorities are ranked and threats perceived.
Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Government: A Review Essay" in Nagel, 146.
s7 0phuls, 168.
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ideology and practice, fundamentally opposed to ecological
goals and demands.
The Costs of Fragmentation III: Jurisdictional Rivalry and
Conflict
Whereas pluralism's proponents look at competition
among fragmented agencies and legislative committees and see
a healthy and positive situation of mutual checks and balances, critics adhere to a darker vision of stubborn rivalry, needless conflict, and gridlock. Citing the organizational behavior research of Simon and others, critics portray agencies as focused first and foremost upon their survival or even expansion in a zero-sum environment of limited
bugetary resources. 58 As Henning and Mangun claim:
A comprehensive environmental approach is seldom attained in the administrative process because of .... an
agency's own security and expansion interests. As a
bureaucratic institution, an agency is concerned with
its own welfare first. Other interests are of secondary consideration. 59
Critics extend this argument to congressional committees as well, characterizing them as being beset by the same
sort of jealous turf rivalry and ideology of selfperpetuation as agencies. To be sure, not all rivalry
amongst committees and agencies stems from a Darwinian
struggle for expansion. Much conflict also stems from simple
58

Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947); Norton Long, "Power and Administration" Public Administration Review 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip
Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots (Berkley, CA: University of
California Press, 1949).
59
Henning and Mangun, 49.
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differences in goals, values, or technical orientations to
problem solving (not to mention legislative mandate, if an
agency).
In such a competitive, fragmented setting, critics
wonder how complex, invariably cross-jurisdictional environmental policy questions can be settled in a scientif ically rational and comprehensive

way.~

Instead of coordina-

tion, argue critics, the usual result is bickering, fingerpointing, and deadlock as each policymaking entity clings to
its own particular value-set and technical orientation while
simultaneously defending its

turf.~

The vertical fragmentation and rivalry of state and
federal environmental managers, claim critics, can be just
as destructive to sound environmental policymaking. The
friction between federal bureaucracies and very conservative
state game, forestry, or grazing agencies in the western
United States is legendary and serves mostly to thwart comprehensive

policies.~

The Reagan administration's New Fed-

eralism of the early 1980s which surrendered additional fed-

~How can, for example a commodity-oriented Forest Service and a preservation/recreation-oriented Park Service,
and the committees which oversee each, all operating in a
competitive, zero-sum context, rationally and cooperatively
coordinate sound land management policy in the greater Yellowstone ecosystem or the Sierra Nevada (both of which contains millions of acres of both national forest and park
land)?
61
Henning and Nangun, 79.
~For a discussion of comparative state environmental
policy, see James Lester, "A New Federalism?: Environmental
Policy in the States" in Vig and Kraft, 73.
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eral authority to the states confused and fragmented policymaking even further as state agencies, left without coordination, funding, or direction, according to William Mangun
and Jean Mangun:
.... found themselves in a complicated, unsupported
position because the federal government seemed to be
more interested in ridding itself of responsibilities
than helping the states do a better job.63
Critics then, reject what they see as an "arthritic
octopus"M of a government with its adversarial system of
vetoes, delays, and stalemate. At most, critics contend,
such a system can produce only disjointed policy fragments
or extraordinarily ambiguous mandates, neither of which can
adequately the complexity of real problems.
The Centralized Solution
Many of the critics of pluralism and its incrementalism and fragmentation look to increased coordination and
centralization of government authority as the key to a more
effective policymaking apparatus and thus better policy outputs. While a number of critics including McConnell, Samuel
Huntington, and Robert Crain call for a consolidation of
government power into more centralized and/or nationalized
structures, it is Lowi who offers the most cogent and de-

~William Mangun and Jean Mangun, "Implementing Wildlife
Policy Across Political Jurisdictions" Policy Studies Journal 19:3-4 (1991), 522.
MGraeme Duncan quoted in Mann, 8.
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tailed prescription in this respect. 65 Lowi argues that the
only way to overcome the crippling ineffectiveness and special interest domination of pluralism is to move closer to
the traditional model of administration and shift policyrnaking authority to the center. "A law made at the center of
government," claims Lowi, "focuses politics there and reduces interests

elsewhere."~

According to Lowi and other

critics then, increased centralization would eliminate rivalry, deal-making, and special interest influence and replace it with clear goals and priorities made in the public
interest by a government unafraid to plan and in an authoritative position to do so.
To Lowi, the key to achieving such rational and effective policymaking, perhaps even more so than the actual
streamlining and restructuring of government agencies, is to
eliminate vague legislative mandates and broad discretion. 67
In their place, clear, detailed, authoritative laws, according to Lowi, should prevail. This juridical democracy, as he
calls it, would necessitate a strong legislature which would
represent the national interest and reclaim its constitu-

65

Lowi, The End of Liberalism; McConnell, Private Power
and American Democracy; Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Politics of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981); Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and David
Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969).
~ Lowi, 93.
67
Ibid. 305-309.
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tional policymaking authority from the interest-ridden scattering of autonomous subgovernments.68
Bureaucracies, for their part, would act as in traditional theory--as neutral, rational implementors of the legislative (and hence public's) will. When agencies do have
to make rules (due perhaps to changing circumstances or the
agency's technical expertise), Lowi calls for "administrative formality" whereby early rulemaking, formal rulemaking
norms and procedures, and rigid criteria would replace the
case-by-case bargaining approach that allegedly favors special interests and creates ad hoc policies.69 Such clear
centrally-derived regulations would supposedly be far more
purposeful, efficient, and just than pluralism's "policieswithout-law ... 70
In the realm of environmental policymaking, the calls
for centralization have been especially loud and numerous. A
number of observers including Barry Commoner, Lynton Caldwell, Garrett Hardin, Charles Hardin, Rosenbaum, and Ophuls
see less fragmented governmental authority and increased
government planning and action as the solution to the environmental gridlock that they believe threatens our existence. 71 As the only repository of legitimate power with the
68

Ibid. 295-313.
69 Ibid. 302.
70
Ibid. 299.
71
Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf,
1971); Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society;
Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern; C. Hardin,
"Observations on Environmental Politics"; Garrett Hardin,
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ability to coerce diverse, self-interested political actors,
centralist critics look to government. Only a committed proactive government, they argue, can control the zero-sum
struggle over increasingly scarce resources and enforce possibly unpopular, but ecologically necessary policies in the
long-term public interest.n
Ophuls makes this argument in an especially vigorous
way, finding the firm implementation of political authority
to be the only way to tame self-interest and step back from
the brink of ecological disaster. With Aristotle, Burke, and
Rousseau as his guides, Ophuls maintains that the only way
to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to bid "farewell to
economic man" and embrace true politics once more. 73 Unlike
the short-term, distributive orientation of pluralist bargaining, such truly political solutions would, according to
Ophuls, involve some conception of the collective interest
and would require the subordination of individual interests,
policymaking by the most competent, and an acceptance of
legitimate authority. 74 Only through this reinforcement of
authority, argues Ophuls and others, can adequate attention
be focused on the holistic, systemic nature of ecological
problems and appropriate measures be pursued.

"The Tragedy of the Commons" Science 162 (13 December 1968),
1243-1248; Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity.
72
Ophuls, 142-155.
73
Ibid. 180.
74
Ibid. 222-226.
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While Ophuls's prescriptions tend to limit democratic
perogatives, other environmental centralists argue that increased comprehensiveness and centralization would actually
enhance democratic decisionmaking. For instance, Edwin
Haefele, in the style of Lowi, calls for a return to truly
representative, legislatively-focused decisionmaking to deal
with environmental issues. He suggests that the executive
branch cannot fairly or adequately weigh competing interests. 75 Charles Hardin, likewise points out the potential
democratic benefits of a reinvigorated party system which
would be another centralizing influence. 76 Mangun and Mangun, meanwhile, find in their study of state-federal relations that environmentalists achieve better representation
in cases where the federal government administers federal
laws than in cases with state administration.n
Thus, centralized authority is seen by those critics
in the McConnell mold as better able to uphold democracy and
the public interest by rescuing policy from the clutches of
obscure and isolated and possibly captured bureaucracies or
local governments and placing it in more open and accountable forums. "Comprehensiveness," claims Paehlke, " ... shifts
decision making out of specialized agencies and into central

75

Edwin Haefele, Representative Government and Environmental Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
for Resources for the Future, 1976).
76
C. Hardin, 191-19 2.
n Mangun and Mangun, 520.
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agencies, the courts, and/or the democratic process itself. " 78
Short of the actual structural centralization of policymaking authority (or perhaps alongside it), some critics
emphasize increased interagency, state-federal, or
legislative-executive coordination and cooperation as being
essential if more effective and comprehensive environmental
policy is to be achieved. Such a move towards coordinated
environmental management would supposedly allow for more
holistic policy consideration of such things as ecosystems,
watersheds, or bioregions and would force at least a partial
integration of highly fragmented and specialized decisionmaking entities.N
This overall approach to improving environmental policyrnaking has been loosely termed "the centralized solution."
It should be noted, however, that the individual proposals
cited above run the gamut from deep structural alterations
presumably requiring the amending of the Constitution to
fairly modest centralizing adjustments or reforms of the
current system. Depending on the theorist, they also target
a number of different manifestations of decentralization,
from vertical forms (such as federalism or the downward
~Robert Paehlke,

"Environmental Values and Democracy:
The Challenge of the Next Century" in Vig and Kraft, 362.
79
Mangun and Mangun, 519-524; Mccurdy, 103, Bartlett,
236. While Bartlett criticizes centralists who hold out what
he considers unrealistic goals for achieving comprehensiveness, he still believes, nevertheless, that there is room
for improved coordination.
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diffusion of power within an agency) to horizontal forms
(such as separation of powers or overlapping agencies and
committees).
The Pluralist Critique of Centralization
Calls for increased centralization, environmental and
otherwise, are met by fierce pluralist objections which reject centralized solutions on several grounds. First, pluralists cast serious doubt upon a centralized policymaking
structure's ability to formulate truly superior policy. Centralists are naive, argue pluralists, to believe that the
consolidation of government authority alone will somehow allow better policy to magically emerge.so On the contrary,
claim pluralists, it is centralization that embeds the status quo by stifling innovation and reducing opportunities for
the competition of ideas. By isolating themselves from publie opinion and interest demands, argues Kelso, the policymaking elite would cut themselves off from huge quantities
of useful information and insight.81
Pluralists contend that centralists vastly overrate
policymakers' capacities to formulate rational policy. From
what is known of the psychology and behavior of organizations, claim a number of pluralists, it is clear that there
are serious limits upon the near-perfect rationality that
policymakers are presumed by centralists to possess. Incom80

Kelso, 259.
81 Ibid. 236.

404

plete knowledge, cognitive limitations, the tendency towards
"groupthink," personal values, and human nature are all
thought by pluralists to work against policymaker rationality.82 To pluralists, this alone would seem to justify the
incremental method with its accumulated knowledge, welltested experience, and multiple points of access.
Mann echoes these doubts about centralized policymaking, arguing that the heavy-handed, overbureaucratized

command-and-control style of centralization requires unrealistic and unworkable levels of knowledge, enforcement, and

coordination.83 Charles Perrow reaches this same conclusion
finding that Lowi-style centralized, rule-oriented bureauc-

racies are effective only at carrying out relatively simple,
straightfoward tasks such as issuing passports.84

~Bartlett, 243; Kelso, 236-239. For a fuller discussion
see, Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Peter Blau, The Dynamics of
Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
83 Mann, 26.
84 Charles Perrow, Organizational Analysis (Belmont, CA:
Brooks/Cole, 1970). Lowi, however, would probably argue that
it is pluralism's hyper-fragmented, grossly overlapping
executive branch that is rigid and "overbureaucratized"
rather than his neutral and streamlined bureaucratic implementors of statutes. Ophuls also counters these pluralist
warnings of unwieldy, unworkable, top-heavy bureaucracies by
proposing that policy design standards rather than direct
hands-on planning (ala the Soviet communism) be employed.
Unlike the absolutism of planning, policy design standards
set general limitations and identify important criteria that
must be met, but leaves considerable latitude for democratic
structures to determine how these goals are specifically going to be achieved. Thus social goals could be met, according to Ophuls, without a huge governmental planning apparatus. Ophuls, 228-229. Similarly, Lowi maintains that when
rule-making is done early in the life of a statute, central-
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Pluralists also take on Lowi regarding his call for
legalism, formalism, and less administrative discretion.
Kelso argues that it is the content of the law and not the
manner of its formulation that is often the real problem
with policy. 85 What guarantee is there, he asks, that unambiguous, centrally-derived laws would address the public interest any better? Could it be, he asks, that the system's
status quo biases are not necessarily inherent to pluralism
but to American culture and society in

general?~

Pluralists also portray centralized decisionmaking and
strict mandates as inflexible and rigid. Kelso turns the
centralists' attack on incrementalism on its head as he
claims that it is actually centralized policymakers with
their expanded jurisdictions and responsibilities who must
more depend more heavily upon established "rules of thumb"
and rigid rulemaking procedures or else risk overload.87
Consequently, this is alleged to leave bureaucrats illprepared to deal with unprecedented situations that their
predetermined mandates do not address. Indeed, increased
decentralization and wider discretion have evolved, argues
Kelso, precisely because of the increased prevalence of com-

ization can be achieved without a heavy-handed "Prussian"
hierarchy or overbureaucratization. Lowi, 304.
85 Kelso , 2 3 3 .
~Ibid.

87

106.
Ibid . 2 3 8 •
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plex, multi-dimensional problems which require flexibility.88
The broader jurisdictional responsibilities of centralized agencies, pluralists argue, also pose the risk that
bureaus may be less than enthusiastic and committed to some
aspects of their widened mission. Given the nature of bureaucracies, Kelso speculates that it may be better to have a
diversity of agencies each committed to the narrow task it
knows best than fewer agencies with a host of tasks, some of
which they might be hostile to.89
Finally, pluralists condemn what they see as centralization's undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies. Pluralists
such as Bartlett, Mann, or Stillman all warn of the possibility that political authority, centralized to achieve
noble environmental goals, might degenerate into rigid,
heartless, overbureaucratized rule by a technocratic class
with little patience for popular concerns or liberal values.~

Critics of Ophuls or Garrett Hardin paint a bleak

Hobbesian picture of government power running roughshod over
individual rights and aspirations in the name of some ruling

88 Ibid. 254.
89 Ibid. 261-262. In fact, it can be argued that it is
centralization rather than pluralist fragmentation that
features a riskier capture scenario since the stakes are
higher. To capture a centralized agency is to gain influence
over a far greater amount of policymaking authority than
capturing a fragmented agency.
~Bartlett, 243, Mann, 28; Stillman, 51-52.
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elite's arbitrary conception of environmental necessity. At
its worst, an environmental police state is envisioned.91
The centralists, argue Stillman, thus contradict themselves in calling for stronger and thus more remote, less
accessible government while simultaneously seeking, and often presuming, wider public support. 92 It is a large and
rather dubious assumption, contends Stillman, that centralized policy decisions, even if made in what the policymakers
truly believe is the public's best interest, will enjoy popular consent. 93 Kelso is even more skeptical of the potential of centralized policymakers to achieve popular support
as he suggests that "when government officials are not subject to the pressures of the bargaining table, they are less
likely to perceive the objectives and needs of people other
than themselves."M Thus, only through bargaining and com91 Once again Ophuls would def end his proposals by claiming that his system's reliance on design criteria rather
than planning would eliminate the need for heavy-handed
government intervention in the everyday realm. He emphatically denies, therefore, that his proposals would lead to a
tyrannical regime. Still his enforcement of even design criteria would require some sort of coercion and, as he admits,
the subordination to some extent of individual rights to
collective needs. Other centralists take a different line of
defense. As was previously discussed in chapter one, some
centralists argue that it is the governing elite in this
country that is most sensitive and protective of liberal
values and not the often extremely illiberal masses. See
Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Praeger,
1958); Herbert Mccloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics" American Political Science Review 58:2 (June
1964).

92 Stillman, 56-57.
93 Ibid. 53.
94 Kelso, 238.
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promise between various interests and the government, argue
pluralists, can true consensus and public support be forged.
This alleged lack of representation of interests in a
centralized system is stressed by Mccurdy as well in his
Louisiana case study of multijurisdictional land management.
McCurdy speculates that if management of the Atachaf alya
basin were ever centralized under a single agency, the broad
representation and participation granted by numerous agencies to their diverse constituencies would inevitably be diminished. 95 Paehlke, meanwhile, finds that the broad access
and participatory opportunities that pluralism provides ereates a sense of efficacy that highly centralized systems
cannot. This efficacy, he argues, is essential for encouraging environmental mobilization.96 The distance at which centralization promises to keep interests would, therefore,
seem to discourage the public from formulating their own
collective responses, thus leaving environmental policymaking strictly to the "experts."
Decentralization vs. Centralization in the Siskiyou

As we have already seen, the American political system
in general is highly fragmented. It should come as no surprise, then, that the politics of the Siskiyou have proven
to be no exception. Despite the fact that the primary scope
of this study is a single jurisdiction--the Siskiyou Nation95 McCurdy, 106.
%Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy," 363.
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al Forest--old growth, and thus Siskiyou policymaking has
involved, according to the former supervisor of the Siskiyou, "a lot of players with a lot of different authorities."
First of all, even the principal administrative entity, the Siskiyou National Forest, is itself divided into
five ranger districts. Beyond the Siskiyou, as previous
chapters and figure 10 show, the Forest Service's Region Six
office in Portland, its Washington D.C. headquarters, the
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the
executive office, various individual congresspersons, a number of committees and subcommittees, other federal agencies
(such as the Fish and Wildlife Service), an interagency committee, the state of Oregon, and the federal courts all
played some role, direct or indirect, in shaping policy on
the Siskiyou. This involvement of so many governmental actors, some of them regional and national, not to mention
private citizens and interest groups, would seem, therefore,
to strongly confirm a model of broad and fragmented policymaking such as, perhaps, Sabatier's advocacy coalition model.
The evidence from the Siskiyou case can tell us a
great deal about the effects of political fragmentation on
environmental policymaking as well as allow us to ponder the
implications of further centralization.97 Since the reality
97 A centralized system, as it shall be defined here,
would involve decisions that were made in a more unitary
fashion by fewer, more consolidated jurisdictions and at

Governmental Entities Involved in the SISKIYOU
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of Siskiyou/old growth policymaking is a high degree of
fragmentation, the question of how different a centralized
system would be requires a good deal of speculation. Still,
the evidence from this case could go a long way in providing
at least some empirical basis to such speculation.
While pluralism features an overall fragmentation of
authority, this scattered authority can occur in the form of
more centralized or higher-level sources such as the executive office, Forest Service headquarters, or the Department
of Agriculture, or as more decentralized or localized
sources such as a ranger district, the Siskiyou Forest itself, or a county surrounding the Forest. Let us assume then
that a future scheme of increased centralization would f eature the enhanced prominence and power of the higher-level,
more centralized policymaking entities which currently
exist. Based on this assumption, one can gain at least some
sense of how a more centralized system might behave by examining how these higher-level entities act today as compared
to the more decentralized actors.
This is, of course, an imperfect measure because centralization's actual implementation would involve far more
than merely boosting the autonomy of the higher levels of

higher levels within those jurisdictions. Furthermore, legislative and executive directives would be more explicitly
carried out with less room for administrative discretion.
Finally, increased decisionmaking would probably occur at
the federal level, at the expense of the state and local
autonomy.
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current policymaking bodies. True centralization, its advocates might argue, would feature a fundamental internal
restructuring and consolidation of these current agencies.
It would also require major changes in the way in which they
operate, especially with respect to their relationship with
Congress and its legislative mandates. These limitations
notwithstanding, however, an examination of contemporary
examples of high-level decisionmaking in the Siskiyou/old
growth case provides perhaps the only opportunity there is
to concretely measure anything even akin to true centralization. Though imperfect, such an approach provides at least
a glimpse into possibilities that would otherwise be pure
speculation.
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the
following questions: (1) Amongst the fragmented policymaking
entities, how did decisionmakers at higher levels of a given
jurisdiction or branch of government treat ecological goals
and demands? Were they or more local or lower-level policymakers more likely to advocate policies supported by environmentalists? (2) Were decisionmakers at the local or state
level more or less amenable to comprehensive ecological
goals than those at the federal level? (3) What were the
overall effects of the fragmentation of Siskiyou/old growth
policymaking upon the formulation of comprehensive,
ecologically-oriented policy?
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In order to address the first two questions, it is necessary to examine the various governmental bodies involved
in this case in search of discrepancies in attitudes and behavior between those institutions as well as between different levels within them. In doing so, one might be able to
discern patterns wherein levels of policymaker centralization would be linked to levels of ecological concern. In
addition, such an examination might tell us something about
the claims of centralists and pluralists regarding the effects of fragmentation (specifically capture, incrementalism, rivalry, and reductionism) on environmental policy.
The Forest Service
The most directly involved agency in the Siskiyou has
been, of course, the United States Forest Service. With its
many far-flung units, the Forest Service is widely recognized as one of the most thoroughly decentralized agencies in
the entire bureaucracy (for a brief description of its
structure see chapter two). In fact, it is at its most local
and decentralized administrative level, the ranger district,
where many observers claim that the agency's most important
decisionmaking occurs.~
Forest Service interviewees unanimously agreed with
this characterization of ranger district autonomy. In the

98

Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger; Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press for Resources for the Future, 1981).
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Siskiyou, the district rangers, who, with their

staff~,

do

almost all of the planning and detail work on timber projects, reported very few constraints on their actions from
the supervisor's office. The supervisor's role has been described by both interviewees and outside observers as being
one of coordination, review, and guidance.100 At least on
the Siskiyou, rangers and the supervisor have tended to see
eye-to-eye on most all issues. No major disputes of any substance were mentioned in the interviews, thus indicating a
similarity in goals and values. Such congeniality and shared
purpose, as Kaufman points out, allows the delegation of authority to assume far fewer risks.1m
At the regional level, the relationship between the
regional forester and the supervisors under his command is
quite similar to the supervisor-ranger relationship. Regarding the day-to-day administration of their forests and even
the details of their forest plans, supervisors, and rangers
for that matter, are reported by interviewees to have considerable latitude. One Siskiyou ranger, for instance, claimed
to "see hardly any influence from the regional office at
all" and ventured to guess that it was the same for the supervisor. In Region Six, according to the ranger, most indi~Staff specialists such as wildlife biologists or hydrologists have no decisionmaking authority; their role is
only advisory. Only line officers (rangers and supervisors)
have such authority.
100 Michael Frome, The Forest Service (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 43.
1m Kaufman, 222.
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vidual forests plans lowered the ASQs and the regional off ice did not try to prevent it.
Other interviewees, however, argue that at the regional level certain contraints and pressures begin to be
brought to bear upon local administrators. Although the Siskiyou did manage a relatively miniscule eight mmbf drop in
the ASQ in its forest plan, the former supervisor implies
that he was prevented from reducing the harvest as much as
he wanted. He states, " .... if anything [the forest plan]
hadn't gone near far enough, but politically I went as far
as I could in reducing the cut and emphasizing other
values."
So despite their near-total autonomy regarding day-today administration, supervisors lose support and power,
warns the current supervisor, when they prove "unable to
perform." In this case, perform might be considered a
euphemism for maintaining high levels of timber output.
Using the goals and values of local Siskiyou administrators which were discussed in chapter five as a basis for
comparison, the regional off ice might seem even more timberoriented than the Siskiyou. One Siskiyou environmentalist
who finds Region Six "obstructionist," argues that even when
local Siskiyou officials agree with environmentalists and
make promises to alter policy, they are forced by regional
timber goals to squeeze out so much timber that they.ultimately have no choice but to go back on these promises. "No
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matter what they agree to locally," she claims, "they don't
have control over it" as the cut level "comes down on them
like a big ole hammer.

01 02

The former supervisor also recog-

nized the timber production slant of the regional office:
Traditionally, the Forest Service, at least in Region
Six .... has been much more commodity oriented and much
more tied to the production of timber and lumber products and tied into that whole economic picture and
the political support base for it.
Even less inclined towards ecological protection has
been the top, Washington D.C. level of the Forest Service.
Although the agency's characteristic decentralization and
delegation applies to D.C.-regional interaction as well, the
top echelons of the Forest Service do impose mandatory levels of resource production (both internally and
legislatively-derived) upon regional (and thus local) administrators which can be avoided only at the risk of termination or demotion. The controversy surrounding former Region
One Forester John Mumma clearly attests to that fact. "I am
expected to produce timber," explained Mumma who was forced
out in 1991 for failing to meet his regional quota,

"[t]here

is no doubt about it. My longevity as Regional Forester is
related to meeting the targets." 1 ~

Regional foresters,

warns one D.C. level official, have no choice but to accomplish what they were funded to do. Thus, regional foresters
1

~ As we shall discuss latter on, there are actually a
number of parties responsible for such high quotas.
103 John Mumma quoted in Jeff DeBonis, "Timber Industry
Wins Again, Congress Sets Dangerously High Timber Cut for
'91" Inner Voice (Winter 1991), 11.
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and supervisors have been faced with the impossible task of
simultaneously meeting timber targets and protecting forest
resources. There is little doubt that such intense pressures
to get out the cut at all costs led supervisors to appeal as
a group to Chief Robertson for change at their 1989
convention. 104
Consequently, both critics and agency personnel describe the D.C. office as being the level of the Forest Service most aligned with timber production goals and as the
former supervisor suggests, "pretty much stuck in a commodity orientation." This is vividly shown by McCormick's account of his 1989 visit to Washington to explain to Chief
Robertson and his deputies his proposal to reduce the Siskiyou's ASQ to 155 mmbf:
I did not get any questions about biological diversity, about anadromous fish, about spotted owls, about
wildlife; all the questions I got, all the inquiries
were having to do with how I was reducing the cut,
what was causing that to happen .... It was close to
being an inquisition .... r thought the Chief's office
was missing the big picture of what was going on out
here and where the public wanted to take management of
the forest.
Although he claims that it has profoundly changed for
the better since 1989, McCormick still finds that by nature
the Chief's office "is always a little behind the power
104

"Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" Headwaters
(March 1990), 3. This was not the first time supervisors
pressured for a reduction in the cut as a similar appeal and
warning of impending crises were made to Chief Peterson as
early as 1983. Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to special report, "Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15
October 1990), 26.
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curve on what's really happening out here on the ground as
regards folks changing, shifting values on how the forest is
managed." Likewise, even the D.C. official, speaking of
changes in agency direction such as the implementation of
New Forestry techniques, conceded that "the field was .... out
ahead of Washington on this."
The Siskiyou's experiment with intense public participation from 1988-1990 also met with a certain degree of toplevel suspicion as the former supervisor reports that his
program of workshop-style participation "made some Forest
Service folks nervous .... The vibrations I would get would be
that I might be going too far sometimes."1m
Not surprisingly, the D.C. office is characterized by a
number of observers as being the arena within the agency
where the timber interests' influence is most directly
felt)06

Interviewees tended to confirm this; environmental-

ists reported no direct contact whatsoever with the regional
or D.C. office, while a timber official, on the other hand,
saw his own group's influence and effectiveness slowly move
from the ranger district level to the regional and national
level (as environmentalists grew stronger on the local
front). Whereas his predecessor never went to Washington,
this official reported travelling there twelve to thirteen
times a year. Thus, while they have lost their local advan1

~ Although again, McCormick expressed confidence.that
D.C. was slowly moving in this direction as well.
106 See, for example, Culhane, 270.
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tage, according to one environmental activist, timber has
enjoyed far superior higher-level access in the executive
branch. 10 7

The former supervisor confirms this point admit-

ting that at the D.C. level, interest groups tied to commodity production tend " to have the Chief's ear." Frome claims
that the chief may have no choice:
The chief is cautious to avoid defying leaders of industry, for they can get his scalp one way or another.
He acknowledges the role of citizen groups, but is
careful not to go overboard or become overly intimate
with them since such behavior is likely to stir up the
industry. 108
The Administration and the Cabinet
Compared with its executive branch superiors, even the
fairly pro-timber top echelon of the Forest Service has
seemed positively moderate in the period from 1983 to 1992.
Almost without exception, the environmental attitudes of top
advisors, cabinet heads, and other top-level administrative
officials who dealt with the old growth issue in both the
Reagan and Bush administrations, have ranged from hostile to
extremely hostile. Although these top-level administrative
officials only very occasionally intervene in the day-to-day
management of or detailed planning for public lands, the
broad priorities they set can still exert tremendous indirect pressure upon land managers. Such priorities set the
tone and the boundaries for policymaking and cannot help but
1

~ During this time, environmentalists did, howe~er,
maintain their national access in the legislative realm.
108
Frome, 39.
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weigh heavily upon even seemingly autonomous lower-level
bureaucrats. In the Reagan and Bush administrations there
can be no mistaking these priorities: the maximization of
commodity production on public lands and the minimization of
ecosystem, wildlife, and other resource protection.
The cabinet official most directly reponsible for
overseeing the Forest Service is the Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture for Natural Resources and the Environment. During the early and mid-1980s, this position was occupied by
John Crowell Jr., a former top executive of Louisiana Pacific. 109 While most assistant secretaries have tread cautiously when dealing with the proud and independent Forest Service, Crowell was a man with an agenda and set about his
task of overseeing the agency with a missionary zeal. During
Crowell's tenure, timber and road budget requests skyrocketed while wildlife, recreation, and soil budgets atrophied. 110

In fact, Crowell, who favored the complete liquida-

tion and conversion of all unprotected old growth, sought a
full doubling of the already high total annual national forest timber output to ten billion board feet.1 11

Consequent-

ly, Crowell, reviled by environmentalists, was also viewed
with suspicion by the Forest Service. Even the fairly

109 Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber
Management Plans" Oregonian special report, 8. Crowell had
as his deputy Douglas MacCleery, previously an official with
the National Forest Products Association. Frome, 8.
110 Durbin, 8.
111 Ibid.
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timber-friendly Region Six forester was moved to comment
that "John has no idea what's out there on the ground. He's
not in touch with reality .... He's living out there in fantasy land. " 112
Despite Crowell's unusually active stance as an assistant secretary, the Forest Service, for the most part,
resisted his more outlandish plans for the national forests.
Still Crowell played a big role in implementing the Reagan
administration's maximum development policies and setting
the agency down the path of unsustainably high timber production. Crowell, who left in 1985, was succeeded by assistant secretaries (George Dunlop and James Moseley) who,
while still firmly production-oriented, stayed much further
out of the spotlight and did not attempted to directly manage Forest Service policy.
The various secretaries of Agriculture during the period of 1983 to 1992 (John Block, Richard Lyng, Clayton Yeutter, and Edward Madigan) have all held largely the same unabashedly pro-development points of view. 11 3

Though Agricul-

ture is very careful not to step on the toes of its largest
and most prestigious bureau, what is usually subtle, behind-

112

Former Region Six Forester James Torrence quoted in

Ibid.

113

This might be due, in large part, to the very nature
of the department which is, of course, dedicated to the production of crops. It is small wonder then that a perennial
demand of many environmentalists and others interested in
Forest Service reform is that the agency to be transferred
to Interior.
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the-scenes pressure infrequently makes its way to the surface. An especially prominent example of this would be the
department directive that forced a reluctant Forest Service
to go along with the very controversial proposal to ban administrative timber sale appeals (the Forest Service sought
only some revisions in the process). As the stakes and tensions in the old growth struggle began to rise after 1990,
the usually silent secretary (by now, Madigan) started to
become more vocal and strident. After publicly calling for
the Forest Service to be "freed from the interference of the
federal courts, "114

In a 1992 speech to an agricultural

group, Madigan later defiantly proclaimed that "[t]his owl
is ultimately going to go the way of the ice truck ....

11

115

The other cabinet level department involved in the old
growth issue has been Interior. While the ideogically ferocious anti-environmentalism of Reagan's forest secretary,
James Watt, is legendary, his successors in the Reagan administration (William Clark and Donald Hodel) largely continued his policies, albeit with a less antagonistic style.
It has been during the tenure of Bush's appointee Manuel

114

Edward Madigan quoted in "Legal Update" Headwaters
(Late Summer 1991), 10.
115 Even more stridently, Madigan suggested, at that same
speech that the 1992 Republican platform should call for
"more money, higher income, more markets. String all the
environmentalists up." Madigan quoted in "U.S. Can't Save
Endangered Owl, Agriculture Secretary Warns" Chicago Tribune
(16 July 1992), sec.1, 13.
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Lujan, however, that Interior has had to deal most directly
with the old growth/spotted owl controversy.
Like his predecessors, Lujan brought to his job what
Vig terms a "dismal environmental record "11 6

and his stance

regarding old growth has done little to change that reputation. Lujan's policies, according to one observer, "distinctly tilt towards industry

11

117

and he has intervened in

his agencies' affairs far more vigorously than any of his
counterparts in Agriculture have. Lujan did just about all
in his power, for example, to prevent or delay the listing
of the spotted owl as threatened by his department's Fish
and Wildlife Service and when finally forced by the courts
to do so, he strongly lobbied for the activization of the
ESA-exempting God Squad committee of which he is chair. 118
At the very top of the executive branch during the
time frame of this study have been Presidents Reagan and
116

Norman Vig, "Presidential Leadership: From the Reagan
to the Bush. Administration" in Vig and Kraft, 49.
117
Ted Gup, "The Stealth Secretary" Time ( 25 May 1992),
57.

118

Like his predecessor Watt, Lujan has left a vivid
trail of notable quotes, calling the BLM's three hundredplus million acres of public land, for example, "a place
with a lot of grass for cows." Referring to the questionable
value of the ESA, Lujan said, "I believe that man is at the
top of the pecking order. I think that God gave us dominion
over these creatures .... ! just look at an armadillo or a
skunk or a squirrel or an owl or a chicken, whatever it is,
and I consider the human being on a higher scale. Maybe
that's because a chicken doesn't talk." Lujan goes on to
testify to the hardiness of species: "All species adjust to
change. I can't give you any specific examples, but .I'm sure
biolo-gists could give you examples of fish that all of a
sudden here comes saltwater intrusion and slowly they adapt
to a saltwater environment." Lujan quoted in Gup, 58.
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Bush and their circle of advisors. For the most part, the
old growth issue did not reach the point where it received
direct presidential attention until the Bush years. While
Bush is generally recognized as being less ideologically
hostile to environmental objectives than Reagan, 119 with the
old growth issue his administration left little doubt that
it stood with timber interests, perhaps more so than any
other element of government, save congressmen from timber
districts. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bush cast
aside any remaining pretensions of being the "environmental
president," adopting harsh anti-environmental rhetoric regarding old growth and the "spotted owl

crowd."1~

Well be-

fore this point, however, the administration sought to keep
up a steady rate of old growth harvest and prevent or limit
protection of the

owl. 1 ~

Concerning the violation of envi-

ronmental laws, Judge Dwyer writes:
119 vig, 53.
1
~ Bush repeatedly used the phrase "spotted owl crowd" in
a dirisive way in 1992 campaign speeches and in the presidential debates.
1
~ Strongly pushing these positions has been a circle of
advisors with a commodity production-orientation more pronounced than that of Bush himself. These executive office
advisors (many of whom sat on the God Squad committee) have
included Dan Quayle in his capacity as both Vice President
and chairman of the anti-regulatory Council On Competitiveness, Chief of Staff John Sununu, Council of Economic Advisors chairman Michael Baskin, and Office of Management and
Budget director Richard Darman. Darman especially, is known
as a unrepentent arch-enemy of environmentalism. Darman
emphasized in a 1990 lecture that "Americans did not fight
and win the wars of the twentieth century to make the world
safe for green vegetables." Darman quoted in John Newhouse,
"The Diplomatic Round: Earth Summit" New Yorker (l June
1992), 70.
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This is not the doing of scientists, foresters, rangers, and others at working levels of these agencies.
It reflects decisions made by higher authority in the
executive branch of government.1~
What is most interesting about top-level adrninistration in the case of the Siskiyou is the level of access publie lands user groups seemed to have been granted. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is actually the reverse
of the localized capture McConnell and others warn of.
Mahood, in fact, speaks of a recent trend in direct lobbying
of the formerly more aloof president and his advisors.123
Lowi, too, notes and bemoans this phenomenon of the "personal president" directly involved in the pettiness of special
interest politics . 124

This trend of high-level timber influ-

ence probably extends back prior to this case, as Barney,
speaking of the Nixon administration, finds that "[n]o agribusiness interest group has found the doors to the White
House more open than the timber industry. "125 Even a local
timber official conceded that, as a whole, his industry was
most effective at the highest levels of national government.
Congress
Not all of the eagerness of the Forest Service to "get

122 From the opinion of Judge William Dwyer, Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District,
199lj, Finding of Fact # 15, Section V.
12 Mahood, 133.
1
~ Theodore Lowi, The Personal President (Ithaca,_ NY:
Cornell University Press, 1985).
125 Daniel Barney, The Last Stand (New York: Grossman,
1974), xvi.
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out the cut" was internally generated or due to pressure
from Agriculture or the executive office. To some extent
this push for high levels of commodity production was also a
product of congressional pressure on an agency understandably keen on maintaining its high budgets. In the Siskiyou
and larger old growth conflict, Congress has played a very
complex and often contradictory role, proving to be, in one
capacity or another, both the environmentalists' best hope
and worst foe. At the root of Congress's ambivalent stance
towards old growth is its dual nature. Determining how ecologically oriented Congress has been has largely depended
upon which segment of the institution is considered. Likewise, the literature on Congress's environmental performance
tends to reflect the body's dualism with some observers
stressing its notable achievements and others citing its paralysis and "lack of coherence" on environmental matters.1U
In the inherent institutional conflict between the
goals of representation and distribution of benefits on one
hand and rational and comprehensive lawmaking on the other,
the former has clearly prevailed in the politics of old
growth. As Lowi and other critics would predict, such dis1u Michael Kraft, "Congress and Environmental Policy" in
James Lester (editor), Environmental Politics and Policy
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press); Mary Cook and Roger
Davidson, "Deferral Politics: Congressional Decision Making
on Environmental Issues in the 1980s" in Helen Ingram and R.
Kenneth Godwin (editors), Public Policy and the Natural Environment (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985); Richard Cooley
and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Congress and the Environment
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970).
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tributive politics has been dominated by local representatives positioned on key committees. The Siskiyou's congressmen along with the rest of the Pacific Northwest's delegation as well as the delegations from other timber-rich Western states have heavily populated the various committees
which oversee the Forest Service and public lands management.
Six committees and six subcommittees have been involved in the politics of old growth. The House and Senate
Appropriations Committees and both of their Interior Appropriations Subcommittees are responsible for setting timber
budgets, and thus ASQs, for the Forest Service. The task of
crafting ancient forest and forest management legislation
falls upon the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee and its Conservation and Forestry Subcommittee,
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and its
Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests Subcommittee, the
House Agriculture Committee and its Forests, Family Farms,
and Energy Subcommittee, and the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee and its National Parks and Public Lands
Subcommittee.
In 1990, Oregon's Senator Hatfield (R) sat on the
Senate Appropriations Committee as well as the Public Lands
Subcommittee. Both of the Siskiyou's representatives, Peter
DeFazio ( D) and Robert Smith ( R), were on the Nation_al Parks
and Public Lands Subcommittee, while Smith also sat on the
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the Forests, Family Farms, and Energy Subcommittee. Nearby
representative Les Aucoin (D) and Washington's Norm Dicks
(D) were on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee,
while Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Rep. Sid Morrison (RWA) among other Western and Northwestern congressmen also
figured prominently on these committees and subcommittees . 127
While there have been too many other outside players
to constitute a classic iron triangle, the relationship between some of these committees (especially Interior Appropriations), the Forest Service, and timber constituents have,
at times, contained many elements of this situation. When it
comes to pleasing constituents in home districts and guaranteeing their votes, timber is a tangible, distributable, and
thus politically lucrative item, while standing trees and
owls are not. As such, various members of Congress have consistently imposed upon a fairly compliant and understandably
budget-conscious Forest Service timber quotas higher than
even the timber-oriented agency has requested--700 mmbf more
in 1986, 1 bbf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf in
1989.1~

In the Siskiyou alone, the congressionally mandated

target for 1987 was 46.7% more than the Forest Service had

127

Committee membership information is from: Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, Almanac of American Politics· 1992
(Washington D.C.: National Journal, 1991).
128
Durbin, 11.
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planned. 1 ~

According to an aide to Chief Robertson, these

congressional imposed ASQs of the 1980s were "earmarked" and
"untouchable, "130 Thus, much of the rangers' mad scramble in
that decade to squeeze sales from every available corner of
their districts was attributable to these unsustainable quotas. Not surprisingly, Siskiyou officials reported in the
interviews that Congress did place some constraints upon
their decisionmaking. 131
As one might expect, the loyalties of most of the
Northwest delegation have been beyond

doubt.1~

"In my six

years on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee,"
Representative Aucoin wrote in a 1986 letter to a constituent, "I have made the well-being of the Northwest's forest
products industry my number one priority. 111 33

In keeping

with these priorities, Northwestern and often Rocky Mountain
129 Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker
(14 May 1990), 56.
1
~ Quoted in Durbin, 11.
131 Still, Siskiyou officials reported a very cordial
working relationship with the Oregon delegation and seemed
to understand congressional intervention as a legitimate
part of doing business.
1
~ The few notable exceptions would include former Washington Sen. Brock Adams, his replacement Sen. Patty Murray
(D) and Reps. Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) and Jim McDermott (DWA).
1" AuCoin letter quoted in Cary Groner, "The Congressional Connection" What's Happening (Eugene OR: 12 May
1988), 7. Aucoin represented an adjacent district to the
Siskiyou area before his def eat to Senator Packwood in the
1992 Oregon Senate race. In that race, Packwood made a point
of blaming the spotted owl and the ESA for Oregon's economic
woes, while the equally pro-timber Aucoin moved to a more
environmental position. Oregon's other senator, of course,
was Mark Hatfield, "the politician most feared and detested
by ancient forest activists," according to Caufield, 82.
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legislators have not hesitated to use their congressional
clout to bully bureaucrats on behalf of timber interests.
AuCoin, for example, publicly threatened Chief Max Peterson's job during hearings when the Chief reported trouble
meeting the 1986 quota's 20%

increase. 1 ~

Peterson resigned

soon thereafter. 135
While the power of the Northwest delegation on the
various forestry committees (and independently as well) has
been substantial, various observers have noticed a slow but
profound shift occurring as committee makeup over over the
1980s has moved slightly away from Westerners. Midwestern
and Eastern representatives are becoming less shy, according
to both Egan and Davis, when it comes to intervening in publie lands issues--traditionally an area where strict deference to Western legislators had been the

norm. 1 ~

While a

number of commitees (especially Agricultural ones) still
134
135

Durbin, 7.
There is a long history congressional intimidation of
Forest Service personnel when certain congressmen believe
that the agency is not keeping up with commodity production.
Most recent examples besides the Aucoin-Peterson flap include the resignation of Regional Forester Mumma in which
Senator James McClure (R-ID) was perhaps the driving force
and Senator John McCain's (R-AZ) confrontation with Coronado
National Forest Supervisor Jim Abbott over an endangered
squirrel. Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians
Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" New York Times (16 September 1991); John Pickens, "Arizona Senator Threatens Forest
Service Chief and Forest Supervisor" Inner Voice (Winter
1991l, 15.
13 Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hinterlands" New York Times (11 November 1990), 4:18; Phillip
Davis, "Cry for Preservation, Recreation Changing Public
Lands Policy" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (3
August 1991), 2145-2151.
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have, to varying degrees, a pro-development tilt, the House
National Parks subcommittee could now be said to be firmly
environmentalist.
In the House Appropriations Subcommittee, meanwhile,
the staunch pro-timber stance of the early and mid-1980s has
eased somewhat as non-timber legislators such as Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL) have increasingly asserted
themselves to offset pro-timber influence. Yates, representing Chicago, typifies this Eastern environmental counterbalance to Western timber interests. "These are the classic
giants we read so much about," said Yates speaking of old
growth at a 1988 hearing, "Coming from the city, I'm prejudiced about those forests. We want them to stand.

11

137

While

environmentalists naturally welcome public lands issues being treated as matters of national policy rather than the
domain of local congressmen seeking pork, this trend has enraged Western pro-timber legislators who resent such "interference." Rep. Don Young (R-AK) went as far as to deride his
colleague Jim Jontz and other pro-environmental representatives as "pimps for Eastern environmentalists. "138
What the growing prominence of non-Western or nontimber congresspeople in public lands issues represents is a
movement away from the strictly distributional, "iron1
~ Rep. Sidney Yates quoted in Alan Hayakawa "Fight
Erupts at Forest Service Hearings" Oregonian ( 15 Apr_il
l 988J.
1
Rep. Don Young quoted in Egan, "Fighting for Control .... "
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triangle" brand of legislative politics that Lowi and McConnell decry. Instead, such politics is more akin to the
national-interest policymaking that both critics advocate
for Congress. In such a scenario, broader concern over
national-scale policy would replace some of the traditional
deference to local representatives' policy preferences and
the vote-trading that often accompanies it. Increased nationalization of old growth politics also assumes that the
relevant agency--the Forest Service--will answer to all of
Congress and not just the local representatives in their
subgovernments as Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) explains:
At the national level, the Forest Service must work
with a broader segment of Congress than it has in the
past. Many of us care deeply about forests located far
beyond our state's borders. Timber target levels are
set by the whole Congress--not just the two senators
in whose state a particular forest is located. 139
In the same vein, Interior Chairman George Miller perceives
the old growth issue as:
.... sort of like the national debt. You're just screwing generations down the line out of their inheritance
.... It's going to be a national decision. This is a
national resource. 140
Although it is changing, Congress is still, however,
quite far from this Lowiesque ideal regarding forest issues.
Rather, this move away from strict distributional politics
1

~ Senator Patrick Leahy quoted in Terence Tipple and J.
Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty
Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to Complexity
and Diversity" Public Administration Review 51:5 (September/
October 1991), 424.
140 Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Oregon" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 16. Author's italics.
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has resulted in a nearly complete stalemate as far as ancient forest legislation is concerned. The pro-timber and
pro-environmental factions in Congress are each strong
enough to thwart the other, but not enough so to see their
policy preference triumph. So on one hand, the worst abuses
of the 1980's congressional super-quotas have ceased as timber targets, though still unsustainably high, have leveled
off somewhat and threats to judicial review and citizen appeals have been soundly beaten back since 1990. And for all
the grief congressional timber quotas have caused environmentalists, most would still claim that they are taken most
seriously and find their closest allies at the congressional
level. Yet in keeping within its overall environmental ambivalence, Congress is no closer, as of 1992, to producing
any sort of long-term comprehensive solution than it was a
half decade

earlier. 1 ~

Perhaps where Congress has most closely conformed to
Lowi's critique is regarding the flexibility of the legislative mandates it has given the Forest Service. In the case
of old growth, Lowi's thesis that broad discretion is vulnerable to being perverted to suit powerful interests has
been irrefutably realized. Not only has the Forest Service
taken extreme liberties with the acts under which it must
operate (most prominently, the Multiple Use/Sustained Yield
1

~ This may finally change in 1993 if the ascende~ce of
the more environmentally inclined Clinton administration
provides any impetus to resolve the issue.

434

Act, NFMA, NEPA, the ESA, and the Clean Water Act), but in
many cases Congress itself has directly ordered the agency
to take action that would violate such laws and in some
cases has then shielded the agency from citizen or judicial
review. 1Q

Regulations regarding reforestation, water qual-

ity, sustained yield levels, wildlife habitat, endangered
species, and environmental impact documentation, to name but
a few, have been routinely violated whether through the Forest Service's own volition or under the congressional
gun. 143
Thus, there exists a profound irony in congressional
behavior regarding forest issues: Congress passes seemingly
tough laws to protect forest resources, but when the actual
implementation of those laws threatens to reduce the flow of
distributive benefits, various congresspersons become indignant and threaten bureaucratic jobs if unsustainable

1

Q
The Interior Appropriations Subcommittee's quotas in
the 1980s, for example, could not be fulfilled without
wholesale violations of Congress's own mandates. The Silver
Fire court ban rider and the infamous Section 318 are clear
examples of congressional protection of agencies who neglect
to enforce mandates and would otherwise be subject to legal
action.
1
~ The laws listed above are each characterized by varying degrees of vagueness or clarity. On one hand, ESA, the
Sustained Yield half of the MU/SY Act and parts of NFMA are
relatively straightfoward, while the Multiple Use half of
MU/SY, much of NEPA, and the more general, non-procedural
goals of NFMA are notoriously ambiguous. Regardless of their
level of precision, however, Congress has generally ·allowed
implementing agencies wide latitude in reinterpreting or selectively enforcing these laws.
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congressionally-mandated quotas are not met.144

More than

anything else, this points to Congress's dualistic nature
regarding ecological issues. There is great tension between
national-interest lawmaking which tends to favor ecological
goals and local, distributively-oriented representation
which tends to favor commodity production.
Because they mostly live far away from old growth forests and do not represent timber workers, the former contingent in Congress has the luxury to consider very important
long-term costs and benefits which logically seem to favor
environmental protection. The latter contingent, however, is
afforded no such luxury to be far-sighted since the shortterm costs of preservation would be borne almost entirely
upon their constituents (just as they previously almost entirely reaped the short-term benefits). Thus we have Sidney
Yates simultaneously hailed as an issue-oriented statesman
def ending the national interest and our natural heritage and
denounced as a sanctimonious meddler with nothing at stake.

144 Appearing with President Bush at a 1991 speech in
Port-land in which Bush complained of "extreme environmental
positions," Sen. Packwood candidly and perhaps inadvertantly
confirmed this congressional double-standard regarding the
laws it passes. When asked by reporters if any of the extremism to which the President ref erred was to be found in
his own agencies or the courts, Packwood replied, "I think
he was pointing out those who file petitions .... Under the
law, those bills (environmental protection measuresr are not
self-enforcing." Packwood quoted in David Sarasohn, "Packwood Connects Bush to a Tree" Oregonian (20 September 1991).
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The Courts
Perhaps the clearest evidence of Congress's environmental dualism and the failure of broad discretion has been
the pivotal role played by the federal judiciary in the
Siskiyou/old growth case. Just as centralists would predict,
in the absence of clear and authoritative goals whose implementation is beyond question, unresolved policy conflicts
end up by default in an overloaded court

system.1~

As a

forum of last resort for gridlocked committees, interests,
and agencies wrangling over vague or unimplemented statutes,
the prominence of the judicial branch in old growth politics
is clear testament to pluralism's weakness in this regard.
Despite a number of judicial setbacks (and the fact
that the burden of proof usually rests with environmental
litigants in such a way as to favor the status quo 146 ), suecessful lawsuits have, nevertheless, been the environmentalists' most effective weapon and the cornerstone of their efforts to save old growth. In fact, according to one activist, the only real tangible success environmentalists have

ever achieved with old growth has been through litigation.
They have scored key victories in which the courts have
ruled that land management agencies have flagrantly violated
statutes such as NFMA, NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act.
Judge Dwyer writes in his 1991 opinion of "a systematic re-

1
~ c. Hardin, 188.
146 Henning and Mangun, 34.
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fusal by the Forest Service to comply with laws protecting
wildlife. "147
Because the law and irrefutable scientific evidence
has mostly been on their side, environmentalists have been
able, therefore, to achieve legally what they could not
achieve politically, forcing their demands to be heard by a
largely resistant legislature and bureaucracy. According to
one environmentalist, it has been the rude crisis caused by
tens of thousands of acres of enjoined timber sales and the
subsequent disruption in the smooth flow of constituent benefits, rather than her group's lobbying and organizing that
has caught Congress's attention and granted the group's demands legitimacy. At least in this case, Petulla is correct
when he claims that "the citizens' 'agency' remains the
courts" in matters

environmental. 1 ~

Naturally, timber interests, their congressional allies, and the Forest Service do not hold judicial intervention in nearly as high esteem. A number of interviewees
spoke of the "total frustration" the Forest Service feels
with the constant litigation and the courts' undoing of all
147

Dwyer opinion, Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, sec.
VI. Actually, a representative of Headwaters claimed that
although the Forest Service was in gross violation of the
ESA, the group "had enough goods on 'em already" using only
NFMA and NEPA. Dwyer's decision on the spotted owl, therefore, found the Forest Service to be in violation of NFMA
procedures. Zilly's ruling against the Fish and Wildlife
Service, on the other hand, did rely on the ESA.
1
~ Joseph Petulla, Environmental Protection in the United
States (San Francisco: San Francisco Study Center, 1987),
103.
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their work. Timber interests, meanwhile, have been simply
apoplectic. One timber company official complained bitterly
about judges who know nothing about forestry making "academic" decisions which prevent Forest Service professionals
from doing their job. According to that official, courtdirected forest policy was akin to having a "dentist running
a spaceship" or an "astronaut drilling on your teeth." Instead, timber interests generally preferred broad mandates
within which Forest Service professionals could practice
forestry as they felt most appropriate. Furthermore, most of
their forest legislation proposals have also included some
sort of limit on judicial review of timber sales.
The courts owe their prominence in the politics of old
growth not only to their accessibility (court-banning riders
notwithstanding), but to a highly fragmented and conflictual
policymaking apparatus as well. Although the federal judiciary, as an antidote to vague or unimplemented statutes and
decentralized confusion, does represent a type of centralized authority, the courts cannot simply be regarded as a
typical manifestation of political centralization as called
for by centralist theorists. A centralized system, at least
as Lowi calls for it, would actually feature a less active
judiciary that would be called on to referee policy disputes
far less often. Still, by serving as a partial corrective to
mischieviously interpreted statutes, judicial rulings do allow us to gain at least some idea of how ecological policy
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might be treated in a more centralized system. Thus, in an
indirect way, court decisions such as Dwyer's or Zilly's allow us to sneak a glimpse into a world in which legislative
mandates are interpreted as being clear and authoritative
and bureaucracies are expected to implement those laws with
some degree of fidelity to the law's intent.
State and Local Government
Although neither the state of Oregon nor the various
counties or municipalities surrounding the Siskiyou had any
direct jurisdiction over policymaking in the federal Forest,
these local governments did, to varying degrees, wield influence. For example, although there was no legal or regulatory requirement for the Siskiyou's administrators to clear
the Forest Plan with the state, the former supervisor reported that the Governor's forestry advisor worked closely
with him on the Plan and that the state's influence was
"significant." In fact, one district ranger claimed that
state pressure on the Plan was much more intense than that
from the regional office or D.C. McCormick confirmed that it
was politically impossible to ignore the state (which went
as far as drafting its own version of the Plan), especially
since Senator Hatfield made it known that he would not agree
to any Plan that Governor Neil Goldschmidt (a Democrat, no
less) did not sign on to. The result was a plan with a
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slightly higher ASQ than the Siskiyou's administrators would
have preferred.
Not all elements of state government, however, were as
timber-oriented as Governor Goldschmidt's office. While many
Western states have fairly anti-environmental wildlife and
public lands agencies, Oregon, traditionally one of the
West's most liberal

states, 1 ~

has two fairly vigilant agen-

cies, the Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) and Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ). Throughout the planning process for the Siskiyou's many timber projects, these
two departments (especially the latter) would often raise
doubts and clearly register their misgivings concerning the
negative wildlife and water quality implications of Forest
Service proposals. These agencies, however, enjoyed far less
clout than the Governor's office. 150

The strongly pro-timber

state Department of Forestry and the governor's office (although it was far less anti-environmental than many of its
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In his evaluation of state environmental policies,
James Lester lists Oregon in the top ttprogressive" category
with high commitment and high institutional capability.
James Lester, "A New Federalism?", 73.
1
~More environmentally inclined state wildlife agencies
such as Oregon's or Washington's have long clashed with the
Forest Service. They argue that national forest wildlife,
although on federal land, are still partly their jurisdiction. When dealing with the hunting and game management
goals and responsibilities of traditional wildlife agencies,
the Forest Service usually is happy to defer to the state.
When confronted with state demands for increased habitat
protection for non-game species, though, the agency is far
less willing to share turf. "State Game Agency Appeals Forest Service Timber Sales" Inner Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 4.
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western counterparts) were much more likely than the ODFW or
the ODEQ to support federal plans.
This gubernatorial support, however, became far less
assured after Democrat Barbara Roberts' victory in 1990
state elections. Roberts, who leans towards environmental
protection, quickly shifted the weight of the governor's
office away from strict commodity production. For instance,
the Governor submitted an official brief in early 1992 urging the God Squad to reject the BLM and Interior's request
to partially lift the old growth logging injunction. Calling
the God Squad process "disgraceful," Roberts claimed that
the federal government was "playing on the fears of our
workers and offering them false hope.

0

15 1

Not surprisingly,

this position earned her the enmity of the timber interests
who promptly initiated a recall petition drive to oust her
from

office. 1 ~

Needless to say, then, the overall environ-

mental stance of the state has been largely dependent upon
who has occupied the governor's office. If the Siskiyou had
to work with a Roberts administration when developing their
Plan, the final outcome may have been somewhat different.
While the state has wavered from a moderate pro-timber
position to a fairly environmentalist one, county and municipal governments around the Siskiyou have had only one unchanging stance--maximum timber harvest. Although the for151

"Governor Blasts Lujan .... And Gets Blasted in Return"
Headwaters Journal (Spring 1992), 16.
1
~ Ibid.
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mer supervisor claims that local officials were a "strong
factor" in policymaking, their positions were so invariably
uncompromising (essentially the same as the timber
interests 153

),

that this probably kept them a further dis-

tance from Siskiyou officials than the state government. For
instance, while the state and the supervisor's office haggled over a relatively small ten or twelve mmbf difference
for the Plan's ASQ, local governments, almost without exception, signed on to the timber industry's Evergreen Alternative which called for a huge 188 mmbf ASQ and short eightyyear rotations. Such an unbending stance probably led to
them being treated more as another timber interest than as
governmental representatives and potential policy brokers.
The Effects of Fragmentation in the Siskiyou
Whether policy in a given instance has been influenced
at the top administrative levels or in the field, or by
local, constituent-focused or national policy-focused legislators, or at the federal or state/local levels, the overall
picture in the politics of old growth has, as mentioned before, been one of considerable fragmentation. The most crucial question, therefore, is whether the policymaking flaws
of fragmentation as alleged by critics (namely, capture, incrementalism, rivalry, and reductionism) have been readily
apparent in the Siskiyou case.
153

In fact, many mill owners and other timber officials
sat on these local government boards.
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Chapter five has already addressed the issue of localized capture and it was determined that while timber-biased
to some extent, the local administrators of the Siskiyou
were certainly not captured. Thus, the isolation of administrative decentralization that critics warn leads to capture,
was simply not enough for local commodity-using clients to
control the Siskiyou, at least after

1983. 1 ~

In fact, as

mentioned in the previous chapter, the history of the Siskiyou case shows far more one-sided access (akin to a capture situation) at the higher, rather than lower levels of
the agency, the Agriculture Department, and the executive
office.
The effects of incrementalism, however, cannot be as
easily dismissed. Throughout the course of Siskiyou and old
growth politics, the grip of previously established policy
patterns has been tenacious; precedence has been king. As we
have seen, the main battlegrounds have been in the businessas-usual forums of timber budgets, ASQs, or EIS processes
for timber projects. The battles that have raged have been
whether to raise or lower targets by a few mmbf or budgets
by a few percentage points. Proposals which have seriously
deviated from the status quo in either direction, whether
eliminating the Endangered Species Act, completely banning
judicial review, establishing large-scale ecosystem-based
1

~ While not captured, some aspects of the agency's relationship with local congressmen did, however, resemble aspects of the traditional subgovernment setup.
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old growth protection, or restricting exports, have been
routinely beaten back. 155

In fact, the only serious jolt to

the status quo--the Dwyer injunctions--were imposed from
outside the administrative/legislative realm. Otherwise, all
the process could produce, at least through 1992, were advisory commission studies and incremental adjustments in the
ASQ. And, of course, a fairly steady flow of timber, injunctions notwithstanding.
Policymaking structures in the old growth case have
thus been incapable of producing radical or comprehensively
conceived realignments of policy such as, perhaps, ecosystem
reserves or true biodiversity protection or a program of
economic restructuring and retraining for timber-dependent
areas or, for that matter, eliminating sustained yield requirements. While perhaps they were never designed to be
capable of such things, this inability, regardless of intent, is precisely what prompts critics to call for reform
or fundamental restructuring.

155

It could feasibly be argued that the incorporation of
New Forestry techniques in Forest Service timber projects
represent a radical deviation from previous policy. As we
discussed in chapter five, however, there are good reasons
to doubt whether the New Perspectives program is truly revolutionary. While New Forestry techniques are authentically
preferable to clearcutting, until they are unmistakably part
of an integrated attempt to achieve ecological sustainability on the national forests and not just designed to_keep
logging high volumes in more acceptable ways, then it cannot
really be considered much of a deviation from an incrementalist status quo.
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The critics' arguments regarding the rivalry and reductionism of decentralized policymaking units can also be
confirmed by evidence from this case. As should be expected,
there was some friction between various policymaking entities, whether state-federal, congressional-Forest Service,
or even within various levels or disciplines within the Forest Service. While there were no spectacular clashes (such
the epic Forest Service-Park Service struggle over the Olympic forest which Twight chronicled), this friction has, on
occasion, caused problems. The rivalry between the timberoriented Agriculture committees and more environmentallyoriented Interior committees over the domain of ancient forest legislation, for instance, has certainly played a role
in creating the half-decade-long legislative stalemate.
Far more destructive to environmental goals, however,
has been the reductionism that has characterized the policymaking realm. Within the world of public lands policy, the
goals, values, and technical orientations of the various
policymaking entities involved have served to constrict
their abilities to formulate long-term, comprehensive solutions to the old growth question. Policies have largely been
drawn up instead, by disparate parties in something of a
vaccuum, without regard to related problems, facts, or
events. The Forest Service, for example, routinely planned
timber sales with little consultation with Fish and_Wildlife
personnel as to spotted owl or marbled murrelet habitat or
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salmon runs, while Fish and Wildlife drew up habitat conservation areas strictly as it concerned their charge, the
spotted owl, rather than the larger old growth community.156
The result of this sort of policymaking-with-blinderson and lack of coordination has been, at times, chaos and
confusion on the Siskiyou; even the policymakers most intimately involved have not always known what exactly is going
on. The Forest Service sold old growth timber while drawing
up their own spotted owl plan, while Fish and Wildlife formulated a completely unrelated recovery strategy which included protection of some of the timber the Forest Service
was busy cutting. The ISC, meanwhile, issued their own spotted owl recommendations as rival congressional committees
with the help of opposing interest groups each drew up their
own tentative ancient forest reserve systems. And throughout
all of this, upper-level executive appointees worked to undermine any potential protective measures, while the federal
court rulings kept up a steady stream of pressure upon agencies in the opposite direction.
It is no wonder then, that with numerous authorized
parties working with so little coordination and pushing in
1

~ One reason, besides differing specializations, for the
fairly poor coordination between the Forest Service and the
Fish and Wildlife Service, according to several Siskiyou
personnel, has been that the latter's chronic understaffing
and underfunding limit its ability to communicate and coordinate. Clarke and McCool goes as far as to term the nearly friendless agency an "organizational gnat." Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, Staking Out the Terrain (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1985), 145.
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such disparate directions, each has tended, in their isolation and specialization, to be, as one observer put it,
somewhat "out of the loop." One activist claims of the Forest Service, "We know more than they do. We can tell them
what's going on." This reductionism goes beyond interagency
relations as even the various specializations within the
Forest Service have often tended to act with a minimum of
internal coordination, mirroring the larger external picture. "The right hand," says a timber official, "doesn't
know what the left hand is doing." Thus, with one of those
hands, agency biologists work to formulate a spotted owl
recovery plan, while with the other, foresters and line
officers draw up unrelated forest plans with ASQs and roadless entries which might very well violate the owl plan.
This lack of a truly comprehensive vision of land management in favor of disjointed, piecemeal, timber saledriven management might be partly attributable to the fact
that the agency is so highly compartmentalized into the
realms of specialists--foresters, engineers, wildlife biologists, hydrologists, soil scientists, archeologists, recreationists, and so on. Perhaps more importantly, some of
these specializations are powerful while others are marginalized. As such, comprehensive solutions integrating old
growth ecology, wildlife, and economic concerns into a longterm, big-picture strategy have faced enormously difticult,
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nearly insurmountable obstacles in such a fragmented and
biased structure.
The closest thing to true coordination and interagency
cooperation in the old growth case has been the work of the
Interagency Scientific Committee, made up of experts from a
number of state and federal agencies. Theoretically, at
least, such a commission should be able to transcend the
conflictual fragmentation of jurisdictions deadlocked on a
particular policy problem and in doing so, provide some coordination and basis for cooperation to these same jurisdictions. The degree of legitimacy that the committee's recommendations eventually garnered, as well as the centrality of
the !SC as a player in the old growth politics of 1989-1991,
points to their surprising success. They did indeed coordinate scientific efforts to understand and manage the spotted
owl. Their exclusive focus on the owl and nothing else, however, has limited their effectiveness at offering the truly
comprehensive sorts of solutions to the larger root problem
(that of vanishing old growth ecosystems) that many observers would expect from an organization of this nature. At
least in this case, therefore, good coordination did not
guarantee comprehensiveness. A newer interagency commission,
the Northern Spotted Owl Recovery Team, similarly made of
various state and federal agencies and individuals, has
since supplanted the !SC as the main vehicle for policy
coordination.
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Conclusion

When considering whether political fragmentation in
the Siskiyou has been harmful to ecological goals or when
comparing the policy preferences of higher levels versus
lower levels of political authority, the only thing that
becomes perfectly clear is that not much is clear. Is political centralization necessary if ecological values are to
be taken seriously and comprehensively considered or does
decentralization offer these values their best chance? The
conclusions that can be drawn from the Siskiyou are decidedly mixed.
As table 18 shows, there has been no clear trend correlating higher-level, more centralized decisionmakers with
more ecologically enlightened attitudes or vice versa. Rather, all policymaking levels advocated all sorts of old
growth policy. Specifically, the federal courts and the ISC
conformed most closely to the thesis that centralized structures are the most environmentally friendly.

Internally,

Congress also seemed to follow this pattern to some extent.
For the most part, local and regional legislators, responding to timber's important role as a constituent benefit,
were among the actors most closely aligned with timber interests and most consistently against old growth protection.
On the other hand, representatives from non-timber districts, adhering to a more national policy (rather than
local representation) orientation, were amongst the environ-
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TABLE 18
LEVELS OF POLICYMAKER CENTRALIZATION ANO ENVIRONMENTALISM

CENTRALIZED
Congress

Administration

ISC
Federal
Courts

Interior Dept.
Agriculture Dept.
Agriculture
Co11aittees

Interior
Coaaittees

USFWS (DC)
USFS (DC)
Agriculture Subco•.
Int. Appr. Subcom.

Interior
Subcoms.

USFS Region 6
USFWS NW Region
OR Dept.of

Gov.Goldschmidt
ODFW

Gov.Roberts
ODEQ

Forestry
local reps
SNF Supervisor's
Off ice

county boards
city councils
DECENTRALIZ

LESS

ENVIRONMENTAL

ranger
districts

MORE
ENVIRONMENTAL_
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mentalists' closest allies. Because of this dualism, the
Congress as a whole must be considered as neither wholly
pro-timber or pro-environmental.
While the examples of Congress, the courts, and the
ISC reinforce the centralization thesis, the evidence from
the administrative sector seems to point to the reverse.
Relatively speaking, in the Siskiyou it was the most decentralized units of administration, the National Forest and
the ranger districts, who were a fair degree more environmentally sensitive than regional or headquarter offices. In
fact, as one climbs the administrative ladder from the Siskiyou to Region Six to Forest Service headquarters to
Cabinet-level departments to top administrative officials,
the anti-environmentalism and commodity-user bias intensifies further and further.
This top-level anti-environmentalism is probably very
case and time specific, however. As such, it points to the
obvious importance of presidential politics and a given administration's ideology. One could easily envision an alternative scenario where top administrators were more ecologically inclined than their decentralized counterparts. For
example, it is probably safe to say that the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture under Carter, Rupert Cutler (who went
on to head the Defenders of Wildlife) was environmentally
way ahead of most of the "on-the-ground" personnel he oversaw in the Forest Service. Similarly, the Clinton adrninis-
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tration may very well prove to have stronger environmental
leanings than most rank-and-file Agriculture or Forest Service personnel. If this case study began after 1992, its
findings in terms of administrative centralization might,
therefore, be quite different. Thus, the hostility this
study found in the Reagan and Bush administrations is far
less about inherent patterns in centralized authority regarding environmental protection than it is about the
changeability of such patterns.
Finally, in terms of differences between federal,
state, and local positions, the evidence from the Siskiyou
case has again been mixed. Prior to 1990, the governor's
off ice and federal administrators stressed timber production
to roughly the same extent, while several state agencies, on
the other hand, were far more ecologically inclined than
either. Since Governor Roberts came to power in 1991,
though, the state government as a whole could be considered
far more in favor of environmental protection than the federal government, a rare achievement in the West where the
federal government is usually considerably more
preservation-oriented than the states. Locally, however,
things were far more traditional as the county and city
governments surrounding the Forest were, without exception,
vigorously opposed to old growth protection.
Regarding decentralization's alleged flaws,

on~y

lo-

calized capture has been shown in the Siskiyou case to have
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very little basis. A cautious, status quo-oriented incrementalism and a. divisive reductionism, on the other hand,
proved to be serious, even crippling problems for comprehensive environmental goals. Incremental policy formulation has
heavily favored a strongly unecological status quo of high
timber budgets and a steady flow of constituent benefits.
The fragmentation and narrow reductionistic perceptions of
policymakers, meanwhile, have turned old growth politics, at
times, into a chaotic and incoherent jumble, inherently incapable of producing, let alone conceiving of holistic or
systematic approaches to ecological problems. Instead, a
series of fractured proposals responding only to isolated
aspects of this issue (the spotted owl, particular patches
of big trees, jobs, or the steady flow of timber) have been
the most this fragmented and highly specialized system could
produce.
Does it follow, then, that centralization would correct these shortcomings? While this study can offer no truly
conclusive evidence of this, one can surely speculate that a
more centralized and integrated policymaking structure might
indeed be able to churn out more comprehensive

policy. 1 ~

If

the case of the Siskiyou shows anything, though, it is that
centralization can be a double-edged sword that offers no

157

Though it has the potential, centralization cannot absolutely guarantee comprehensiveness. While comprehensiveness probably needs some degree of centralization, the reverse is not necessarily true.
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guarantee of environmental correctness. For environmentalists, therefore, the centralization and integration of government power is a risky and highly volatile affair.
If the centralized administration is sympathetic to
ecological objectives, then such a system might have the
potential to work brilliantly. If not, however, centralized
structures could be used towards a very different end-perhaps comprehensive anti-environmentalism and comprehen-

sive resource exploitation. As long as this country has free
elections, then administrations will change and, as was the
case in Oregon in 1990 or the United States in 1980 or 1992,
fairly significant differences in environmental attitudes
may result. Thus, only an environmental dictatorship could
absolutely assure that a centralized and comprehensive policymaking structure would maintain fidelity to ecological
values. What centralization does, therefore, is to raise the
stakes and turn policymaking into a gamble in which interests could win big or lose big. Conversely, decentralization offers opportunities for neither a sweeping ecological
overhaul of policy or an equally sweeping revocation or total

backlash.1~

Despite all of its considerable flaws, fragmentation
has the one advantage of providing a sturdy guarantee of ac158

The only possible scenario for far-reaching policy
change might be if either environmental interests or -their
resource-using opponents lost so much power as to become
irrelevant and completely marginalized; in either case (but
especially the latter), an unlikely scenario.
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cess for environmentalists that a more fickle centralized
system cannot. In a decentralized system opportunities to
influence policy are simply more numerous. Environmentalists
who found themselves shut out of top-level decisionmaking
and kept at arms-length by the Forest Service still had
cards to play as they turned, in this case, to Congress
where they cultivated close non-timber district allies, and
even more importantly, to the federal courts. By contrast,
if an interest in a highly centralized system is shut out at
the top, they are shut out period. Thus, fragmentation does
indeed increase opportunities for participation, help groups
maintain flexible strategies for achieving influence, and
allow multiple policymaking entities to keep each other in
check.
While these are undoubtedly attractive qualities to
environmental interests who sometimes find themselves on the
margins of politics, fragmentation inflicts a heavy price
for its virtues. The costs of easy access and checks and
balances are precisely the sorts of incrernentalism and narrow vision that strangle holistic ecological policymaking.
Mann recognizes this as he argues that fragmentation "imposes its own

controls" 1 ~

on the very reform movements it

so generously gives an initial forum to:
[T]he same fragmented system that provided opportunities for fractional groups when public pressures where

159

Mann, 2 3.
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significantly intense, made further progress very difficult after the initial wave passed.160
Fragmentation, therefore, offers environmentalists
half a loaf: guaranteed access to the system and a wide array of tools and strategies to work with, but practically no
chance to achieve the truly comprehensive, systemic ecological policy they feel is ultimately the only solution. Centralization, on the other hand, does hold out that patential, but it holds the chance for total disaster (James Watt
or John Crowell with no restraints) as well. While the guarantee of heavy compromise and the knowledge that truly sound
ecological policy will always be defeated are bitter pills
to swallow, many environmentalists prefer the devil they
know to one they do not, as Bartlett suggests:
The consequences of abstract and
hensive decisionmaking proposals
certain; what is certain is that
would shift in poorly understood
risky) ways.1M

often untried compreare necessarily unpolitical advantage
(and thus politically

In sum, then, pluralist decentralization and its politics of "muddling through" are clearly antithetical to ecological policy goals, as its critics suggest. While they
provide widespread access to the political system and often
serve to prevent some of the more grievous and overt environmental abuses in the short term, they cannot prevent the
slow, long-term deterioration and unraveling of ecosystems,
something only a more comprehensive approach can address. It

160 Ibid. 21.
iM Bartlett, 242.
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cannot be concluded with much confidence, however, that the
centralized alternative would be any better, and in some
scenarios, might even be worse.
Centralization will be foolproof only after ecological
values have been firmly associated with the public interest
and universally and authentically accepted and internalized.
Otherwise, the best strategy might be what Mccurdy suggests:
maintain the system's decentralization and access, but work
to improve coordination, install procedures for integrated
policymaking, and encourage the neutral professionalism of
agencies. More interagency commissions (perhaps with binding
authority), more unambiguous language in legislation which
guarantees citizen and judicial review and allows less
overtly subversive administrative discretion, and a less
parochial public lands policy orientation in Congress would
all go a long way towards improving coordination, and possibly the even the chance for comprehensiveness without assuming centralization's greatest risks.

CHAPTER 7
RADICAL DECENTRALIST AND MAJORITARIAN ALTERNATIVES

.... there are limits to the environmentalist slogan
"think globally, act locally."
Robert Paehlke

Centralization is but one structural adjustment that
the critics of pluralism advance as a preferable alternative
to this process they oppose. This chapter examines two other
forms of democratic organization commonly put forth by various critics--radical decentralization and majoritarianism-within the framework of ecological politics and the politics
of the Siskiyou specifically.
While the centralist critique of the pluralist process
prescribes increased governmental centralization, integration, and rationality as the solution to pluralism's alleged
shortcomings, these other critics look to increased public
participation and even final authority in matters of policy458
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making. What these various advocates of public involvement
all share in common is a firm belief that pluralism's special interest-dominated governmental apparatus or the centralist's rigid "expert"-dominated bureaucracy can only
serve to thwart the public's interests and desires. Thus,
the most legitimate and appropriate source of policymaking
authority is seen to be the public.
Radical Decentralist Alternatives

Participatory Democracy
As the last chapter has shown, the centralist critique
of pluralism emphasizes excessive decentralization as the
root of pluralism's flaws. Another group of critics, however, come to quite the opposite conclusion, arguing that
pluralism's alleged inequality and bias can be overcome only
through even more decentralization all the way down to the
most localized level. To participatory democrats such as
Robert Wolff, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Carole Pateman, or Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, it is only at this
very local community level that direct and meaningful public
participation in governance can take place. 1

1

Robert Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968}; Alan Altschuler, Community Control (New York:
Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, MA: At the University
Press, 1970); Frank Byran and John McClaughtry, The Vermont
Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale (Post Mills,
VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 1989).
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According to these participatory democrats, or communitarians as some call them, 2 the virtues of such intense
public involvement are twofold. Not only will it lead to authentically democratic decisionmaking with increased access
to and responsiveness of government, but will also accrue
benefits for the participants themselves. Direct participation, it is argued, bestows upon citizens a priceless sense
of efficacy, belongingness, and civic responsibility.3 Thus,
participation becomes, to participatory democrats, not only
a means for more egalitarian policy, but a virtuous political and social end as well.
Pluralism's process of participation, on the other
hand, is alleged to be a sham, offering only lopsided access
and government-sanctioned inequity and bias, especially
against marginal and/or more diffuse interests.4 Thus, only
through community control by a fully mobilized citizenry can
all the voices of a community be heard and the power of the

2 While

it used by some to denote the movement for decentralized community control, the term communitarian is used
by other political theorists to refer more broadly to a belief in individual responsibility and obligation to the
greater society. As such, it is the political opposite of
libertarianism. To avoid confusion, the term participatory
democrats will be used to refer to proponents of decentralized community control.
3 This is a theme that runs through Wolff, The Poverty of
Liberalism, Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory,
and Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism· (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1967).
4 Richard Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United
States (new York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46.
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elite be reined in. One decentralist sums up participatory
democracy's advantages:
Thus the virtue of the community of direct democracy
is that it does not easily succumb to governing elites
and is able to offer systemic resistance to autocratic
leaders. It provides the forum where new ideas may at
least be considered and, through free debate, the
means of making their virtues known. It produces in
time an openness and tolerance in political matters
and processes that can extend into the social sphere.
It encourages participation, not simply because it is
in everyone's self-interest to show up at the meeting
and keep from being elected dog-catcher, but because
the whole range of community problems tends to become
as real as--in effect to be--personal problems. If it
is in addition consensual, its workings will militate
against the unjust treatment of any individual--individuals presumably having a say in their own fate ....
Consensus, too, if a regular process, works to round
off the edges of minority opinions after a while so
that in time they fit in more smoothly with--or at
least accepted between--the opinions of the majority.s
While many ecological thinkers call for centralization
(see chapter six), so-called deep ecologists such as Kirkpatrick Sale or William Devall and George Sessions and so-

cial ecologists like Murray Bookchin or Andre Gorz place
blame for the ecological crisis firmly upon what they see as
the large, remote, and thoroughly undemocratic social, economic, and political structures which pervade our society. 6
According to Sale, these impersonal and hierarchical insti-

5 Kirkpatrick

Sale, Human Scale (New York: Coward, Mccann,
and Geoghegan, 1980), 509-510
6 Kirkpatrick Sale, Human Scale and Dwellers in the Land:
The Bioregional Vision (San Francisco, Sierra Club Books,
1985); William Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecol9gy
(Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Murray Bookchin,
The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, CA: Chesire, 1982); Andre
Gorz, Ecology as Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1980)
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tutions are struck by the disease of giantism and are controlled by the elite few to the detriment of the many. 7
The indifferent destruction huge, centralized industrial structures bring, say decentralist ecologists, can
only be reversed by the philosophy of small is beautiful
wherein power is devolved to the local community, bioregion,
or even watershed. It is only at this most decentralized level, they argue, that truly ecological policy can flourish,
made possible by a direct democracy involving those who actually live in and love their local environs (rather than
distant and unsympathetic interests or power brokers) as
Sales shows:
If, further, the community is guided by the tenets of
ecological harmony and steady-state equilibria, it is
hardly the type to despoil its environment or readily
admit the toxic or polluting industry (which, being in
control of its economy, is free to reject). Conscious
of the way it relates to the ecosystem, it would likely establish, and value, its connections to other communities within the bioregion .... Conservative it would
certainly be, in the best sense of that word, for that
is precisely what recycling and resource recovery,
precisely what self-sufficiency is all about, .... 8
Because the future configurations of politics and society they envision rely upon a somewhat optimistic view of
human nature, participatory democrats and radical ecological
decentralists are accused by pluralists and others of idealistic utopianism. As attractive as it seems in theory, say

7

This is the main theme running throughout Sale, Human
Scale.
8 Sale, Human Scale, 510.
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critics, participatory democracy will inevitably break down
in practice due to a number of factors.
First, pluralists point out that while diffusing power
to the community level might seem to enhance individual control, in the bigger scheme of things, it diminishes one's
actual problem-solving efficacy. Not only does radical decentralization leave each local jurisdiction with less resources to cope with problems, but also less authority to
deal with transjurisdictional issues outside their control
which are often the real source of their problems.9 Thus,
even the most ecologically committed community's perogatives
are limited when dealing with the sovereign town upstream
which is dumping sewage into the river both share as Kelso
suggests:
In their quest for meaningful participation, communitarian democrats thus seem to confront an unresolvable
paradox. By reducing the size of the polity, they increase the opportunities for individuals to participate; but by increasing the opportunities for citizen
involvement, they run the risk of trivializing its importance. The smaller the unit of government, the less
significant become the issues that the individuals
within the political community can effectively inf luence. 10
Paehlke, too, notes this dilemma regarding environmental protection:
The contradictions between the "anarchist" and "localist" utopias of Bookchin and other environmentalists
and the burgeoning bureaucracies cannot be ignored.
But one cannot simply dismiss the growth of national
9william Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1978), 201.
10

Ibid.
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environmental bureaucracies as a betrayal of the
cause. Were regulatory powers not established on a
national basis, pollution "havens" would abound--some
jurisdictions would choose a massive industrial tax
base over a clean environment, and surrounding areas,
if not whole nations, would soon bear the costs. National, even international environmental standards and
regulations make a great deal of sense .... there are
limits to the environmentalist slogan "think globally,
act locally. 11
11

To its advocates, then, pluralism's seemingly chaotic mix of
centralized and decentralized structures provides just the
right blend of meaningful authority and access to make participation, though less direct, really count.
Pluralists and other detractors also call into doubt
participatory democracy's workability. Contrary to the decentralists' claims, pluralists such as Edward Banfield and
James Q. Wilson argue that the smaller the jurisdiction, the
more intense conflict will become. 12 Pluralists thus predict
that communitarian systems will collapse under the weight of
the inevitable conflict pure democracy brings. Robert Hine,
in his study of California communes, in fact, finds that the
most democratic ones had the least longevity. 13
Other critics go as far as to suggest that a participatory democracy can ironically degenerate into something
less than democratic. Kelso, for instance, borrowing an argument from centralist critics of pluralism, suggests that

11

Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989), 156.
12 Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New
York: Random House, 1963).
13 Robert Hine cited in Kelso, 200.
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radical decentralization might actually increase rather than
break the power of dominant groups in such a limited and
isolated political realm. 14 He also finds that communal patterns of social organization often serve to stifle and repress rather than celebrate diversity as is claimed.1 5 As
such, minority groups, far from being empowered, may actually be oppressed within a community with none of the multiple
avenues for redress which pluralism offers.
Finally, critics find participatory democracy unviable
due to the sheer weight of public indifference. In addition
to being over-confident about the logistics of mass involvement, argue critics, participatory democrats overestimate
the public's willingness to overcome their indifference and
narrow self-interest. Kelso, for example, points to a number
of studies of direct democratic structures such as Kibbutzim, communes, and autonmous workers' councils which find
not only widespread conflict, but also debilitating apathy
in the face of the awesome obligations demanded by participatory systems.16 Recreating pre-modern political associations in an intensely modern world filled with individualistic, consumeristic, and technological pressures may very
well be, therefore, an impossible task. The indirect parti-

14 Kelso, 227.
15

16

Ibid. 198-199, 203.
rbid. 181-195. Participatory democrats, however, might

respond by pointing to fairly successful examples of direct
democracy in the industrialized world such as the Swiss confederation or New England town meetings.
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cipation of interest groups in a pluralist system, on the
other hand, is alleged to be a far more realistic and less
burdensome manifestation of democracy and civic
involvement. 17
Participatory democrats respond to such charges by
claiming that pluralists create a straw man when they base
their criticisms of participatory democracy's potential upon
observations and assumptions originating from a pluralist
context. If people do not seem ready to take on the responsibility of self-rule, they argue, it is because the current
undemocratic system leaves them cynical, apathetic, and unprepared. 18 It is only through the act of direct participation and the actual witnessing of its many benefits, that a
culture of civic duty and political efficacy can develop and
eventually flourish. 19 Few participatory democrats promise
that this will be a quick or easy shift and some even seem
to suggest that some sort of transition will be necessary. 20
Privatization
There exists another form of radical decentralization
based upon assumptions very different from those of participatory democracy. The political ideology of privatization is
17
18
19
20

Ibid. 179.
Pateman, 79-101.
Ibid.

There is disagreement among participatory democrats as
to whether the public is ready to assume the substan~ial
burdens of self-rule. Theorists such as Wolff feel that the
public is currently ready, while others such as Pateman concede that they must first gain the skills to participate.

467

founded largely upon the beliefs of libertarianism and freemarket capitalism. Its advocates claim that the decentralization of authority to its most basic unit--the individual
(especially in his or her capacity as a potential property
owner and economic free-agent)--provides the best alternative to what is seen as pluralism's scandalous inefficiency
and illiberal (as in anti-private property) tendencies. Privatization as both coherent theory and political movement is
perhaps most developed in the area of public lands politics
where calls are made for public land to be divested to private owners, thereby decentralizing management even beyond
local community control.
Theorists such as John Baden and Richard Stroup, Baden
and Dean Lueck, and William Dennis and Randy Simmons all argue that distributively-oriented pluralist administration
creates bureaucratic inefficiency in management, clientelism, and worst of all, government subsidization of environmental destruction.21 Speaking of pluralism, Simmons and
Dennis maintain that "authority is separated from responsibility;" in this case, the responsibility conferred by pri-

21 John Baden and Richard Stroup, Bureaucracy vs. Environment (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981);
John Baden and Dean Lueck, "Bringing Private Management to
the Public Lands: Environmental and Economic Advantages" in
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (editors), Controversies in Environmental Policy (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1986); William Dennis
and Randy Simmons, "From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" in Kamieniecki,
et al.
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vate ownership. 22 According to its advocates, privatization,
by forcing a reliance upon the free market, would actually
benefit ecological goals as in many cases, commodity production and associated environmental despoilation would become
too costly without government subsidies.23 Most privatizers
would agree, then, with ideological bedfellow James Watt who
as Secretary of the Interior claimed that, "there is no
greater wisdom than the

marketplace."~

Most all environmental theorists, whether centralist,
pluralist, or communitarian, vehemently oppose the ideology
and practice of privatization. To suggest widespread privatization would benefit the environment, critics would argue,
requires an appreciation of the fantastic far greater than
that of even the most utopian communitarian. As wrong-headed
and client-dominated as they often find it, government administration of public lands is far preferable to most environmentalists than private ownership; a point made by the
pluralist Mccurdy:
Privatizers conclude that government agencies are
inefficient mechanisms for reflecting public choice.
Pluralists, on the other hand, view the absence of
government interference as inefficient given the
public's desire for participation in resource
decisions.a

22 Dennis and Simmons, 71-75.
23 Baden and Lueck, 51-54; Dennis and Simmons, 71.
24 James Watt quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental
Politics and Policy (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 29.
a Howard Mccurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New
Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamieniecki, et al, 101.
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Thus, government management, as poor as it may be, at
least holds out the potential for public involvement and influence and maybe even policy change. On the other hand,
private ownership, according to Mccurdy, offers no representation, no appeal, and no redress, all standard in a pluralist system. 26 The only thing standing between healthy private land and a stripmine, therefore, is some ambiguous notion of owner "responsibility". And when the free market is
the operative factor, the owner's responsibility is clear:
to be efficient with his or her assets as the market determines. The problem here, claim Thomas Ingersoll and Bradley
Brockbank is that the market has no real way to measure ecological value; those elements considered essential to the
functioning of an ecosystem are usually considered "free
goods" with little or no market value.V
The Potential of Radical Decentralization: The Evidence from
the Siskiyou
As has been discussed, decentralist ecologists would
argue that, ultimately, land use decisions that are relevant
to and respectful of bioregional ecosytems can come only
from small autonomous communities exercising democratic participatory policymaking. They would probably suggest that if
authority rested at the local level, whether as part of a

26

Ibid. 100.
vThomas Ingersoll and Bradley Brockbank, "The Role of
Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy" in Kamieniecki,
et al, 207.
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loose confederation within the Cascadia bioregion of the
Northwest or as a cluster of settlements within the Rogue or
Illinois watersheds, the old growth would stand.
What then, would land management policy in what is now
the Siskiyou National Forest really look like if authority
was vested in the local community? Evidence from the Siskiyou case is based, of course, upon only what has been in the
past and is presently; the rest is speculation. With that in
mind, one should consider that what is observable from the
southwest corner of Oregon does not seem to bode well for
either old growth or the spotted owl. True community control, as things stand today, would most likely translate into a level of resource exploitation aggressive enough for
environmentalists to yearn for the "good old days" of Forest
Service management.
Simply put, on the most local level, pro-timber sentiment would overpower ecological concern. This is not to say
that environmentalists are not a powerful presence in southwest Oregon; to the contrary, they are a dynamic, aggressive, and numerically respectable contingent of the area's
population. But they also are a minority. 28 In a truly participatory context (that is, assuming fairly universal par28

Polls show that while Oregonians are split fairly
evenly over the old growth and spotted owl controversies,
most environmentalist support comes from urban areas, while
rural areas strongly favor logging. Southwest Oregon, it
should be remembered, is one of the more rural parts· of the
state. Kathie Durbin, "Polls Show Oregonians Deeply Split
Over Owl" Oregonian (6 May 1990).
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ticipation) environmental voices would be drowned out and
timber production would rule the day in local community
governing structures. The resolutely pro-timber attitudes
and behavior of municipal and county boards in the Siskiyou
area in the past decade provide some idea as to what true
local control might look like if implemented today.
Perhaps the only alternative scenario to outright timber domination might be the sort of extreme polarization and
conflictual stand-off that pluralists warn about. Sales's
claim that intense participation brings opponents closer together, seems somewhat wishful knowing the bitter political
divisions that have so deeply split the Siskiyou community
in the past decade.
It seems very doubtful, therefore, that mere decentralization would bring about ecologically sound policy unless such a structural change was preceded by a major value
shift. In theory, at least, deep ecologists make sense when
they suggest that local folks know and can thus care for
their local ecosystems far better than remote centralized
bureaucracies bent upon industrialization and economic
growth. The problem is that there are two questionable assumptions implicit in this:

(l) local people are unified in

their commitment to ecological principles, and (2) they are
self-sufficient enough to be free of the competition inherent to the global-scale economy that is the reality 9f the
day. In actuality, however, local residents are sometimes
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even hungrier and more desperate for economic growth and development than centralized bureaucrats are.
Some participatory democrats, as noted before, are
cognizant of this dilemma and might concede that some sort
of economic restructuring and value shift or socialization
process is necessary before radical decentralization can be
put into practice. The more that new ways of perceiving the
forests, the planet, economics, and citizen responsibility
gain currency, they would argue, the more appropriate and
desirable becomes community control.
Just as troublesome would be transjurisdictional problems which, by their very nature, would abound in the Siskiyou case. Even assuming a particular county or watershed
shared an unshakeable committment to ecologically sustainable land use, how would it deal with the community upstream, perhaps less committed, whose logging chokes streams
with debris and destroys interconnected salmon runs or fragments the larger forest ecosystem and owl habitat that the
first community shares with it? Hardin's "tragedy of the
commons" would likely be realized. Thus not only must communities be internally united in their values for community
control to work smoothly, but all communities must be similarly united or else one community's policies, no matter how
noble and well-intentioned, will become isolated and trivialized. As the example of the Siskiyou shows, environmentalists were most successful in addressing issues of larger
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scope--forest management laws, endangered species--than
fighting their battles on a local timber sale-by-timber sale
or even forest-by-forest basis.
What about the other decentralist option--that of privatization? Here, there is more concrete evidence to judge
by in that forest tracts adjacent to the Siskiyou are privately held and subject more directly to market forces. If
this private land in southwest Oregon (or, for that matter,
most anywhere else in the country), is any indication, then
privatization would be an unmitigated environmental disaster
for the Siskiyou forest. While Forest Service and BLM management has indeed often been extremely destructive, it
pales in comparison to the land management history of adjacent private forest land, especially in areas of high commercial value.
Far from being "responsible" as advocates claim, private ownership in southwestern Oregon has mostly led to the
wholesale liquidation of "assets" in ways that very often
violate completely the principles of sustained yield, multiple use, ecological sustainability, public participation,
or the right of appeal. Only on the steepest ridges or inaccessible slopes would privatization offer any advantage;
the lack of government subsidization of prohibitively costly
roads or helicopter logging would probably grant these areas
a temporary reprieve until the price of timber rose_ high
enough to justify such investments. Otherwise, any reasonab-
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ly accessible acreage, especially low-lying areas along
streams, would be sure to be harvested for its valuable old
growth timber and probably with cost-effective clearcutting
techniques. The private lands surrounding the Siskiyou National Forest, much of it either denuded pasture or monoculture tree farms, provide a fairly clear glimpse into any future scenario of privatization.
Ma1oritarianism

Majoritarian Theory and Ecological Politics
Advocates of majoritarian democracy comprise yet
another school of thought critical of pluralism. Like participatory democrats, they object to pluralism on the grounds
that it violates the public

int~rest

in favor of private in-

terests. Also, they too argue that the public should be far
more directly involved in their own goverance. Unlike participatory democracy, though, advocates of majoritarianism, or
populist democracy as Kelso calls it,29 do not see radical
decentralization as a prerequisite for achieving direct democracy. Nor do they share participatory democrats' suspicion
of large-scale governmental institutions. On the contrary,
an active and aggressive government endowed with the necessary resources is seen by majoritarians such as Michael
Harrington as essential to the protection of the public

29 Kelso, American Democratic Theory.
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interest and the implementation of the public's sovereign
will. 30
Thus, majoritarians basically favor a consolidation of
government authority in order to render it unresponsive to
any interest save the public's. 31 How majoritarians differ
from the centralist thinkers discussed in the last chapter
involves where they believe government ought to get its mandate. To centralists, a rational and expert elite develops
policy according to their conception of the long-term public
interest. A majoritarian government, on the other hand,
would exist merely to implement the popular will as expressed to them by the public (even at the state or national level) as directly as possible, especially by means of referenda and initiatives. 32 Such a system, in all its directness
and simplicity, argue majoritarians, maximizes democracy and
assures that majority rule does not degenerate, as they feel
it does in pluralism, into minority rule.33
When it comes to environmental issues, for instance,
majoritarians such as Mark Kann see a clearcut case of such
minority rule, claiming that overwhelming public desires are
30 Michael Harrington, Towards A Democratic Left (New
York: Macmillan, 1968), chap. 5.
31 Here the majoritarians resemble the elite-centralists.
In fact, scholars who call for such a consolidation from a
somewhat left-of-center perspective such as McConnell or
Schattschneider are quite difficult to definitively categorize as either purely centralist or majoritarian.
32 Harrington, chap.5.
33 Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, Democracy and the
American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.,
1956), 24.
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constantly being thwarted by an unholy alliance of private
and governmental

elites.~

If "the people" only had their

say and saw it enforced, majoritarians argue, environmentalism would triumph. To bolster their point, majoritarians
might point to a number of public opinion studies which suggest that the American people overwhelmingly support environmentalism. 35
According to Robert Mitchell, such public support at
the beginning of the 1990s, stands stronger than ever.36 According to Mitchell, protection of the environment is now a
bona-fide "motherhood issue", a fact made clear by the overall failure of Reagan's anti-environmental crusade.37 In
fact, a 1989 Roper poll found only 15% of the public supporting cutbacks in environmental protection, while another
poll found 53% in 1988 agreeing that the government regulates and is involved in environmental issues "too little."~

Thus, as Riley Dunlap says, environmentalism has

~Mark Kann, "Environmental Democracy in the United
States" in Kamieniecki et al, 253-261.
35 For overviews of such studies see, Robert Mitchell,
"Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?"
in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editor), Environmental Policy in the 1990s (Wahington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); Riley
Dunlap, "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy" in James
Lester (editor), Environmental Politics and Policy (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1989); and a somewhat dated,
though still informative article by J. Fred Springer and
Edmond Constanti, "Public Opinion and the Environment: An
Issue in Search of a Home" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Environmental Politics (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974).
36 Mitchell, 81.
37 Ibid. 82-83.
38 Roper and Cambridge Reports polls cited in Ibid. 85.
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become not only an "enduring concern" but has achieved "the
status of an important value.

"39

If left up to the public

rather than bureaucrats or private interests, a majoritarian
would probably be quite confident that environmental objectives would almost always prevail.
Critics of majoritarianism, however, find the question
of the popular will--both how to express it and how much authority to vest in it--to be far more complex than majoritarians would admit. First of all, critics argue that the
referenda process which majoritarians rely so heavily upon,
is deeply flawed or at least highly limited in its usefulness.~

How can referenda, ask critics, address the tech-

nical intricacies of the extremely complex, multi-faceted
issues which account for so many current policy problems? An
undifferentiated public, argue critics, simply does not possess the knowledge to render a well-informed vote on many
policy options.41 Such an uninformed mass, it would seem,
could easily be fall prey to media campaigns of manipulation
and deceit run by the most savvy and/or well-financed interests affected by a particular policy question.
Other critics, meanwhile, even question whether the
public's will is synonymous with the public interest.
Ophuls, for example, maintains that the problem with ecological policy is not that the public's voice has been silen39

Dunlap, 133.

~Kelso,

67-82.

41 Ibid. 67, 87.
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ced, but that the clamor for economic growth or political
pork--the destructive sum of individual desires--is heard
all too well. 42 To Ophuls, therefore, only a rational elite
could save us from ourselves and act on behalf of a true
public interest that cannot simply be tallied through votes.
Another problem with such a majoritarian arrangement,
according to critics, is that referenda can realistically
produce only vague, large-scale directives, rather than
technically detailed, workable policy. Consequently, "the
linkage between the public's original wishes and the operations of the state will become more tenuous." as the power
and discretion of the state become magnified to the detriment, rather than enhancement of the public interest. 43
Thus, Kelso argues that "the very quality of popular participation may become more symbolic than substantive in nature."~

Ironically, according to pluralists, the public is

more involved in the actual nitty-gritty of the policymaking
process in a pluralist rather than majoritarian system. 45
Critics call attention to what they see as another
serious flaw in the majoritarian process--it has no way to
gauge the intensity by which different people support or oppose various policy outcomes. How democratic is it, critics
would ask, for the votes of those who passionately desire
~William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
(San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1977), 189-190.
43
Kelso, 88.
~Ibid.

45

Ibid. 65.
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some outcome or are deeply affected by it to be swamped by
the votes of those who know or care little but still cast
their obligatory

vote?~

According to Kelso, "it may be more

fair for the political system to decide in favor of those
government policies which are most pref erred rather than
those programs which are preferred by most."Q Otherwise,
one risks confronting the so-called "Arrow Problem"--the
paradox of a collective policy choice which does not faithfully correspond to most individuals'

preferences.~

Again,

only pluralism is said to be appropriate--in this case, able
to weigh intensity through its bargaining process.
At the root of this problem of intensity is what pluralist emphatically insist is a diverse and fragmented polity. In such a setting, they argue, majoritarian referenda
are simply too unsubtle and inflexible a tool to truly capture the public will and decide complex issues. Kelso makes
this point:
While populists often talk as if there were a popular
or majoritarian sentiment on most issues, we can see
that in many cases, such sentiment simply does not
exist .... Thus efforts to force a majority stand out of
a diverse and heterogeneous set of publics are likely
to lead to .... problems .... While the referendum will
mechanically generate a majority opinion of an issue,
~This might especially be a problem in public lands politics, alleged by Rosenbaum to be an "arcane business to
most Americans." Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy 283.
47Kelso, 83. Kelso claims that it is, perhaps, only in a
fairly small community with roughly similar values that referenda can weigh all votes in a truly equitable way.
~Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New
York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951).
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that opinion may not correspond to any well-defined
set of beliefs in the larger population.49
Without universal goals and values amongst the polity,
it would run the risk, therefore, of alienating significant
portions of the electorate and in its worst manifestation,
imposing a tyranny of the majority.
Majoritarianism and the Siskiyou
The question at hand, then, is whether a process which
offers less distilled, more direct public choice (through,
perhaps, state or national referenda) would treat ecological
goals and values more kindly. Would the Siskiyou case have
been settled in the environmentalists' favor long ago if the
influence of interest groups was lifted and the public spoke
its mind through the ballot? While evidence exists as to the
broad public support environmentalism enjoys, how reliably
would this translate in a majoritarian system into Siskiyou
National Forest policy?
Like similar questions regarding decentralized participatory democracy, much of what can be offered here as analysis involves, by necessity, a good deal of conjecture.
Still, various polls and two very telling California referenda in 1990 offer at least some empirical basis with which
to ponder the potential of majoritarianism in the politics
of old growth.

49 Kelso, 70.
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It has already been speculated that if left strictly
up to local, timber-dependent communities, there would be a
good chance that policy on the Siskiyou would shift towards
even more commodity production. A majoritarian system, however, would rely upon a much broader scope of public opinion
to set policy in what majoritarians would stress is a national forest established for the benefit of all Americans.

In this broader context, the nature of public opinion,
according to most of the public opinion literature on the
environment, shifts rather dramatically to favor environmentalism.so While it cannot be said for certain, national, and
to a lesser extent state (Washington and Oregon) opinion on
old growth today is probably quite a bit more environmentally inclined than local community opinion.
Whether mass opinion would treat old growth more kindly than current policy does is less clear. A 1990 Media
General/Associated Press poll, however, suggests it would.
The poll shows 61% of the public favoring a "ban on woodcutting in old forests."s1 Another 1990 poll conducted by the
Seattle Times finds similar support for old growth amongst
Washington residents with 52% backing "a logging ban to pro-

50

once again, see the summaries of this issue offered by
Dunlap, Mitchell and Springer and Constantini (see footnote
32)
51 Media General/AP poll cited in Wild Oregon (Summer
1990), 9. The same poll also found 75% favoring prompt government action "to deal with global deforestation."
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tect spotted owl habitat" versus 38%

opposed.~

In a 1990

Elway Research poll, meanwhile, 64% of Washington residents
found wildlife habitat and the number of trees left to be
the primary considerations in logging issues as opposed to
30% who the felt the economy and jobs were.53 In less urban

and more timber-dependent Oregon, on the other hand, a 1990
Oregonian poll shows public opinion over old growth to be
far more polarized and evenly split.54
Even if one could construe from these polls the implication that state or national referenda would put an end to
the cycle of over-cutting in the national forests, environmentalists would be wise to look deeper into the nature of
public opinion on the environment before declaring majoritarian decisionmaking a panacea (as some of their more fanciful literature seems to suggest).
While almost every commentator looking at this issue
has found overall public support for the environment, nearly
~Seattle Times poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll"
Oregonian (25 April 1990). While the AP poll has somewhat
simplistic wording, the Seattle Times poll is fairly explicit.· For instance, the question cited above included a warning that opponents of such a ban "say it will cost thousands
of jobs in the timber-dependent communities in western Washington."
53 Elway Research poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll."
54 Kathie Durbin, "Polls shows Oregonians Deeply Split
Over Owl" Oregonian (6 May 1990). This poll should serve as
a reminder that reliability of polling data is never indisputable. When a key statement in the poll was worded, "Forest jobs must be protected even if it means the loss of
spotted owl habitat," 46% agreed and 48% disagreed. But when
it was worded, "To protect the spotted owl, we should stop
logging on large tracts of federal timberland," only 34%
agreed and 60% disagreed.
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all have also remarked upon the relative shallowness and
fragility of much of this support. Dunlap, for instance,
questions how salient environmental issues really are to the
public, their professed support notwithstanding.SS Anthony
Downs agrees as he claims that ecological issues are on an
"attention cycle" in which issues have their "moment in the
sun" and then fade from view as media hype decreases and
public boredom and doubts about costs increase.s6
Culhane, meanwhile, finds a similar lack of public
interest regarding the Forest Service's participation process. After describing why the Forest Service could never,
despite their efforts, get a grasp on the views of the nonexistent "silent majority", he suggests that:
.... the Service face reality, understand that the undifferentiated public is never going to pref er attending public meetings over watching "Dallas" and thus
concentrate upon groups which actively profess an interest [that is, groups with a high level of intensi ty--ed. ] s7
Despite the old growth controversy's relatively high
profile (at least as environmental issues go) and its suecessful expansion beyond the Northwest into a national issue, Culhane is likely right in that forest issues are probably never going to capture the full public's imagination

ss Dunlap, 132-134.
S6 Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The IssueAttention Cycle" Public Interest 28 (1972), 38-50.
~Paul Culhane, "Public Participation in National.Forest
Planning: Is it Different of Just More?" conference paper,
Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seattle WA (April 1991), 11-12.
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or attention. Especially in areas in the East or Midwest
with few public lands, forest issues will never be very
salient to more than a select group of citizens and activists interested in environmental affairs.
While Dunlap or Downs find the public's broad support
somwhat shallow, other observers such as Charles Hardin, also find it contradictory as demands for environmental protection and sacrifice-free material abundance are simultaneously made.58 Dunlap, meanwhile, finds that the public, despite their self-professed environmentalism, holds politicians far more accountable for economic rather than environmental problems.59 Americans, he goes on to argue, tend to
have a profound lack of understanding of ecological issues
and what is often their incompatibility with other deeplyheld values such as economic growth or private

property.~

Thus, the public may not yet appreciate that the environmentalist, as Rosenbaum suggests, "may well be a revolutionist disguised as a reformer" asking "for some form of
cultural suicide."M This is a point Ophuls strongly echoes:
The irony is, of course, that the ideas of human ecology, despite their resemblence to older conservative
ideas, will not be interpreted as conservative at all
by most Americans, but as revolutionary in the most
profound and radical way. Compared to them, Marxism,
~ Charles Hardin, "Observations on Environmental Politics" in Nagel, 183-184.
59 Dunlap, 134.
~Ibid. 122. Dunlap does finds, however, that there is an
emerging knowledgability that may someday change this.
61 walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern
(New York: Prager, 1977), 57, 280.
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which merely asks that "progress" be given central direction in the interest of social justice, seems like
an old friend.62
This supposed failure of the public to recognize the
deeper costs and implications of ecology would seem, therefore, to set the stage for a potential backlash or some such
eventual erosion of superficially held support at the first
signs of oncoming hardships or sacrifice. Said one observer
several years ago at the height of the so-called "green"
craze:
Today, its anything green. Tomorrow, it'll be anything
jobs. Try to cut thousands of jobs in the middle of a
recession and see what happens. You'll have recipe
books for spotted owl corning out of Congress.63
The continuing recession and budgetary problems of the
early 1990s may be just the event to fray this fragile support. Already, donations to environmental groups have declined in the past few years, prompting layoffs and scaledback operations among formerly booming groups.M Thus, publie opinion that once seemed solid may, if challenged, actually turn out to be quite unstable.
How, then, does all this relate to the Siskiyou case?
While public support for old growth might seem fairly clear,
environmentalists should want to think hard before unreservedly embracing the power of rnajoritarianism on forest is-

62

William Ophuls, "Reversal is the Law of Tao: The Imminent Resurrection of Political Philosophy" in Nagel, 44.
63 Quoted in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" Natic:rnal
Journal (28 July 1990), 1831.
MEliza Carney and w. John Moore, "From the K Street
Corridor" National Journal (4 January 1992), 30.

486
sues; the ecological impact of vox populi is not quite
clear. While national and regional public support of environmental goals has certainly been crucial to the success of
Siskiyou environmentalists (Lou Gold, after all, knew exactly why he had to give hundreds of lectures coast-to-coast),
public opinion is, at best a volatile ally of ecology. Before they surrender the current legal and scientific advantage they enjoy in an otherwise hostile pluralist arena, environmentalists ought to be sure their public support is unwavering, something they cannot now do.
A good example of this volatility of public opinion
might be California's Propositions 128 and 130, perhaps the
best pieces of evidence that exist today regarding old
growth and majoritarianism in action. These two measures,
informally known as "Big Green" and "Forests Forever" were
put on the 1990 state ballot after the requisite 600,000
signatures were collected. Big Green was a sweeping, comprehensive proposal which would place limits upon greenhouse
gases, ozone-depleting chemicals, and pesticide usage, in
addition to prohibiting the clearcutting of redwood forests
and raising a $300 million bond for reforestation and private forestland acquisition.65 The Forests Forever initiative, which dealt exclusively with forests, proposed to
raise $742 million for the purchase of highly endangered

65 Robert Guskind, "Big Green Light" National Journal (6
October 1990), 2401-2402.
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private old growth redwood forest, end clearcutting on all
forests in the state, tax whole log exports, and assist
displaced mill

workers.~

After early polls showed environmentalists with a substantial lead in both initiatives, opponents, including the
timber industry, went all out, spending tens of millions of
dollars to defeat the proposal.67 In the state hardest-hit
by an increasingly severe national recession, timber interests successfully managed to portray Big Green and Forests
Forever not only as billion dollar taxpayer boondoggles, but
a potential death-blow to the state's wood products industry.~

In the end, Big Green was trounced by a two-to-one

margin while Forests Forever was more narrowly defeated 52%
to

48%.~

~Ibid.; Bald Mountain Bulletin (Winter 1990/1991), 1.
67 Big Green's opponents, which included an array of business and agriculture groups were reported to have spent
$16.5 million to defeat the proposal. The timber industry,
meanwhile, reportedly spent $10 million to defeat both Big
Green and Forests Forever. Jorge Casuse, "Black Tuesday for
Big Green Backers" Chicago Tribune (11 November 1990) sec.1,
6; Bald Mountain Bulletin, 1.
~Robert Reinhold, "Once Considered a Sure Thing, California's Environmental Package Falters" New York Times (16
September 1990), 30.
69 Casuso, 6; Bald Mountain Bulletin, 1. It should be
noted, however, that the timber industry's counterinitiative, paradoxically titled, "The Global Warming and Clearcutting Reduction, Wildlife Protection, and Reforestation
Act", nicknamed by the media "Big Stump" was defeated 70% to
30%. In all, however, the 1990 elections were fairly bleak
for environmentalists and their various referenda and initiatives. Environmental propositions in six states--mining
regulations in South Dakota, a bond for wild land purchase
in New York, a recycling measure in Oregon, stream protection measures in Missouri, land use measures in Washington
and California's two initiatives all went down in defeat as
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At least from the environmentalists' perspective, one
lesson of this initiative and its defeat might be that even
a generally supportive public is quite vulnerable to the
fear and doubt-provoking media campaigns of a well-financed
opposition, thereby making referenda a risky proposition.70
Such riskiness and unpredictablity largely sum up the diff iculty environmental initiatives have not only with
majoritarian-style referenda, but decentralized community
control as well. Perhaps even more so than schemes of centralization, community and/or popular sovereignty on issues
of environmental policy, given the social, cultural, and
economic context which exists today, are subject to extremely volatile and unpredictable forces. Ecological crises,
severe unemployment, corporate media campaigns, or popular
culture trends can all sway public opinion quite suddenly
and forcefully for or against environmental protection.
Local community opinion, meanwhile, is influenced by the
added dimension of local culture, history, and socio-

prospects for a worsening recession loomed. Robert Pear,
''Voters Spurn Array of Plans for Protecting Environment" New
York Times (8 November 1990), sec.B, 1.
70 Majoritarians, however, might argue that Big Green, although a majoritarian-style referendum, occurred within a
larger context of pluralism. In this case then, administrative or legislative pluralism was simply replaced by "referenda pluralism" in which powerful interests still compete
for influence and dominate the policymaking process. In a
truly majoritarian system, its advocates would argue, the
power of special interests to fragment, confuse, or manipulate the public would have previously been diminished.
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economic circumstance which can all militate against comprehensive, holistic national environmental policies.
The mostly positive but fairly shallow and unstable
body of public opinions towards the environment that exist
today must be harnessed into a stable and deeply-held valueset if ecological advocates can more fully trust referenda
or local control. Working towards this end should, therefore, be an imperative of the environmental movement.

CHAPTER 8
PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY: SOME CONCLUSIONS

Thus emerges the classic environmental dilemma: what
must be done cannot be done.
Robert Bartlett

This study's long journey through the thickets of democratic theory, ecological politics, and the history of the
Siskiyou National Forest, by its very design, is not capable
of definitively proving broad theories or constructing grand
models of ecological politics. But by concentrating in great
detail upon a specific and very fascinating case of such
politics, it has, nevertheless, provided quite a bit of insight, in a way that studies of broader scope could not, into the relationship of democracy {particularly of the pluralist variant} and ecology.
Critics have raised doubts about the pluralist process
regarding both how well it actually functions and how norrna490
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tively desirable it is as a form of democratic organization.
As a fairly diffuse, non-material public interest, environmentalism would seem to strongly qualify as one such political movement likely to be disadvantaged by the pluralist
process.
The doubts of the critics center around three issues:
(1) the inherent inequality of interest group organization
and competition,

(2) the bias of bureaucratic administration

towards more powerful economically-oriented interests, and
(3) structural characteristics in the system, particularly
the fragmentation of political authority, which are also
alleged to favor the status quo. As alternatives to pluralism, critics prescribe a diversity of arrangements depending
upon their perspective. These include increased centralization and formalized administration and lawmaking, increased
decentralization and community control, and broad-scale
majoritarian control through referenda and other direct participatory mechanisms.
The question that has remained consistent throughout
this study has been: what does the political history of the
Siskiyou National Forest from 1983 to 1992 tell us about how
interests and policy demands rooted in ecological values
fare in a pluralist political process? As such, this work
has tried to determine whether the arguments of pluralism's
detractors or advocates seem more valid concerning the three
main issues of interest group competition, bureaucratic ad-
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ministration, and the potential biases of pluralist structures? Would the various forms of democratic organization
offered as alternatives more reliably advance ecological initiatives?
Principal Findings
The history of the Siskiyou National Forest from 19831992 reveals that environmentalists have had mixed success
in the pluralist system as it now stands. While losing (to
various degrees) practically every battle they fought over
local timber projects and plans on the Siskiyou, they still
managed to move the Forest's administration away from a
strictly one-dimensional preoccupation with timber production and forced the agency to at least acknowledge and confront issues important to them.
Local environmentalists have also had mixed success
when working in conjunction with regional and national
groups on broader old growth and spotted owl issues. They
have very effectively built public support and expanded
their issue into a matter of national concern attended to
even by Presidents. In Congress, environmentalists have
mostly taken a battering in the politics of timber appropriations and riders, but have recently had a few triumphs
here as well. As for the high-stakes game of ancient forest
legislation, stalemate has prevailed with both sides thwarting the other.
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Only in the judicial realm have environmentalists
clearly dominated. Court victories have been their ace-inthe-hole, a weapon so strong that it could hold off an
actively belligerent presidential administration. Without
such judicial support, the story of old growth politics
would have been a very different one, with thousands more
acres of ancient forest sure to have been cut in the last
decade and the spotted owl, probably left unlisted as an
endangered species, rapidly approaching extinction.
In the case of the Siskiyou, pluralist theory was most
strongly supported as it concerned interest group organization. While ecological interests did face some obstacles and
were at a distinct, but not overwhelming, disadvantage in
terms of material resources, they seemed to suffer few of
the problems of formation and mobilization that many of the
critics would have predicted. Contrary to Olson's thesis,
environmentalists vigorously organized and did so (at least
locally) without offering selective incentives of any real
value nor threatening sanctions. Instead, common values,
ideology, and the shared perception of a serious threat
seemed to be the chief motivating factors.
Despite some inequities, environmentalists in the Siskiyou proved to be more than worthy opponents of timber interests. They clearly served as the countervailing force
that pluralists foresee, effectively voicing their concerns
and pursuing their objectives. Part of this may have been
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due to their successful use of strategic communication and
symbolic language and imagery--f acets of interest group competition which rely less upon the sheer weight of group resources. Timber, however, held their own in this regard, employing many of the same techniques.
Although the environmentalists made their presence
keenly felt and effectively projected themselves into the
policy struggle, the realm of bureaucratic administration
(especially important in a national forest) offered less
support for pluralist theory. The main bureaucratic actor in
the Siskiyou case, the Forest Service, just barely met the
criteria regarding how a pluralist agency is supposed to act
(namely, as a fairly open, balanced, and flexible policy
broker). While participation has been institutionalized and
access opened, the real impact of this has been, at best,
limited. Instead, other factors mentioned by critics, including deeply-held agency values, budgetary imperatives,
and perhaps some vestiges of old-fashioned clientelism, all
serve to produce a distinct bias in Forest Service administration in the Siskiyou. While the notion of agency capture
by dominant clients (the centerpiece of many critiques of
pluralist administration) could not at all be supported in
the Siskiyou, the agency's bias often ends up serving the
same ends. Regarding agency flexibility, the Forest Service
could once more be found to inhabit a fairly hazy area that
is not quite as pluralistic as advocates claim nor as in-
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flexible as critics suggest. In the end, the Siskiyou National Forest could be considered an agency that simultaneously manages to act pluralistically to some extent while
also maintaining a fairly strong timber production orientation. This orientation is most likely due to a combination
of professional norms and values, the agency's budgetary
structure, and perhaps some degree of obligation to a
resource-using client group whose demands strongly reinforce
the agency's own internally-derived mission.
Perhaps the most severe criticism of pluralism's effect on ecological policymaking centers around how the system's decentralized, fragmented authority renders policymakers impotent to tackle complex, multi-faceted ecological
problems. The pluralist policymaking process is accused of
being inertia-bound and heavily favoring the status-quo of
environmental destruction. As a remedy, a number of critics
call for centralized political authority capable of breaking
the incrementalist logjam and producing rational, comprehensive policies.
In the Siskiyou, political fragmentation did indeed
seem to have the deleterious effects upon ecological policymaking that critics argue it does (with the exception of
agency capture). Narrow turf-bound reductionism, cautious
piecemeal incrementalism, and a fractious tendency towards
stalemate all cursed policymaking in the Siskiyou and the
entire old growth region, and all clearly thwarted the crea-
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tion of any sort of comprehensive and scientifically and
socially defensible approach to old growth policy. For all
their successes, environmentalists never really got the
chance to move beyond reactive "preserve what you can" types
of responses and address the root causes of ecological disruption.
What centralist critics do not give pluralist fragmentation enough credit for, however, has been the undeniably
open access and broad strategic opportunities it has provided ecological advocates with. By contrast, centralization,
while holding out the (not yet proven) potential for more
comprehensive policy, also presents the risk of much more
restricted decisionmaking access and fewer strategic weapons
in the environmentalists' arsenal. To consolidate authority
in such a way will work for environmentalists only if such
authority is resolutely committed to ecology. At least in
the Siskiyou/old growth case, however, there is no evidence
that more centralized levels of policymaking are, by nature,
any more or less ecologically sensitive than decentralized
policymakers.
Prescriptions for Change
One must consider next, then, the question of which
democratic arrangement would be most beneficial to ecological goals if the Siskiyou case is to serve as any indication. Many of pluralism's

alleg~d

flaws and biases were
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abundantly clear and well-documented in this study. Centralized and formalized administration, though, is an extremely
risky solution as a dependence upon the questionable ecological enlightenment of elites puts any environmental initiative on very shaky ground. Furthermore, if centralized administration ever does turn hostile, environmentalists could
depend on far fewer avenues for redress or appeal, especially regarding the lawsuits that have been their salvation.
Majoritarianism, meanwhile, depends upon a similarly
fickle source of authority. While currently supportive, public opinion, especially if not reinforced with high levels
of knowledge and salience, could easily turn on environmentalism, regardless of its stature as a long-term public interest. This would especially be true if economically hard
times prevail and/or significant sacrifices are asked to be
made.
Highly decentralized participatory democracy and community control offers substantial risks and limitations of
their own. There is simply no guarantee that without a deep
and broad-based value shift, local populations will act as
more vigilant defenders of the environment than more centralized authorities. In fact, in the case of the Siskiyou,
some fairly good evidence exists suggesting they would act
less so. And even if vigilant, the scope of authority in
such small autonomous jurisdictions might prevent

co~un-

i ties from dealing with more complex, transjurisdictional
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aspects of ecological problems thus threatening to trivialize even the most well-intentioned policy decisions.
Although decentralization has, in the last decade,
probably eclipsed centralization as the solution most in
vogue among ecological theorists, it should be remembered
that the bulk of environmentalist's political achievements
thus far have been realized through fairly centralized
policies. Paehlke echoes this point:
.... there is an important caveat with regard to the
relationship between decentralization and environmentalism. However strongly environmentalists prefer a
decentralized, self-managing future, environmentalism's effect in advanced industrial economies has often been to broaden and strengthen the powers of the
central government. 1
Where does this leave ecology as a political movement
then? From the above summary, it would seem that no democratic formulation offers a rock-solid guarantee to treat
ecological values and objectives sympathetically. While this
is a sobering conclusion for ecologists, it is an important
one if it reminds them that no prescription is a panacea, an
unfortunate notion that frequently shows up in much ecological theory. Those who value things such as old growth or
healthy streams would do well to beware of simple theoretical solutions to what in reality is so complex and multifaceted an issue.

1

Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of
Progressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989), 155-156.
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It is clear that the pluralist process places signif icant, sometimes seemingly fatal obstacles and biases in the
path of ecologically enlightened policy. Yet environmentalists must never forget that pluralism also grants them one
precious gift that no other form of political organization
can guarantee in quite the same way--multiple channels of
diverse and open access to the political process. Observes
the head of the Sierra Club:
"Of all the countries in the world, the U.S. has, by
far, the most easily influenced government .... there is
often pretty good recourse if you're systematic and
organized in how you go about it."2
Thus, the "baby" of access, redress, and appeal must
not be thrown out with the "bathwater" of status quo biases,
delay, and incoherent policy. This naturally provides all
thoughtful environmentalists, and political scientists for
that matter, with a thorny dilemma that Robert Fluno sums up
well:
.... so long as pluralism is so frustrating and so embarassingly selfish, men will be angered by it. As a
process of collective policy-making, it is too intellectually unattractive, too incredibly clumsy, for
those of us who prize order in a world so depressingly
chaotic .... But the gamble that concentration [or devolution--ed.) is better than pluralism is simply that:
a gamble, perhaps the most ancient and risky of political gambles.3

2Quoted in Trip Gabriel, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest,
They Hear It" New York Times Magazine, (4 November 1990),
59.
3Robert Fluno quoted in G. David Garson, Group Theories
of Politics (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 155-156.
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Yet to be content with the status quo of pluralism as
it stands today is and should be unacceptable to most environmentalists. Their significant legal successes notwithstanding, environmentalists, in dealing with the Forest Service, Congress, and the Administration, have had a grueling
uphill fight every step of the way. For all the access it
grants, this pluralist status quo mostly has brought shortsightedness, paralysis, and a profound bias towards the dispensation of those material, distributable political goods
that cause old growth to fall and the web of biodiversity to
further unravel. This is the paradox of pluralism and the
case of the Siskiyou can serve as a metaphor for this ambivalence as it occurs across the political spectrum.
Here one must return to a question raised in the first
chapter: are ecological values, because of their immaterial,
firmly zero-sum nature, hopelessly out of place in a pluralist process that stresses bargaining and compromise and is
far more comfortable distributing material benefits? To a
pluralist, the environmentalists might be considered to have
enjoyed great success and influence in the old growth campaign. They did, after all, gain much access and clearly
push policymaking, however grudgingly, their way. By pluralist standards, this is about the most any reasonable player
could ask for. To an environmentalist with zero-sum beliefs,
however, ecological disruption is an either/or thing which
no amount of access or even success in nudging arguments
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around can make up for; only the halting of such disruption
will do. A cartoon printed in a Northwestern newspaper during the height of controversy captures the environmentalists' dissatisfaction with pluralist-style solutions. It
shows a politician, presumably seized by the spirit of compromise, pointing to a giant Douglas fir and offering a logger the top half and an environmentalist the bottom half .4
When analyzing the outcome of this case, it is quite important, then, to keep in mind these differing standards of
what constitutes policy-influencing success.
Ultimately, it is quite difficult to determine whether
the pluralist system holds out the potential to adequately
confront ecological problems in the long-term; that is,
without mistaking interest group access or even influence
for the resolution of real problems. Perhaps pluralism's
worst flaws in this regard cannot be rectified; maybe they
are rooted too deeply in its structural core and very nature
and the best the process can be expected to produce is a
continuation of muddling through with haphazard, piecemeal
reactions. If one feels that such a critique overemphasizes
structural factors, on the other hand, this might be a bit
too pessimistic an assessment in that it does not adequately
recognize the importance of situational, historical, and
sociocultural factors in shaping the outcomes a pluralist

4

This cartoon appeared with Keith Ervin, "The Tree Fight"
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (24 September 1989).
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process can produce. Perhaps profound changes in these
external policymaking factors (deep values shifts, worsening
ecological deterioration, etc.) can, in some cases, exert
enough pressure to overcome or off set the effects of pluralism's fragmented structure and piecemeal orientation.
Even if it is assumed that this latter scenario is
true, the need for radical reform in the process as it regards environmental policymaking should be vividly clear.
Undertaking such reform will not be as easy as wishing it
so, however, as the more admirable aspects of pluralism are
clearly the flipside of its more troublesome ones. To banish
reductionist fragmentation, for instance, is to possibly
banish checks and balances or multiple access as well. To
preserve pluralism's beneficial qualities while addressing
its many problems, therefore, is a very precarious task
which, if at all possible, must be attempted with immense
precision.
With that warning in mind, it must also be said that
if ecological problems are ever to be adequately confronted,
this process of reform must carry on even to the point where
pluralism actually incorporates significant aspects of the
critics' remedial alternatives. From the centralists, for
example, pluralism must far more vigorously adopt mechanisms
for formulating more comprehensive policy and coordination
and cooperation across jurisdictions. Policymaking

p~oce

dures must also be allowed to assign adequate value to those
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less material, less tangible ecological values that so often
fail to be incorporated or given full weight in distributive
pluralist bargaining. A reformed pluralist system must also
allow less administrative reinterpretation and outright disrespect for the law and better attempt to ensure the scientific and legal integrity of bureaucratic administrators.
From participatory democrats and majoritarians, the
pluralist process should adopt a thorough institutionalization of meaningful citizen participation and review in every
stage of the policymaking process as well as uphold standing
to sue in the courts. For environmentalists, such rights and
opportunities, to the extent they have been extended, have
proven simply indispensible. At least in this regard, the
validity of Paehlke's thesis that democracy goes hand-inhand with environmentalism should be abundantly clear.
And perhaps most importantly, from all critical theories, however divergent, should be borrowed and incorporated
into a pluralist democracy the heretofore alien concept that
there sometimes does exist a clear and identifiable public
interest that unites all citizens (whether they recognize it
or not) and transcends all notions of "issue publics" or
"attentive publics" or any other use of public in the plural
form. There must come a time when our collective needs as a
polity to protect the ecosystems that sustain us, conserve
the future's resources, and safeguard the biodiversity upon
which we depend and are an integral part of are recognized
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as more than "just another interest" in the pluralist battleground of so many interests. 5 This reluctance to rank
problems and values and collective needs beyond simply assuaging whichever

interes~

cries out the loudest is one of

the most insidious aspects of pluralism. Perhaps more than
anything else, then, the pluralist process needs to be alt

lowed the courage and resolve to identify the long-term public interest better. If it does, then it just may be able to
adequately address the ecological problems that we all must
confront.

5 Even

Kelso, pluralism's ardent defender, argues for
reform in this respect, calling for a public pluralism in
which the government actively sponsors and encourages those
groups it deems to be working on the public's behalf. While
preserving pluralism's basic competition of interests, government would, in effect, act to level the playing field so
to speak. William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978).
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APPENDIX A
THE NATURE OF ECOLOGICAL VALUES
To fully appreciate how pluralism and ecology interact, one must delve more deeply into the nature of ecological values than merely recognizing that they are complex
and often intangible. It must be understood just how fundamentally such values and priorities differ from economically quantifiable ones.
The dominant attitudes towards nature prevalent
throughout America's early history has been characterized by
most observers as being utilitarian and fairly antagonistic .1 These attitudes stemmed largely from two sources.
First is what historians Lynn White and Roderick Nash each
suggest is the influence of European culture and religion.2
The first settlers brought these cultural and religious
values with them to the New World and were, consequently,
guided by them in their endeavors to subdue what they felt
was a savage, desolate and godless wilderness.
The influence of the Enlightenment, which figured so
prominently in shaping American political thought, also had
a role in shaping early attitudes towards the natural world.
Besides basing political legitimacy upon the foundations of
property rights and economic self-interest, Enlightenment
thought, in a more general sense, offered a vision of continual material progress based upon the rational scientific
unraveling and manipulation of nature. The achievement of
this goal of optimal rationality and material progress, of
course, required a substantial alienation from any affective
attachment to the natural world which, by necessity, had to
be seen as nothing more than raw material and potential economic opportunity.3 "In the vocabulary of material progress", claims Nash, "wilderness had meaning only as an obstacle."' By overcoming this obstacle and making the land
accessible and productive, its full economic and thus rational value could then be realized.

1

There are seemingly countless treatments of this subject; perhaps the best is Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the
American Mind revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1973).
2Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind; Lynn White,
"The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" Science 155
10 March 1967), 1203-1207.
3Perhaps the best summation of Enlightenment Thou9ht's
views on nature is in William Leiss, The Domination of
Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974).
4 Nash, 41.
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Originating with the Romantic and Transcendentalist
movements of the early to mid-19th century and continuing
ever since, dissent towards this dominant view of nature has
steadily grown in both scope and complexity, developing
eventually into what today we can broadly call the ecological position. In its original and most precise sense, the
term ecology, according to Henning and Mangun, is the "study
of the relationships between all living things and the physical environment." 5 As shall be shown, however, ecology has
come to be used far more broadly than merely referring to a
field of study. Ecological values can be considered to encompass at least three dimensions, which although distinct,
are usually characterized by so much overlap and interconnection of concepts, that they now rarely, if ever, occur in
isolation.

The first dimension of the ecological value system includes biocentric or what Henning and Mangun call, "appreciative and non-utilitarian" attitudes; 6 that is, the belief
that all natural things have inherent value and thus do not
require having utility for human beings in order to have
worth. Such thinking necessitates, of course, a rejection
not only of utilitarianism, but humankind's privileged position in the grand natural scheme of things. The naturalist
and writer John Muir who was deeply influenced by Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau makes this point:
The world, as we are told was made especially for man
--a presumption not supported by the facts. A numerous
class of men are painfully astonished whenever they
find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe
which they cannot eat or render in some way that which
they call useful to themselves .... Now it never seems
to occur to these .... that Nature's object in making
animals and plants might possibly be first of all the
happiness of each one of them, not the creation of all
for the happiness of one. Why should man value himself
as more than a small part of one great unit of creation?7
Similarly, the forester and naturalist Aldo Leopold
admonishes us to develop the respect for nature necessary to
change from "conquerer" of the land community to "plain mem-

5 Daniel

Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 2.
6

Ibid. 8.
7 John Muir quoted in Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Station, TX: TeAas A&M University Press,
1980), 29.
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ber and citizen of it", 8 while the author Edward Abbey invokes an existentialist plea for us "to let Being be."9
Although biocentric ideas have been a common thread
throughout the writings of the ecologically-minded from the
Transcendentalists on down, it has not been until the last
decade that they have been fully articulated as a coherent
and well-developed body of social, ethical, and philosophical thought. Works by William Devall and George Sessions,
Fritjof Capra, Arne Naess, and Gary Synder have heartily
rejected anthropocentrism while attempting to clearly and
formally stake out the alternative biocentric or deep ecology position and its implications for society.10
Another subtly different component of the ecological
value system, what Joseph Petulla calls the "ecologic" perspective, emphasizes the interdependence and interrelatedness of all elements in nature.11 This perspective borrows
many of its ideas from the science of ecology which was formally established around the turn of the century as a means
to measure the flow of energy and balance of life throughout
natural communities. Scientific ecologists such as Rachel
Carson, Barry Commoner, or Garrett Hardin, have all attempted to document the self-regulating balances of natural systems and humankind's disruptive effects upon those balances. 12
Not surprisingly, this focus upon interdependencies
and equilibriums makes ecology the most holistic and inclusive of all the sciences. Perhaps Commoner offers the
starkest rejection of reductionism in his field when he
declares simply that, "everything is related to everything
else. 13 To ignore this basic fact of ecology and foolishly
attempt to do "just one thing", ominously warns William
11

8 Aldo

Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1949), 204.
9Edward Abbey, Down the River (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1982), 119.

10 william Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt
Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Fritjof Capra, "Deep
Ecology: A New Paradigm" Earth Island Journal 2:4 (1987),
27-30; Arne Naess, "The Shallow and Deep, Long-Range Ecology
Movement" Inquiry 16 (1973), 95-100; Gary Synder, The Practice of the Wild (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990).
11
Petulla, 30.
12 Amongst their many works, perhaps the most representative are: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1962); Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New
York: Knopf, 1971); Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" Science 162 (13 December 1968), 1243-1248.
13 Commoner, 3 3 .
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Ophuls, is to be assured of facing "unintended consequences. "14 Because of this holistic and systemic orientation,
those operating from the ecologic perspective value, above
all, the integrity, stability, and proper functioning of
complex and biologically diverse natural systems both for
the entire planet's and our own species' sake.
To the ecologists, therefore, the gravest sin possible
is to disrupt this delicate balance. Such priorities, however, naturally find themselves on a collision course with
values and priorities associated with the economic growth
demanded by modern industrial society. Leopold recognizes
this value gap as he argues that a policy towards the land
that is:
.... based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually eliminate, many elements in the land community
that lack commercial value, but are (as far as we
know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of
the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic
parts. 15
Similarly, Commoner likens life on earth to a complex
web in which humankind, through its destructive activities,
is continually breaking strands. Eventually, he warns, when
enough of the threads have been eliminated, the entire web
will disintegrate.16 Thus, ecologists' chief role is to
serve, in Petulla's words, as the "enemies of disruption." 17
The final element of the ecological value system involves that which can be considered primarily spiritual or
aesthetic. It is rare that ecological values are articulated
without at least some reference made to the awesome beauty
and sublimity of nature as well as the serenity, wisdom, and
spiritual power to be either gained by the observer or found
within the observed. In fact, aesthetic and spiritual arguments formed the original basis for the preservationist position as ecologic and biocentric rationale were added only
later.
Aesthetics provided the grounds upon which the Romantic movement, which gave birth to some of the earliest preservationist sentiments, justified the value of nature. The
wilderness provided to the Romantics and their modern off14 william Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977), 22-23.
15 Leopold, 214.
16 Commoner, 38.
17 Petulla, chap.4.
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spring the most perfect standard of beauty and, according to
Bob Marshall, "perhaps the best opportunity for .... pure esthetic rapture." 18 Thus, to the Romantics and their kin, on
the basis of its sheer, overpowering beauty alone, nature
clearly justifies its own value and thereby deserves protection.
The spiritual aspect of ecological values is a bit
more complex as it can take one of two forms: the upholding
of nature as spiritually sacred in its own right or else the
belief that nature offers spiritual benefits to those who
become intimate with it. In American thought, the former
sentiment goes all the way back to Transcendentalist thought
which, in seeing nature as synonymous with or at least symbolic of the Universal Spirit and hence, goodness, morality,
and truth, provided the starkest of counterpoints to the
hostile Puritan or frontier vision of the wilderness.
Perhaps no one linked nature to the divine with as
much enthusiasm and quasi-religious fervor as did Muir who
spoke of nature as a "window opening into heaven" and a
"mirror reflecting the Creator." 19 Muir's writings are
filled with all sorts of religious imagery as he refers to
natural objects as "sparks of the divine Soul", to forests
as "God's First Temples" and the business interests who
would commercially exploit them as "temple destroyers. 20
Thus, to Muir and those who follow in his footsteps, nature
and especially wondrous natural places are the sacred
dwellings of whatever their conception of the divine is (be
it God or gods or animistic spirits). As such, defiling
these places would not merely be wrong or ill-advised, but
profanity and blasphemy of the worst sort.
11

There is another angle to this notion of nature and
spirituality that is less concerned with the divine nature
of nature itself than it is with the spiritual and psychological benefits nature offers humankind. According to such
thinking, nature has value and deserves protection as the
antidote for the nerve-shattering alienation, dehumanization, and brutality of modern civilization. To Justice
William O. Douglas, for example, wilderness provides a respite from society's "mass compulsions" and a place where
"man need not become an automaton",~ while Nash quotes
neurologist William Gibson as deeming wilderness areas "the
greatest mental health guardians we have."~ Historian
Theodore Roszak, meanwhile, argues that nature's magical,
18
19
20
21
22

Bob Marshall quoted in Nash, 204.
Muir quoted in Nash, 125.
Ibid. 125, 130, 161.
william o. Douglas quoted in Nash, 248.
william Gibson quoted in Nash, 249.
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mystical, and wondrous qualities are one of the only things
left that can stand up to the modern era's crushing cynicism. 23
In addition to wilderness's tonic effect on humankind,
preservationists also suggest that it serves the essential
function of providing a real, present contrast to civilization; in other words, wilderness plays the vital role of the
Other through which civilization gains definition and even
value. Wilderness, then, is thought to be crucial as the
wellspring of civilization, the raw material out of which
civilization was forged. Without wilderness, its proponents
warn, civilization loses its source and hence, its identity .2 4
In a similar vein is wilderness's alleged role as a
storehouse of raw freedom. To William O. Douglas, for example, a society which maintains roadless areas makes a
"pledge to Freedom ... 25 To eliminate wilderness, then, would
be to strike a direct blow at freedom as Abbey clearly believes as he confesses his fear "that if we allow the freedom of the hills to be taken from us, then the very idea of
freedom may die with it. 26 To Abbey, then, the destruction
of the wilderness in all its dark, mysterious, and dangerous
glory and its replacement with the mind-numbing bland safety
of modern conveniences is synonymous with the destruction of
freedom by an ever more obstrusive and totalitarian technological state:
11

I see the preservation of wilderness as one sector of
the front in the war against the encroaching industrial state. Every square mile of range and desert saved
from the strip miners, every river saved from the darn
builders, every forest saved from the loggers, every
swamp saved f rorn the land speculators means another
square mile saved for the play of human freedom. 27
The summation of the ecological value system is best
left to Thoreau who ties together all the strands of ecol23

Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1969), chap. 8.
24 Such arguments are particularly well put by such writers as Aldo Leopold, Howard Zahniser, and Joseph Wood
Krutch among others who contribute to the text of Francois
Leydet (editor), Time and the River Flowing: Grand Canyon
(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1964), as well as in Edward Abbey, Down the River.
25 oouglas quoted in Nash, 248.
26 Abbey, Down the River, 120-121.
27 Edward Abbey, The Journey Home (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1977) I 235-236
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ogy, biocentrism, romanticism, Transcendentalism, aestheticism, and spirituality when he boldly proclaims in no morally uncertain terms that, "In wildness is the preservation of
the world.~

~Thoreau quoted in Paul Brooks, "Wilderness in West~rn
Culture" in William Schwartz (editor), Voices for the Wilderness (New York: Ballantine, 1968), 39.
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APPENDIX B
THE INTERVIEWS
Much of the data used in this study were gathered
through in-depth interviews. Although conducting such detailed and time-consuming interviews inevitably limits the
number of individuals contacted (as compared to say, telephone surveys or questionnaires), it was the goal of this
study to collect information from a well-balanced and highly relevant group of participants. Those I interviewed met
one of three criteria: (1) they were known to me through my
research as a significant participant, (2) they were recommended by other participants as someone to talk to, or (3)
they were representative of a larger group of actors whose
perspective I sought (such as Siskiyou district rangers or
D.C. level Forest Service officials). I certainly did not
get to interview every last person my research told me was
important or whom was recommended to me due to a number of
practical constraints inherent to the research design (for
one, I would probably be interviewing until 1994!). Nevertheless, I feel that my final roster of interviewees was
relevant, diverse, and well-balanced enough to offer a very
full and richly multi-dimensional view of Siskiyou politics.
Specifically, I interviewed fifteen individuals. These
included eight fairly active local interest group participants and seven Forest Service officials. The interest group
interviewees were evenly split between four timber industry
officials from several different trade associations or companies and four environmentalists, similarly from a variety
of groups. Of the Forest Service personnel interviewed, five
were from the Siskiyou National Forest, one was a regional
official from Portland and one was an official from the
agency's Washington D.C. headquarters. The five Siskiyou
personnel included the Forest Supervisor, the now-retired
former Supervisor (who served from 1983-1990), two district
rangers, and a staffer involved in timber planning and appeals. All interviewees were asked a similar set of openended questions which varied slightly depending upon whether
the individual represented timber, environmentalists, or the
agency.
Since most of the interviewees are still actively involved in the politics of the Siskiyou and must deal with
one another, maintaining their confidentiality was of utmost
importance. Thus, information, opinions, and quotes taken
from these interviews, with the exception of the former and
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current Forest Supervisors, are attributed only in a generic
manner and none are cited in the footnotes. All interviews
were conducted by the author between April 1991 and November
1992 in either southwest Oregon or Chicago and were tape
recorded. Approximately half were conducted in person and
half by telephone.
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF OTHER NOTABLE NATIONAL, AND STATE/REGIONAL
INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN OLD GROWTH AND RELATED ISSUES.1
Environmental

Timber

Save America's Forests,
Washington D.C.

American Forest Resource
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Western Ancient
Forest Campaign,
Washington D.C.

Western Washington
Commercial Logging Action
Committee, Seattle

Ancient Forest Alliance,
Washington D.C.

American Forest Products
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Association of Forest Service
Employees For Environmental
Ethics, Eugene, OR

Oregon Project/Oregon
Public Lands Coalition
Salem, OR

Cascade Holistic Economic
Consultants, Portland

National Forest Products
Alliance, Washington D.C.

Forest Conservation Council
Eugene, OR

Public Timber Council,
Washington, D.C.

Greater Ecosystem Alliance,
Bellingham, WA

Oregon Forest Industries
Council, Salem, OR

Washington Environmental
Council, Seattle.

Washington Contract Loggers
Association Olympia, WA

Central Oregon Audubon
Society, Bend, OR

Gifford Pinchot
Alliance2

Greenpeace U.S.A.,
Washington D.C.

Western Public Lands
Coalition, Salt Lake City

Native Forest Council,
Eugene, OR
Sierra Club, San Francisco
Forest Reform Network, Dallas
Lighthawk, Sante Fe, NM
Seattle Audubon Society
Mazamas, Portland
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1 This

listing includes some of the more notable interest
groups involved in the old growth issue and related issues
(such as national forest management policy, Forest Service
reform, or wilderness) which did not directly take part in
the conflict over the Siskiyou National Forest. Still, these
groups had an indirect impact upon the Siskiyou through
their more general activities regarding old growth and other
forest issues. Measuring indirect impact is, of course, an
extremely difficult proposition in that the Siskiyou conflict took place on so many levels and involved so many factors. As such, it is very difficult to draw the line as to
which indirectly involved groups to include and which to
leave out. A truly comprehensive listing would have to include literally hundreds of local environmental groups or
sawmills focused on a particular county, national forest, or
watershed all across the nation. As the forest reform issue
has heated up in the past decade such groups, at least on
the environmentalist side, have been established in every
part of the country where there are National Forest units
(including Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New England, and the Appalachian states). Because such local groups' influence on
events in the Siskiyou is so much more indirect and diluted
than the more broadly focused national and state/regional
groups, they will not be included here. Groups that are included are: (1) of a national or Pacific Northwest focus;
(2) mentioned by a Siskiyou participant in an interview; (3)
mentioned in a journalistic account of old growth/forest
policy issues; or (4) a litigant in federal case regarding
old growth or the northern spotted owl 1988-1991.
2I was unable to track down the headquarters location of
this organization.
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APPENDIX D
DDESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA FOR
TABLES 1 and 2.
Table 1 -

Group--This list of groups includes those determined to
have directly participated at some level in the politics of
the Siskiyou National Forest. A group included in this list
must have satisfied one of the following criteria: (1) identified as a Siskiyou National Forest workshop attendee; (2)
litigant in a lawsuit involving solely the Siskiyou National
Forest; (3) filed an administrative appeal to the Siskiyou
National Forest 1986-1991; (4) mentioned by participants
interviewed as a group actor (not including participant's
own affiliation; (5) mentioned as a participant in at least
two separate non-interest group journalistic accounts of the
Siskiyou conflict.
Scope--Local refers to an area of concern that corresponds to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou National Forest, or
a watershed or section of the Siskiyou. State refers to the
state of Oregon. Regional refers to the Pacific Northwest or
the western United States.
Level of Participation-- 1 = very active and/or sustained participation; 2 = moderate and/or infrequent participation. Category l's high level of participation would include any group that was identified as being a regular and
active participant in the Siskiyou conflict and its many
subissues. Such a group would consistently and energetically
engage in the various activities listed in table 1. While
such groups did not necessarily have to engage in all of
these activities, it had to have at least pursued its speciality consistently and vigorously. Category 2 is essentially
a catchall category for any group that did not qualify as
having a high level of participation. It may, therefore, include a range of levels of participatory intensity. Note also that this variable does not necessarily measure effectiveness, but instead intensity of involvement. The measure
in this variable was determined by the identification of a
group participant by interviewees (from a group other than
the one being measured) as a group with a high or less than
high level of involvement in the Siskiyou. In addition, any
group determined to have been a regular workshop attendee
was automatically considered to have a high level of participation.
Group Type and Membership-- M = individual membership
group; CG = coalition group or trade association with other
groups or companies as members. The actual membership figure
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is the number of dues-paying individual or group members, or
if the group does not collect dues, members which satisfy
that group's minimum requirements for membership.
Paid Staff--Number of paid, non-volunteer staff. Paid
part-time staff are measured as .5 staff each. Thus, the
staff of a group with 2 full and 2 part-time workers would
be calculated as 3.
Annual Budqet--Total annual operating budget. A (*)
next to the figure indicates an approximation and/or the
average of a range. Sometimes interviewees could only give
an approximate, non-official figure for their group's annual
budget. Other interviewees gave a range such as "somewhere
between x and y dollars." In the latter case, the average of
these figures was presented in the table.
Source of Fundinq--Listed in order of the amount of the
group's budget for which each accounts: 1 = membership dues;
2 = grants (donations beyond annual or life membership requirements, foundation grants, or grants from any other
source); 3 = fundraising (special projects, speaker's fees,
auctions, benefits, etc.); 4 =sales (proceeds from the sale
of group-sponsored products or services).
Activities--This variable shows how groups participated
in the political conflict in the Siskiyou. M = monitoring,
tracking, mapping, or appealing timber sales, the Forest
Plan, or similar projects and/or attendance at Forest Service workshops, advisory boards, or hearings; LT = litigant
or intervener in any lawsuit regarding activities in the
Siskiyou; E = public education and publicity including newsletters, press releases, speaking engagements, guided field
trips, letter-writing campaigns, advertising, and related
organizing; LB = lobbying public officials in order to impart information and influence policy; R = technical, economic, or scientific research; P = group maintains state or
federally registered political action committee to dispense
campaign contributions. Activities have been determined by
interviews with participants and a multitude of data from
the case, including Forest Service documents and journalistic accounts
Table 2 Company--This is a list of politically active local
woods products companies. Several large corporations have
local operations which are listed as well. The criteria for
listing these companies is the same as for the interest
groups in table 1 (see this appendix).
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Employees - Number of total employees.
Annual Sales - Amount of total sales in millions of
dollars.
Annual Lumber Production - Number of millions of board
feet of timber the company produces annually. Note that most
of the timber produced by smaller companies comes from public land, much of that from the Siskiyou. The large corporations, on the other hand, get their timber from a number of
sources, most prominently their own private timberlands.
Level of Participation - See same heading for table 1
in this appendix.
Activities - See same heading for table 1 in this appendix. Note, however, that there are less possible activities in table 2.

Sources of data:
Personal interviews (see main text for specific citations) and telephone survey of various group participants by author (April 1991 to February 1992).
Robert Clayton, "The Environmentalists" Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report (20 January 1990), 146.

Encyclopedia of Associations, 26th edition (Detroit:
Gale Research, Inc., 1992).

Forest Industries 1988-1989 North American Factbook
(San Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1988).
Trip Gabriel, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest, They Hear
It" New York Times Magazine (4 November 1990).
Margaret Kriz,

"An Environmental Who's Who" National

Journal (28 July 1990), 1828.
Million Dollar Directory (Parsippany NJ: Dun's Marketing Services, 1991).

1990 Directory of the Forest Products Industry (San
Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1990).
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USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Appeal Number Record 1986-1990.
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, minutes from Shasta Costa workshop,
(June 1991).
State and Regional Associations of the U.S., 3rd ed.
(Washington D.C.: Columbia Books, Inc., 1991).
USDA Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY1990, 1st Report (1 December 1989).
Ward's Business Directory (Detroit: Gale Research,
Inc., 1991).
Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Oregon Grassroots
Inventory, unpublished document (22 April 1991).
Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Oregon Grassroots
Survey, unpublished document (April 1991).
Edward Zuckerman, Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990
(Washington D.C.: Amward Publications, Inc., 1990).
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APPENDIX E
MAJOR LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE
1. The 1897 Organic Act--broadly sets forth the principles of the Forest Reserve System and how it is to be administered .1
2. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960--

recognizes a diversity of values inherent in the national
forests 2 and mandates that they be administered for a multiplicity of uses that best suits the public interest and is
"not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the
greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output." The act
also requires that the annual output of renewable resources
from a given forest not exceed that forest's ability to perpetually sustain those resources.
3. The Forest and Rangeland.Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974 (RPA)--directs the Forest Service and

the BLM to engage in periodic long-range review and planning
on its various units.
4. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976

(FLPMA)--besides serving as the BLM's charter, also provides additional guidelines for systematic Forest Service
and BLM planning, reiterates multiple use/sustained yield
principles, and provides mechanisms for public participation.
5. The Rational Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)-amends previous legislation to add further requirements for
comprehensive planning (such as ten year plans for each
unit) and public participation. In addition it reaffirms and
specifies additional multiple use/sustained yield principles
(regarding such issues as annual timber quotas, watershed
protection, and reforestation), as well as establishes regulated clearcutting as an allowable harvesting method.

1

0ne key provision of the Organic Act specifically prohibits the cutting of any timber other than dead or mature
trees, a prohibition which essentially precludes clearcutting. The Forest Service was successfully sued in 1973 for
this violation of their own organic act and consequently,
legislation was passed in 1976 (NFMA) which amended the
Organic Act to allow clearcutting.
2specif ically these are identified as recreation, range,
timber, watershed, and fish and wildlife.
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Other major environmental legislation not exclusively
directed at the Forest Service but with which it is required
to comply include:
6. The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969
(NEPA)--a sweeping and somewhat vague law which among other
things requires federal agencies to prepare detailed environmental impact statements for any federal actions "significantly affecting the quality of the natural environment."
7. The Wilderness Act of 1964--sets strict guidelines
for the management of congressionally designated wilderness
areas, many of which are on national forest land.
8. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)--mandates
that the federal government document, protect, and attempt
to revive species determined to be officially threatened or
endangered.
9. The Clean water Act--establishes water quality
standards for the nation's waterways and contains provisions
regulating activities that affect wetlands.
10. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1966-establishes restrictive management guidelines for congressionally designated Wild and Scenic Rivers and the land
immediately along the banks.
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APPENDIX F
STAGES OF TYPICAL FOREST SERVICE EIS PARTICIPATION
PROCESS
PRE-DRAFT EIS STAGE
1. Notice of intent regarding a proposed action is issued
through various local media outlets.
2. Participants are notified and recruited through Forest
Service mailings, calls, and media appeals.
3. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to
explain the proposed action and identify issues and participant concerns to be incorporated into the various EIS alternatives that the Forest Service must construct.
4. Mail comment solicited and analyzed to identify issues
and participant concerns.
5. In some cases, workshop sessions are held for participants and the Forest Service to discuss issues and concerns
and jointly design EIS alternatives.
PRE-FINAL EIS STAGE
6. Draft EIS is formulated and released; it compares the
various alternatives in terms of key issues and indicators
measuring those issues and identifies the Forest Service's
draft preferred alternative(s).
7. The DEIS comment period commences; mail comments regarding the various alternatives, including the preferred alternative are solicited and analyzed.
8. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to
explain and describe the alternatives including the preferred alternative and identify participant concerns.
POST-FINAL EIS STAGE
9. Final EIS is formulated and released; it compares the
various alternatives, including any new or modified ones,
and identifies the Forest Service's final preferred alternative.
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10. Final EIS comment period commences; mail comments
regarding the various alternatives, including the final
preferred alternative are solicited and analyzed.
11. The Record of Decision is formulated and released.
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APPENDIX G
PRE-DRAFT EIS ISSUES, PARTICIPANT CONCERNS, AND
POLICY POSITIONS
The period preceding the development of a draft environmental impact statement is a crucial period for policy
formulation and one in which the most meaningful participation supposedly takes place. This is the stage when alternatives to be considered in the EIS are constructed and the
crucial issues to be measured and compared between alternatives are identified.
It is important for this study, therefore, to establish the primary issues, concerns, objections, and demands
raised by the various participants during this stage for
each of the seven EISs considered in this study. Participation at this stage differs from that in post-draft stage.
Post-draft participation focuses, in large part, on supporting or opposing the various alternatives, including the Forest Service's preferred one. All of these alternatives can
be expressed in quantifiably measurable ways; board feet of
timber, acres harvested, miles of roads built and so on.
Pre-draft participation, on the other hand, very often revolves around essentially non-quantified demands. At this
stage, participatory input most often does not take the form
of explicit numerically-expressed policy preferences, but
rather broader types of demands; cut more timber, don't enter such-and-such roadless area, protect old growth, etc.
The pre-draft positions identified here are taken from
the EIS documents themselves. NEPA regulations require that
such issues and concerns expressed during public meetings,
workshops, and mail comments be identified, summarized, and
documented in the EIS (both draft and final). The issue
headings are as presented in each EIS. The specific sources
for this data are:
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Record of
Decision, (Region 10: GPO, 1988), 9-15.

Land and Resources Management Plan Final EnvironmenImpact statement Appendices, Volume 1 (Region 10:
GPO, 1989), sec. A, 2-7.

~~~t-a-1

Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource
Final Environmental Impact statement, Volume 1
(Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 14-29.

~~~P-r-o-jects
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Integrated Resource Project Final Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. 1, 8-

~~~~-Canyon

14.

Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement

~~~~-Quosatana/Bradford

(Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. I, 12-21.
~~~---,--Two

Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Siskiyou National Forest:
1992), sec. I, 1-3.

~~~~-West

Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO 1992),
sec. 1, 9-11.

Silver Fire Recovery Project Issues and Concerns
RAPID TIMBER RECOVERY Timber--Rot and insect damage will reduce quality of
burned timber and drop volume 35-90% unless salvage is conducted promptly.
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construction will compound fire-caused to fish habitat through increased sedimentation and loss of stream-side shading causing stream temperatures to rise.
PRODUCTIVITY Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construction will cause increased soil erosion and will remove organic matter/woody material essential for the recovery and
future productivity of the burned areas.
WILDLIFE Environmentalists--Salvage activities will compound
adverse effects of the fire upon wildlife populations (including the northern spotted owl) and their habitats.
Timber--Salvage activities will enhance big-game
habitat and restore badly damaged habitat.
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REFORESTATION Timber--Only full-scale salvage can return burned area
to optimum stocking levels; natural regeneration would lower
sustained yield harvest levels.
ROADLESS AREAS Environmentalists--Entering roadless areas will increase erosion and fragmentation and preclude future wilderness or national park designations in North Kalmiopsis.
Timber--New roads are necessary for salvage/recovery
activities, future fire protection, and recreation, hunting,
and sightseeing.
RECREATION AND VISUAL RESOURCES Environmentalists--Salvage activities would destroy
remoteness, solitude, and scenic value of Bald Mountain area
and would thus preclude highly-valued recreational and
aesthetic opportunities.
Timber--Burn area is an unsightly wasteland and only
full salvage/recovery program will make area fit once again
for recreational usage.
ECONOMICS Environmentalists--Costs of expensive salvage operation will far outweigh revenue that salvaged wood products
will generate, thus costing the Federal government and taxpayers.
Timber--Only full-scale, rather than limited salvage
harvests enough timber to be cost-effective.
-Alternative logging methods such as helicopter
logging are too expensive to be cost-effective.
-Maximum salvage operations are necessary to
maintain jobs, community stability, and local revenue.
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE SCOPE OF THE EIS Environmentalists--The burn area should not be
developed so that the portions of the Siskiyou National
Forest, including the North Kalmiposis, can be designated
the Siskiyou National Park.
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Forest Plan Issues and Concerns1
TIMBER MANAGEMENT Environmentalists--current harvest levels are unsustainable and damaging to forest ecosystem health and biodiversity; harvest levels need to be reduced.
-Unproductive, unsuitable land needs to be removed
from forest land base when calculating the Siskiyou's sustained yield level; much land currently in the forest land
base has soil that is too fragile to allow for harvesting
and successful reforestation.
-Economic criteria, such as whether a sale is belowcost, should be incorporated in management decisions regarding timber harvesting.
Timber--Annual harvest levels need to be increased, or
in the very least maintained, in order to assure a steady
flow timber necessary for local and regional jobs, county
revenue for schools and services, and overall community
stability.
-The forest land base cannot be reduced any further
if there is to be an adequate flow of timber into local
economies; further withdrawals will make the ASQ impossible
to meet and will thus reduce the overall annual output and
lock up high-quality marketable timber.
-certain methods of logging mandated by the Forest
service in given sales (such as helicopter logging, for example) are not cost-efficient.
OLD GROWTH Bnvironmentalists--Old growth forests are a vital component of the forest ecosystem and their protection is necessary to maintain biodiversity, especially as habitat for
old growth-dependent species as well as aesthetic values and
certain recreational opportunities.
Timber--Old growth is overmature, wasteful, and keeps
the sustained yield rate down; converting old growth into
younger, managed stands would boost forest yields.

isome issues mentioned in the EIS that are not relevant
to the forest management issues this study is concerned with
were excluded.
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RESIDUE MANAGEMENT Environmentalists--Disposing of timber harvest wastes,
especially through burning, damages soil productivity by
sterilizing the soil and removing decomposing organic material; it can threaten other resources such as air and water
as well.
Timl:>er--Disposal of wastes is necessary to prevent
catastrophic forest fires and improve yields.
DEPARTURE FROM NON-DECLINING FLOW Environmentalists--Accelerating harvest schedules
and/or shortening rotations would lead to even more unsustainable harvest levels and would seriously damage forest
resources.
Timl:>er--Accelerating harvest schedules and/or shortening rotations is a means by which to fill a projected void
in private timber supplies as well as make up for recent
losses in the forest land base.
WILDLIFE HABITAT Environmentalists--Unsustainable levels of timber
harvest will damage wildlife habitat, especially that of
interior forest-dependent species.
Timl:>er--Logging will open up closed forest environments and create habitat beneficial to a number of big-game
species.
SOILS Environmentalists--Logging activities damage soil
through compaction, erosion, increased landslides, and the
reduction of organic matter; this will, in turn, decrease
soil productivity to the detriment of the entire ecosystem.
SENSITIVE PLANTS Bnvironmentalists--A number of rare, unusual, and
locally occurring plants exist only in the Siskiyou National
Forest and many occupy fragile ecosystems that are not restorable if disrupted by logging activities.
FISHERIES Bnvironmentalists--Logging and road construction will
damage fish habitat and cause declines in fish production in
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one of the most economically valuable fisheries in the
United States.
VISUAL RESOURCES Environmentalists--Logging activities destroy scenic
values which, in turn, precludes recreational opportunities
and hurts the local tourist industry.
Tim.ber--A large number of scenic areas are already
protected; to prevent timber management to protect additional scenic values would require too high a cost in terms of
lost timber volume.
RECREATION Environmentalists--Logging activities irreversibily
alter wild, scenic, and remote areas and thus preclude valuable and increasingly rare recreational opportunities centered around solitude and primitive, unspoiled settings.
Tim.ber--A major portion of the forest is already reserved for primitive recreational opportunities.
WATER Environmentalists--Logging activities can degrade
water quality through increased siltation, water temperature, and possibly other pollutants; changes in vegative
cover and ground water recharge can also adversely affect
the Forest's delicate hydrology, leading to the increased
potential for both drought and flooding.
WILDERNESS AND UNROADED AREAS Environmentalists--Additions to the existing wilderness system should be made or recommended; in the least,
timber harvesting should not occur in unprotected roadless
areas so to not preclude the potential for future congressional wilderness designation.
Tim.ber--Any additions to the already large areas of
protected wilderness on the Siskiyou would further reduce
the forest land base, lock up economically valuable resources, and force reductions in harvest levels.
HARDWOOD CONVERSION Bnvironmentalists--Loss of hardwood forest acreage
through timber harvesting and subsequent conifer reforestation adversely affects wildlife habitat, biodiversity, and
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aesthetic variety; soils and water are also damaged when the
unmarketable hardwoods are disposed through burning.
Timber--Economic benefits gained from converting commercially valueless hardwoods to valuable conifers would
outweigh the wastage of the logged hardwoods.
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE EIS Environmentalists--Herbicide usage for brush control.
-National Park proposals.
Timber--Lifting of protected status of congressionally
designated wilderness areas.

Shasta Costa Project Issues and Concerns
AESTHETIC/ROADLESS VALUES Environmentalists--Logging in the highly scenic Shasta
Costa basin would destroy the aesthetic attributes of this
area, especially along the heavily travelled Bear Camp Road,
the main east-west route through the Forest.
-Logging and road construction would impact upon
the area's wild, unroaded character and thereby preclude opportunities for solitude and various recreational activities.
BIODIVERSITY/ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE Environm.entalists--Logging and road construction would
adversely affect the forest ecosystem and its ability to
sustain itself as well as reduce the diversity of plant and
animal species.
-Fragmentation of old growth stands is especially
injurious to ecosystem sustainability and makes it very difficult to maintain viable populations of old growthdependent species.
-Local issues of forest health are tied into global
environmental concerns such as the issue of global warming.
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COMMODITY OUTPUTS/FOREST PLAN Timl>er--Suf f icient timber output from the Shasta Costa
basin is necessary to maintain local jobs, county revenue
for roads, schools, and services, and overall community
stability.
-Projects employing New Forestry methods in the
basin would feature significantly reduced timber yields and
would thus violate the harvest targets laid out in the Forest Plan and would lead to an eventual reduction in the
Plan's overall ASQ for the entire Forest.
-New Forestry projects would be economically inefficient; timber sales in the basin should stress costeffectiveness and long-term positive cash flow.
WATER QUALITY/FISH HABITAT Environmentalists--Previous logging activities in the
area as well as naturally occurring landslides have already
adversely affected water quality and fish habitat through
sedimentation in portions of Shasta Costa Creek; additional
logging activities would further damage already degraded
parts of the creek and offset the benefits of any stream
restoration efforts.
-Further degradation of Shasta Costa Creek would
damage water quality, appearance, and turbidity on the
National Wild and Scenic Rogue River into which it flows.
The Rogue is a very heavily used recreational river and
damage to it might adversely impact the local tourist/recreational industries.

canyon Project Issues and Concerns
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES Environmentalists--Logging, mining, and road construction in the Canyon area would reduce water quality, especially in the Wild and Scenic Illinois River, by increasing
stream sedimentation and temperature, thereby damaging fish
habitat including that of the Fall Chinook and Coho Salmon
currently listed by the state as sensitive species.
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ECONOMICS/FLOW OF WOOD PRODUCTS Environmentalists--The costs of preparing timber sales
in this difficult, marginal area would exceed revenue.
Timber--Initial preparation costs (i.e. roads) would
be offset by futures sales.
-overall benefits of maintaining steady flow of wood
products from the area is worth the costs; a steady supply
of timber is necessary to generate county revenue and maintain jobs and community stability.
-certain harvest methods designed for maximum resource protection are too costly and remove too low a volume
of timber.
-The timber base on the Forest is shrinking and all
areas destined for harvest in the Forest Plan ought to be
intensively manage~ for maximum timber production.
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL Environmentalists--Logging in the Canyon area may adversely affect northern spotted owl habitat and/or individual spotted owls located in the area.
Timber--canyon is very marginal spotted owl habitat
with an extremely sparse owl population and the area is not
currently listed by the USFWS as critical habitat.
FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY Environmentaiists--Logging and road construction may
adversely affect the very fragile and unique ecosystem of
the canyon area by reducing soil productivity, fragmenting
and removing biologically valuable stands of mature interior
forest habitat, and reducing the diversity of plant and animal species.
-The rate of projected harvest for the Canyon area
is unsustainable and will lead to the breakdown of the forest ecosystem.
Timber--Timber harvesting would increase biological
diversity be creating new types of habitat.
ROADLESS CHARACTER Environmentalists--Logging and road construction in
roadless portions of the Canyon area would alter its natur-
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al, wild character and jeopardize backcountry recreational
opportunities.
-Entering roadless areas would rule out possibility for future wilderness designation, national park status,
or U.N. World Heritage Site status for the area.
Timber--Roads are necessary for more productive timber
management and more cost-efficient logging.
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS Environmentalists--Limits on mining activity.
-Nomination of the canyon area as a U.N. World Heritage Site.
-Scenic and aesthetic values in the canyon area.
-Preventing the spread through roads and logging of
the Port Orford cedar root rot disease.

Quosatana/Bradford Projects Issues and concerns
SCENERY Environmentalists--Logging would destroy the area's
high scenic quality and adversely impact the local Rogue
River-based tourist industry.
WILDLIFE HABITAT Environmentalists--Fragmentation of interior forest
habitat would adversely affect various wildlife species,
especially those dependent upon old growth such as the
northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.
-Logging and road construction might cause the
loss of connective wildlife habitat between the planning
area and the adjacent Kalmiopsis Wilderness.
FISH HABITAT AND WATER QUALITY Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would
adversely impact water quality and consequently fish habitat
through increased siltation, sediment deposition, and
changes in water temperature.
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-Diminished water quality might reduce the Rogue
River's aesthetic quality as well as adversely impact upon
economic sectors (fishing, recreation, and tourism) dependent upon the Rogue.
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY Environmentalists--Conversion of natural forests to
plantations reduces the diversity of plant and animal
species.
-Soil compaction, erosion, and loss of woody debris
may adversely impact upon soil productivity and consequently
forest health.
-Logging would reduce the amount of especially diverse old growth forest.
PORT ORFORD-CEDAR ROOT ROT DISEASE Environmentalists--Road construction and logging
activities would pose a serious risk of introducing Port
Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently uninfected
areas.
GEOLOGICAL STABILITY Environmentalists--Logging increases the potential for
landslides, especially near sensitive riparian areas.
ROADLESS CHARACTER Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would
alter the area's roadless character, preclude future wilderness designation, and adversely affect primitive recreational opportunities.
ECONOMICS Environmentalists--Logging in areas of marginal productivity will lead to expensive reforestation efforts.
-Certain timber sales in the planning area will be
below-cost, money-losing sales.
Timber--Proposed helicopter logging in certain areas
would adversely affect local logging companies which do not
have such capabilities.
- Adequate levels of timber harvesting will provide
important county revenues.
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HARDWOOD CONVERSION Tim.ber--Conversion of hardwood stands to coniferous
plantations is necessary to increase commercial forest base
in order to maintain adequate timber yields.
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS Environmentalists--Additional wilderness designation
for parts of the planning area.
-Global environmental concerns such as global warming.
-Northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet protection.

Two Forks Project Issues and Concerns
INTERIOR HABITAT Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would
reduce habitat for interior forest-dependent wildlife species including old growth species such as the northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.
ROADLESS CHARACTER Environmentalists--Proposed logging and road construction would adversely impact upon the roadless character of
the area and thereby preclude future wilderness designations
in the Windy Valley Roadless Area as well as various recreational and aesthetic opportunities.
LONG-TERM TIMBER YIELD Tim.ber--The proposed action does not truly abide by
the Forest Plan in that it does not harvest and intensively
manage as many acres as the original Plan calls for thereby
reducing future timber yields.
FISH HABITAT Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would
lead to increased sedimentation thereby damaging highqual i ty spawning areas for steelhead and trout in sensitive
areas.
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ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS Environmentalists--Logging would reduce the number of
critical wildlife corridors between larger blocks of forest.
-Logging and road construction would risk spreading Port Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently uninfected areas.

West Indigo Project Issues and Concerns
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would
degrade fish habitat in West Indigo Creek by increasing erosion and stream sedimentation.
ECONOMICS Environmentalists--Some timber sales in the planning
area might be below-cost, money-losing sales.
Timber--A steady flow of timber into the local area is
essential to maintain jobs, county revenue, and community
stability.
INTERIOR HABITAT Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would
fragment mature/old growth forest and adversely impact old
growth and interior forest-dependent species such as the
northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet.
FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY Environmentalists--Logging and road construction might
adversely affect forest ecosystems by disrupting soils, hydrology, nutrient cycles, natural fire activity, and forest
productivity and leading to a reduction in the diversity of
plant and animal species.
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APPENDIX H
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND CATEGORIES AND INDICATOR
VALUES FOR TABLE 17
Table 17 attempts to compare seven Siskiyou National
Forest final and/or draft EIS decisions (as well as one nonEIS decision) in terms of both level of formal participation
and the timber-environmental index, a quantifiable measure
of where a decision stood relative to the timber interests'
and the environmentalists' favored positions.
Level of Formal Participation--This variable measures
the degree to which a given EIS process offered opportunities for formal participation (as opposed to informal calls,
visits, etc.) in the crucial period preceding the release of
the draft EIS. It consists of three categories: low, moderate, and high. Decisions in the low category offered no predraft workshops or public meetings; at most they included
only mail comments. Decisions featuring moderate levels of
participation included pre-draft public meetings and mail
comments, but no workshops. High participation decisions
incorporated all three forms of participation in the predraft stage.
Timber-Environmental Index--This index measures where
the Forest Service's preferred alternative for a given EIS
stands in relation to the timber interests' and the environmentalists' preferred alternatives. The index values fall
between the scores of O which represents the timber interest
position and 1.0 which represents the environmentalist position. The index is calculated as follows with x = timber EIS
alternative, y = environmentalist EIS alternative and z =
Forest Service preferred alternative:

x-zl
lx-y
The specific indicators which are measured by the index (i.e. total harvest volume) vary in some cases from EIS
to EIS. This lack of direct comparability is a serious problem and a major reason this index was designed; it allows
for a more comparable cross-EIS measure. The index is not
foolproof, however, as indicators measuring things that are
just too different might still allow a certain skewing of
the index value to occur.1 It is, therefore, still important

1This was the case with the indicators chosen to measure
water quality and silviculture. They were so completely
disparate from EIS to EIS that even the index value was of
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to choose ind{cators that are as similar as possible. While
specific indicators may vary, they can all be organized into
four broad categories: timber production, road construction,
roadless areas, and old growth (for the specific indicators
themselves, see the following tables).
The summary index value given to each to each EIS
decision in table 17 is calculated as the mean of only the
first four categories listed above. This is because these
categories tended to employ indicators that were consistently the most similar from decision to decision. This
hopefully would avoid skewed index numbers. When a category
consisted of two or more relevant individual indicators, the
mean index value of these indicators was used to obtain the
broader category's index value.2
There is one last note about the index that is important to consider. While the index measures Forest Service
decisions between a scale of O to 1.0, a score of .50 does
not necessarily imply perfect Forest Service balance; only
that its preferred alternative fell exactly halfway between
the range defined by the timber and environmental alternatives. For example, the fact that the agency enters a major
roadless area or stand of old growth but plans to log only
half of what the timber industry wants may not necessarily
represent a balanced decision or a true mid-point compromise. Thus, the index is by no means a perfect measure of
how the Forest Service balances interests and their demands.
It is rather a measure limited by the bounds of the EIS alternatives and the indicators by which the Forest Service
chose to analyze those alternatives. Still, the index can
provide, in the very least, a means by which to compare
various EIS decisions against one another in terms of their
relative leanings.
The Alternatives--The various alternatives upon which
calculation of the index depends are listed, described, and
compared in each EIS. Identifying the DEIS and FEIS preferred alternatives is a straightfoward task--each EIS announces such a preference and as such it constitutes Forest Service policy. Identifying the timber and environmental alternatives, however, is not nearly so simple. The most direct
and certainly most desirable manner by which to determine
which EIS alternative comes closest to each interest's posi-

questionable validity. For this reason, they were left out
of the analysis.
2For example, if the old growth category has two indicators, acres of old growth remaining and acres of mature
interior habitat remaining and their values are .60 and .40
respectively, the overall old growth index value would be
considered .50 when it was figured into the overall EIS
index.
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tion is to find a clear trend in participant support and endorsement for a given alternative in the post-DEIS mail comment that is exerpted, summarized, and in some cases, reproduced in the appendices of all final EISs. Thus, if a clear
majority of comments urge adoption of Alternative A, then an
assumption will be made that that alternative comes closest
to capturing the essence of that interest's positions and
demands.

Occasionally, though, interests voiced clear preferences for alternatives ouside the range of those described
in the EIS. In such cases, the EIS alternative or combination of alternatives that come closest to approximating the
major points of the outside alternative were considered as
that group's alternative. Fortunately, in the few cases
where this happened, there were fairly similar EIS stand-in
alternatives (see the proceeding tables). When more than one
alternative was commonly supported or several were needed to
capture the full essence of an outside alternative, the
timber-environmental index value was figured by taking the
mean of those several alternatives that collectively correspond to a given interest.
Perhaps a more serious problem occurs when attempting
to determine which alternatives match interest positions in
the decisions for which there is only a DEIS document currently available. The problem is that draft EISs do not, of
course, contain information on post-draft comments supporting or opposing the various alternatives. In these cases, a
best guess as to the interest-favored alternative had to be
made based upon the pre-draft issues, concerns, and positions documented in Appendix G as well as previous patterns
and tendencies made evident in other decisions.
Trying to capture the full nature of an interest's
policy desires by matching the interest to an EIS alternative is, admittedly, an imperfect and rather constrained
measure that at best at can only off er a partial approximation of an interest's overall policy orientation (appendix
G's pre-draft issues and concerns perhaps come closer to
achieving this). Still, these alternatives are supposedly
drawn up in accordance with the information gained through
pre-draft public comment and participation and so, at least
indirectly, they reflect the interests' positions to some
extent. Thus, however limited this preferred alternative
approach may be, these alternatives are by no means
arbitrary.

540

Silver Fire Recovery Project1

Timber
Alt.D

Envir. DEIS pref. T-E
FEIS pref.
Alt.J Alt.I
index2 Alt. I -mod.

T-E
index

TIMBER PRODUCTION
salvage volume
241
(nunbf)

0

146

.39

157

.35

ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)

0

20.5

.46

20.0

.47

SUMMARY INDEX
VALUE

38.0

.43

.41

1source: USDA Forest service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental
Imp~ct statement, (Region 10: GPO, 1988).
Timber-Environmental index; O • timber position, 1.0 = environmentalist position.
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Forest Plan 1
Timber
Alts. 2
C.D.Dl

Envir. DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E
Alt.M3 Alt.K
index Alt.S
index

TIMBER PRODUCTION- annual
ASQ (mmbf)

177/170/185
177.3 mean

34

155

.16

162

.11

ROAD CONSTRUCTION
(miles)

308/271/271
289.5 mean'

0

206

.29

228

.21

ROAD LESS
AREAS-acres
retained by 5th
decade (1000s)

69/69/69
69 mean

284

92

.11

126

.27

OLD GROWTH
acres mature/OG
retaineds (1000s)

67/72/72
69.2 mean

190.6

85.7

.14

99.1

.25

% of forest as
17/17.5/16
OG by 5th decade 16.7 mean
(lOOOs)

SUMMARY INDEX
VALUE

32.6

18. 3
C.12

.10
19.1
.:..!!
mean>
C.20 mean)

.17

.20

1 source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Land and Resources Management Plan Final Environmen~al Impact Statement Appendices, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1989)
The majority of timber interest participants supported their
own "Evergreen Alternative" which the Siskiyou N.F. did not specifically develop as an EIS alternative. However the main features of
the "Evergreen Alternative" are featured in Alternatives c,D, and
Dl.
3Many environmentalists also wanted a national park alternative,
but that was ruled out on the basis that it was beyond Forest Servicf jurisdiction.
on those indicators where Alt. D and its quicker rotation variation Dl are the same the mean is calculated counting them as only
a s!nqle value.
outside already protected wilderness areas.
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Shasta Costa Project 1

Timber
Alts. 2
B

Envir. DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E
Alt.A
index Alt.SC
Alt.C
index

TIMBER PRODUCTION
3 yr. harvest
17.5/22.5
volume (mmbf)
20.0 mean

0

11.2

.44

13.4

.33

ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)

6. 23/11. 54
8.89 mean

0

2.47

• 72

5.09

.43

ROADLESS AREAS
t roadless acres
maintained

85/84
84.5 mean

100.0

93.0

.55

92.0

.48

OLD GROWTH
t interior old
growth retained

83/84
83.5 mean

100.0

96.0

.76

90.0

.39

SUMMARY INDEX
VALUE

• 62

.41

1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Reqion, Siskiyou
National Forest, Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource
Projects Final Environmental Impact statement, Volume 1 (Reqion 10:
GPO 1990).
~Some in the timber community merely wanted the Forest Service
to implement the Forest Plan objectives for the basin (Alt. B),
while others wanted maximum harvest.
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canyon Project 1

Timber Envir.
Alt.c Alt.A
TIMBER PRODUCTION
2 yr. harvest
volume (mmbf)

DEIS pref.
Alts.E.PA2

T-E FEIS pref. T-E
index Alt.S
index

16.5

0

6.2/10.7
8.5 mean

.49

9.0

.45

ROAD CONSTRUCTION (miles)

7.9

0

0.4/7.3
3.9 mean

.51

4.0

.49

ROADLESS AREAS
acres harvested
in roadless areas

323

0

34/247
140,5 mean

.57

240

.26

OLD GROWTH
acres OG retained

66

141

141/66
103.5 mean

.so

141

1.00

acres owl habitat
retained

1610

2187

1982/1748
1865 mean

.44

1859

.43

acres interior
mature forest
retained

1908

3137

2119/2299
2209 mean

di

1928

SUMMARY INDEX
VALUE

1source: USDA Forest
National Forest, Canyon
men~al Impact Statement
In the Canyon DEIS,
preferred alternatives.

.39 mean

.49

&1.

.48 mean

.42

Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
Integrated Resource Project Final Environ(Region 10: GPO, 1992).
the Forest Service identified two different
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Quosatana/Bradford Projects 1

Timber
Alts.D.E

Envir.
Alt.A

TIMBER PRODUCTION
3 yr. harvest
volume (mmbf)

19.4/28.2
23.8 mean

0

18.55

.22

ROAD CONSTRUCTION
(miles)

5.23/10.61
7.92 mean

0

3.97

.so

ROADLESS AREAS
acres harvested
in roadless areas

471/587
529 mean

0

294

.44

0

0.20

road construction in
roadless areas (miles)

OLD GROWTH-acres
interior mature/OG
forest retained
% area in mature/
old growth forest

SUMMARY INDEX VALUE

1. 69/5. 93

3.81 mean

DEIS pref.
Alt.F

T-E
index

~

.70 mean

1676/1605
1640.5 mean
35/33
34 mean

2396

2212

.76

39

35

.20
.48 mean
.48

1source: USDA Forest service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Resource Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10:
GPO, 1992).
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Two Forks Project 1

Timber
Alt.B
TIMBER PRODUCTION
2 yr. harvest
volume (mmbf)

Envir.
Alt.A

DEIS pref.
Alt.F

T-E
index

20.0

0

13.8

.31

5.4

0

5.2

• 04

ROAD LESS AREAS-acres
road less area retained

10566

11484

9558

<0.00

road construction in
roadless areas (miles)

3.04

0

3.04

o.oo

12220

13374

12085

ROAD CONSTRUCTION
(miles)

OLD GROWTH-acres
interior mature/CG
habitat retained
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE

<0.00

.o8 2

1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Reqion, Siskiyou
National Forest, Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft
Env~ronmental Impact statement (Siskiyou National Forest: 1992).
Index values less than o.oo are counted as o.oo when calculatinq the summary index.
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West Indigo Project1

Timber
Alt.E

Envir.
Alt.A

DEIS pref.
Alts.D.G2

T-E
index

TIMBER PRODUCTION
harvest volume (mmbf)

28.6S

0

16.0/10.6S
13.3 mean

.S3

ROAD CONSTRUCTION
(miles)

13.6

0

9.7/4.S
7.1 mean

.47

OLD GROWTH-acres
interior mature/old
growth retained

2428

343S

2726/3087
2906.S mean

.48

acres total old
growth retained

3367

3883

3S88/3682
363S mean

SUMMARY INDEX VALUE

~

.so mean
.so

1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou
National Forest, West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft
Env~ronmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992).
In the West Indigo DEIS, the Forest Service identified two preferred alternatives.
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Surrmary Index Values
Silver Fire DEIS •••.•••••• .43
Silver Fire FEIS •••••••••• .41
Forest Plan DEIS •••••••.•

o

•17

Forest Plan FEIS ..•••••..• .20
Shasta Costa DEIS ••••••••• •62
Shasta Costa FEIS ••••••••• .41
Can.yon DEIS . .............. .49
Carlyon FEIS . ·e • • • • • • • • • • • • •

.42

Quosatana/Bradford DEIS ••. . 48
Two

Forks DEIS .. o•••······ 008

West Indigo DEIS •••••••••. .50
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